

PART ONE

Russian Fundamentals

Part One addresses four primary areas that set the context for Russian tactical actions. Chapter 1 presents Russia's strategic setting and introduces national capabilities that impact the tactical fight to help set the context for actions of the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation (Сухопутные войска Российской Федерации— Sukhoputnyye voyska Rossiyskoy Federatsii— SVRF shortened to SV in this document), discussed in subsequent chapters. Chapter 2 describes the historical basis of the current Russian military: its doctrine and concepts, current structure, and integration of joint capabilities. Chapter 3 focuses on battlefield task organization for defensive and offensive actions using "New Look" formations to perform standardized battle drills.

Chapter 1

Russian Strategic Overview

This chapter is an overview of the fundamental conditions that contextualize the Russian Federation, its military, and its actions in an operational environment (OE). It examines Russia's relations with the United States and projects Russia's approach to exploiting conditions of the environment to yield a strategic advantage. It also introduces national capabilities that support military operations, both during competition and conflict.

RUSSIA IN COMPETITION

1-1. From the time of Peter the Great in the 17th and early 18th centuries to the present day, Russia has sought what it perceives is its rightful place as a world power. This drive is a result of Russia's geopolitical insecurity and a strategic culture and worldview influenced by the size of its territory, length of its borders, and a perception of military encirclement. As a major European power starting in the 18th century and for nearly three hundred years afterward, Russia was a dominant regional and global power. In 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia experienced a significant setback and has struggled with finding its new role in the international community.

1-2. Russia's policy statements, including the 2021 National Security Strategy, provide a glimpse into Russian leader's vision for its role. While the Security Strategy is like the one announced in 2015, the tenor of the revised document is stronger, revealing Russia's view of deteriorating relations with the West. For the foreseeable future, this position sets the tone for all Russian national actions and for any interaction with the United States, NATO, and the West.

1-3. Russia's relations with the United States are defined by a perpetual state of competition and self-interest. While there are instances of positive interaction on discrete programs, the relations between Russia and the United States remain predominantly competitive. Today's rivalry can be traced back as far as the 1918–1920 Allied invasion of Russia at Archangel and Vladivostok, which included U.S. troops, during the

Russian Revolution. Even after the U.S. alliance with the Soviet Union during the Second World War, both countries quickly returned to a competitive stance during the Cold War. Actions during the Cold War up to the present set an enduring tone of competition and confrontation between Russia and the United States.

1-4. During the Cold War, the rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union escalated and ultimately resulted in massive efforts to undermine and compete with one another. The eventual breakup of the Soviet Union and a turn toward democracy did not resolve this, but rather it paved the way for a new phase of competition and conflict that provides fodder for negative Russian narratives about the United States' role on the international stage. Today, substantial sectors of the Russian population and political structure consider the United States to be the primary cause of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This inherent distrust of the United States and Russia's expanding rivalry with other European countries have exacerbated Russia's distrust of the U.S.-led liberal world order that embraces collective security, economic openness, and social progress.

1-5. Russia's 2021 National Security Strategy holds that Russia's policy pursuits are being restrained by a Western containment strategy via diplomatic, informational, military, and economic methods meant to continue Western dominance. The Security Strategy is complemented by its Information Security Doctrine, and a military doctrine that tasks its armed forces and other security services with defeating aggression against Russia and creating conditions favorable to Russian interests.

Note. The Russian National Security Strategy and other military publications serve as the basis for use of the term “aggressor” throughout this ATP. While Russia does use other terms such as “enemy” or “threat,” its underlying security vision sees aggressors using direct and indirect methods to undermine and destroy the nation.

RUSSIAN STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

1-6. Russia pursues a global strategy driven by a desire to once again be recognized as a world power. Its foreign policy stratagems will endure beyond the current leaders, and it is highly likely that future Russian leaders will pursue these policies for the foreseeable future, given its institutionalization throughout the Kremlin and other bureaucracies. As a world power, Russia believes it can provide stability for countries on its periphery, particularly the former Soviet states, and influence international policy and law away from the liberal international system of the West. To achieve this end state, Russia will give priority to the following strategic objectives: maintaining regional dominance, ensuring protection and security of its national interests as well as the current regime, countering foreign interference, and recognition as a global power.

REGIONAL DOMINANCE

1-7. Russia's quest for regional dominance is a longstanding characteristic of its foreign policy and directly related to its perception of encirclement and containment efforts from the West. Russia believes that maintaining regional dominance will preserve its ability to exert influence in its “near-abroad”—Russia's term for former Soviet states and other nearby countries. Russia views influence in this region as an effective buffer against potential aggressors and justifies any associated military engagements as purely strategic defensive actions, designed to maintain its bulwark against aggressors.

PROTECTION AND SECURITY

1-8. Russia's aspirations to have a more significant role on both regional and global stages are underpinned by an essential requirement to ensure protection and security of national interests. Policy and doctrine documents highlight domestic and foreign concerns, and the Russian military is tasked with ensuring these concerns do not impact the country's desired end state. As an element of national power, Russia openly modernizes and wields its military and nuclear capabilities as a deterrent to aggressors. Russia is emphasizing the development of structure, composition, and size, as well as improved technologies for these capabilities to engage anticipated internal and external threats.

COUNTERING FOREIGN INTERFERENCE

1-9. Russia's entire approach to international affairs is driven by the perspective that others are deliberately working to counter its efforts. It views NATO and the United States as the worst perpetrators of this interference and plans for the inevitable requirement to counter that interference. Notably, Russian policy and doctrine allow for both reactionary and preemptive actions, across all elements of national power, to protect its national interests.

RECOGNITION AS A WORLD POWER

1-10. All these objectives contribute to Russia's drive to achieve world power status, an end-state it views as necessary to shape the global environment and shift international policy and law away from the current U.S.-led system. To achieve this objective, Russia will continue its efforts to grow its international standing as a foil to the United States, NATO, and the liberal international system. These include forging key strategic partnerships in regions of the world where the United States lacks a strong foothold and providing political, economic, and military support to regimes friendly to Russia, all the while exploiting and manipulating the information environment to its advantage.

1-11. Russia's national policy statements and doctrine indicate a readiness and willingness to intervene in any international crisis it sees as relevant to its national interests. Russia emphasizes the importance of the diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of national power in recognition of its limited military power projection capabilities. Russia's sophistication in the application of soft power, particularly in the area of information, allows it to seize opportunities to gain strategic objectives. It does use its military capabilities to support sophisticated information operations that focus engagements with the West. Russia continues making progress in upgrading and reforming its military power to expand deterrence and security, however its nuclear arsenal remains its essential military guarantor in safeguarding the nation.

