The US Glide Phase Interceptor to protect against hypersonic threats using a multi- layered solution to defend against hypersonic glide vehicles. "Modern warships have intricate electrical, radar, and computer systems that did not exist on World War II-era warships, making damage assessment and repair of modern ships significantly more complex." Therefore, a back-to-the-future approach to de-digitize and re-analog certain components could enhance redundancy, streamline assessments and support faster work. The US Fleet Forces Command legacy training model is front-loaded, schoolhouse-centric, and stove-piped, resulting in ineffective training delivery and learning atrophy. It experiences too much unnecessary friction within the complex system-of-systems called the force generation process. The US Fleet Forces Command have now updated the model to create career-long training continuums for all rates – from E-1 to E-9 (with technically accurate 3D augmented reality images). This will drive sailors' progression from apprentice, to journeymen, supervisor, and finally master. Next comes the how. The US Fleet Forces Command brings the infrastructure to the point of need – on the waterfront and the flight line. This means they need the IT infrastructure to give sailors the access they need to receive training anytime and anywhere. And just as critically – they are working to put all of the policies, processes, and organizations in place to sustain this. For example, they have to fully institutionalize this in administrative and training commands so that there can be the accountable party for keeping the detailed training requirements up-to-date by having the subject matter experts in place. Give the sailors what they need, get out of the way, give them the opportunity, and they will exceed expectations. It’s very important there is a place with skilled people that can do war gaming in the littoral environment, and who are adding the right inputs to a game like that. You can do gaming anywhere, but if you don’t have skilled people with knowledge of that kind of environment, the result would be useless. It would be useful to influence the development of new war fighting tactics and techniques; to evaluate what we are doing; to be able to game on it; and then have something brought back again, so we can be better and better all the time and adjust to new differences. Maintenance, energy storage, mobile applications of power and effort to decrease a hardware footprint and increase operational efficiency all provide the foundation for ship combat success. "You've got lasers, larger arrays, an upgraded X band radar, maybe additional VLS cells, large missile launchers, and also potentially an integrated power and energy system versus just an integrated a power system". Carl von Clausewitz wrote that to sustain operations in the field, an army "necessarily remains dependent on its sources of supply and replenishment and must maintain communications with them." Regenerative logistics offers a "closed system" of sustainment in which SIF produce, consume, reproduce, and re-consume with limited inputs from outside support. Conventional sustainment, also known as "push-pull" logistics, remains the SIF concept's greatest vulnerability. Batteries, oils and lubricants and so on need to be protected from the temperature. If they are able to choke us off logistically, they'll take us to our knees. Even so, the operational vision behind the concept remains valid, making this obstacle worthy of the climb. China is looking to "harness these changes with the aim of eroding or even leapfrogging the United States' military strengths".
Back in 2004, the US concluded that the Chinese were very concerned about American aircraft carriers and were seeking to muster sufficient air and naval forces to deal with 2 American carriers operating off their coasts. So the US made plans to quickly get as many as 7 American carriers off the Chinese coast. This not only upset Chinese military planning, but rubs the Chinese the wrong way by pointing out Chinese military weakness. The gunboat neo-diplomacy stirred memories convenient for CCP – of opium-trading, gunboat-wielding Brits kicking off China’s “Century of Humiliation.” The evolution of Chinese radar from old Soviet equipment to series production, to indigenous designs, to French examples and finally to modern Chinese vessels with sonar suites parallels Chinese naval progress. The types of sonars equipped on Chinese warships are a barometer of Chinese anti-submarine capability. France provided modern sonar equipment to China from 1974 until 1993. Until 2016, China was the most important single market to sell German machines. In 2020, China topped the ranking of the largest machine tool producing countries worldwide. German MTU explained that they do not supply engines for Chinese warships, but that some of their maritime diesels are also used for commercial ships and are thus dual-use technology. After MTU established a joint-venture in 2010 with a Shaanxi Diesel Engine Heavy Industry Co Ltd to build MTU maritime diesel engines in China, the head of the Chinese engine manufacturing firm acknowledged that it supplied military versions of the MTU engines for the Chinese navy and coast guard. China’s tremendous strides in shipbuilding over the last decade suggest that the PLA can overcome its weakness in global power projection. Having a much larger number of skilled workers and shipyards, China and South Korea, two of the largest shipbuilders in the world, use prefab techniques for their commercial ships and naturally do the same for their war ships. China's two largest state-owned shipbuilders, the China State Shipbuilding Corporation and the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, merged in November 2019 creating the world's largest shipbuilder as measured by production capacity. Based on current build rates, the PLA will likely have a sufficient number of these vessels in service by the 2030 to 2035 time period to provide adequate protection for the PLAN’s carriers. Chinese Navy could still numerically build the world’s largest fleet with more than 420 warships (including submarines) by 2030, however, China's Navy only has 20% of its manpower from voluntary force while the remaining 80% are conscripts on short-service commission. And that’s why the majority of China's fleets are docked at their respective home ports at any given time. The centre of gravity of China's A2/AD capabilities is its integrated ISR and targetting, centred on mobile missile launchers, including tactical anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles but also long-range strategic attack systems. By shooting and moving, the Chinese hope to keep these systems protected. In 2019, the China's efforts included efforts to acquire dynamic random access memory, aviation, and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) technologies. A Chinese national was sentenced to prison for conspiring to export military-& space-grade technology illegally to China. He purchased radiation-hardened power amplifiers and supervisory circuits used for military & space applications. China has at least 2 to 4 submarines with 24 to 48 JL-2 submarine-based ICBMs (12 missiles per boat). US warships total tonnage, is twice the total of China's Navy. The Carrier Strike Group remains the premier fighting unit of the US Navy. US Navy really knows how to power projection in two forms, 44 strike naval fighters coming off a carrier and all those devils dogs coming out the back of an amphibious ship, throwing large number of cruise missiles or bombs. A reduction in the number of aircraft carriers from 11 to 9 would have repercussions. China is in the midst of a major naval construction program, with 370 ships, and plans to have 435 ships by 2030. China will have 360 battle force ships at the end of 2020, compared with the US Navy has a steady count of 297 warships in active duty service fleet, despite promises from the Donald Trump administration to increase that to at least 355, a number many analysts agree is the minimum needed. In 2022, then CNO Gilday announced that the requirement is actually much higher, in excess of 500 battle force ships. Multiple other experts' analyses confirm those higher numbers. Defense Department has plans for 400 to 500 ships Navy by 2030 (including 150 upto 240 unmanned ships, 66 to 70 9th-gen nuclear attack submarines and large payload submarines, 12 Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines, 80 to 96 large combatants like destroyers, 82 to 90 logistics & auxiliary ships, 56 to 70 littoral frigates, 60 Marines strike ships & 6 (or 9) to 18 lighter amphibious assault (mini-carriers), a considerable jump. Instead of 2 brigades on 38 traditional amphibious ships; now, the deployed units will be supplemented by 31 to 35 commercial-looking and sounding Landing Ship Medium vessel (earlier, called light amphibious vessels, each carrying about 75 Marines and their gear and heavy firepower for a limited period of time at 14 knots and could beach itself for shore-to-shore operations). 10 Landing Ship Medium vessel being large-deck. Until the Landing Ship Medium program delivers, the stern landing vessel will act as a surrogate. These would enable the three Marine Littoral Regiments in the Pacific to move immediately to strategic choke-points and strategic locations throughout the battlespace before the action begins, in order to conduct sea denial as part of distributed maritime operations. Normally, the US Navy does not buy foreign ships or ship designs, but decades of poor investment decisions and marginalisation of expertise have led the US Navy is in absolute precarious position (U.S. Navy's aversion to real testing programs is due to not accepting any risk from Congress to cut to these programs if any design faults are found out before production), because China is about to replace the US in the pacific with its vast ship manufacturing and accurate firepower in the pacific. The US Navy already has the required number of destroyers, and it has already retired all of its guided-missile frigates. Building up 56 to 70 littoral frigates will restore balance to what’s become a top-heavy fleet. The new number is the result of a U.S. study called Battle Force 2045. However, U.S. Navy's aversion to real testing of new revolutionary programs comes from not accepting any risk from Congress oversight to terminate Navy's programs if any defects are found out before production. US shipyards firms have poor capacity to provide maintenance and repair of Navy warships fleet, which is causing poor readiness and inability to perform missions. Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) is a four-star admiral and his deputy is the chief of naval operations (CNO) have failed to help upgrade the capacity of private shipyards. US shipyards firms have poor capacity to provide maintenance and repair of Navy warships fleet, which is causing poor readiness and inability to perform missions. Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) is a four-star admiral and his deputy is the chief of naval operations (CNO) have failed to help upgrade the capacity of private shipyards. Since 2017, China has been sending 16 to 19 PLAN warships (along with axillary ships), for 3 months per year, into the Indian Ocean. Indian Navy has the capacity of monitoring around 17 to 18 warships in the Indian Ocean. By 2025 and 2035, China is looking to have 32 and 52 PLAN warships force respectively, in the Indian Ocean, that can restrict the Indian Navy at will. China has officially confirmed to provide the Pakistan Navy with 8 "next-generation attack submarines" with AIP system, along with four Type 054A/P destroyers. The Indian Navy goal, set in December 2019, was already lowered from 200 ships to 175-ships, but even that number is unlikely in the next five years due to a lack of funds. Indian Navy has a shortfall of, 1265 officers and 11,166 sailors. India needs at least a total of 6 to 9 nuclear attack submarines and 18 diesel attack submarines (with AIP) to meet its 30-year submarine-building plan. The Indian Navy's plan was inspired by a similar cabinet authorisation for 42 squadrons of the Indian Air Force, and is to seek approvals for 24 attack submarines in total. India has just 7 out of 15 submarines that are battle ready at any given time. Out of which, 2 are nuclear submarines INS Arihant and INS Chakra, with the latter being leased from Russia. India's nuclear submarine program is also India's most expensive defence program. Any nation that has the design technology to built mini-nuke reactors for submarines can also build nuclear aircraft carriers. While India's defence chief is in favour of building both types of nuclear submarine (attack & ballistic), which is a must for India's nuke-triad. The economies of scale will tilt the financial arguments in favour of an all nuclear-powered submarine fleet by the 2040. The issue is, at best, India can build only 1 nuclear submarine every 2 years. Conventional submarines don't have the speed for the hunter-attack role. So the 12 SSK like the six Scorpene (Kalvari-class) SSK (Project-75) and the six Project-75I SSK are the replacements for the four Class 209/Type-1500 (Shishumar class) SSK and 10 Sindhughosh-class or Kilo Class (Type 877EKM ‘Paltus’) diesel-electric submarine. The three SSGN family will function as SSN (one patrolling the Indian Ocean while another providing flank protection to it) till 2030, until the 6 dedicated SSN are produced. The naval industrial bases of China, Japan and South Korea have seen the induction of advanced tech, such as machine-learning systems and digital capabilities. Indian navy's future warships design (to counter Type-052d & Type-055) needs multi-island super-structure (an integrated mast), which means that the ship is able to carry more high-power sensors & electronic equipment. UK, Russia, Italy and Japan have mastered that type of design (e.g. 30FFM (previously, known as 30DX) frigate, fremm & type-45 destroyer), making their warships more making it more survivable. This is a complex, compact, integrated suite that must manage its electronic noise interference. However, Norwegian Helge Ingstad frigate (built by Navantia shipyard) was already unstable due to its multi-island super-structure and easily capsized when it was slightly hit by a tanker vessel at very low speed. The future maritime fight, as US Navy officials see it, will involve military forces with a mix of manned and unmanned aircraft, ships and other systems. Some actions will one day involve solely uncrewed platforms. "That's a more complex scenario to where developing what that (tactics, techniques and procedures) looks like, operating parameters and how you would execute that in a contested environment or a combat environment. It's tying in our current tactics, techniques and procedures and incorporating these unmanned systems in a more persistent and scalable way to increase our warfighting capability." said Cmdr. Jerry Daley. Rapid technological advances "increases the ability to close kill-chains faster with persistent communication, even in a sort of contested environment". A key objective this year was to increase lethality. They also experimented with commercial satellites and line-of-sight communications to see how they could integrate into something of a naval ISR capability.
Germany's MAN Energy manufactures bore diesel engines and turbo-machinery equipment for marine propulsion, used by the Indian Navy. A three tier security arrangement for coastal security was formally put in place with the Indian navy guarding the outer tier, the Indian coast guard patrolling the intermediate layer and the marine police force patrolling the shallow and inland waters. Others such as the Customs Department (marine-preventive) and the Central Industrial Security Force (marine wing) have also been made part of the coastal security architecture. This arrangement looks perfect on paper. However, the Indian navy argues that while it has been entrusted with the overall responsibility for coastal security, it does not have the power to task all the concerned organisations or command their resources for everyday coastal security duties and therefore should not be held responsible.
The silent service if armed with nuke-capable SLBMs and SLCMs has the best second-strike capability and the best deterrent. This is one area where the Chinese are still behind the west. Preserving hunter-killer (that can go 30 knots silently) submarine manufacturing know-how is not cheap and building 4th generation mini-PWR for the first time is not easy. It is India's costliest and largest defence programme, and the money is not enough due to delays and lack of clarity. China is again proposing to fund (under One Belt, One Road) the construction of a 135 kms canal in Thailand to connect the Gulf of Thailand with the Andaman Sea. Currently. 30% of the Malacca traffic (especially large tankers or container ships) pay a large canal transit fee (over $100,000 for a large vessel). A new proposed canal would shorten voyages by 2,200 kms (two days at sea).
The letters “AN” were originally part of the Joint Army-Navy nomenclature with later became known as the Joint Electronics Type designation. The air & missile defense radar (AMDR) system's official U.S. Navy name is AN/SPY. Destroyers (Big & performance loaded) |
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Indian Navy has to induct warships by three or four every year against this requirement for seven to nine new warships every year. Indian warship builders had built just three older Delhi-class destroyers under Project 15 when the Indian Navy then took years to rework the design into what it called a “follow-on” class – Project 15A – but which was actually a substantively different warship that incorporated newer and more sophisticated technology. This is a recipe for delay.
Design and planning warship building is also dogged by capacity limitations. All four public sector warship yards – Mazagon Dock (Mumbai); Garden Reach (Kolkata); Goa Shipyard (Goa) and Hindustan Shipyard (Visakhapatnam) – are located in metropolitan areas with little scope for expanding facilities. Hence, this has forced the navy to look overseas to Russia to build four follow-on frigates of the Talwar-class.
Design and planning warship building is also dogged by capacity limitations. All four public sector warship yards – Mazagon Dock (Mumbai); Garden Reach (Kolkata); Goa Shipyard (Goa) and Hindustan Shipyard (Visakhapatnam) – are located in metropolitan areas with little scope for expanding facilities. Hence, this has forced the navy to look overseas to Russia to build four follow-on frigates of the Talwar-class.
Kolkata-class Project 15A destroyers
It was almost seven years after the Kolkata was launched before it started sea trials in 2013. During those sea trials, machinery issues sent the vessel back to the yards for repair. Each vessel has cost India close to 1 billion U.S. dollars. The design was developed by the Indian Navy's Directorate of Naval Design, with detailed design developed by Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL). Built by the Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers Ltd (GRSE), Kolkata, it will be the first warship armed with an indigenous rocket launcher for anti-submarine warfare. They are the largest naval vessels ever constructed at the Indian naval yards at Mazagon. Interestingly, the Kolkata-class is almost 2,000 tonnes heavier than its predecessor --- the Project 15 Delhi-class destroyers --- because of its heavier armour plating. Despite that, it moves as fast as the Delhi-class, propelled by the same Ukrainian turbines. This indicates how much they have improved its propulsion system.
It will the first Indian ship to be armed with 16 land attack, anti-ship Brahmos missile, again manufactured in India with Russian collaboration. These capabilities give INS Kolkata an ability to operate without supporting fleet of ships. The navy’s unique Weapon and Electronic Systems Engineering Establishment (WESEE), undertook the herculean task of integrating the melange of Russian, Israeli, Dutch, French, Italian, and Indian systems which went into this ship. Nowhere else in the world is such a complex undertaking attempted, but WESEE’s endeavours have been invariably rewarded with success.