STRATEGIC SETTING

1-12. Russia approaches international relations in a deliberate and opportunistic manner. It perceives that the United States is weakening and forecasts a shift in power distribution that would result in more equal power sharing between the United States and rising powers like China and Russia. To capitalize on this perception, Russia, for the foreseeable future, will continue to seize on global opportunities to achieve situational advantage to further its strategic objectives and to confront the United States in the diplomatic, military, economic, and information domains. Russia will combine this approach with its long-established stratagem of competition and confrontation with the United States and NATO in the states on the periphery of its borders.

1-13. Conditions will enable Russia to compete with the United States and other Western nations, as well as to create opportunities for Russia to achieve a competitive advantage against its rivals. Paragraphs 1-17 through 1-25 describe key considerations about Russia's influence and exploitation of the future environment:

1-14. Russia's analysis of how the United States fights and its own experience in recent conflicts lead it to the understanding that information management is critical for successful actions. Russia uses information manipulation, deceptions, and disruption to achieve information dominance during competition and conflict. It also continues enhancement of automation of the command and control (C2) process coupled with integration of its military complexes to provide real-time battlefield visibility and awareness.

1-15. Russia will manipulate the objective reality favorable to its opponents to create a subjective reality favorable to itself. To accomplish this, it will employ reflexive control methods and use deception and influence to manipulate the perceptions of an "aggressor." Reflexive control is a methodology initiated by the Soviets in the 1960s. In plain terms, it is a process of transmitting cunningly designed information to the aggressor which will cause it to willingly make decisions beneficial to the Russians. Russia sees its actions as successful when it achieves cognitive dominance over its targets and leaders of aggressor states voluntarily make decisions favorable to Russia.

1-16. Russia will actively challenge the relative position of U.S. influence in the global order while avoiding direct confrontation with the U.S. military. Russia seeks to integrate its military, technological, information, diplomatic, economic, cultural, and other powers to achieve its strategic goals. Through integration of these

methods and collaboration with its regional partners. Russia will create situations in which U.S. power is severely constrained. By using nonmilitary elements of power short of armed conflict during competition with the West it will avoid direct conflict with the United States but will still act to counter U.S. interests whenever it is to Russia's advantage to do so. This approach will be constrained by Russia's economic, demographic, and technical limitations.

1-17. An expanding spectrum of contentious issues will continue fueling future competition and conflict between Russia and the West. The number and intensity of friction points—some enduring and others new—will increase competition between Russia and the West and possibly bring them closer to overt conflict. Russia will continue to compete with the West for nuclear and missile supremacy, while newer theaters of competition open or intensify in the Arctic. That competition and conflict will take new and very different forms involving all domains and elements of national power.

1-18. Russia will continue to fight while maintaining deniability. Russia gains plausible deniability and a degree of diplomatic cover in carrying out proxy wars using criminal and militant groups, or special operations troops and other military or paramilitary forces (such as the Wagner Group and other aligned private military contractors). Russia will continue to use these proxies with covert conventional forces to achieve outcomes that would otherwise be untenable in the strategic arena. These actions allow Russia to further its objective of improving its world power status while avoiding direct military conflict with U.S. and NATO military forces.

1-19. Scientific and technological progress will provide Russia and its surrogates' militaries with increased precision, speed, range, adaptability, survivability, and effectiveness. Russia will continue to seek technologies that improve these characteristics to achieve overmatch using both developments from the civilian sector as well as direct military advances. It will continue using specific niche weapons systems, such as hypersonic missiles; unmanned aerial vehicles; precision-guided artillery; electromagnetic warfare; directed-energy weapons; and unmanned aircraft, vehicles, marine craft, and systems, directed at perceived U.S. vulnerabilities.

1-20. Russia will expand its capabilities to operate in and influence urban environments that are increasingly interconnected. The rapidly growing interconnection of economic and information systems will link populations at the individual level. Russia's use of information warfare (IV) will allow it to exploit these conditions.

1-21. Russia has less restrictive rules of engagement regulating competition and conflict than does the United States. Using unconventional methods, it will avoid condemnation and sanction by other nations during competition. As a result, use of proxy forces, information confrontation (IPb), or cyber-attacks in the competitive domains of land, air, maritime, space, and information will be more common than open military confrontation. In military conflicts, Russia actively plans for and practices the use of nuclear, chemical, and flame weapon fires at the strategic to tactical levels.

Note. Distinctions between the Russian categories of information confrontation (информационное противоборство—*informatsionnyye protivoborstvo*—IPb) and information warfare (информационная война—*informatsionnaya voyna*—IV) are debated within official Russian references. Information confrontation is presented in this ATP but the primary focus for tactical actions will be on information warfare.

1-22. Russia will exploit trends such as its youth, increased urbanization along major bodies of water, and technological advancements. While these trends do not define the entire list, their convergence will result in regional and international turbulence that Russia will likely exploit to its advantage. Other naturally occurring conditions, such as natural disasters, extreme weather events, and their second- and third-order effects will have significant impacts on an OE due to resulting competition and conflict between Russia and other nations.

1-23. Russia likely will target vulnerable countries or regions strategically important to achieving its objectives. Such areas with divided populations, especially those with ethnic Russians living in them, are the most vulnerable to Russian exploitation. Other areas with critical natural resources or those considered locations of strategic importance will also be of interest to Russia.

1-24. Russia will seek to contest the global commons. The global commons—the Earth's domains or areas that no one state controls, but on which all rely, such as oceans, atmosphere, and orbital space—will be increasingly contested in the future. Land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains will continue to be targeted by Russia to achieve its objectives.

1-25. All these factors will create conditions U.S. forces must be prepared to encounter when conducting multi-domain operations against Russia or a Russian proxy force. Russia will use all its instruments of national power in an integrated campaign to further its strategic goals and objectives. It will direct, control, and integrate the actors and actions that impact tactical-level U.S. forces from the Russian national strategic level.

RUSSIA'S OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-26. Russia's perception of an OE is characterized by a sense of strategic vulnerability and a desperate desire for great power status. It harbors concerns about its population over the potential for unrest caused by the general dissatisfaction with the standard of living and is entirely untrusting of the United States and its Western European allies. Russia seeks to insulate itself from the United States and its allies by creating a sphere of influence in its near-abroad in the former Soviet states and is working to become more cooperative with countries outside of Europe. The following conditions are presented using eight interrelated operational variables which are political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time, collectively referred to as PMESII-PT serve as a descriptive overview of Russia's understanding of its OE.

POLITICAL

1-27. To maintain the current operational environment, current Russian leaders in power must continue to achieve the nations' strategic goals:

- Integration of all elements of national power-political, cultural, economic (including energy), military, diplomatic, and IV are necessary to succeed in competition and conflicts.
- Domestic policies emphasize the importance of strategic nuclear force and conventional military capability to counter perceived threats.
- Domestic and foreign policies to maintain a strategic sphere of influence, or buffer zone, between Russia and NATO countries.
- Foreign policy efforts are expanding Russia's influence beyond its near-abroad. Russia is actively involved in the Middle East and Africa, working to establish domination in the Arctic, and joining cooperative agreements in Asia. It also continues to develop its strategic relationship and cooperation with China.
- Russia retains permanent member status on United Nations Security Council, enabling it to effectively counter attempts by this organization or many other international organizations to act against Russian interests.

MILITARY

1-28. Russia's National Defense Strategy focuses on the following principles to counter possible United States' and their European Allies' aggressions to Russian Territories:

- A modern and effective military is essential to providing Russian security and to achieving world power status.
- Modern nuclear forces and means from strategic to tactical levels are essential elements of Russia's military power.
- Modernization efforts are a priority for all areas of the military, including nuclear, air, maritime, and land power.
- Capabilities development is focused on improving precision fires, anti-tank, and high mobility systems.
- Integration of military capabilities using automated command and control complexes to prevent aggressor's access to Russia's periphery are a priority for expansion.

ECONOMIC

1-29. Russia's economic policies focus on the following:

- Economic strength is necessary to not only fuel the other elements of national power but also to attain or retain status as a world power. Economic considerations influence or direct political actions.
- Economic policies target exploitation of domestic natural resources (for example, hydrocarbons, minerals, fisheries), including those found in the Arctic.
- Export and trade controls are a means to influence or coerce other European countries.
- Power generation, military materiel, and technical expertise are key economic commodities.

SOCIAL

1-30. Russian leaders rely heavily on ensuring its social construct aligns with their strategic goals:

- Support of the Russian population is essential to maintain the nation and to achieve great power status. Russian leaders view the threat of hybrid warfare used to create internal unrest in the form of a popular revolution as a significant threat.
- Russian culture creates a strong basis to oppose Western liberal policies and initiatives.
- The ethnic Russian diaspora is a legitimate resource used to support national objectives.
- The Russian Orthodox Church has a key role to play in establishing social and military conditions in Russia.

INFORMATION

1-31. Russia's operational environment relies heavily on controlling information:

- Russia views the information environment of utmost importance for both its domestic and foreign policy efforts.
- Russian overt and covert efforts to control the information environment and manipulate perceptions of reality will continue to target its domestic population as well as aggressors.
- Confrontations and conflicts may be won primarily—or even exclusively—by using IPb or warfare. Information actions ultimately focus on defeating a competitor's will to fight.

INFRASTRUCTURE

1-32. Russia continues to improve infrastructure with the following considerations in mind:

- Development efforts are focused on military equipment storage sites to facilitate brigade, division, and army deployment.
- Construction and maintenance of underground facilities to protect the nation's leaders and strategic forces around Moscow will continue.
- Russia's size causes it to emphasize maintenance and improvement of its interior lines of communication, primarily rail, to facilitate rapid movement of military forces.
- Efforts to develop new contracts to build nuclear power facilities outside of Russia further Russian influence and status.
- Development of the coastal city of Kaliningrad as well as the Kaliningrad Oblast is ongoing to mitigate the effects of changing sea levels.

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

1-33. Russia's large land mass poses a variety of challenges within its operational environment:

- Russia must capitalize on the effects of climate change to exploit the Arctic region before its competitors do the same.
- Russia's vast border dictates that it requires military forces that can rapidly deploy in response to a wide variety of threats.

- Military complexes must be designed to operate in areas with numerous water obstacles and Arctic conditions.

TIME

- 1-34. Russia understands the importance of swift actions and strategic patience to achieve its strategic goals:
 - The Kremlin recognizes the timing complications that the United States faces due to the deployment distances involved to bring land forces to bear in the event of a conflict.
 - Russia looks to take advantage of NATO's decision-making process, which often requires consensus and can be time consuming.
 - Russia's political leaders understand that IPb takes time to develop and becomes more effective by directing the same or related messages at the target population through various channels over an extended period.
 - Russia has demonstrated the ability to employ unconventional means (proxy forces, IPb, or cyber-attacks) over an extended period to undermine U.S. interests and shape potential future battlefields in their favor.

Chapter 2

Russian Military Overview

This chapter focuses on the historical background and basis of the Russian military. It also reviews the military doctrine and thought that directs the evolution of the military. It presents the factors that influence the latest organizational restructuring of Russia's security and military forces, as well as national-level integration of forces and means to accomplish strategic goals and objectives.

NATIONAL LEVEL SUPPORT TO MILITARY OPERATIONS

2-1. The advent of what has been dubbed New Generation Warfare, or 6th Generation Warfare, has ushered in a host of new concepts resulting in an updated Russia military doctrine. Russia's doctrinal evolution greatly influences future conflicts down to the tactical level. To set favorable conditions in an operational environment Russia relies on the integration of national level capabilities to attain strategic advantage.

2-2. The military philosopher Sun Tzu first highlighted the ability to destroy an aggressor's will to resist without battle as a sign of military prowess. Russia's evolving concept of warfare wholeheartedly embraces this idea. Russia's warfare concept demonstrates a growing capability in its approach to warfare, rather than focusing the traditional elements of warfare—materiel and organization—Russia now emphasizes psychological and IV. Russia's perception that there is little, or no separation of peace and conflict resulted in the evolution of Russia's understanding of warfare. Every action it takes across its diplomatic, information, military, and economic elements of power is specifically calculated to achieve effects in what it sees as psychological battlespace. This approach to warfare, developed from analysis of Western military actions, shows Russia's materiel approach to warfare will rely on the effects of precision targeting and massed fires as well as the type of IV embodied in previous descriptions of New Generation Warfare.

2-3. Russia believes that to win any future conflict, it must dominate in IPb, harness the population to support its operations, and use integrated strikes to defeat any aggressor. These characteristics, taken together, form the current Russian concept of warfare as primarily focused on the political will of an aggressor. These concepts have been central to Russia's military reorganization and prioritization of future capabilities development, and they have been particularly impactful on the SV. Modernization efforts for the SV focus on creating a force that can capitalize on national assets, such as those that set the conditions in the social and information environments, and on increasing its competence with precision reconnaissance and targeting coupled with weapon systems with significant improvements.

2-4. Military doctrine complements this modernization by accounting and planning for the contributions of national-level actions as part of a Russian integrated campaign. While national-level actions impact and are often conducted at a tactical level, they are rarely, if ever, controlled by tactical-level commanders. Should the United States find itself embroiled in conflict with Russia, it will be confronted in a tactical fight with efforts to dominate the information environment, proxies working among the population on behalf of Russia, and the presence of precision strike capabilities on the battlefield.

Note. Russia's emphasis on precision fires capabilities, referred to as Russia's "Strike" capability, is discussed in chapter 5.

INFORMATION SUPERIORITY

2-5. Russia recognizes that domination of the information environment prior to and during combat is critical to successful operations. Information warfare consists of information-technical or information-psychological

actions. Information-technical actions employ physical means to manipulate or attack information reliability while information-psychological means concentrate on the individual or population perception of the information.