These capabilities give Project 15A INS Kolkata an ability to operate without supporting fleet of ships. It has state-of-the-art sensors and Battle Management Systems, will significantly improve India's area air coverage at sea as well as the strength of multi-mission capabilities. It has an in-built anti-submarine capability, can take on anti-ship missile and a fighter aircraft. A concern for the INS Kolkata, in addition to not having her primary anti-air armament, is that she will go to sea without a Towed Array Sonar (TAS). The indigenous system did not meet Indian requirements and the Indian Navy is now feverishly looking to purchase a system to integrate into the vessel from elsewhere.
The three Project 15A Kolkata-class destroyers have the L-band LW 08 "Jupiter" 2D early warning long-range air-search radar.
INS Chennai was the first vessel to be built with DMR-249 Grade B steel made by SAIL (equivalent to Russian AB2 grade steel used in P-16, P-15, two P-15A DDGs & four P-28 corvettes).
INS Delhi has been upgraded with KH 35E Uran anti-ship missile system, including the 3Ts-25E Garpun-Bal-E missile targeting radar, is being replaced by the Brahmos missile system and an unspecified surface surveillance radar (SSR).
It was almost seven years after the Kolkata was launched before it started sea trials in 2013. During those sea trials, machinery issues sent the vessel back to the yards for repair. Each vessel has cost India close to 1 billion U.S. dollars. The design was developed by the Indian Navy's Directorate of Naval Design, with detailed design developed by Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL). Built by the Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers Ltd (GRSE), Kolkata, it will be the first warship armed with an indigenous rocket launcher for anti-submarine warfare. They are the largest naval vessels ever constructed at the Indian naval yards at Mazagon. Interestingly, the Kolkata-class is almost 2,000 tonnes heavier than its predecessor --- the Project 15 Delhi-class destroyers --- because of its heavier armour plating. Despite that, it moves as fast as the Delhi-class, propelled by the same Ukrainian turbines. This indicates how much they have improved its propulsion system.
It will the first Indian ship to be armed with 16 land attack, anti-ship Brahmos missile, again manufactured in India with Russian collaboration. These capabilities give INS Kolkata an ability to operate without supporting fleet of ships. The navy’s unique Weapon and Electronic Systems Engineering Establishment (WESEE), undertook the herculean task of integrating the melange of Russian, Israeli, Dutch, French, Italian, and Indian systems which went into this ship. Nowhere else in the world is such a complex undertaking attempted, but WESEE’s endeavours have been invariably rewarded with success.
These capabilities give Project 15A INS Kolkata an ability to operate without supporting fleet of ships. It has state-of-the-art sensors and Battle Management Systems, will significantly improve India's area air coverage at sea as well as the strength of multi-mission capabilities. It has an in-built anti-submarine capability, can take on anti-ship missile and a fighter aircraft. A concern for the INS Kolkata, in addition to not having her primary anti-air armament, is that she will go to sea without a Towed Array Sonar (TAS). The indigenous system did not meet Indian requirements and the Indian Navy is now feverishly looking to purchase a system to integrate into the vessel from elsewhere.
The three Project 15A Kolkata-class destroyers have the L-band LW 08 "Jupiter" 2D early warning long-range air-search radar.
INS Chennai was the first vessel to be built with DMR-249 Grade B steel made by SAIL (equivalent to Russian AB2 grade steel used in P-16, P-15, two P-15A DDGs & four P-28 corvettes).
INS Delhi has been upgraded with KH 35E Uran anti-ship missile system, including the 3Ts-25E Garpun-Bal-E missile targeting radar, is being replaced by the Brahmos missile system and an unspecified surface surveillance radar (SSR).
The Indian Navy is the world's fifth largest. It has three commands - the western, southern and eastern commands. The eastern command, which is headquartered at Visakhapatnam in Andhra Pradesh, is home to the Indian Navy's submarine arm. A tri-services command was set up in 2001 at Port Blair in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
It was in 1960 that the MoD bought the complete design package of the Leander-class FFG’s superstructure and its licenced-manufacturing rights from the UK’s Vickers Armstrong & Yarrow. However, the first of six Leander-class FFGs to be built by the MoD-owned Mazagon Docks Ltd (MDL)—INS Nilgiri--was commissioned only 12 years later on June 23, 1972, nine years after the Royal Navy commissioned its first Leander-class FFG. Thereafter, between 1974 and 1981 the following five Leander-class FFGs were commissioned, and were followed by three Project 16 Godavari-class FFGs and three Project 16A Brahmaputra-class FFGs, accounting for a total of 12 FFGs built as variations (conceptualised and designed by the Navy’s Directorate General Naval Design, or DGND) of the same basic hull design and with the same steam engine-based propulsion package.
The eastern naval command has grown remarkably in recent years. In 2005, it had 30 warships under its command. Six years later, that number has grown to 50 - roughly a third of the Indian Navy's entire fleet strength. It is poised to expand further.
India's only aircraft carrier INS (Indian Naval Ship) Viraat is to be assigned to the eastern command after the refurbished Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov (renamed INS Vikramaditya) joins the western fleet. All five Rajput-class guided-missile destroyers (modified versions of Soviet Kashin class destroyers), which were with the western command have joined the eastern fleet.
The Indian Navy's only ship to be acquired from the Americans, the amphibious USS Trenton, now renamed INS Jalashwa, has been put under the eastern command. It will be joined soon by the indigenously manufactured stealth frigates INS Shivalik, INS Satpura and INS Sahyadri as well as the US-manufactured P-8I Poseidon long-range maritime patrol aircraft and the Italy-made new fleet tanker, INS Shakti.
It will be the eastern command that will take charge of India's nuclear submarines. INS Arihant, which is undergoing sea trials was constructed at Visakhapatnam. Two other nuclear submarines are reportedly under development here.
The eastern command has bases at Visakhapatnam and Kolkata. It will soon have a forward base at Tuticorin and an operational turnaround base at Paradeep. In addition to naval air stations at Dega and Rajali, the eastern command has got a new one, INS Parundu at Uchipuli, where UAVs are being deployed. Reports in the media have hinted at a nuclear submarine naval base somewhere near Visakhapatnam. Codenamed Varsha, the project is under wraps.
The gap between the western and eastern commands appears to be narrowing. In the wake of the eastern command's rising profile and strength, the Indian navy recently upgraded the post of the eastern command's chief of staff to three-star rank, ie the same as that of his counterpart at the western naval command.
India's east coast faces six littorals - Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia - across the Bay of Bengal. Its Andaman and Nicobar Islands are scattered midway between its east coast and the Straits of Malacca.
China, though not a Bay of Bengal or Indian Ocean littoral, has been able to secure for itself a presence in these waters by building strong political, economic and defense relationships with several littoral states, including building commercial/naval port infrastructure there that have dual civilian and military use. Besides Gwadar in Pakistan, which sits on the Arabian Sea, China is building ports at Hambantota in Sri Lanka and at Chittagong in Bangladesh. In Myanmar it has upgraded several ports including those at Sittwe, Kyaukpyu, Bassein, Mergui and Yangon and is building radar, refit and refuel facilities at its naval bases at Hainggyi, Akyab, Zadetkyi and Mergui. China's presence in these ports may be presently benign. This “string of pearls” also includes Tanzania (Bagamoyo). However, Indian analysts warn that Beijing could seek to use these ports for military or strategic purposes. Given its substantial influence in these countries, its demands could well be conceded, they say.
That would bring the Chinese navy into the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. While analysts believe that China is still several years, if not decades away from having the capability of supporting sustained naval deployment in the Indian Ocean, it is this looming possibility that India is preparing for by beefing up its eastern naval command. Besides, building force levels of the eastern command to prepare for this contingency, the Indian navy has also been building ties through port calls and joint exercises with other Asia-Pacific navies, many of whom are China-wary.
While joint naval exercises are aimed at developing naval interoperability among the participating fleets, those between India and other China-wary navies carried out in the Bay of Bengal are also aimed at sending out a message to the Chinese navy that its possible future presence in the Indian Ocean will not go unchallenged. The Indian navy has exercised with the navies of Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia since the early 1990s.
The Milan naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal include several Asia-Pacific countries. In September 2007, for the first time ever, the Indo-US Malabar exercises, which are usually held in the Arabian Sea, were held in India's eastern seaboard and included Singapore, Japan and Australia too. The Indian navy has forayed into the South China Sea, which China describes as a ‘core national interest' as well as the Pacific Ocean on port visits and for joint exercises.
The eastern naval command's rising profile has paralleled the evolution of India's "Look East" policy. The navy has played an important role in achieving this expansion. If in the 1990s, the navy remained confined largely west of the Malacca Straits, the past decade has seen it make forays into the Pacific too. Increasingly it is engaging in multilateral exercises in waters off Northeast Asia and its vessels have ventured up to Vladivostok.
India has shown increasing capability to impact the Asia-Pacific security architecture. While still not a key player in the region, neither is it marginal. Much of the global discourse on the evolving Asian security architecture has focussed on maritime rivalry and containment of China. But there is scope for co-operation given shared threats that countries face from pirates and terrorists to sea lanes and choke points. The seas provide a potential area of collaboration among Asia's naval powers. This can be used to begin building a new co-operative Asian order. --- Sudha Ramachandran
Air power and air cover at sea and maritime reconnaissance are essential ingredients in the lexicon of ‘war fighting at sea’, and means must be devised to include aviation MR and fighter assets in the naval ORBAT commensurate with the operational role a Navy is required to play. The dictum ‘what you cannot patrol you cannot control,’ is still valid.
It was in 1960 that the MoD bought the complete design package of the Leander-class FFG’s superstructure and its licenced-manufacturing rights from the UK’s Vickers Armstrong & Yarrow. However, the first of six Leander-class FFGs to be built by the MoD-owned Mazagon Docks Ltd (MDL)—INS Nilgiri--was commissioned only 12 years later on June 23, 1972, nine years after the Royal Navy commissioned its first Leander-class FFG. Thereafter, between 1974 and 1981 the following five Leander-class FFGs were commissioned, and were followed by three Project 16 Godavari-class FFGs and three Project 16A Brahmaputra-class FFGs, accounting for a total of 12 FFGs built as variations (conceptualised and designed by the Navy’s Directorate General Naval Design, or DGND) of the same basic hull design and with the same steam engine-based propulsion package.
The eastern naval command has grown remarkably in recent years. In 2005, it had 30 warships under its command. Six years later, that number has grown to 50 - roughly a third of the Indian Navy's entire fleet strength. It is poised to expand further.
India's only aircraft carrier INS (Indian Naval Ship) Viraat is to be assigned to the eastern command after the refurbished Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov (renamed INS Vikramaditya) joins the western fleet. All five Rajput-class guided-missile destroyers (modified versions of Soviet Kashin class destroyers), which were with the western command have joined the eastern fleet.
The Indian Navy's only ship to be acquired from the Americans, the amphibious USS Trenton, now renamed INS Jalashwa, has been put under the eastern command. It will be joined soon by the indigenously manufactured stealth frigates INS Shivalik, INS Satpura and INS Sahyadri as well as the US-manufactured P-8I Poseidon long-range maritime patrol aircraft and the Italy-made new fleet tanker, INS Shakti.
It will be the eastern command that will take charge of India's nuclear submarines. INS Arihant, which is undergoing sea trials was constructed at Visakhapatnam. Two other nuclear submarines are reportedly under development here.
The eastern command has bases at Visakhapatnam and Kolkata. It will soon have a forward base at Tuticorin and an operational turnaround base at Paradeep. In addition to naval air stations at Dega and Rajali, the eastern command has got a new one, INS Parundu at Uchipuli, where UAVs are being deployed. Reports in the media have hinted at a nuclear submarine naval base somewhere near Visakhapatnam. Codenamed Varsha, the project is under wraps.
The gap between the western and eastern commands appears to be narrowing. In the wake of the eastern command's rising profile and strength, the Indian navy recently upgraded the post of the eastern command's chief of staff to three-star rank, ie the same as that of his counterpart at the western naval command.
India's east coast faces six littorals - Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia - across the Bay of Bengal. Its Andaman and Nicobar Islands are scattered midway between its east coast and the Straits of Malacca.
China, though not a Bay of Bengal or Indian Ocean littoral, has been able to secure for itself a presence in these waters by building strong political, economic and defense relationships with several littoral states, including building commercial/naval port infrastructure there that have dual civilian and military use. Besides Gwadar in Pakistan, which sits on the Arabian Sea, China is building ports at Hambantota in Sri Lanka and at Chittagong in Bangladesh. In Myanmar it has upgraded several ports including those at Sittwe, Kyaukpyu, Bassein, Mergui and Yangon and is building radar, refit and refuel facilities at its naval bases at Hainggyi, Akyab, Zadetkyi and Mergui. China's presence in these ports may be presently benign. This “string of pearls” also includes Tanzania (Bagamoyo). However, Indian analysts warn that Beijing could seek to use these ports for military or strategic purposes. Given its substantial influence in these countries, its demands could well be conceded, they say.
That would bring the Chinese navy into the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. While analysts believe that China is still several years, if not decades away from having the capability of supporting sustained naval deployment in the Indian Ocean, it is this looming possibility that India is preparing for by beefing up its eastern naval command. Besides, building force levels of the eastern command to prepare for this contingency, the Indian navy has also been building ties through port calls and joint exercises with other Asia-Pacific navies, many of whom are China-wary.
While joint naval exercises are aimed at developing naval interoperability among the participating fleets, those between India and other China-wary navies carried out in the Bay of Bengal are also aimed at sending out a message to the Chinese navy that its possible future presence in the Indian Ocean will not go unchallenged. The Indian navy has exercised with the navies of Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia since the early 1990s.
The Milan naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal include several Asia-Pacific countries. In September 2007, for the first time ever, the Indo-US Malabar exercises, which are usually held in the Arabian Sea, were held in India's eastern seaboard and included Singapore, Japan and Australia too. The Indian navy has forayed into the South China Sea, which China describes as a ‘core national interest' as well as the Pacific Ocean on port visits and for joint exercises.
The eastern naval command's rising profile has paralleled the evolution of India's "Look East" policy. The navy has played an important role in achieving this expansion. If in the 1990s, the navy remained confined largely west of the Malacca Straits, the past decade has seen it make forays into the Pacific too. Increasingly it is engaging in multilateral exercises in waters off Northeast Asia and its vessels have ventured up to Vladivostok.
India has shown increasing capability to impact the Asia-Pacific security architecture. While still not a key player in the region, neither is it marginal. Much of the global discourse on the evolving Asian security architecture has focussed on maritime rivalry and containment of China. But there is scope for co-operation given shared threats that countries face from pirates and terrorists to sea lanes and choke points. The seas provide a potential area of collaboration among Asia's naval powers. This can be used to begin building a new co-operative Asian order. --- Sudha Ramachandran
Air power and air cover at sea and maritime reconnaissance are essential ingredients in the lexicon of ‘war fighting at sea’, and means must be devised to include aviation MR and fighter assets in the naval ORBAT commensurate with the operational role a Navy is required to play. The dictum ‘what you cannot patrol you cannot control,’ is still valid.
China’s “peaceful rise” has led other regional countries to work together as a counterweight to the new superpower, a development evinced by India’s recent moves to strengthen its presence in the East Sea and its cooperation with Vietnam. Beijing and New Delhi are honing a keener edge on their maritime rivalry in Asian waters as India begins to establish its presence in the South China Sea, which China claims almost entirely as its own territorial waters. So far this “string of pearls” includes Bangladesh (Chittagong), Burma (Sittwe and Coco Island), Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Pakistan (Gwadar), and Tanzania (Bagamoyo).
When receiving Indian External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna during his four day visit to Vietnam on September 17, President Truong Tan Sang welcomed India’s “Look East” policy. He hailed the active participation of India in the region and supported the strengthening of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-India dialogue. Krishna’s Vietnam visit came amid a new row between China and India, exemplified by the fact that the Indian company ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) has begun exploring oil and gas in two blocks in Vietnam’s East Sea waters. The East Sea is also known as the South China Sea.
For decades, the navy's eastern command played second fiddle to the western command, which is headquartered at Mumbai. Long considered the navy's "sword arm" the western command cornered most of the resources and attention of strategic planners.