2-6. Russia categorizes information actions into two groups: IPb and IV. These groups encompass hostile actions in which information is a tool, a target, or a domain. Primarily IPb involves covert measures employed by Russia during ongoing competition prior to and during large-scale war. Information warfare focuses on those aggressive actions in the information environment, including electromagnetic warfare, that support SV combat actions. Strategic and operational IV units integrate with tactical formations to perform actions that support tactical units and subunits.

2-7. Efforts to dominate the information environment are not limited to periods of war; rather, Russia conducts IPb throughout competition, crisis, and conflict. During competition, Russia uses IPb to protect its forces and populace against adverse information, to degrade aggressor capabilities, and to set the conditions in the OE. The protection measures are continuous and transition into the initial period of conflict when military forces become employed. Active IV attacks may begin in the initial period of conflict and continue into large-scale war. National-level information campaigns continue in support of Russian strategic objectives while the SV employs integrated IV actions in support of all combat actions.

2-8. Russia's IV means are combined systematically and continuously to target the aggressor's political will to wage war and its decision-making processes. Russia uses a host of methods to accomplish information dominance: propaganda, counterpropaganda, deception, deflection, provocations, reflexive control, disinformation, and psychological pressure. These multiple forms of information manipulation and attack present a believable compilation of information and corroborating evidence, as a deception, that guides decisions that seem to be reasoned and correct to an aggressor but support Russian goals. Russian reflexive control manipulates information and other forms of sensory presentation so that apparently true data obtained by the IV target is mutually supporting misinformation.

2-9. Russia also uses electromagnetic warfare methods that allow an aggressor the freedom to continue its use of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), and that do not cause suspicions of intrusion; this is enabled by Russian deception or disruption practices. Russian protection and security measures ensure the actual situation, and its IV manipulation are not uncovered. At designated times, key information-gathering and -transmitting nodes will be disrupted or destroyed using jamming or spoofing and are designed to combine with other IV means to provide false electromagnetic signatures or incorrect targeting data.

2-10. Russia includes several elements under the IV umbrella: computer network operations, psychological operations, strategic communications, influence, intelligence, counterintelligence, disinformation, electromagnetic warfare, disruption of communications, jamming or spoofing navigation systems, destruction of aggressor computer and network capabilities, and various deception/denial (*maskirovka*). Russian *maskirovka* employs camouflage, deception, denial, subversion, sabotage, espionage, propaganda, and psychological operations, to degrade or deny an aggressor's ability to fully understand and adequately respond to the OE situation. All the different elements in the information environment are treated as a coordinated whole under the heading of IV.

2-11. Russia may employ IV methods or tools from both civilian and military sources and from assets of third-party actors. Tools for waging IV can include but are not limited to: Conventional physical and electromagnetic destruction means, malicious software, denial-of-service attacks, manipulation on the Internet, manipulation of the media, manipulation of public opinion, exploitation of communication networks and employment of various types of reconnaissance, espionage, and eavesdropping technologies.

2-12. The types of IV do not exist in isolation from one another and are not mutually exclusive. The overlapping of functions, means, and targets requires that they all be integrated into a single, integrated IV plan. However, effective execution of IV does not necessarily involve the use of all elements concurrently. In some cases, one element may be all that is required to successfully execute an IV action. Nevertheless, using one element or sub-element, such as camouflage, does not by itself necessarily constitute an application of IV.

RUSSIAN PROXY FORCES

2-13. Russia regularly uses, and will continue to use, proxy forces (private military companies, separatist forces in areas of frozen conflict, allies, and partners) to achieve success in conflicts and throughout the competition period. Russia's use of proxy forces provides it an umbrella of plausible deniability and enables it to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic goals that it otherwise might not. These forces, that may not be controlled by Russian tactical commanders, have significant influence on the tactical battlefield and provide Russia the added advantage of undermining Western tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. The United States is most likely to encounter three forms of Russian proxies: local militant (separatist) groups, private military companies, and criminal organizations.

Militant Groups

2-14. Russia typically uses local militant groups in its near-abroad to influence local conditions to shift a conflict to benefit Russian strategic interests. These groups have historically been composed of regular Russian soldiers, Russian mercenaries, criminals, local pro-separatist groups, Russian right-wing extremists, Russian nationalists and communists, soccer hooligans, motorcycle gangs, and deserters from the local (non-Russia) army and security services. These groups may conduct independent or coordinated actions separate from or in concert with Russian military or security forces. Under these conditions, these groups can capably pressure the local governments to aid Russian activities and provide political cover for Russia's attempt to control its near-abroad.

Private Military Companies

2-15. Russia has a history of employing private military companies (PMCs) or security forces that dates to the tsar's use of Cossacks in the 18th century for internal security and actions on Russia's periphery. Individuals employed by PMCs may be recognized as mercenaries by the international community. The traditional international definition of a mercenary is a person that fights for monetary gain rather than loyalty to a particular nation and that is indifferent to issues of legality. While Russian law prohibits the use of mercenaries, Russian PMCs' continued involvement in conflicts in Syria and some African nations indicate the use of PMCs is something Russia will continue.

2-16. There is a close connection between the Russian government and some PMCs. For example, one of the foremost PMCs trains its personnel at a Russian military-intelligence special operations force training center. Still others, while perhaps lacking in access to the facilities as described above, are closely aligned with the Kremlin's agenda and their command-and-control system mirrors that of the Russian ground forces (SV). In many of their overseas operations, PMCs have trained with and conducted actions that support the Russian Ministry of Defense as well as being equipped in a manner akin to the SV. PMCs have employed tanks, multiple rocket launchers, air defense systems, and artillery with success. As they do not officially represent Russia, the PMCs can adopt any organization, equipment, or uniform as they attempt to blend in with the local forces.

Criminal Organizations

2-17. Transnational criminal organizations play a large role in persistent conflict. Organized crime is deeply rooted in Russian society and is likely a major tool of Russian statecraft. Several countries on Russia's periphery and across the world accuse Russia of using criminal activity to undermine control of their countries. Russia has used, and will likely continue to use, organized criminal networks as a geopolitical weapon. It has used such networks to support separatist actions throughout Eastern Europe, including arming pro-Russian separatist groups. Criminal organizations have formed part of the pro-Russian separatist forces, in many cases making them indistinguishable from separatists.

2-18. Russian criminal organizations, assisted by Russian intelligence specialists, are known to work together with local political activists, fringe political parties, and powerful oligarchs. Their actions can support Russian political campaigns and objectives designed to undermine the power of local governments.

THE MILITARY'S ROLE

2-19. Russia's 2021 National Strategy sets the framework to achieve national interests by prioritizing its goals and objectives for security. The following national actions are emphasized: strengthening the country's defense, ensuring political and social stability, economic modernization, preserving and developing Russian culture, and strengthening Russia's status as a leading world power. Of these actions, the military is tasked with the first and last, respectively strengthening the country's defense and strengthening Russia's status as a leading world power.