The enhanced attention being paid to the eastern command is prompted in part by apprehensions over China's looming naval presence in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. But it is part of India's two decades-long effort to focus its diplomatic, economic and military energies eastward as part of its "Look East" policy. Besides, the navy's new eastward orientation is also aimed at enabling India to emerge a significant player in the emerging Asia-Pacific security architecture.
India's incursion into the South China Sea, including visits to Vietnamese ports by its warships, is undoubtedly also a retort to Beijing's so-called "string of pearls" strategy to contain the Indian Navy. For years China has maintained electronic listening posts on Burma's Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal to eavesdrop on Indian naval communications. More recently Beijing has increased its naval relationship with Pakistan to include port privileges for Chinese warships and Beijing is heavily involved in the building of a deep sea port in Sri Lanka.
Vietnam, of course, is happy to have regional naval power India as an ally in its increasingly tense relations with Beijing over the South China Sea and has also revived a longstanding security relationship with Moscow. Last week Hanoi also signed an agreement with Indonesia to establish joint patrols on their maritime border to improve security in the South China Sea. Hanoi is also buying attack submarines from Russia to try to counter China's burgeoning submarine fleet, whose most potent craft are based at the southern tip of Hainan Island.
In confronting Beijing, India is entering a long and complex, but increasingly acid dispute over the South China Sea whose corrosive qualities have risen as the estimates of the submarine oil and gas reserves have escalated.
As well as Vietnam, Beijing is lined up against Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia with rival claims based on ownership of some or all of the Paracel and Spratly groups of islands, islets and reefs. Based on these claims, each country asserts a 200-mile (322-kilometre) exclusive economic zone around each outcrop and the rights to all resources in that area. Beijing goes much further than the other claimants. It asserts that almost the entire South China Sea, right down to Indonesia, some 1,200 kilometres south of Hainan Island, is Chinese territory based on "historic title" that it says overrides the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Even beyond that, while UNCLOS allows for peaceful right of passage for foreign vessels across exclusive economic zones, Beijing increasingly portrays the South China Sea as its own territorial waters where its authority extends over all foreign vessels. China's Asian and southeast Asian neighbours are increasingly alarmed by this posture, especially as their fishing, merchant and research vessels now regularly have to deal with violent or threatening confrontations with Chinese ships.
When Beijing claimed that it now considers its ownership of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea as a "core interest," Clinton retorted by proposing that the U.S. help establish an international mechanism to mediate the overlapping claims of sovereignty between China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia.One response from China's neighbours has been to ask the United States to reassert its naval presence in the region and to reignite sometimes diminished defence alliances, for example with the Philippines. This Washington has done and Japan, which has its own territorial disputes with China outside the South China Sea but much of whose imports and exports travel its sea lanes, is moving to strengthen its political ties with Southeast Asia and India. This new U.S. assertiveness vis-à-vis Beijing has been widely welcomed in the region. The other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) strongly endorsed Clinton's call for multilateral commitment to a code of conduct for the South China Sea rather than China's preferred bilateral approach. However, while the U.S. remains distracted by economic woes and the challenges of the Arab Spring in the Middle East, Japan is proving unable to tackle its political inertia and emerge as a credible balancer in the region. Thus the regional environment is conducive for assertion by Beijing.
http://apdforum.com/en_GB/article/rmiap/articles/online/features/2013/01/29/china-blue-water
Indonesia reneged by handing over two submarines and four missiles boats to the Pakistan Navy during the 1965 conflict. Further this expansion gave President Sukarno the muscle to propose that the Andamans and Nicobar Islands should become a part of the Indonesian Archipelago in case Pakistan waived her claim to these territories as being part of East Pakistan!
When receiving Indian External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna during his four day visit to Vietnam on September 17, President Truong Tan Sang welcomed India’s “Look East” policy. He hailed the active participation of India in the region and supported the strengthening of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-India dialogue. Krishna’s Vietnam visit came amid a new row between China and India, exemplified by the fact that the Indian company ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) has begun exploring oil and gas in two blocks in Vietnam’s East Sea waters. The East Sea is also known as the South China Sea.
For decades, the navy's eastern command played second fiddle to the western command, which is headquartered at Mumbai. Long considered the navy's "sword arm" the western command cornered most of the resources and attention of strategic planners.
The enhanced attention being paid to the eastern command is prompted in part by apprehensions over China's looming naval presence in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. But it is part of India's two decades-long effort to focus its diplomatic, economic and military energies eastward as part of its "Look East" policy. Besides, the navy's new eastward orientation is also aimed at enabling India to emerge a significant player in the emerging Asia-Pacific security architecture.
India's incursion into the South China Sea, including visits to Vietnamese ports by its warships, is undoubtedly also a retort to Beijing's so-called "string of pearls" strategy to contain the Indian Navy. For years China has maintained electronic listening posts on Burma's Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal to eavesdrop on Indian naval communications. More recently Beijing has increased its naval relationship with Pakistan to include port privileges for Chinese warships and Beijing is heavily involved in the building of a deep sea port in Sri Lanka.
Vietnam, of course, is happy to have regional naval power India as an ally in its increasingly tense relations with Beijing over the South China Sea and has also revived a longstanding security relationship with Moscow. Last week Hanoi also signed an agreement with Indonesia to establish joint patrols on their maritime border to improve security in the South China Sea. Hanoi is also buying attack submarines from Russia to try to counter China's burgeoning submarine fleet, whose most potent craft are based at the southern tip of Hainan Island.
In confronting Beijing, India is entering a long and complex, but increasingly acid dispute over the South China Sea whose corrosive qualities have risen as the estimates of the submarine oil and gas reserves have escalated.
As well as Vietnam, Beijing is lined up against Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia with rival claims based on ownership of some or all of the Paracel and Spratly groups of islands, islets and reefs. Based on these claims, each country asserts a 200-mile (322-kilometre) exclusive economic zone around each outcrop and the rights to all resources in that area. Beijing goes much further than the other claimants. It asserts that almost the entire South China Sea, right down to Indonesia, some 1,200 kilometres south of Hainan Island, is Chinese territory based on "historic title" that it says overrides the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Even beyond that, while UNCLOS allows for peaceful right of passage for foreign vessels across exclusive economic zones, Beijing increasingly portrays the South China Sea as its own territorial waters where its authority extends over all foreign vessels. China's Asian and southeast Asian neighbours are increasingly alarmed by this posture, especially as their fishing, merchant and research vessels now regularly have to deal with violent or threatening confrontations with Chinese ships.
When Beijing claimed that it now considers its ownership of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea as a "core interest," Clinton retorted by proposing that the U.S. help establish an international mechanism to mediate the overlapping claims of sovereignty between China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia.One response from China's neighbours has been to ask the United States to reassert its naval presence in the region and to reignite sometimes diminished defence alliances, for example with the Philippines. This Washington has done and Japan, which has its own territorial disputes with China outside the South China Sea but much of whose imports and exports travel its sea lanes, is moving to strengthen its political ties with Southeast Asia and India. This new U.S. assertiveness vis-à-vis Beijing has been widely welcomed in the region. The other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) strongly endorsed Clinton's call for multilateral commitment to a code of conduct for the South China Sea rather than China's preferred bilateral approach. However, while the U.S. remains distracted by economic woes and the challenges of the Arab Spring in the Middle East, Japan is proving unable to tackle its political inertia and emerge as a credible balancer in the region. Thus the regional environment is conducive for assertion by Beijing.
http://apdforum.com/en_GB/article/rmiap/articles/online/features/2013/01/29/china-blue-water
Indonesia reneged by handing over two submarines and four missiles boats to the Pakistan Navy during the 1965 conflict. Further this expansion gave President Sukarno the muscle to propose that the Andamans and Nicobar Islands should become a part of the Indonesian Archipelago in case Pakistan waived her claim to these territories as being part of East Pakistan!
The retention of strong US maritime deployments in the Asia-Pacific theatre, a more proactive and assertive Japanese naval force projection, and a build-up of the naval capabilities of such key littoral states as Indonesia, Australia and Vietnam: all may help delay, if not deter, the projection of Chinese naval power in the Indian Ocean.
We need to use this window of opportunity to build up our own naval capabilities. Our regional diplomacy should support this approach by fostering closer relations with these 'countervailing' powers.
The Indian Navy has no such choice of a neighbour it can share costs with, and yet has a responsibility in the Indian Ocean to ensure peace and stability. This makes Indian Navy’s task a Hobson’s choice. The escalating cost of fuel is a consideration for all navies and conventional carriers are nick named ‘Guzzlers’, and yet aircraft carriers serve a purpose for large navies, just as submarines do in no less a measure.
The Indian Navy has always tried to give both platforms importance. The trend in surface ships by navies is to give accent to littoral warfare and build littoral combat ships, which can combat terrorism and operate closer to the shore known as the littoral, but large platforms are essential for support of the fleet at sea ‘to carry boots on ground’, provide disaster relief and evacuations. Navies also have to acquire large landing platforms with helicopters in numbers for this.
The navy's indigenisation programme starts with a consensus that buying foreign-built warships undermines budgets and capabilities. Given this co-operative ethos, it is unsurprising that defence shipyards tend to be headed by retired admirals.
When the navy wants a new class of warships, it begins by selecting an Indian shipyard to build it; the directorate of naval design creates a conceptual design and works with the shipyard to translate that into a detailed design; the directorate of indigenisation co-ordinates with industry to ensure that as many systems as possible are sourced from India; the navy allocates the budget and the shipyard rolls out the warships. Indigenous warships are often late and there are occasional quality issues. But the navy gets its home-designed warship at less than the global price. And each time a spare part is used, each time a refit or upgrade is carried out, more money is saved. Over its service life of three decades, the cost of an Indian warship comes to less than a quarter of one bought abroad.
We need to use this window of opportunity to build up our own naval capabilities. Our regional diplomacy should support this approach by fostering closer relations with these 'countervailing' powers.
The Indian Navy has no such choice of a neighbour it can share costs with, and yet has a responsibility in the Indian Ocean to ensure peace and stability. This makes Indian Navy’s task a Hobson’s choice. The escalating cost of fuel is a consideration for all navies and conventional carriers are nick named ‘Guzzlers’, and yet aircraft carriers serve a purpose for large navies, just as submarines do in no less a measure.
The Indian Navy has always tried to give both platforms importance. The trend in surface ships by navies is to give accent to littoral warfare and build littoral combat ships, which can combat terrorism and operate closer to the shore known as the littoral, but large platforms are essential for support of the fleet at sea ‘to carry boots on ground’, provide disaster relief and evacuations. Navies also have to acquire large landing platforms with helicopters in numbers for this.
The navy's indigenisation programme starts with a consensus that buying foreign-built warships undermines budgets and capabilities. Given this co-operative ethos, it is unsurprising that defence shipyards tend to be headed by retired admirals.
When the navy wants a new class of warships, it begins by selecting an Indian shipyard to build it; the directorate of naval design creates a conceptual design and works with the shipyard to translate that into a detailed design; the directorate of indigenisation co-ordinates with industry to ensure that as many systems as possible are sourced from India; the navy allocates the budget and the shipyard rolls out the warships. Indigenous warships are often late and there are occasional quality issues. But the navy gets its home-designed warship at less than the global price. And each time a spare part is used, each time a refit or upgrade is carried out, more money is saved. Over its service life of three decades, the cost of an Indian warship comes to less than a quarter of one bought abroad.
The long-term Maritime Capabilities Perspective Plan had identified a mix of two major roles for the force: One, the traditional blue water operational capability and two, a plan to effectively counter threats closer to the coast. India, which has embarked on a rapid modernisation of its naval fleet, is keen to gain expertise from the South Korea, which one of the world leaders in shipbuilding.
India is planning to develop the Andaman and Nicobar Islands as a major amphibious warfare hub by setting up full-fledged training facilities and basing a sea-and-land fighting unit to provide teeth to its capability to take the battle into enemy shores. India is in the process of building own large-size amphibious warfare vessels and has also procured a warship from the US now christened INS Jalashwa to augment its capabilities in this regard.
The Navy is also in the process of setting up Operational Turn Around (OTR) bases, Forward Operating Bases and Naval Air Enclaves along the coast, which would enhance the reach and sustainability of its surveillance effort on both the coasts.
Another capability the Indian Navy quietly added in November 2013 was a dedicated communication satellite. The satellite is described as a force multiplier by senior naval officers. It covers the Navy’s entire area of interest in the Indian Ocean and beyond. The satellite handles all data transfers for maritime domain awareness and the entire range of communications and networking needs of the Indian Navy.
India is planning to develop the Andaman and Nicobar Islands as a major amphibious warfare hub by setting up full-fledged training facilities and basing a sea-and-land fighting unit to provide teeth to its capability to take the battle into enemy shores. India is in the process of building own large-size amphibious warfare vessels and has also procured a warship from the US now christened INS Jalashwa to augment its capabilities in this regard.
The Navy is also in the process of setting up Operational Turn Around (OTR) bases, Forward Operating Bases and Naval Air Enclaves along the coast, which would enhance the reach and sustainability of its surveillance effort on both the coasts.
Another capability the Indian Navy quietly added in November 2013 was a dedicated communication satellite. The satellite is described as a force multiplier by senior naval officers. It covers the Navy’s entire area of interest in the Indian Ocean and beyond. The satellite handles all data transfers for maritime domain awareness and the entire range of communications and networking needs of the Indian Navy.
Corvettes (Small & agile)
These can be also used as offshore patrol vessel (OPV) when firepower is traded in for higher speed. Indian offshore patrol vessels (OPV) have names from Indian mythology. Indian Patrol vessels are named after islands. Indian corvettes are named after personal arms.
- Sweden's Visby-class (one of the class of U.S.'s LCS is based on this, although not as small) & larger Visby Gen-2 developed from Version 5 (supplement with mine-removing, K31 helicopter landing, anti-ship missiles, missile-defence, anti-submarine torpedoes and variable depth sonar and additional stealth tech)
- German's K130 Braunschweig-class
- Morocco's Damen made SIGMA-class
- Russia's Project 20386 is an improved ver. based on Project 20380 Steregushchy-class (export: Project 20382 Tigr-class)
- Russia's Project 22800 Karakurt-class corvette
- India's Next-Generation Arnala class anti-submarine corvette (NGC) ($4.6 billion) that are capable of offensive SSM attacks, ASW operations, local defence, MIO, and VBSS operations.
- China has made more than 70 nos. of (formerly 582) Type 056 (NATO: Jiangdao-class)
- Singapore's Formidable-class Frigate
- Russia's Gepard-class Frigate
| Russia's Project 20380 Steregushchy-class (export: Project 20382 Tigr-class) multi-purpose corvette is (at 2,200 tons) about 30% smaller than an LCS and cost only 20-25% as much. Yet, it carries a 100mm automatic gun, 14.5-mm machineguns, close-in defense “Gatling gun” systems (AK-630), medium range surface-to-air missiles (S400 series), SS-N-25 anti-ship missiles (sub-sonic and shorter ranged than the US Harpoon but far more capable than the Griffin), 533-mm (21”) torpedoes, 324mm anti-submarine torpedoes and a helicopter. The ship is not only in production for the Russian Navy but also for the navies of Algeria and Indonesia. A version is also being built for China. |
Russia 4000-ton Project 20385 Gremyashchy-class ships were based on the same Project 20380 corvettes as the Steregushchy-class (export: Project 20382 Tigr-class) but differ from their predecessors by greater dimensions and displacement. Gremyashchiy-class is larger and more advanced multipurpose corvettes. Its propulsion was German MTU diesels but due to the sanctions, they were cancelled and Russian-made 1DDA-12000 diesel turbines are beeing used. These new ships are equipped with a UKSK VLS system comprising 8 launchers for SS-N-30, SS-N-27 or SS-N-26 cruise missiles instead.
India's Project-28 ASW Kamorta-Class Corvette / coastal patrol warships
Unlike the multi-role frigates (with land-attack capability) of the Indian Navy, the Kamorta-class corvettes main focus is on shipboard anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability and it being made cost-effectively in numbers in India.
There’s a significant difference between the INS Kiltan, and the two class types — INS Kamorta and INS Kadmatt. While the Kamorta and Kadmatt are built entirely of steel (DMR249A special grade high-tensile steel developed by SAIL in India), the Kiltan’s entire superstructure has been constructed with carbon fibre reinforced composite plastic — instantly shaving off 100 tons in weight from the brand new submarine hunter. Apart from the weight saving, the advantages are four fold:
(a) It provides essential corrosion resistance to the exposed superstructure,
(b) improves sea-keeping ability by increasing metacentric height (a measure of the initial static stability of a floating body). And,
(c) the use of non-metals reduces radar signature and boosts stealth, specifically by suppressing extremely low frequency electromagnetic radiations.
Weight gain from radar signature reduction work had extracted a significant price on the ship’s nimbleness and top speed during the final design stages. The decision to explore a composite superstructure was decided as an imperative for the two final ships. With a displacement of 3500 tonnes, the sleek and magnificent ship spans 109 meters in length and 14 meters at the beam and is propelled by four diesel engines to achieve speeds in excess of 25 knots with an endurance of 3450 nautical miles. Enhanced stealth features have been achieved by ‘X’ form of Hull, full beam superstructure, inclined ship sides and use of Infra-Red Signature Suppression (IRSS) system designed by NSTL for cooling the Engine and Generator exhausts.
Known earlier by its GRSE 'Yard-3017' nomenclature where the keel was first laid and launched in 2010, the sturdy warship Kamorta is the first in its class of four ASW corvettes being built under Project-28 (P28) for the Indian Navy. A sturdy warship, INS Kamorta, is the country's first indigenous anti-submarine warfare (ASW) corvette, built under Project-28 (P28) for the Indian Navy. It is named after the erstwhile Petya Class ship from USSR ex-Kamorta. ASW corvettes Kadmatt, Kiltan and Kavaratti are to follow suit progressively. Named after islands in Andaman & Nicobar and Lakshwadeep archipelago, ASW corvettes Kadmatt, Kiltan and Kavaratti are to follow suit progressively. Cost of four of these class of ships is Rs. 7852.39 crore. INS Kavaratti corvette cost Rs 1,700 crore.
The design includes many stealth features, including reductions in noise and vibration of the vessels. The aim with this project is to stipulate unprecedented standards while providing opportunities to Indian vendors to develop expertise with the technology. As in INS Shivalik, high-grade steel produced in India was utilized for its construction. The sophisticated frontline warship with stealth features will also be the first warship armed with the new trainable chaff launcher - Kavach. S-band Revathi radar, the naval variant of the DRDO-made Central Acquisition Radar (CAR), is a confirmed sensor aboard the vessel. It is also the first naval ship fitted with bow mounted 'Sonar' (sound navigation and ranging) for enhanced underwater surveillance. With about 90 percent of the ship being indigenous, it is also capable of deploying a helicopter, adding considerable punch to the ship's anti-submarine capability. It to be noted that the foldable hangar door has been fitted for the first time with a rail-less helicopter traversing system.
The first two raft-mounted gearboxes for the first corvette were produced in France on the DCNS Nantes site, but the next four were produced in India under a transfer of technology agreement between DCNS and its industrial partner WIL (Walchandnagar Industries Limited). France's DCNS has provided a comprehensive engineering package of raft mounted Propulsion Power Transmission Systems consisting of eight reduction gear units on cradles and either thrust blocks. It incorporates state-of-art low-noise CODAD (combined diesel and diesel) propulsion system with hydraulic coupling between main engines and gearbox.
Indigenously developed IRSS (infrared signature suppression system) devices are fitted in engine exhaust for reducing infra-red signatures enabling it to stealthily operate. With reverse osmosis plant for fresh water generation, sewage treatment plant with vacuum toilet facilities totally compliant with International Maritime Organisation regulations, the warship measures up to all stringent regulatory needs to operate across oceans of the world.
The ship is also fitted with sophisticated, indigenously made stabilizing systems. The propulsion as well as the power generation systems with damage control system is enveloped by an 'Integrated Platform Management System' for achieving a superior state of control and integration. The hull of the ship is built with special grade high-tensile steel (DMR249A) developed by Indian Navy and procured from SAIL (Steel Authority of India) for which GRSE trained its team of welders to achieve conditions of near zero-rejection state. This grade of steel is being used for the first time on any indigenously built naval ship, making the ship very cost-effective, fuel-efficient, powerful and well suited for the service intended.
With an approximate displacement of 3,400 tonnes, it can achieve a maximum speed of 25 knots. It is powered by four indigenously designed 3888 KW diesel engines at 1050 rpm and can cover nearly 3,500 nautical miles at 18 knots. The overall length of the ship is 109 meters and is nearly 13 metres wide at its maximum bulge. Each ship will be manned by 14 officers and 150 sailors.
The P15A destroyers will deploy 16 BrahMos in vertical launch configuration, heavy-weight torpedoes, ASW rockets, 76 mm Medium Range gun and two guns as Close-in-Weapon System (CIWS) with dedicated fire control systems, chaff systems and the PDMS which would be installed in due course. Her sensors include the most advanced bow mounted sonar, advanced ESM system and direction finder, an air surveillance radar with capability to detect target exceeding 200 Km and an active towed array system. It includes a license-built Otobreda 76 mm Super Rapid gun in a stealth mount and L&T built derivatives of the RBU-6000 torpedo launchers. The ship is equipped with a Bow mounted Sonar and are capable of deploying a Seaking 42B helicopter, adding considerable punch to the ship’s anti-submarine capability.
Stealth features include X-form Hull for low RCS, Raft Mounted Gear Box for low under-water noise and Infra-red Signature Suppression Device for low heat radiations. Usage of DMR 249A steel for construction, which has been developed indigenously by Defence Material Research Laboratory and manufactured in-house Steel Authority of India Ltd (SAIL). The hull of the ship is built with special grade high-tensile steel (DMR249A) developed by Indian Navy and procured from SAIL (Steel Authority of India) for which GRSE trained its team of welders to achieve conditions of near zero-rejection state. Use of Carbon Fibre Reinforced Plastic (CFRP) superstructure integrated with the steel hull in the third and fourth ships of the class. First time installation of revolutionary foldable hanger door and Railless Helo Traversing System and Telescopic Boat Davit.
Highlights of the design include Low Radar Cross Section (RCS) signature through full beam superstructure, inclined ship sides and reduced Infra-red (IR) signature by use of “Infrared Suppression System (IRSS) device’ for cooling the engine and diesel alternator exhausts, developed indigenously by Naval Scientific and technical Laboratory (NSTL).
Unlike the multi-role frigates (with land-attack capability) of the Indian Navy, the Kamorta-class corvettes main focus is on shipboard anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability and it being made cost-effectively in numbers in India.
There’s a significant difference between the INS Kiltan, and the two class types — INS Kamorta and INS Kadmatt. While the Kamorta and Kadmatt are built entirely of steel (DMR249A special grade high-tensile steel developed by SAIL in India), the Kiltan’s entire superstructure has been constructed with carbon fibre reinforced composite plastic — instantly shaving off 100 tons in weight from the brand new submarine hunter. Apart from the weight saving, the advantages are four fold:
(a) It provides essential corrosion resistance to the exposed superstructure,
(b) improves sea-keeping ability by increasing metacentric height (a measure of the initial static stability of a floating body). And,
(c) the use of non-metals reduces radar signature and boosts stealth, specifically by suppressing extremely low frequency electromagnetic radiations.
Weight gain from radar signature reduction work had extracted a significant price on the ship’s nimbleness and top speed during the final design stages. The decision to explore a composite superstructure was decided as an imperative for the two final ships. With a displacement of 3500 tonnes, the sleek and magnificent ship spans 109 meters in length and 14 meters at the beam and is propelled by four diesel engines to achieve speeds in excess of 25 knots with an endurance of 3450 nautical miles. Enhanced stealth features have been achieved by ‘X’ form of Hull, full beam superstructure, inclined ship sides and use of Infra-Red Signature Suppression (IRSS) system designed by NSTL for cooling the Engine and Generator exhausts.
Known earlier by its GRSE 'Yard-3017' nomenclature where the keel was first laid and launched in 2010, the sturdy warship Kamorta is the first in its class of four ASW corvettes being built under Project-28 (P28) for the Indian Navy. A sturdy warship, INS Kamorta, is the country's first indigenous anti-submarine warfare (ASW) corvette, built under Project-28 (P28) for the Indian Navy. It is named after the erstwhile Petya Class ship from USSR ex-Kamorta. ASW corvettes Kadmatt, Kiltan and Kavaratti are to follow suit progressively. Named after islands in Andaman & Nicobar and Lakshwadeep archipelago, ASW corvettes Kadmatt, Kiltan and Kavaratti are to follow suit progressively. Cost of four of these class of ships is Rs. 7852.39 crore. INS Kavaratti corvette cost Rs 1,700 crore.
The design includes many stealth features, including reductions in noise and vibration of the vessels. The aim with this project is to stipulate unprecedented standards while providing opportunities to Indian vendors to develop expertise with the technology. As in INS Shivalik, high-grade steel produced in India was utilized for its construction. The sophisticated frontline warship with stealth features will also be the first warship armed with the new trainable chaff launcher - Kavach. S-band Revathi radar, the naval variant of the DRDO-made Central Acquisition Radar (CAR), is a confirmed sensor aboard the vessel. It is also the first naval ship fitted with bow mounted 'Sonar' (sound navigation and ranging) for enhanced underwater surveillance. With about 90 percent of the ship being indigenous, it is also capable of deploying a helicopter, adding considerable punch to the ship's anti-submarine capability. It to be noted that the foldable hangar door has been fitted for the first time with a rail-less helicopter traversing system.
The first two raft-mounted gearboxes for the first corvette were produced in France on the DCNS Nantes site, but the next four were produced in India under a transfer of technology agreement between DCNS and its industrial partner WIL (Walchandnagar Industries Limited). France's DCNS has provided a comprehensive engineering package of raft mounted Propulsion Power Transmission Systems consisting of eight reduction gear units on cradles and either thrust blocks. It incorporates state-of-art low-noise CODAD (combined diesel and diesel) propulsion system with hydraulic coupling between main engines and gearbox.
Indigenously developed IRSS (infrared signature suppression system) devices are fitted in engine exhaust for reducing infra-red signatures enabling it to stealthily operate. With reverse osmosis plant for fresh water generation, sewage treatment plant with vacuum toilet facilities totally compliant with International Maritime Organisation regulations, the warship measures up to all stringent regulatory needs to operate across oceans of the world.
The ship is also fitted with sophisticated, indigenously made stabilizing systems. The propulsion as well as the power generation systems with damage control system is enveloped by an 'Integrated Platform Management System' for achieving a superior state of control and integration. The hull of the ship is built with special grade high-tensile steel (DMR249A) developed by Indian Navy and procured from SAIL (Steel Authority of India) for which GRSE trained its team of welders to achieve conditions of near zero-rejection state. This grade of steel is being used for the first time on any indigenously built naval ship, making the ship very cost-effective, fuel-efficient, powerful and well suited for the service intended.
With an approximate displacement of 3,400 tonnes, it can achieve a maximum speed of 25 knots. It is powered by four indigenously designed 3888 KW diesel engines at 1050 rpm and can cover nearly 3,500 nautical miles at 18 knots. The overall length of the ship is 109 meters and is nearly 13 metres wide at its maximum bulge. Each ship will be manned by 14 officers and 150 sailors.
The P15A destroyers will deploy 16 BrahMos in vertical launch configuration, heavy-weight torpedoes, ASW rockets, 76 mm Medium Range gun and two guns as Close-in-Weapon System (CIWS) with dedicated fire control systems, chaff systems and the PDMS which would be installed in due course. Her sensors include the most advanced bow mounted sonar, advanced ESM system and direction finder, an air surveillance radar with capability to detect target exceeding 200 Km and an active towed array system. It includes a license-built Otobreda 76 mm Super Rapid gun in a stealth mount and L&T built derivatives of the RBU-6000 torpedo launchers. The ship is equipped with a Bow mounted Sonar and are capable of deploying a Seaking 42B helicopter, adding considerable punch to the ship’s anti-submarine capability.
Stealth features include X-form Hull for low RCS, Raft Mounted Gear Box for low under-water noise and Infra-red Signature Suppression Device for low heat radiations. Usage of DMR 249A steel for construction, which has been developed indigenously by Defence Material Research Laboratory and manufactured in-house Steel Authority of India Ltd (SAIL). The hull of the ship is built with special grade high-tensile steel (DMR249A) developed by Indian Navy and procured from SAIL (Steel Authority of India) for which GRSE trained its team of welders to achieve conditions of near zero-rejection state. Use of Carbon Fibre Reinforced Plastic (CFRP) superstructure integrated with the steel hull in the third and fourth ships of the class. First time installation of revolutionary foldable hanger door and Railless Helo Traversing System and Telescopic Boat Davit.
Highlights of the design include Low Radar Cross Section (RCS) signature through full beam superstructure, inclined ship sides and reduced Infra-red (IR) signature by use of “Infrared Suppression System (IRSS) device’ for cooling the engine and diesel alternator exhausts, developed indigenously by Naval Scientific and technical Laboratory (NSTL).
After 26/11, a chain of 48 Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders and receivers by SAAB of Sweden and Elcome Marine of India, TETRA radars from Denmark, OBSERV cameras from Canada and night vision devices from Controp Israel has been set up by Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) along the coast.
Their connectivity by fibre optics and internet is being operationalised by Director Generals of Coast Guard and Lighthouses to ensure warnings for reaction, under the NC3I project set up under the Cabinet Secretary (the country’s highest civil services officer). The DG Shipping has set up Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) of all ships at sea in the Indian LRIT Region and has provided feeds to the Navy and Coast Guard.
All these are being linked to the National Command Centre. The systems deployed are very advanced, and call for highly skilled manpower with adequate training, and standard operating procedures (SOPs).
Their connectivity by fibre optics and internet is being operationalised by Director Generals of Coast Guard and Lighthouses to ensure warnings for reaction, under the NC3I project set up under the Cabinet Secretary (the country’s highest civil services officer). The DG Shipping has set up Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) of all ships at sea in the Indian LRIT Region and has provided feeds to the Navy and Coast Guard.
All these are being linked to the National Command Centre. The systems deployed are very advanced, and call for highly skilled manpower with adequate training, and standard operating procedures (SOPs).
A unique feature of the 950-ton Buyan-M Project 21631 class patrol corvette (based on a relatively cheap small ship) is that it can move around both littoral areas (green-water operations) and also potential numerous inland waterways (brown-water operations). Imagine, a ship under a 1000-ton with a missile-carrying strike range close to an US Arleigh Burke class destroyer of just under 7000-ton, moving on a river near an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) somewhere in Western Russia. has showed clearly the difference in capability & attitude between the 4,000-ton US LCS, 4 times as big as a Buyan-M, but with much weaker firepower too. However, the Russia experienced, the riverine qualities of Buyan-M significantly impaired the ship’s qualities in open blue waters. The 800-ton Karakurt-class Project 22800 is built specifically to address this problem. It gives the Karakurt-class much better abilities in rough sea while providing maritime support but it will handle green-water operations much better than Buyan-M. The Karakurt-class will not give Russia a blue-water navy. They are too small for that, and they do not have the endurance for sustained operations. Considering the ongoing anti-piracy role of the Russian Navy off the Horn of Africa, you get a glimpse of the likely role of these ships, both at home and far from base. Up to now, the Russian Navy did not have a dedicated ship to carry out these duties, but used much larger ships, largely unsuited for this specialist role. And every one of these ships must be treated as a potential launcher for nuclear missiles, which gives them a strategic significance in themselves.
Royal Malaysian Navy 15-to-5 types of ship plan:
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Five 2,400 ton Ada-class corvettes (with SIGINT, torpedo defense and hangar for helicopter and UAVs) have been built for Turkey, four for Pakistan and two for Ukraine. There are 8 anti-ship missiles, 21 air-defense missiles and 2 launchers for ASW torpedoes.
Frigates “Destroyer Escorts”
(US Navy requires large no. of littoral frigates & has retired guided-missile frigates)
(US Navy requires large no. of littoral frigates & has retired guided-missile frigates)
These ships usually form the numerical bulk of a naval fleet as they are relatively cheaper than large destroyers and cruisers. Each type of frigate has its own set of strengths as its developed specifically to fulfill a specific role e.g. anti-air or anti-submarine or surface/land-attack or general multi-purpose. China leads the world with 52 frigates across three different classes, followed by Taiwan, which has 24. Indian frigates are named after mountain ranges or rivers (destroyers are also named after rivers).