2-20. Russia's expectations for the military's role in executing these actions is found in its military doctrine, the most recent of which was published in 2014. Notably, doctrine allows for expansive military involvement in prevention and deterrence activities as well as calls for protection of peoples and activities abroad. Below is a summary of the specified tasks from the latest revision to Russian doctrine:

- Protect national sovereignty.
- Ensure strategic (nuclear and non-nuclear) deterrence, including the prevention of military conflicts.
- Maintain combat-ready strategic nuclear forces, their support units, and facilities.
- Provide timely warning of an air or space domain attack as well as notification of military risks and military threats.
- Maintain combat readiness of the Armed Forces, and other troops and bodies.
- Defend air and space domain critical ground facilities as well as maintain readiness to counterattacks from the air and space domains.
- Deploy and maintain space vehicles to support the activities of the Armed Forces.
- Protect and defend important state and military facilities.
- Build new military infrastructure facilities—as well as modernize and develop existing ones, of the Armed Forces and other troops and bodies.
- Protect Russian citizens abroad from armed attack.
- Participate in peacekeeping operations to restore peace, eliminate threats, and suppress acts of aggression in accordance with international law.
- Combat piracy and ensure safety of navigation and security of economic activities on the high seas.
- Combat domestic terrorism and suppress international terrorist activities.
- Participate in domestic law enforcement activities and emergency management to ensure public security and restoration of post-emergency services.
- Protect national interests in the Arctic region.

2-21. The 2014 doctrine highlights areas of particular concern for Russia, identifying military risks and threats expected to be encountered by Russian forces. Among these is an expected build-up of power among NATO countries, destabilization in some states and regions, deployment of aggressor militaries in the vicinity of Russian interests, existence of strategic missile systems, and growth in separatist and extremist groups in some regions of the world. The use of information technologies and subversive techniques and organizations—to target Russian interests politically and militarily—is also listed.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN RUSSIAN MILITARY

2-22. The Russian military, while much smaller than its Soviet predecessor, has significantly expanded its capabilities in IV, prioritized acquisition, and development of technology to better enable its fires assets, and increased its efforts to professionalize its enlisted ranks. New formations like the (Батальонная Тактическая Группа - battalion tactical group or BTG) have also appeared; however, even during the Soviet period military actions involved the task organization of troops for battlefield missions. The Soviet view of the battlefield was linear with forces connected on both flanks. The new Russian assessment is that, because of the devastating effects of precision weapons, battlefields will be dispersed and nonlinear with brigades and divisions defending in separate actions or launching attacks on separate avenues. Russian tactics are a result of a combination of innovations and a continuation of past Soviet practices.

2-23. Russian analysis of both its own performance and the United States' performance in recent conflicts has led to a significant restructuring and reorganization of the Russian military to capably compete against potential aggressors. Years of budget constraints, personnel shortages, and training deficiencies were highlighted by Russian combat performance in 1994 to 1995 in Chechnya and 2008 in Georgia. These conflicts highlighted a requirement to reorganize and modernize Russian military forces to create the forces necessary to conduct 6th Generation Warfare and meet Russia's strategic and doctrinal mandates.

2-24. After a sub-par performance in Chechnya and Georgia, Russian leaders realized that much of the military's ground troops were understaffed, poorly trained, ill equipped, and inadequately led. With these factors as motivation, the Russian political and military leaders used the analysis of Western military forces to identify strengths and weaknesses of those forces and warfighting methods to develop new organizations and formations. The results of that analysis precipitated the reorganization of Russia's military as shown in figure 2-1.

Figure 2-1. Russian Ministry of Defense forces

2-25. Russia labeled its reorganization concept the "New Look." The concept's primary object is to exploit the perceived weaknesses of Western forces and minimizing exposure of the ground forces to direct combat with those forces unless battlefield overmatch is achieved. Russian leaders stated that information dominance in all spheres, as a main tenet of the concept, was necessary to engage future aggressors. This motivated developments in new reconnaissance, electromagnetic warfare, and automated command-and-control complexes, among others.

2-26. The New Look concept incorporated several goals:

- Elimination of mass mobilization by creation of permanent readiness units.
- End all cadre units.
- Transition from an army-division-regiment structure to an army-brigade structure.
- Increased leader and soldier professionalism.

2-27. New Look evolution launched a massive re-armament program, including the establishment of "permanently ready forces" that caused significant force reorganization and revamping the personnel staffing practices of field units manned by professional voluntary contract soldiers (контрактник - kontraktnik). Inadequately manned Russian divisions and regiments were restructured into separate combined arms brigades. Before long, however, Russia re-established the divisional/regimental structure, in a limited manner, to improve its span of control in some military districts based on the most likely threat. It also opted to preserve many of its separate combined arms brigades. Both divisions and separate brigades are subordinate under a combined arms or tank army (TA).

2-28. Russian analysis of recent conflicts resulted in the requirement for ground troops capable of independent actions against modern aggressors. The desired end state is a combined-arms force capable of conducting short, high-intensity campaigns during the initial period of war to achieve Russia's objectives. To accomplish this the Russian leaders defined the components of the new force:

- Smaller combined-arms formations, based on brigades and BTGs, capable of launching and sustaining combat in a high-intensity environment.
- Use of all elements, including irregular forces, to create the conditions that allow the SV to advance into designated regions. This approach ostensibly portrays that the SV is there to support and protect endangered populations or regimes and establishes defensive positions to oppose any attempts to remove those forces. This presents the international community with a surprise attack.
- Reduced manpower requirements through development and increased use of robotic systems as combat enablers. Manning habitually plagues Russia's modernization plans through a shortfall in available manpower and reliance on conscripts.
- Layered offensive and defensive systems capable of denying penetration by Western forces and of transitioning to offense or defense as dictated by battlefield conditions.
- Reliable platforms constructed on standardized running gear to simplify logistics and maintenance.
- Reconnaissance and visibility of contested areas across all domains.
- Strike systems, both lethal and nonlethal, to allow strikes at the necessary times and locations to facilitate ground success. The strike concept maintains the basic principle from Soviet era/history that fires lead the ground maneuver fight to establish conditions for success. Strike includes direct, indirect, and nonlethal electromagnetic fires up to and including nuclear weapons.
- An evolved decision-making process for new organizations and systems that did not discard the "scientific approach" of the decision process. Use of correlation of forces, nomograms, and battle drills at all echelons remain key elements of the SV's approach to decision-making and combat.

2-29. Forces were reorganized to provide a spectrum of deployment capabilities. The initial ground troops at the brigade level should be able to form and deploy one or two combined arms BTGs with predominantly contract soldiers and the latest combat systems in less than 24 hours. These units are followed by brigades or regiments with a larger share of conscripts and older equipment, but still manned at a level capable of deploying in D+10 days, followed by troops from other military districts that mobilize using brigade and battalion equipment sets at designated mobilization sites, or storage and maintenance bases, for deployment within D+30 days. Army and division-level headquarters with their own combat forces command the deploying units, with the capability to allocate additional forces and means as needed based on the combat calculations.