Frigates are meant to be faster and cheaper than the big and heavy destroyers. The key distinction between frigates and destroyers is size but also function. The U.S. Navy has learned hard lessons that speed at sea is a terribly expensive capability and is not worth sacrificing so much. Except for large nuclear-powered ships, high speeds are only possible for limited times and in good weather. Moreover, speed is needed to deploy quickly over long distances but more than 25 knots is unlikely to needed for any tactical use. Hence, upcoming ships will trade some speed in favour of more weapons and heavier armor. The Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is not only staggeringly overpriced and chronically unreliable but — even if it were to work perfectly — cannot match the combat power of similar sized foreign warships costing only a fraction as much.
The USS Freedom ended up costing nearly $600 million, about twice what the first ship in the class was supposed to have cost. The trimaran design had 90% more "material deficiencies" than the traditional design. The Littoral-surface multi-mission Combat Ship (LCS) is not the only recent failed new ship concept. The new Ford class nuclear aircraft carrier is crippled by bad design decisions and manufacturing problems. Before that there were the DDG-1000 class stealth destroyers that proved too expensive to mass-produce. Only three were built and their main weapon does not work. Similar problems inflicted the Seawolf SSN (nuclear attack sub). All these failed projects indicate that the navy has not yet fixed its fundamental inability to design and build new ships.
Frigates are meant to be faster and cheaper than the big and heavy destroyers. The key distinction between frigates and destroyers is size but also function. The U.S. Navy has learned hard lessons that speed at sea is a terribly expensive capability and is not worth sacrificing so much. Except for large nuclear-powered ships, high speeds are only possible for limited times and in good weather. Moreover, speed is needed to deploy quickly over long distances but more than 25 knots is unlikely to needed for any tactical use. Hence, upcoming ships will trade some speed in favour of more weapons and heavier armor. The Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is not only staggeringly overpriced and chronically unreliable but — even if it were to work perfectly — cannot match the combat power of similar sized foreign warships costing only a fraction as much.
The USS Freedom ended up costing nearly $600 million, about twice what the first ship in the class was supposed to have cost. The trimaran design had 90% more "material deficiencies" than the traditional design. The Littoral-surface multi-mission Combat Ship (LCS) is not the only recent failed new ship concept. The new Ford class nuclear aircraft carrier is crippled by bad design decisions and manufacturing problems. Before that there were the DDG-1000 class stealth destroyers that proved too expensive to mass-produce. Only three were built and their main weapon does not work. Similar problems inflicted the Seawolf SSN (nuclear attack sub). All these failed projects indicate that the navy has not yet fixed its fundamental inability to design and build new ships.
U.S. Frigates made for escort duty are back, the last frigates for escort duty were built more than 30 years ago to protect expensive U.S. vessels from the Soviets. A longer ship was needed, so the design could stay within the proper space and weight margins, as these new features were adding into the FREMM design to create the final Constellation-class design. The 5,000 to 7,000 ton FREMM has been in service since 2007 and is currently used by 4 nations. The first U.S. Constellation-class FREMM supposed to be in service by 2026. The desire to add a second shipyard strongly indicates the Navy wants far more than the original number.
U.S. FREMM will also have one 57mm gun and a hangar and landing pad for two helicopters or one helicopter plus UAVs. It is equipped with AN/SPY-6(V)3 AEGIS-type AESA radar with 3 fixed-face arrays and Kongsberg Naval Strike Missiles (NSM). NSM uses GPS and inertial guidance systems, as well as a heat imaging system (and a database of likely targets) for picking out and hitting the intended ship. There are 4 Mk-53 anti-submarine torpedo launchers and 32 or 41 VLC cells for anti-aircraft or other missiles. There will also be a RAM system for anti-missile defence. Top speed is about 48 km/h.
The CODLAG propulsion system for the Constellation is a new configuration which combines GE LM-2500+G4 gas turbine and two MTU diesel engines to power the ship via an electric drive system. The Constellation class will not be side launched at 70 percent completion like LCS was. Instead, it will be built to minimum 90 percent, before transferring into the water. It will also benefit from a new dedicated lab for Aegis equipment testing and radar integration facilities. The Constellation-class program will be a game-changer as it will be able to tell you “the status of your engine, the status of all your components, and when you need to do maintenance and how you plan for that maintenance.”
U.S. FREMM will also have one 57mm gun and a hangar and landing pad for two helicopters or one helicopter plus UAVs. It is equipped with AN/SPY-6(V)3 AEGIS-type AESA radar with 3 fixed-face arrays and Kongsberg Naval Strike Missiles (NSM). NSM uses GPS and inertial guidance systems, as well as a heat imaging system (and a database of likely targets) for picking out and hitting the intended ship. There are 4 Mk-53 anti-submarine torpedo launchers and 32 or 41 VLC cells for anti-aircraft or other missiles. There will also be a RAM system for anti-missile defence. Top speed is about 48 km/h.
The CODLAG propulsion system for the Constellation is a new configuration which combines GE LM-2500+G4 gas turbine and two MTU diesel engines to power the ship via an electric drive system. The Constellation class will not be side launched at 70 percent completion like LCS was. Instead, it will be built to minimum 90 percent, before transferring into the water. It will also benefit from a new dedicated lab for Aegis equipment testing and radar integration facilities. The Constellation-class program will be a game-changer as it will be able to tell you “the status of your engine, the status of all your components, and when you need to do maintenance and how you plan for that maintenance.”
5,700 ton Type 31 frigate is intended to enter service alongside the more capable 8,000 ton Type 26 frigate, together they will replace the smaller Type 23 frigates for Royal Navy. Type 26 frigates might be preferable but are 4 times more expensive than Type 31 frigates. Each new Type 31 frigate will be powered by 4 MTU 20V 8000 M71 engines, each delivering over 8,000 kW. On-board power will be provided on each vessel by four MTU generator sets based on 16V 2000 M41B units, each delivering in excess of 900 kW.
China's 4,000 ton Type 054 frigate is based on Western, not Russian, designs. Pakistan's Chinese-made Type 054 (Jiangkai I) Sword-class frigates resembled the French La Fayette-class frigates in shape and displacement. This frigate is a modern design and the first one entered service in 2008. By 2012 ten of these had been built and by 2016 there were 25.
In addition, the Chinese used French, or French-derived, electronics and weapons. The French exported these systems to China in the 1980s, and later granted production licences. These systems were similar to those used on the La Fayettes in the 1980s. The frigate's diesel engines are by French SEMT Pielstick. It is the first Chinese warship equipped with VLS (Vertical Launch System) and has 32 VLS cells for HQ-16 anti-aircraft missiles. There are 8 anti-ship cruise missiles, a 76mm gun and two 30mm multi-barrel auto-cannon for anti-missile defense. There are 6 torpedo tubes and 12 launchers for anti-submarine rockets (carrying depth charges). There is also a hangar for a helicopter. All this is handled by a crew of 165.
Type 054A Jiangkai-II guided-missile frigate, uses the same hull but with improved sensors and weapons. It costs around $320-$360 million per ship (about half the cost of FREMM). It is China’s most produced, big, modern, important combat ship. The Type 054A has a top speed of 48 kms/hr and endurance of about 3 weeks on internal fuel (moving at cruising speed). It replaces the 1,400 ton Type 053 frigates (based on Russian Cold War era Riga class).
5,000 ton Type 54B is similar in shape to the 054As but has a new 20 MW all-electric power plant. The 054Bs are apparently designed with long range escort in mind and as part of aircraft carrier or amphibious task forces. The 054Bs will come with upgraded electronics and an ASW helicopter.
In addition, the Chinese used French, or French-derived, electronics and weapons. The French exported these systems to China in the 1980s, and later granted production licences. These systems were similar to those used on the La Fayettes in the 1980s. The frigate's diesel engines are by French SEMT Pielstick. It is the first Chinese warship equipped with VLS (Vertical Launch System) and has 32 VLS cells for HQ-16 anti-aircraft missiles. There are 8 anti-ship cruise missiles, a 76mm gun and two 30mm multi-barrel auto-cannon for anti-missile defense. There are 6 torpedo tubes and 12 launchers for anti-submarine rockets (carrying depth charges). There is also a hangar for a helicopter. All this is handled by a crew of 165.
Type 054A Jiangkai-II guided-missile frigate, uses the same hull but with improved sensors and weapons. It costs around $320-$360 million per ship (about half the cost of FREMM). It is China’s most produced, big, modern, important combat ship. The Type 054A has a top speed of 48 kms/hr and endurance of about 3 weeks on internal fuel (moving at cruising speed). It replaces the 1,400 ton Type 053 frigates (based on Russian Cold War era Riga class).
5,000 ton Type 54B is similar in shape to the 054As but has a new 20 MW all-electric power plant. The 054Bs are apparently designed with long range escort in mind and as part of aircraft carrier or amphibious task forces. The 054Bs will come with upgraded electronics and an ASW helicopter.
F-22P Zulfiquar class frigate. Its built by China and Pakistan for the Pakistan Navy.
The F-22P hull uses many of the radar cross-section reduction features of China's Type 054 frigate to help it evade detection by radars mounted on other ships, aircraft and anti-ship missiles.
The F-22P hull uses many of the radar cross-section reduction features of China's Type 054 frigate to help it evade detection by radars mounted on other ships, aircraft and anti-ship missiles.
3,000 ton Multi-Mission or Littoral-Surface Combat Ship (MMC aka LCS) The first Freedom LCS was launched in 2006 and the first Independence LCS was launched in 2008. In January 2020 the U.S. Navy decided to retire 4 of its troublesome LCS. Currently, there are only 25 LCS ships in service, but many are not operational. Six in service had operational limitations because of debilitating engine (ball-bearings in the combining gear) problems and were unable to go overseas or do much more than act as patrol ship. The trimaran design had 90% more "material deficiencies" than the traditional design. The Navy doesn't even know how to repair many commercial systems onboard LCS, and is starting to pay the manufacturers of such systems for the required data to troubleshoot and fix issues on the ships. By 2022 only 17 ships will be in service, with only 11 fully capable. Six have operational limitations and are unable to do much more than act as patrol ships. It was also found that the interchangeable mission modules took far longer, 2 to 3 days instead of 2 to 3 hours, to replace. The LCS has demonstrated it cannot really replace the 51 old but very successful Perry class frigates and 26 smaller mine warfare ships. The replacement for the LCS, Constellation-class guided missile frigates, has already been selected and ordered. The LCS failed, and the US Navy turned to a proven European frigate design that could enter production quickly.
There are actually two LCS classes; the Lockheed Martin's mono-hull (traditional design) USS Freedom class and the General Dynamics' USS Independence class, which is a radical trimaran design. The navy surprised everyone in 2010 by choosing both monohull and trimaran designs and requesting that the 50 or so LCS ships be split between the two very different looking ships (they both share many common elements). However, these ships lack the range and electronic warfare capabilities. Both types of LCS had their own problems, as well as problems common to the overall LCS concept. Basic endurance is 21 days. Top speed was expected to be over 80 kilometers with a range of 2,700 kilometers. SeaRAM has become the standard in LCS, over RAM (RIM-116 "Rolling Air-Frame") missiles, to replaces the earlier Phalanx auto-cannon (two kilometers range). LCS does not possess a ship-killing capability when facing a large commercial vessel. The Naval Strike Missile is the heaviest anti-ship weapon, and it is far too light to pose a lethal threat to large commercial ships.
The latest problems are development delays that have to do with the simplest weapon, involving the surface launched Hellfire II missile to deal with small boats. In 2011 the navy decided to equip LCS with a surface launched version of the Griffin air-to-surface missile as an alternative to the Hellfire II. But it was soon realized that the Griffin took longer to reach a target than the Hellfire and that the speed difference could be critical given the types of targets this system was designed to handle (small armed boats some carrying missiles of explosives for a suicide attack). So the navy went back to the Hellfire.
The US Navy has identified 32 reliability issues in both versions that are related to its propulsion, fuel lines, power plants, including the biggest issue being the unreliability of parts related to its combined gearbox. Currently, all the Freedom type LCS ships can only use the diesel engines due to the problem with the ball-bearings in the combining gear. The two high-speed clutch bearings would wear faster than anticipated over a period of time and result in a failure of the combining gear. An engineering defect was found in the bearings' system in USS Detroit (LCS-7) and USS Little Rock (LCS-9) ships. The system links the ship's Rolls-Royce MT30 gas turbines and Colt-Pielstick diesel engines, which power the main drive shaft to achieve 40-knot top speed. Warships using diesel (for economical slow cruising) and gas turbine (for rapid acceleration) engines have been around for decades, and a bad combining design should not have happened. Three ships in the class - the USS Milwaukee, the USS Fort Worth and the initial USS Freedom - have experienced breakdowns, leaving them unusable. USS Minneapolis-Saint Paul (LCS 21) is the first Freedom-variant ship to receive the fix. Until this is fixed, there cannot be high-power for Electronic Warfare (EW), jammers and sensors for SIGINT, etc.
The US Navy may never be able to fix it's mine counter-measure (MCM) and ASW, due to the sonars catching loud noise interference from the LCS's water jets, so they have abandoned the swappable modules' concept for LCS.
There are actually two LCS classes; the Lockheed Martin's mono-hull (traditional design) USS Freedom class and the General Dynamics' USS Independence class, which is a radical trimaran design. The navy surprised everyone in 2010 by choosing both monohull and trimaran designs and requesting that the 50 or so LCS ships be split between the two very different looking ships (they both share many common elements). However, these ships lack the range and electronic warfare capabilities. Both types of LCS had their own problems, as well as problems common to the overall LCS concept. Basic endurance is 21 days. Top speed was expected to be over 80 kilometers with a range of 2,700 kilometers. SeaRAM has become the standard in LCS, over RAM (RIM-116 "Rolling Air-Frame") missiles, to replaces the earlier Phalanx auto-cannon (two kilometers range). LCS does not possess a ship-killing capability when facing a large commercial vessel. The Naval Strike Missile is the heaviest anti-ship weapon, and it is far too light to pose a lethal threat to large commercial ships.
The latest problems are development delays that have to do with the simplest weapon, involving the surface launched Hellfire II missile to deal with small boats. In 2011 the navy decided to equip LCS with a surface launched version of the Griffin air-to-surface missile as an alternative to the Hellfire II. But it was soon realized that the Griffin took longer to reach a target than the Hellfire and that the speed difference could be critical given the types of targets this system was designed to handle (small armed boats some carrying missiles of explosives for a suicide attack). So the navy went back to the Hellfire.
The US Navy has identified 32 reliability issues in both versions that are related to its propulsion, fuel lines, power plants, including the biggest issue being the unreliability of parts related to its combined gearbox. Currently, all the Freedom type LCS ships can only use the diesel engines due to the problem with the ball-bearings in the combining gear. The two high-speed clutch bearings would wear faster than anticipated over a period of time and result in a failure of the combining gear. An engineering defect was found in the bearings' system in USS Detroit (LCS-7) and USS Little Rock (LCS-9) ships. The system links the ship's Rolls-Royce MT30 gas turbines and Colt-Pielstick diesel engines, which power the main drive shaft to achieve 40-knot top speed. Warships using diesel (for economical slow cruising) and gas turbine (for rapid acceleration) engines have been around for decades, and a bad combining design should not have happened. Three ships in the class - the USS Milwaukee, the USS Fort Worth and the initial USS Freedom - have experienced breakdowns, leaving them unusable. USS Minneapolis-Saint Paul (LCS 21) is the first Freedom-variant ship to receive the fix. Until this is fixed, there cannot be high-power for Electronic Warfare (EW), jammers and sensors for SIGINT, etc.
The US Navy may never be able to fix it's mine counter-measure (MCM) and ASW, due to the sonars catching loud noise interference from the LCS's water jets, so they have abandoned the swappable modules' concept for LCS.
- The surface-warfare chief had said that the Navy had yet to settle key LCS issues regarding its missions and tactics. Half of the MCM package — the three components operated from helicopters, as opposed to the other three deployed from in-water unmanned vehicles — has been used by LCSs in the Indo-Pacific, with the remaining systems still pending final testing and approval. The problems of the MCM (Mine Counter Measures) module are with the “integration” (the hardware and software created to get all components of the MCM module to work efficiently together.)