2-30. In the last few years their continuing analysis of likely future conflicts has come to view the most likely to be large scale war against U.S. and NATO forces. This resulted in a shift away from separate maneuver brigades back to divisions with subordinate regiments. The organization of the divisions is dependent on the most likely threat to the military district where they are based. Division organization is not standard and may be tank heavy or motorized rifle heavy with four regiments or less.

MILITARY DOCTRINE AND THOUGHT

2-31. Russia's military is key to achieving the country's strategic objectives, as outlined in chapter 1. These objectives underpin Russia's view that it must develop forces and means capable of 6th Generation warfare to be a leading world power. This concept motivates the reorganization and modernization of the SV as well

as leads it to develop new techniques and procedures to employ those forces. It also reinforces Russia's reliance on nuclear weapons, both strategic and tactical, to deter aggression while it modernizes and reorganizes its military. Much like U.S. strategic concepts, Russia wants to present an aggressor with an opponent that possesses significant capabilities to exert simultaneous pressure in all domains.

2-32. Russian strategies are intended to increase the costs of confrontation to make aggressor missions unsupportable from political, economic, and diplomatic perspectives. Russia's objective is to weaken an aggressor's national or collective will to maintain the conflict by inflicting highly visible and embarrassing casualties and related losses on aggressor forces. Modern nations have shown a sensitivity to domestic and world opinion in relation to protracted conflict and seemingly needless casualties. The Russians believe they have a comparative advantage against militarily superior forces because of what it perceives as its stronger collective national will to endure hardship or casualties.

2-33. Russia intends to win conflicts with minimal close combat and ensure any engagements that do occur are on terms favorable to its interests. It will attempt to set the information environment conditions so that deployment of aggressor forces is ultimately counter to the aggressor's interests. If the aggressor does deploy forces, Russian goals are centered on creating information environment constraints that prevent success of the aggressor's campaign. The balance of Russian methodologies focuses on four key areas:

- **Disrupt or prevent understanding of the information environment.** Russian IV activities manipulate the acquisition, transmission, and presentation of information to suit its preferred decision outcomes.
- **Enable targeted instability.** Russia fosters instability in key areas and among key groups so that regional security does not match aggressor operational requirements.
- **Disaggregate partnerships.** Russia undermines partnerships, reducing the ability of the aggressor to operate in its preferred combined, joint, and interagency manner.
- **Deny or complicate access.** Russia focuses pre-conflict activities to deny access to an aggressor force, using nonlethal means initially and transitioning to lethal means if necessary. It will undermine relationships; raise political stakes; manipulate public opinion; attack resolve; and constrain or deny basing rights, overflight corridors, logistics support, and concerted allied action. Establishment and employment of an integrated air and missile defense system serves as a key to degrade and disrupt an aggressor's capability to close with and engage Russian forces.

2-34. As it applies instruments of national power, Russia integrates those forces and means at selected times and locations to achieve desired effects as part of its overall campaign. The country uses offensive and defensive tactics and techniques, including crime and terrorism, to counter an aggressor. Russia can also employ these actions to manipulate population perceptions and dissuade support to an aggressor's military forces or other institutions. When necessary, Russia uses acts of physical and psychological violence to gain influence and develop willing or coerced cooperation in a target population. Concurrently, it uses indirect means to progressively degrade an aggressor's combat power and infrastructure, and to influence otherwise psychologically the political, social, economic, military, and information variables of the OE. As an example, Russia seeks to influence and control the flow of information by using its radio-electromagnetic combat capabilities to disrupt the official communications channels of a target country and to insert psychological warfare messages in social media targeting soldiers' families.

SCIENTIFIC SUBSTANTIATION

2-35. Russia uses scientific substantiation to understand the types of current and future conflicts, those most likely to occur, and the capabilities necessary to succeed in those conflicts. This understanding guides the development of its military forces. Although it creates the theory of why and how the military must evolve, the actual application depends on many other factors, including public support, economic viability, and technological advancements.

2-36. The Russian General Staff uses analysis by the military scientific community to define the conditions of modern conflicts as well as to develop and validate the forms and methods of employing its military forces. The analysis incorporates both the classical and asymmetrical means of military employment in support of strategic objectives, as well as operational and tactical actions.

In 2009, Russia established the Military Science Committee of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. The Military Science Committee is tasked with providing scientific evidence about construction, development, training, and the actual and predictable conditions of political-military, economic, and demographical situations. The Military Science Committee also promotes innovation in future warfare. The principal objectives of the committee are—

- Force development.
- Forecasting the development of construction, training, and use of the armed forces.
- Developing recommendations on the enhancement of force structure, forms and methods of conducting combat.
- Development of arms and military equipment.
- Study of related issues, such as nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence, countering unmanned aerial vehicles, and conducting IV actions as well as others.
- Improvement of the military science complex of the armed forces, including its composition, structure, and staff size based on actual needs to accomplish military actions.
- Development of modeling and experiments into process automation, including systems of information support.
- Direction of work on military history.

2-37. For the military and ultimately the ground forces, military science also plays a key role in development and validation of military theory and practice. These are a few of the key missions performed by The Military and Scientific Center of the Ground Forces:

- Scientific substantiation of the concepts, programs, and plans for the construction of the ground forces.
- Development of operational art and tactics.
- Improving combat and mobilization readiness.
- Improvement of weapons and military equipment.
- Study of problems associated with military education and training.

ARMED CONFLICT

2-38. The latest Russian military doctrine demonstrates a nuanced understanding of conflict. Russia views local wars and armed conflicts as the most likely and common types of direct clashes between it and any aggressors. Russia's current doctrine defines local war as a conflict with limited political and supporting military goals where military actions are limited to the border of the warring states and mainly affects only the interests of those states. This judgment is based on its analysis of current trends and the capabilities of its most likely aggressors. Russia believes that large-scale war will most likely be the result of the expansion and escalation of hostilities from the regional to the international level. Russia views the characteristics of these conflicts as follows—

- Integrated employment of military forces in conjunction with the other elements of national power.
- Weapons and military equipment based on advanced technologies that include high-precision, hypersonic weapons; electromagnetic warfare; use of new physical principles, automated information, and control complexes; unmanned aircraft and maritime vessels; and guided robotic weapons.
- Global simultaneous attacks in the land, air, maritime, space and cyberspace domains, and the information environment.
- Task-organized and rapidly deployed forces and means to inflict large-scale damage on aggressor facilities and forces.
- Reduction of the time needed to conduct military actions and strikes.
- Enhanced automated command and control (C2) of both units and weapons using a global networked computer complex.
- Permanent military operations zones in the territories of conflicting sides.
- Integration of irregular and private military companies in military actions.
- Use of indirect and asymmetric actions.

- Financing and directing opposition political or public groups outside the conflict area.