- The worst difficulties are with the ASW module. All the components work well and integration is fine, but in getting all this done someone lost track of module weight, which was not supposed to exceed 105 tons. The excess weight must be removed before the LCS can safely and reliably use the ASW module. This will prove expensive, since most of the ASW components involved have been around for a while and are not easily or cheaply modified. Hence, the U.S. Navy has decided to permanently install modules (either surface warfare, mine warfare or anti-submarine warfare) in the 40 LCS ships the navy plans to have. The ASW package, appeared almost ready for primetime in 2016 and 2019, but turned up new technology issues.
The LCS began development in 2002, went into sea trials in 2009, commissioned in 2010 and put it into mass production in 2012. The navy originally sought to have between 50 and 60 LCSs by 2014-18, at a cost of $460 million (after the first five) each. The USS Freedom ended up costing nearly $600 million, about twice what the first ship in the class was supposed to have cost. All these problems caused the navy to decide in early 2014 to cut the number to be built from 52 to 32. Initially, the Navy aimed for each ship to cost $220 million, but the Government Accountability Office estimates procurement costs for the first 32 ships are currently about $21 billion, or about $655 million to $1.3 billion per ship—nearly triple what they were supposed to cost. The program’s three mission packages, according to the latest select acquisition report, add about $7.6 billion. At this point, cancellation of the program is becoming an attractive option. It looks like the navy will only have, at most, 30 LCS ships by the end of the decade and still unsure about exactly what it can use these ships for.
The 2,500 tons LCS was meant to avoid the expense of building an improved version of the 71 Perry class frigate. When the Navy in the 1990s first began shaping the LCS program, the idea was for a highly-automated fast ship with swappable multi-mission modules so that LCS could do what the navy needed (like assemble a lot of mine clearing ships or anti-submarine vessels) in an emergency. Foreign navies had already applied the concept successfully, e.g. the Danish Navy’s “Standard Flex” series of weapon modules had in particular grabbed the U.S. Navy’s attention. LCA was previously designed to have a shallow draft, so they can operate where bigger (destroyer) ships cannot, permitting access to very shallow "green" and even "brown" coastal and riverine waters where most naval operations have taken place in the past generation. Instead, now each LCS will be a conventional ship built for a single type of mission and a significantly larger crew. Normally, a ship of this size would have a crew of about 200. Each LCS actually has two complete crews ("blue" and "gold") of 50 (plus mission package personnel) who take turns running the ship. This makes it possible to keep an LCS at a distant posting for years, by simply flying in a relief crew every six months.
In an interesting change, at the start of 2015 the navy decided to reclassify the LCS as frigates. This was not unexpected as in size and function the LCS ships were very comparable to frigates, but the LCS was meant to be much more than a frigate and used a very innovative design. The navy could have built a new class of frigates, but the LCS design was a lot more flexible, making it possible for different “mission packages” to be quickly installed so that LCS could do what the navy needed (like assemble a lot of mine clearing ships or anti-submarine vessels) in an emergency. This has not worked out as well as expected. Unlike the foreign systems they were modelled on, LCS modules will not be swappable within a day or two, as originally envisaged. Instead, the process can take weeks. Currently, it takes far longer (2-3 days instead of 2-3 hours) to replace.
Lots of problems with design were to be expected because the LCS was a radical new warship design and these always have a lot of problems at first. For the LCS, the problems never stopped. Some were fixed, other resisted solution at all and others were fixed, then broke again. In the end there was plenty of innovation but nothing that was useful or reliable. The U.S. Navy has been increasingly unhappy with the performance of American ship builders. The issue was the same one the Navy has had with so many warships since the 1980s; poor management in design and construction.
The US Navy has not previously disclosed the cracks in higher-stress areas in the Independence-class LCS, and these cracks can grow if the ships transits faster than 15 knots in seas with maximum wave heights of about eight feet. Taking out deck plate and shell plate can't be done outside a big availability and, if nothing else, it will add to the ship's weight, which will likely slow it down. The first version also had a long crack in its hull, and it's prone to "galvanic corrosion". The LCH ship has weight and stability issues, lack of compartmentation, structural weaknesses, excessive vibration at speed, weak flight decks, poor sea-keeping by both versions, insufficient stores, inadequate range, poor endurance, sub-standard survivability (though some additional shrapnel protection will be added). This was to be expected because the LCS was a radical new warship design and these always have a lot of problems at first. There is some nervousness about all this. The U.S. Navy has not introduced a radical new design for nearly a century.
The ballooning LCS construction costs caused the Navy to try to save money by ordering that future ships be built to commercial standards. This will reduce their survivability level (protection of ship, crew, and vital systems) to (or below) the lowest level (of three) the Navy recognizes. LCS has been rated as not survivable in a “hostile combat environment.”
When Saudi Arabia became the first export customer for the LCS, they specified four modified Freedom type LCS ships that were basically modified to be frigates. The Saudis called their LCS the MMSC (Multi-Mission Surface Combatant) frigates. MMSC will have a larger crew of about 120. A helicopter will also be carried on the MMSC, and the heavier armament means it will not be able to use the mission modules the LCS was designed to carry.
The 2,500 tons LCS was meant to avoid the expense of building an improved version of the 71 Perry class frigate. When the Navy in the 1990s first began shaping the LCS program, the idea was for a highly-automated fast ship with swappable multi-mission modules so that LCS could do what the navy needed (like assemble a lot of mine clearing ships or anti-submarine vessels) in an emergency. Foreign navies had already applied the concept successfully, e.g. the Danish Navy’s “Standard Flex” series of weapon modules had in particular grabbed the U.S. Navy’s attention. LCA was previously designed to have a shallow draft, so they can operate where bigger (destroyer) ships cannot, permitting access to very shallow "green" and even "brown" coastal and riverine waters where most naval operations have taken place in the past generation. Instead, now each LCS will be a conventional ship built for a single type of mission and a significantly larger crew. Normally, a ship of this size would have a crew of about 200. Each LCS actually has two complete crews ("blue" and "gold") of 50 (plus mission package personnel) who take turns running the ship. This makes it possible to keep an LCS at a distant posting for years, by simply flying in a relief crew every six months.
In an interesting change, at the start of 2015 the navy decided to reclassify the LCS as frigates. This was not unexpected as in size and function the LCS ships were very comparable to frigates, but the LCS was meant to be much more than a frigate and used a very innovative design. The navy could have built a new class of frigates, but the LCS design was a lot more flexible, making it possible for different “mission packages” to be quickly installed so that LCS could do what the navy needed (like assemble a lot of mine clearing ships or anti-submarine vessels) in an emergency. This has not worked out as well as expected. Unlike the foreign systems they were modelled on, LCS modules will not be swappable within a day or two, as originally envisaged. Instead, the process can take weeks. Currently, it takes far longer (2-3 days instead of 2-3 hours) to replace.
Lots of problems with design were to be expected because the LCS was a radical new warship design and these always have a lot of problems at first. For the LCS, the problems never stopped. Some were fixed, other resisted solution at all and others were fixed, then broke again. In the end there was plenty of innovation but nothing that was useful or reliable. The U.S. Navy has been increasingly unhappy with the performance of American ship builders. The issue was the same one the Navy has had with so many warships since the 1980s; poor management in design and construction.
The US Navy has not previously disclosed the cracks in higher-stress areas in the Independence-class LCS, and these cracks can grow if the ships transits faster than 15 knots in seas with maximum wave heights of about eight feet. Taking out deck plate and shell plate can't be done outside a big availability and, if nothing else, it will add to the ship's weight, which will likely slow it down. The first version also had a long crack in its hull, and it's prone to "galvanic corrosion". The LCH ship has weight and stability issues, lack of compartmentation, structural weaknesses, excessive vibration at speed, weak flight decks, poor sea-keeping by both versions, insufficient stores, inadequate range, poor endurance, sub-standard survivability (though some additional shrapnel protection will be added). This was to be expected because the LCS was a radical new warship design and these always have a lot of problems at first. There is some nervousness about all this. The U.S. Navy has not introduced a radical new design for nearly a century.
The ballooning LCS construction costs caused the Navy to try to save money by ordering that future ships be built to commercial standards. This will reduce their survivability level (protection of ship, crew, and vital systems) to (or below) the lowest level (of three) the Navy recognizes. LCS has been rated as not survivable in a “hostile combat environment.”
When Saudi Arabia became the first export customer for the LCS, they specified four modified Freedom type LCS ships that were basically modified to be frigates. The Saudis called their LCS the MMSC (Multi-Mission Surface Combatant) frigates. MMSC will have a larger crew of about 120. A helicopter will also be carried on the MMSC, and the heavier armament means it will not be able to use the mission modules the LCS was designed to carry.
The 6,670 ton Project 17AU Nilgiri-class stealth frigate is a follow-on of the Project 17 Shivalik-class frigate for the Indian Navy. With a basic and functional design developed by the Indian Navy, the ships will be built at MDL and GRSE, which will be modernized and enhanced thanks to Fincantieri’s advice in order to use the modular construction technique as well as the one known as ‘Integrated Construction (IC) methodology’, where the blocks are pre-outfitted with pipes etc, to reduce the build period of warships. The crew complement will be reduced from the existing 257 (including 35 officers) to about 150 by using high levels of automation, which will reduce the operational costs by around 20%.
RAWL-03 by INDRA of Spain comes in knocked-down condition and are licence assembled by Tata in India.
The 1st to 7th vessels of the new class are to be named INS Nilgiri, INS Himgiri, INS Udaygiri, INS Dunagiri, INS Taragiri, INS Vindhyagiri and INS Mahendragiri. Each of these ships is 149 m long, with a displacement of approximately, 6670 ton and a speed of 28 knots. It will be powered by two license-assembled LM2500 marine gas turbines developed by GE and two diesel engines in a combined CODOG turbine. However, P-17A is under-armed as has only 16 VLS for anti-ship missiles. On the other hand, the Type 26 carries 24 VLS for anti-ship missiles and also few land-attack missiles, which means that, in case it is faced with a volley of saturation attack, it can defend itself with more number of missiles.
Like the six Project 1135.6 upgraded Talwar-class (modified Krivak III) frigates, the Project 17 Shivalik-class frigates also have Russia's MR-760 Fregat-M2EM radar (China uses a copied version called Type 382 radar).
RAWL-03 by INDRA of Spain comes in knocked-down condition and are licence assembled by Tata in India.
The 1st to 7th vessels of the new class are to be named INS Nilgiri, INS Himgiri, INS Udaygiri, INS Dunagiri, INS Taragiri, INS Vindhyagiri and INS Mahendragiri. Each of these ships is 149 m long, with a displacement of approximately, 6670 ton and a speed of 28 knots. It will be powered by two license-assembled LM2500 marine gas turbines developed by GE and two diesel engines in a combined CODOG turbine. However, P-17A is under-armed as has only 16 VLS for anti-ship missiles. On the other hand, the Type 26 carries 24 VLS for anti-ship missiles and also few land-attack missiles, which means that, in case it is faced with a volley of saturation attack, it can defend itself with more number of missiles.
Like the six Project 1135.6 upgraded Talwar-class (modified Krivak III) frigates, the Project 17 Shivalik-class frigates also have Russia's MR-760 Fregat-M2EM radar (China uses a copied version called Type 382 radar).
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Talwar-class
Project 11356M Admiral Grigorovich class (original Krivak IV-class) & Project 1135.6 modified Krivak III class multi-purpose frigates.
Indian Navy's original Talwar class (Krivak IV-class) frigates use an older 'single-arm' launcher that can fire only one missile at a time, compared to upgraded Talwar class frigates (modified Krivak III) from Russia that are expected to have VLS that allows the launch of multiple missiles simultaneously.
The first batch of Project 1135.6 upgraded Talwar-class (modified Krivak III) frigates, the 5P-10E fire-control system, have been replaced with Lynx-U2 fire-control system.
Project 11356M Admiral Grigorovich class 4,000 ton frigates, alternately referred to as the Krivak IV-class, is a modernized rather than a brand new stealth design. Its primary function is air defense, escorting, and submarine hunting. Its most distinguishable characteristic are two vertical launch batteries of Kalibr SS-N-27 supersonic cruise missiles (NATO code name is “Sizzler”). The Krivak IV is the fourth generation of the Krivak frigate class. Gorshkov is the only Russian combat ship to be equipped with BrahMos missiles. The Gorshkov's cost about $400 million each and will replace 32 Krivak I class frigates and larger ships like the 8,400 ton Sovremenny class destroyers. Construction began in 2006 and the first Gorshkov was launched in 2010 because 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine (which meant Russia could not get the gas turbine engines for these ships and that technology was developed and monopolized by Ukrainian plants).
Project 1135 or Krivak-class, that was first commissioned in 1970. It was upgraded thrice until the 1990s. Between 1970 and 1989, 40 Krivak I, II and III were built in Soviet Union. While Krivak I and II class were used by Soviet Navy KGB Border Guards were the sole operator of the Krivak III class. Today all Krivak class frigates, with the exception of two still serving in BSF, are decommissioned. Krivak class was the main frigate force of Soviet Union at that time. After the end of Cold War, Russian Federation started a number of frigate design programs with the intention of replacing Krivak and other light frigates such as Grisha and Koni classes.
The first result of this new generation ships was Jastreb class Neustrashimy launched in 1988 and commissioned in 1993. Jastreb class was intended for the replacement of Krivak class. Neustrashimy was followed by Gepard class, Tatarstan launched in 1993, commissioned in 2002 and Steregushchiy launched in 2006 and commissioned in 2007.
India bought four upgraded Type 1135.6 Krivak III-class stealth frigates that Russia will supply the Indian Navy for slightly over Rs 20,000 crore ($3 billion), or about Rs 5,000 crore ($775 million) per vessel. With the current contract, the navy will operate 10 Krivak III frigates – the fleet’s largest single type. The Krivak III costs marginally less than the Rs 5,750 crore ($888 million) that the navy will pay for each of seven indigenous frigates that Mazagon Dock Ltd, Mumbai (MDL) and Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers, Kolkata (GRSE) have been contracted to build under Project 17A. However, tonne-for-tonne, the indigenous frigates are cheaper. In July 2006, the Indian government announced that Russia would build 3 “stealth warships” for India under a Rs 5114 crore (INR 51.14 billion, then about $1.1 billion) contract signed in New Delhi. The contract actually covers 3 modified Type 1136M Krivak III/ Talwar Class frigates, as a follow-on to an earlier $900 million purchase in 1997.
Indian-made Talwar-class frigates are expected to cost almost double than the direct Russian import due to the cost of building infrastructure and transfer of technology.
The Talwar class is an Indo-Russian joint production. Its top speed of 56 km/hr. While their length is the same as frigates, they have roughly the same width as destroyers. Ships of this class have quite a few systems of Indian origin and manufacture, including their anti-submarine sensor (sonar) suite and complete communication equipment. The Indian Navy wanted to fill the gap created by the decommissioning of the Leander class frigates until the Project 17 Shivalik class frigates entered service. In recent years, India has purchased 8 Russian-built Krivak (Talwar) class frigates. The first three were delivered in 2003-04, while the second set is being delivered in 2009-12. Re-branded as the Talwar-class frigate, each vessel is armed with a 100mm A-190E naval gun on its bow. Unlike its Russian predecessor, however, the Talwars had 8 lethal BrahMos cruise missiles in vertical launchers. The Talwar also supports a helipad on its stern, replacing the 130mm guns of the early Krivak. Each of the new frigates is to be armed with eight jointly developed BrahMos supersonic anti-ship cruise missile instead of the Klub-N/3M54TE missile system, a 100-millimetre gun, a Shtil surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, two Kashtan air-defence gun/missile systems, two twin 533-mm torpedo launchers and an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopter.
The first tranche of three frigates (INS Talwar, Trishul and Tabar) was contracted in 1997 for about one billion dollars and delivered between 2003-04. The second tranche of three (INS Teg, Tarkash and Trikand) was contracted in 2006 and delivered in 2012-13 for a slightly higher price. 'Teg', the 4,000 ton frigate of the Project 11356M, also known as Talwar class, is first of the three frigates ordered by the Indian Navy in 2006 under a 1.5 billion dollar deal with Russia. India Navy already operates three of these stealth frigates and had ordered three more to bolster its fleet. The two other warships of the same class - the 'Tarkash' (Quiver) and the 'Trikand' (Bow) are at various stages of construction at the "Yantar" naval shipyard in Russia's Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad. Earlier in the last decade, Russia's another Baltiisky Zavod shipyard in St Petersburg had built first three of the stealth frigates - INS Talwar, INS Trishul and INS Tabar. The last three Talwars were "stealth" frigates and the same size as the original Talwars India ordered in the 1990s. The Stealthy Talwars have their superstructure changed so as to reduce the radar signature (making the ship less likely to show up on enemy radars).
INS Trikand (Bow), a Teg class Guided Missile frigate, is powered by four gas turbines engines, the ship can achieve speeds upto 32 knots and can generate a maximum electric power of 3.2 MW. The ship is further augmented with the latest stealth features like reduced radar, infrared, magnetic and acoustic signatures, which makes it difficult to detect by enemy at war time. Her weaponry includes ‘state-of-the-art’ surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, a high calibre gun, anti-submarine torpedoes and rockets. This is complimented by an advanced sensor suite, combat management system and an integral Airborne Early Warning Helicopter, the Kamov 31.
The Krivak III/ Talwar Class ships like INS Tabar are not really stealth warships by comparison to more modern designs like Singapore’s new Formidable Class frigates from France (a Lafayette Class derivative). They’re best described as mid-range multi-role frigates, with some stealth features and a potential emphasis on anti-submarine work. They’re also important to the 4,000t Talwar class, whose potential for a strong ASW role is partly derived from the anti-submarine capabilities of some Klub-N missiles. Talwar class ships like the Navy’s existing INS Talwar (Sword), INS Trishul (Trident), and INS Tabar (Axe) can carry 14 vertically-launched Klub missiles, though sources indicate that the new Teg (Saber), Tarkash (Quiver), and Trikand (Bow) may be fitted for 8 of the much larger supersonic BrahMos anti-ship missiles instead.
Project 11356M Admiral Grigorovich class (original Krivak IV-class) & Project 1135.6 modified Krivak III class multi-purpose frigates.
Indian Navy's original Talwar class (Krivak IV-class) frigates use an older 'single-arm' launcher that can fire only one missile at a time, compared to upgraded Talwar class frigates (modified Krivak III) from Russia that are expected to have VLS that allows the launch of multiple missiles simultaneously.
The first batch of Project 1135.6 upgraded Talwar-class (modified Krivak III) frigates, the 5P-10E fire-control system, have been replaced with Lynx-U2 fire-control system.
Project 11356M Admiral Grigorovich class 4,000 ton frigates, alternately referred to as the Krivak IV-class, is a modernized rather than a brand new stealth design. Its primary function is air defense, escorting, and submarine hunting. Its most distinguishable characteristic are two vertical launch batteries of Kalibr SS-N-27 supersonic cruise missiles (NATO code name is “Sizzler”). The Krivak IV is the fourth generation of the Krivak frigate class. Gorshkov is the only Russian combat ship to be equipped with BrahMos missiles. The Gorshkov's cost about $400 million each and will replace 32 Krivak I class frigates and larger ships like the 8,400 ton Sovremenny class destroyers. Construction began in 2006 and the first Gorshkov was launched in 2010 because 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine (which meant Russia could not get the gas turbine engines for these ships and that technology was developed and monopolized by Ukrainian plants).
Project 1135 or Krivak-class, that was first commissioned in 1970. It was upgraded thrice until the 1990s. Between 1970 and 1989, 40 Krivak I, II and III were built in Soviet Union. While Krivak I and II class were used by Soviet Navy KGB Border Guards were the sole operator of the Krivak III class. Today all Krivak class frigates, with the exception of two still serving in BSF, are decommissioned. Krivak class was the main frigate force of Soviet Union at that time. After the end of Cold War, Russian Federation started a number of frigate design programs with the intention of replacing Krivak and other light frigates such as Grisha and Koni classes.
The first result of this new generation ships was Jastreb class Neustrashimy launched in 1988 and commissioned in 1993. Jastreb class was intended for the replacement of Krivak class. Neustrashimy was followed by Gepard class, Tatarstan launched in 1993, commissioned in 2002 and Steregushchiy launched in 2006 and commissioned in 2007.
India bought four upgraded Type 1135.6 Krivak III-class stealth frigates that Russia will supply the Indian Navy for slightly over Rs 20,000 crore ($3 billion), or about Rs 5,000 crore ($775 million) per vessel. With the current contract, the navy will operate 10 Krivak III frigates – the fleet’s largest single type. The Krivak III costs marginally less than the Rs 5,750 crore ($888 million) that the navy will pay for each of seven indigenous frigates that Mazagon Dock Ltd, Mumbai (MDL) and Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers, Kolkata (GRSE) have been contracted to build under Project 17A. However, tonne-for-tonne, the indigenous frigates are cheaper. In July 2006, the Indian government announced that Russia would build 3 “stealth warships” for India under a Rs 5114 crore (INR 51.14 billion, then about $1.1 billion) contract signed in New Delhi. The contract actually covers 3 modified Type 1136M Krivak III/ Talwar Class frigates, as a follow-on to an earlier $900 million purchase in 1997.
Indian-made Talwar-class frigates are expected to cost almost double than the direct Russian import due to the cost of building infrastructure and transfer of technology.
The Talwar class is an Indo-Russian joint production. Its top speed of 56 km/hr. While their length is the same as frigates, they have roughly the same width as destroyers. Ships of this class have quite a few systems of Indian origin and manufacture, including their anti-submarine sensor (sonar) suite and complete communication equipment. The Indian Navy wanted to fill the gap created by the decommissioning of the Leander class frigates until the Project 17 Shivalik class frigates entered service. In recent years, India has purchased 8 Russian-built Krivak (Talwar) class frigates. The first three were delivered in 2003-04, while the second set is being delivered in 2009-12. Re-branded as the Talwar-class frigate, each vessel is armed with a 100mm A-190E naval gun on its bow. Unlike its Russian predecessor, however, the Talwars had 8 lethal BrahMos cruise missiles in vertical launchers. The Talwar also supports a helipad on its stern, replacing the 130mm guns of the early Krivak. Each of the new frigates is to be armed with eight jointly developed BrahMos supersonic anti-ship cruise missile instead of the Klub-N/3M54TE missile system, a 100-millimetre gun, a Shtil surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, two Kashtan air-defence gun/missile systems, two twin 533-mm torpedo launchers and an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopter.
The first tranche of three frigates (INS Talwar, Trishul and Tabar) was contracted in 1997 for about one billion dollars and delivered between 2003-04. The second tranche of three (INS Teg, Tarkash and Trikand) was contracted in 2006 and delivered in 2012-13 for a slightly higher price. 'Teg', the 4,000 ton frigate of the Project 11356M, also known as Talwar class, is first of the three frigates ordered by the Indian Navy in 2006 under a 1.5 billion dollar deal with Russia. India Navy already operates three of these stealth frigates and had ordered three more to bolster its fleet. The two other warships of the same class - the 'Tarkash' (Quiver) and the 'Trikand' (Bow) are at various stages of construction at the "Yantar" naval shipyard in Russia's Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad. Earlier in the last decade, Russia's another Baltiisky Zavod shipyard in St Petersburg had built first three of the stealth frigates - INS Talwar, INS Trishul and INS Tabar. The last three Talwars were "stealth" frigates and the same size as the original Talwars India ordered in the 1990s. The Stealthy Talwars have their superstructure changed so as to reduce the radar signature (making the ship less likely to show up on enemy radars).
INS Trikand (Bow), a Teg class Guided Missile frigate, is powered by four gas turbines engines, the ship can achieve speeds upto 32 knots and can generate a maximum electric power of 3.2 MW. The ship is further augmented with the latest stealth features like reduced radar, infrared, magnetic and acoustic signatures, which makes it difficult to detect by enemy at war time. Her weaponry includes ‘state-of-the-art’ surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, a high calibre gun, anti-submarine torpedoes and rockets. This is complimented by an advanced sensor suite, combat management system and an integral Airborne Early Warning Helicopter, the Kamov 31.
The Krivak III/ Talwar Class ships like INS Tabar are not really stealth warships by comparison to more modern designs like Singapore’s new Formidable Class frigates from France (a Lafayette Class derivative). They’re best described as mid-range multi-role frigates, with some stealth features and a potential emphasis on anti-submarine work. They’re also important to the 4,000t Talwar class, whose potential for a strong ASW role is partly derived from the anti-submarine capabilities of some Klub-N missiles. Talwar class ships like the Navy’s existing INS Talwar (Sword), INS Trishul (Trident), and INS Tabar (Axe) can carry 14 vertically-launched Klub missiles, though sources indicate that the new Teg (Saber), Tarkash (Quiver), and Trikand (Bow) may be fitted for 8 of the much larger supersonic BrahMos anti-ship missiles instead.
Each modified Project 22350M Admiral Gorshkov class Second Series multi-purpose frigates for Russian Navy would get 24 cruise missiles instead of 16. While their length is same as frigates, they have roughly the same width as destroyers. The ship design is based upon Project 11356 Talwar-class or Krivak III class frigate built for the Indian Navy and also features stealth technologies. It has been designed to also perform anti-submarine (ASW) in support of blue water operations.
The 8 new Landing Craft Utility (LCUs) vessels with a displacement of around 500 tonnes will be built and delivered to the Navy in the next three to four years. The LCU is a boat used by amphibious forces to transport equipment and troops to the shore and are capable of transporting combat vehicles and troops from amphibious assault ships to shores. The new vessels will be used to replace the existing fleet of six amphibious boats already in service. Its current fleet of LCUs is capable of carrying 35 armed troops right up to the beach and land. The ship can accommodate 216 personnel including 160 army troops. The bow ramp on the ship enables loading and unloading of combat equipment and vehicles on beaching. Ballast arrangement further ensures desired trim for smooth beaching operations.
The government has cleared the Rs 2,176-crore acquisition of eight specialised vessels or LCUs (landing craft utility), capable of "hard beaching" on enemy shores, to boost the country's amphibious warfare and island protection capabilities. Since the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, 2004, the landing platform dock (LPD) and the amphibious assault ship (LPH) have emerged as an instrument of soft power, with their on-board fleets of multi-purpose utility helicopters, landing craft (LCM), and air-cushion vehicles; plus their command-and-control capabilities and cavernous holds proving to be invaluable for disaster relief, small-scale policing or mass civilian evacuation operations. At the same time, the LPDs and LPHs and today emerged as invaluable tools for undertaking asymmetric warfare (against pirates in the high seas), expeditionary amphibious campaigns (such as those undertaken by the Royal Navy in 1982 to retake the Falklands Islands), and low-intensity maritime operations involving vertical envelopment tactics, which the Indian Navy calls “effecting maritime manoeuvres from the sea”.
It was in the September 2004 issue of FORCE magazine, an analysis on the need for the Indian Navy to urgently begin planning for acquiring a modest fleet of no less than three LPHs for it to undertake both humanitarian relief operations within the Indian Ocean Region whenever required, as well as prepare for the prospects of undertaking power projection-based expeditionary amphibious campaigns with its own integral naval infantry assets (as opposed to the still existing flawed practice of transporting a mere mechanised battalion of the Indian Army on board large landing ship tanks (LST-L).
This comes even as the defence ministry is finalizing another project to acquire four huge amphibious warfare ships, called Landing Platform Docks (LPDs) for "stand-off beaching", for around Rs 16,000 crore. India's five-year effort to bolster its littoral capabilities will begin showing progress this year as the Navy enters the global market to acquire four landing platform dock (LPD) warships.
The LCUs and LPDs will help in swiftly transporting thousands of troops, heavy weapon systems and infantry combat vehicles over long distances to take the battle right to the enemy mainland.
The LCUs are likely to be based at India's first and only regional 'theatre command', the strategically-located Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC), which will complete 10 years of existence next month.
While the Navy's 2005 doctrine emphasized preparedness for littoral warfare, driven by India's emergence as a regional power and increasing Chinese operations in the Indian Ocean, the pace of acquisition is slow and inadequate, defense analysts here said.
"Well, at long last, we are paying attention to getting more assets that can be used for littoral operations. The pace is slow but is building up. Four LPDs are to be built for the Indian Navy. Our current inventory of landing craft utility and landing ship tanks are quite old. LPD Jalashwa is actually quite old but in a fairly satisfactory condition," said Probal Ghosh, a retired Indian Navy captain and defense analyst.
The government has cleared the Rs 2,176-crore acquisition of eight specialised vessels or LCUs (landing craft utility), capable of "hard beaching" on enemy shores, to boost the country's amphibious warfare and island protection capabilities. Since the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, 2004, the landing platform dock (LPD) and the amphibious assault ship (LPH) have emerged as an instrument of soft power, with their on-board fleets of multi-purpose utility helicopters, landing craft (LCM), and air-cushion vehicles; plus their command-and-control capabilities and cavernous holds proving to be invaluable for disaster relief, small-scale policing or mass civilian evacuation operations. At the same time, the LPDs and LPHs and today emerged as invaluable tools for undertaking asymmetric warfare (against pirates in the high seas), expeditionary amphibious campaigns (such as those undertaken by the Royal Navy in 1982 to retake the Falklands Islands), and low-intensity maritime operations involving vertical envelopment tactics, which the Indian Navy calls “effecting maritime manoeuvres from the sea”.
It was in the September 2004 issue of FORCE magazine, an analysis on the need for the Indian Navy to urgently begin planning for acquiring a modest fleet of no less than three LPHs for it to undertake both humanitarian relief operations within the Indian Ocean Region whenever required, as well as prepare for the prospects of undertaking power projection-based expeditionary amphibious campaigns with its own integral naval infantry assets (as opposed to the still existing flawed practice of transporting a mere mechanised battalion of the Indian Army on board large landing ship tanks (LST-L).
This comes even as the defence ministry is finalizing another project to acquire four huge amphibious warfare ships, called Landing Platform Docks (LPDs) for "stand-off beaching", for around Rs 16,000 crore. India's five-year effort to bolster its littoral capabilities will begin showing progress this year as the Navy enters the global market to acquire four landing platform dock (LPD) warships.
The LCUs and LPDs will help in swiftly transporting thousands of troops, heavy weapon systems and infantry combat vehicles over long distances to take the battle right to the enemy mainland.
The LCUs are likely to be based at India's first and only regional 'theatre command', the strategically-located Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC), which will complete 10 years of existence next month.
While the Navy's 2005 doctrine emphasized preparedness for littoral warfare, driven by India's emergence as a regional power and increasing Chinese operations in the Indian Ocean, the pace of acquisition is slow and inadequate, defense analysts here said.
"Well, at long last, we are paying attention to getting more assets that can be used for littoral operations. The pace is slow but is building up. Four LPDs are to be built for the Indian Navy. Our current inventory of landing craft utility and landing ship tanks are quite old. LPD Jalashwa is actually quite old but in a fairly satisfactory condition," said Probal Ghosh, a retired Indian Navy captain and defense analyst.
Naval warfare changed on Sept. 9, 1943. Dictator Benito Mussolini had been deposed, the new Italian government was abandoning a lost war and its doomed Nazi ally and the Italian fleet was sailing to Malta to surrender. But the habitually treacherous Nazis, who had always suspected their Italian allies of similar trickery, detected the Italian ships leaving port.
The Luftwaffe dispatched a force of Dornier Do-217 bombers to deal with the Italian ships.
As the bombers approached, the Italians were unsure whether the Germans meant to attack or just intimidate. They were relieved to see the German aircraft appear to drop their bombs into the ocean. Perhaps with uncharacteristic gentleness, the Germans were just firing warning shots.
But then something unexpected happened. Instead of plunging straight down into the sea, the bombs headed toward the Italian ships. One slammed into Roma’s hull, exited out the other side and exploded in the water, destroying an engine room.
A second bomb penetrated the deck into the forward magazine, where shells for the ship’s big 15-inch guns were stored. The battleship exploded, killing 1,253 members of her crew.
The age of the ship-killing missile had dawned.