RUSSIAN CAMPAIGNS

2-39. Russia's recent campaigns highlight its strategy towards modern and future conflicts. Russian forces have intervened in local conflicts while continuing to wage IV against nations involved in the conflict, operating on its periphery, and against those it considers as aggressors. Russia's deployment of military forces for these operations provided officers with combat experience, tested new weapons platforms, and showed itself to be a successful military force internationally.

2-40. As observed in recent campaigns, Russia may employ irregular forces or special operations forces to exploit familiarity with the physical environment of a region and the ability to blend into a local populace. Its activities occur over extended periods of time, but may change in tempo, speed, and duration. While timing of Russian action may appear random, the actions and activities are deliberate decisions and part of a long-term campaign or stratagem. Even when circumstances are beyond its control, Russia has an ability to deftly seize on unexpected opportunities to achieve desired effects.

2-41. Russia can use international protocols and conventions, national laws, and moral codes that guide or regulate behavioral norms and social interactions to limit an aggressor's use of overmatch weapons systems or other capabilities. Military affiliates comply with these codes of conduct when advantageous for the IV campaign or for overt or clandestine actions. If Russia incorporates clandestine use of combat power, the country can then claim plausible deniability for actions considered illegal or immoral.

2-42. Although an individual, organization, or combination of forces often receives immediate notoriety for violent actions, Russia complements physical violence with methodical, long-term psychological warfare. The overarching agenda includes but is not limited to the following methods:

- Spotlight popular grievances for resolution.
- Establish influence, popular recognition, and support of a targeted segment of a population.
- Expand active or passive support in an area or region.
- Deter opposition to Russian goals and objectives within a specific population.
- Marginalize the governance or extra-regional influence of an aggressor.
- Develop general acceptance and legitimacy of Russian programs and actions.
- Achieve Russian political or national objectives without alienating critical segments of indigenous or extra-regional populations.
- Expand physical control and governance in an area or region.
- Attract an international or global audience, or external organizational sources of influence that support Russian aims.

2-43. Russia seeks to gain the approval and support of certain elements within a target population in order to obtain active or passive assistance. The methods must eventually communicate a compelling narrative of legitimacy that is accepted by the population. Legitimacy may require a gradual process of convincing the population that Russian military or security forces are an acceptable means to achieve desired social, economic, religious, or political effects. However, Russia can also attempt to confer authority on itself without regard to the population's goals. It may declare that its actions are justifiable under existing conditions and attempt to degrade the legitimacy of a targeted government.

2-44. Russian actions may encompass a complex array of irregular and regular organizations, units, or individuals with various coordinated or perceived disparate single agenda aims. A particular geographic, political, cyberspace, or ideological environment may lead to alliances or affiliations that are dynamic and constantly changing in purpose and actions.

2-45. Internal security forces or law enforcement organizations infiltrated by Russian security services can also be used to support military actions. The collaboration among organizations, units, and individuals of a population may be based on coercion, contractual agreement, or common goals and objectives—either temporary or long term. Russia may prefer indirect approaches such as subterfuge, deception, and nonlethal action to achieve strategic objectives. However, when necessary, the country is committed to violent action in order to compel an aggressor or opposing government to submit to its intentions.

2-46. Some irregular organizations, such as affiliated criminal gangs, exist for their own commercial profit and power. These elements intend to influence or coerce, with no interest in a populace's quality of life or civil security. Other forms of Russian subterfuge include use of rogue individuals or groups with single-issue agendas that are willing to use criminal activity or terrorism to achieve their objective. Russia seeks opportunities to co-opt or affiliate with these varied types of organizations for mutual temporary benefits.

Integration of All Domains

2-47. Russia does not use the term multidomain operations, but it does work to integrate all of its elements of national power across all domains with any battlefield actions.

2-48. Russia's emphasis on information and psychological warfare does not translate to de-emphasis of physical warfighting capabilities. The SV continues to maintain and improve its capabilities to conduct combat actions at the tactical level using long-established tactics and non-prescriptive techniques to conduct effective mission tasks and drills. The continuing evolution of these techniques and procedures achieves the desired immediate or near-term effects and supports the aims of higher headquarters to weaken or defeat an aggressor's resolve to prolong a conflict.

2-49. The Russian military uses the term strike to refer to the convergence of multiple effects, to include multiple domains, focused on an aggressor force. These strikes incorporate everything from pre-conflict IV to nuclear fires.

2-50. Strategically, Russia uses the threat of nuclear fires at all echelons and considers the threat of escalation as a valid means of de-escalating conflict to avoid large-scale combat. Such threatened strikes are designed not to necessarily defeat the United States on a battlefield, but to cause enough political pressure that the United States cannot sustain its political resolve to continue the conflict. However, Russia likely has a lower threshold for use of low-yield, nonstrategic nuclear weapons assessing them to be less escalatory.

2-51. At the tactical level, strike predominantly relies on fires from direct and indirect forces and means to achieve the desired outcomes in combined-arms battle. The ground-force use of strike seeks to integrate all effects, whether they are from IV, REB, aerospace support, or irregular warfare actions.

National Battle Management

2-52. Russia's national command and control authority begins with its President and flows down through the Minister of Defense and General Staff. The President is the Supreme Commander in Chief of the armed forces and is authorized to assume direct C2 over the military during times of crisis and martial law. Subordinate to the President, the Minister of Defense oversees and directs the operations of the General Staff. The General Staff is tasked with ensuring Russia's national security and developing operational plans for armed forces C2. The Joint Strategic Commands (known as OSK) are joint force elements that have operational control in peace and wartime of all general purpose forces—across military services—stationed within the geographic boundaries of a military district.

2-53. The National Defense Management Center (Центр управления национальной обороной - Tsentr upravleniya natsional'noy oboronoy – known as NTsUO), based in Moscow, is the single organization that orchestrates the integration of all national, regional, and territorial actions to defend Russia. It coordinates and manages the actions of ministries, departments, and civil authorities in support of security actions. As a unified interagency system, it serves to integrate all Russian organizations and forces involved in national security, including 159 federal and state agencies as well as 1,320 state corporations and military-industrial companies.

2-54. Using modern communications complexes, the NTsUO generates real-time situational updates disseminated to all levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. It manages all national-level security actions to include nuclear attack early warning, retaliation status, and air and missile defense, as well as directing combat actions in specific theaters. The NTsUO uses the latest automated C2 complex to enable automatic collection and analysis to generate situational estimates. The NTsUO complex can send orders, direct missions, manage strikes and fires, and synchronize logistics support of forces.

2-55. Russia places strike as the leading function in its joint and tactical actions, with all other forces and means enabling it to set the conditions for successful land operations. Strike involves engaging all lethal and

nonlethal forces and means to attack an aggressor at a planned location and time on the battlefield. The NTsUO integrates reconnaissance and intelligence collection to create targeting information and, using its network-centric capability, conducts command and control (C2) of strike complexes to engage those targets. This complex allows passing automatic target engagements directly to the firing or launching platform without going through the intervening headquarters levels. In addition, the firing or launch complexes may be able to operate in an autonomous mode—without the need for operator initiation of the strike.

2-56. Russian equipment modernization programs incorporate the requirement to include automated command and control system communications and data systems to send and receive information. These *Avtomatizirovannyye Sistemy Upravleniya - Автоматизированные Системы Управления* – (ASUs) are intended to provide near-real-time information sharing between SV soldiers using *Strelets* reconnaissance, command and control, and communications system (known as KRUS) (*комплекса разведки, управления и связи* (known as КРУС)). The *Strelets* can interface with the Airborne troops (VDV) *Andromeda-D*, and Air-Space Force (VKS) *Metronom* strike-aviation, naval vessels, and high-precision missiles and massed artillery fire.

2-57. Three subordinate C2 centers of the NTsUO monitor and control Russia's nuclear forces, conduct battle management to identify developing threats, and focus on day-to-day actions from strategic to tactical levels. The NTsUO and its subordinate centers integrate all elements of Russian power through Army and Corps commands to allow the Russian military to transition away from large formations and massed fires to a more refined and precise force.

RUSSIAN MILITARY FORCES

2-58. Russia's military forces have several components organized to conduct or support actions on land. The focus on the military forces in this ATP is on military services that interact with or support the SV. Each service has a distinct mission focus and has forces assigned to Russia's five Joint Strategic Commands (OSKs), based on the geographic boundaries of military districts. OSK West, South, Center, East, and Northern Fleet are the joint commands that manage, control, and direct all forces in their areas of responsibility. The OSKs, as a joint-force element, incorporate all forces and means as opposed to just the land forces of the former military districts. Figure 2-2 on page 2-12 shows the geographical laydown of the respective military districts and associated OSKs.

- OSK West conducts joint efforts focused on the Baltic States. The Baltic Fleet falls under this OSK.
- OSK South cover actions in the eastern European region. This OSK has the most recent experience with the reorganization and joint-force ground actions in Ukraine and Crimea. The Caspian Sea Flotilla is subordinate to this OSK.
- OSK Center focuses on actions in Central Eurasia.
- OSK East focuses on the Pacific and Asian areas. The Pacific Fleet falls under OSK East.
- OSK Northern Fleet focuses joint efforts to improve the ability to project military campaigns into the Barents Sea and Arctic region.

Figure 2-2. Geographic regions of Russia's military districts

NUCLEAR FORCES

2-59. The Russians consider their tactical, operational, and strategic nuclear arsenal to be the ultimate safeguard against any attack on their homeland. The nuclear forces comprised the Naval Forces, Strategic Rocket Forces, and Long-Range Aviation.

2-60. Russia constantly trains for nuclear war, and nuclear, biological, and chemical defense units are well resourced and play a fundamental role within tactical maneuver units. The Russian military regularly employs simulated nuclear strikes in its war games and field exercises. While Russia is prepared to fight in a nuclear-threatened environment, it deems this scenario unwise because of the possibility of escalation.

2-61. Russia is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and states that it adheres to a "no first use" policy about nuclear weapons. However, like all nuclear powers, Russia continues to modernize its nuclear capabilities. Russia retains approximately 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons capable of delivery by naval vessels, aviation, surface-to-surface missiles, or artillery, in addition to the approximately 4,500 strategic weapons in its inventory.

SECURITY SERVICES

2-62. Russia possesses numerous militarized intelligence and security services. These forces may field units with similar equipment and training to that of the SV. All of these organizations concentrate their efforts on internal security, while the ground forces under the Ministry of Defense are primarily concerned with external threats but will assist with internal security when required. Russian leaders show an increasing concern over internal threats and have allocated resources to modernize the security services that may have previously gone to the Ministry of Defense. The following list shows the different ministries or agencies and their estimated size:

- Ministry of Internal Affairs: 904,800 personnel.
- Federal Security Services Border Guards: 170,000 personnel.
- Ministry of Justice: 32,000 personnel.
- Ministry of Emergency Situations: 289,000 personnel.

- Federal Protection Service: 20,000 personnel.
- National Guard: 340,000 personnel.

AEROSPACE FORCES

2-63. Russia reorganized its aerospace forces in 2015 to combine the Space operations, Air Force, Aerospace Defense, and Air Defense forces into one branch, the Air-Space Force (Vozduzhno-kosmicheskie sily - VKS). The VKS' main missions are air/space control to degrade aggressor capabilities and intelligence collection focused on aggressors. The current organizations used to support the SV are Air Force and Air Defense Armies, with one for each of the military districts.

2-64. Russia's military doctrine tasks the VKS with sole responsibility for air and space defense and long-range transport. The VKS tasks and complexes include—

- Air and space defense.
- Communication.
- Intelligence.
- Electromagnetic warfare.
- Unmanned aerial vehicles.
- Automatic engagement weapons.
- Military transport.
- Personal protective equipment.

2-65. VKS support to the SV includes three components: long-range aviation, frontline aviation, and integrated air defense forces. As part of the reorganization, the VKS also received the space and missile defense forces. Air or surface-to-surface fire support for tactical maneuver forces—primarily from frontline aviation and missile defense forces—is planned and delivered through the VKS.

NAVY

2-66. The Russian Navy focuses on protection of territorial waters but does have limited power projection capabilities. The Navy's power projection capability primarily rests with its fleet of ballistic missile submarines. The Navy includes two forces with land-based missions: Naval Infantry and Coastal Missile and Artillery Troops. Separately, the Coastal Forces of the Navy primarily focus on defense of Russia's coastline from aggressor surface fleets as well as from air and sea landing forces. It assists the SV with anti-landing defenses in the coastal area.

Naval Infantry

2-67. The Naval Infantry (Морская пехота – known as MP) is subordinate to the fleet commanders but does not have a set organization within each fleet. Missions include amphibious assault, coastal defense, counterterrorism, anti-piracy, as well as ship and naval base security. It is considered an elite force with counter-diversionary capabilities to defeat aggressor intelligence gathering units associated with water or seaborne actions. As an elite force it conducts training and actions with VDV units.

2-68. The Naval Infantry is smaller in number than other ground force units, with only 9,000 personnel. It is similar in organization to the motorized rifle units of the SV. The Naval Infantry consists of four independent brigades, a separate brigade, and three separate battalions.

Coastal Missile and Artillery Troops

2-69. The Coastal Missile and Artillery Troops (Береговые ракетно-артиллерийские войска – known as BRAV) have the mission of defending Russian ports, harbors' shore-based facilities, and the 38,000 km of shoreline. As the name implies, its forces are composed of long-range artillery and missile units with the capability to engage aggressor surface fleets attempting amphibious assaults or air landings on the coast.

2-70. Russia is modernizing the Coastal Missile and Artillery Troops units with long-range surface-to-surface and cruise missile complexes. Engagement ranges are between 300 and 600 km, with fire direction