Battleships were armored to survive multiple bomb hits—in 1944, the Japanese super-battleship Musashi was hit by 17 bombs and 19 torpedoes before sinking. But a bomb dropped from high enough should have enough kinetic energy, imparted by gravity, to smash through thick deck armor.
The problem was hitting the battleship in the first place. High-flying bombers in the 1940s had scant chance of hitting a warship frantically weaving through the water at 30 knots. That meant aircraft had to come in low to attack, which made them easier targets for the ship’s antiaircraft guns and also robbed the bombs of kinetic energy.
The 11-foot-long Fritz-X, slung under the wing of a bomber, had radio-controlled fins that could change the munition’s glide path. A tail-mounted flare enabled the operator on the bomber to track and adjust the weapon’s course. Tests showed that 50 percent of bombs would land within five meters of the target—astounding accuracy for the 1940s.
Does this sound familiar? It should, because the concept endures in modern weapon such as America’s Joint Direct Attack Munition, a kit that makes dumb bombs smart by adding fins and satellite guidance.
Weapons systems
Since World War II, torpedoes are considered lethal ‘one shot weapons’ and in the 1971 war, Pakistan Navy’s Hangor sank INS Khukri on Dec 8, and 178 souls in white lost their lives off the waters off Diu. Appropriately, the Indian Navy is now adequate attention to both aircraft carriers and submarine capabilities. Over the years, India has bought a number of major Russian weapons systems for domestically built ships. These purchases have included anti-ship missiles and SAMs, torpedoes, ASW rocket launchers and naval guns. Most significantly, the Shivalik class frigates and Kolkata class destroyers are armed almost entirely with Russian weapons such as the RBU-6000 rocket launchers, SET-65E torpedoes, SS-N-27 anti-ship missiles, and SA-N-12 surface-to-air missiles.
At the moment, navy warships are equipped with old Russian heavy torpedoes. For the four Shishumar-class Class 209 Type 1500 SSKs, the IN has short-listed two types of ASCMs: a combination of Novator 3M-54E Klub-S supersonic ASCM and 3M-14E LACM, and Boeing’s UGM-84A Harpoon. Western naval warships have light weight torpedoes for anti submarine operations but Russian warships and submarines have heavy weight anti ship torpedoes, which are however not compatible with the Scorpenes. US torpedoes pose the greatest threat which is why so many American allies use Mk 48s and pay to get the latest models or upgrade kits. The Mk 48 was a major reason why Russia always felt they were at a major disadvantage in underwater operations and combat.
India’s request to buy 32 MK-54 All-Up-Round Lightweight Torpedoes, 3 recoverable exercise torpedoes, 1 training shape, plus containers, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, transportation and other supports. India intends to use the torpedoes on its forthcoming 8 P-8I Neptune maritime patrol aircraft, and the numbers involved mark this as an initial familiarity and training buy. Technically, Boeing is the P-8i lead integrator, but the Mk54 is a Raytheon design. On the other hand, Lockheed Martin offers the GPS-guided, high altitude launch HAAWC/Longshot, consisting of an adapter kit mounted on a Mk.54.
All torpedo tubes are of common size called 21 Inch (533mm) and Atlas Elektronik has the DM2A4 Seahake from Germany and WASS from Italy has the Blackshark which Malaysia has chosen for its first Scorpene Tungku Abdul Rahman which called at Cochin en route to Lumut early in September 2010. Both are new generation, long-range, stealth, wire guided torpedoes featuring electrical propulsion system and a fibre optic cable for torpedo guidance. The Indian Navy exchanged notes.
India's Pipavav has teamed up with Germany's Atlas Elektronik to pitch the "SeaHake mod4 (DM2A4 )" heavy torpedo with uncertainty over the French F21 heavy torpedo deal going through. 98 Whitehead Alenia Sistemi Subacquei (WASS) Black Shark heavyweight torpedoes for for the IN’s six Scorpene SSKs. The first 20 Black Sharks will be delivered directly by WASS, while the MoD-owned Bharat Dynamics Ltd will licence-assemble the rest from WASS-supplied completely knocked-down kits.
At the moment, navy warships are equipped with old Russian heavy torpedoes. For the four Shishumar-class Class 209 Type 1500 SSKs, the IN has short-listed two types of ASCMs: a combination of Novator 3M-54E Klub-S supersonic ASCM and 3M-14E LACM, and Boeing’s UGM-84A Harpoon. Western naval warships have light weight torpedoes for anti submarine operations but Russian warships and submarines have heavy weight anti ship torpedoes, which are however not compatible with the Scorpenes. US torpedoes pose the greatest threat which is why so many American allies use Mk 48s and pay to get the latest models or upgrade kits. The Mk 48 was a major reason why Russia always felt they were at a major disadvantage in underwater operations and combat.
India’s request to buy 32 MK-54 All-Up-Round Lightweight Torpedoes, 3 recoverable exercise torpedoes, 1 training shape, plus containers, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, transportation and other supports. India intends to use the torpedoes on its forthcoming 8 P-8I Neptune maritime patrol aircraft, and the numbers involved mark this as an initial familiarity and training buy. Technically, Boeing is the P-8i lead integrator, but the Mk54 is a Raytheon design. On the other hand, Lockheed Martin offers the GPS-guided, high altitude launch HAAWC/Longshot, consisting of an adapter kit mounted on a Mk.54.
All torpedo tubes are of common size called 21 Inch (533mm) and Atlas Elektronik has the DM2A4 Seahake from Germany and WASS from Italy has the Blackshark which Malaysia has chosen for its first Scorpene Tungku Abdul Rahman which called at Cochin en route to Lumut early in September 2010. Both are new generation, long-range, stealth, wire guided torpedoes featuring electrical propulsion system and a fibre optic cable for torpedo guidance. The Indian Navy exchanged notes.
India's Pipavav has teamed up with Germany's Atlas Elektronik to pitch the "SeaHake mod4 (DM2A4 )" heavy torpedo with uncertainty over the French F21 heavy torpedo deal going through. 98 Whitehead Alenia Sistemi Subacquei (WASS) Black Shark heavyweight torpedoes for for the IN’s six Scorpene SSKs. The first 20 Black Sharks will be delivered directly by WASS, while the MoD-owned Bharat Dynamics Ltd will licence-assemble the rest from WASS-supplied completely knocked-down kits.
With a tradition going back over 100 years in the field of naval weapon systems, ATLAS ELEKTRONIK GmbH, a BAE SYSTEMS company (British Aerospace SYSTEMS), holds a 50% share of the world torpedo market. The German company cooperates with 16 Navies throughout the world. Handicapped by red tape, Indian Navy attempt to launch old German Surface & Underwater Target SUT heavyweight torpedoes (hwt) from the new French-designed Kalvari submarines has failed.
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DCNS dual-purpose F-21 is a newer-generation heavy-weight torpedo HWT when compared to the WASS-built "Black Shark" heavyweight torpedoes. The F21 feature an electrical propulsion system based on the DCNS-supplied MU-90 lightweight torpedo Aluminium-Silver-Oxide technology battery, providing 50+km range and 50+ knots speed, according to DCNS. Equipped with a planar array and fully digital acoustic head, the F21 is also to comply with demanding nuclear-powered platform safety requirements, including insensitive warhead and safe detonation technology.
The acquisition of torpedoes was held back because the front runner, Black Shark torpedo, was being made by a Finmeccanica subsidiary called Whitehead Alenia Sistemi Subacquei (WASS). The Black Shark F21 was developed by DCN and incorporates a new Advanced Sonar Transmitting and Receiving Architecture (ASTRA) active/passive acoustic homing head; an updated guidance-and-control section; a fibre-optic guidance link and spool; a new electric motor; and a skewed contra-rotating propeller.
Even though the ongoing $300 million project to procure 98 torpedoes has not been cancelled officially, the navy has issued Request for Information (RFI), re-launching the process to procure the weapons. An evaluation committee had given an "all clear", but despite that the project had not moved further.
Finmeccanica rival Germany’s Atlas Elektronik had raised questions about Black Shark's selection. They have also bagging the contract for supplying 96 Sea Hake mod4 ER (Extended Range) Heavyweight Torpedo (an export version of DM2A4) to arm the the Indian Navy’s six Scorpene SSKs.
This is a dual purpose torpedo against submarines and ships with full digitization of torpedo guidance and homing, target tracking, attitude control, sensors, a fiber optic communication/guidance wire, a digital strap-down system with fibre optic gyros for precision navigation and powered by a 300 kW high-frequency permanent magnet electric motor.
Atlas Electronix have upgraded the Indian Navy’s Shishumar class and supplied the SUT-B wire guided torpedoes which have proved very successful, claims that it can provide the expertise through UDS if decisions are taken soon, and not made ‘fait accompli’ for the Blackshark, as time elapses. There will be a requirement for around 100 torpedoes for the submarines and could cost could touch around $ 700 million.
The first Scorpene submarine, however, was supposed to use Blackshark Heavy Weight Torpedos (hwt) but the Defense Ministry blacklisted the company on corruption charges at the last moment.
The acquisition of torpedoes was held back because the front runner, Black Shark torpedo, was being made by a Finmeccanica subsidiary called Whitehead Alenia Sistemi Subacquei (WASS). The Black Shark F21 was developed by DCN and incorporates a new Advanced Sonar Transmitting and Receiving Architecture (ASTRA) active/passive acoustic homing head; an updated guidance-and-control section; a fibre-optic guidance link and spool; a new electric motor; and a skewed contra-rotating propeller.
Even though the ongoing $300 million project to procure 98 torpedoes has not been cancelled officially, the navy has issued Request for Information (RFI), re-launching the process to procure the weapons. An evaluation committee had given an "all clear", but despite that the project had not moved further.
Finmeccanica rival Germany’s Atlas Elektronik had raised questions about Black Shark's selection. They have also bagging the contract for supplying 96 Sea Hake mod4 ER (Extended Range) Heavyweight Torpedo (an export version of DM2A4) to arm the the Indian Navy’s six Scorpene SSKs.
This is a dual purpose torpedo against submarines and ships with full digitization of torpedo guidance and homing, target tracking, attitude control, sensors, a fiber optic communication/guidance wire, a digital strap-down system with fibre optic gyros for precision navigation and powered by a 300 kW high-frequency permanent magnet electric motor.
Atlas Electronix have upgraded the Indian Navy’s Shishumar class and supplied the SUT-B wire guided torpedoes which have proved very successful, claims that it can provide the expertise through UDS if decisions are taken soon, and not made ‘fait accompli’ for the Blackshark, as time elapses. There will be a requirement for around 100 torpedoes for the submarines and could cost could touch around $ 700 million.
The first Scorpene submarine, however, was supposed to use Blackshark Heavy Weight Torpedos (hwt) but the Defense Ministry blacklisted the company on corruption charges at the last moment.
VA-111 Shkval supercavitating rocket-propelled torpedoes intended as a countermeasure against torpedoes launched by undetected enemy submarines. It is four times faster than normal torpedoes. Originally unguided, it is now auto-piloted.
This high speed is due to supercavitation, whereby a gas bubble, which envelops the torpedo, is created by outward deflection of water by its specially shaped nose cone and the expansion of gases from its engine. This minimizes water contact with the torpedo, significantly reducing drag.
The Russians started designing it in the 1960s when the NII-24 research institute was ordered to produce a new weapon system capable of combating nuclear submarines. Research on developing a self-propelled supercavitational projectile began in the early 1960s at the Ukrainian Institute of Hydromechanics. In 1969, the GSKB-47 merged with NII-24 to create the Research Institute of Applied Hydromechanics in Ukraine. The research led to the construction of underwater supercavitating rifles for use by elite Russian Spetznaz troops, and in the mid-1970's to the creation of the world's first supercavitating torpedo (constructor Merkulov).
Iran claimed it has created a version named Hoot. A downgraded Shkval, the Shkval-E went to an international arms fairs in 1995, and both China, Iran and France have been known to have acquired limited numbers of Shkvals.
The U.S. torpedo researchers have been unable to design a similar torpedo with detection and homing technology that will enable the torpedo to distinguish an enemy sub from a rock formation. Also, the U.S. emphasis is more on silence rather than speed. The U.S. military has tested a prototype, but combat-ready versions are not expected for at least 15 years. In 2000, former U.S. Naval intelligence officer and an alleged DIA spy Edmond Pope (Captain, USN, retired) was held, tried, and convicted in Russia of espionage related to information he obtained about the Shkval weapon system.
This high speed is due to supercavitation, whereby a gas bubble, which envelops the torpedo, is created by outward deflection of water by its specially shaped nose cone and the expansion of gases from its engine. This minimizes water contact with the torpedo, significantly reducing drag.
The Russians started designing it in the 1960s when the NII-24 research institute was ordered to produce a new weapon system capable of combating nuclear submarines. Research on developing a self-propelled supercavitational projectile began in the early 1960s at the Ukrainian Institute of Hydromechanics. In 1969, the GSKB-47 merged with NII-24 to create the Research Institute of Applied Hydromechanics in Ukraine. The research led to the construction of underwater supercavitating rifles for use by elite Russian Spetznaz troops, and in the mid-1970's to the creation of the world's first supercavitating torpedo (constructor Merkulov).
Iran claimed it has created a version named Hoot. A downgraded Shkval, the Shkval-E went to an international arms fairs in 1995, and both China, Iran and France have been known to have acquired limited numbers of Shkvals.
The U.S. torpedo researchers have been unable to design a similar torpedo with detection and homing technology that will enable the torpedo to distinguish an enemy sub from a rock formation. Also, the U.S. emphasis is more on silence rather than speed. The U.S. military has tested a prototype, but combat-ready versions are not expected for at least 15 years. In 2000, former U.S. Naval intelligence officer and an alleged DIA spy Edmond Pope (Captain, USN, retired) was held, tried, and convicted in Russia of espionage related to information he obtained about the Shkval weapon system.
USHUS-2 is an Integrated Submarine Sonar System which physically and functionally replaces the MGK-400 and MGK-519 Sonars on four EKM class of submarines. USHUS-2 is a state-of-the-art upgrade of NPOL designed sonar USHUS in terms of the technology and sonar capabilities. USHUS is operational onboard 5 of the 9 frontline EKM submarines of Indian Navy. USHUS-2 is a world-class sonar suite, tailored for the remaining four EKM class of submarines. USHUS-2 sonar suite includes Passive Sonar, Active Sonar, Intercept Sonar, Obstacle Avoidance Sonar and Underwater Telephony. The USHUS-2 Sonar Suite has been designed and developed by NPOL and productionised by M/s. Bharat Electronics. USHUS-2 is currently in installation phase in Indian Navy designated platforms.
2009: German ACTAS Elektronik's advanced ultra-low-frequency active/passive towed-array sonar for India's new corvettes, frigates and destroyers to wage ASW especially against fast diesel-electric submarines (beating L-3 Communications’ CDS-100 LFATS and THALES's CAPTAS). However, for the ultra low-frequency dipping sonar requirement, the IN is likely to go for the L-3 Communications's HELRAS.
The import of ATAS was blocked since the mid-1990s because the DRDO was developing an indigenous ATAS called Nagan. In 2012, the Nagan project was officially shut down and the DRDO began work on another system called ALTAS.
Until then, these vessels have only limited sonar capability, provided by a relatively ineffective Passive Towed Array Sonar (PTAS), and a hull-mounted sonar called HUMSA. Without an Advanced Towed Array Sonar, India's most advanced warships - including 25 destroyers, frigates and corvettes built and bought since 1997 - would be sitting ducks.
With the Indian Navy's best warships worryingly incapable of detecting modern submarines, such as Pakistan's Agosta 90B, the ATAS project is therefore a key element of the strategy to secure Indian waters. The project is destined to be rolled out to various classes of ships including Delhi, Talwar, Kamorta, Shivalik and Kolkata. The first six systems will be manufactured at the company's facilities and the follow-on batches would be manufactured in Indian under the Transfer of Technology (ToT) arrangement with Indian public sector unit. Eighty advanced sonars could be tendered over the next three years.
Company officials said the towed array sonar provided by ATLAS permits observation of the sea space at ranges considerably above 60 kilometers, depending on the propagation conditions of the water. This gives the sonar an operational range that by far exceeds that of radars and the weapons range of submarines.
While the Arabian Sea offers tricky, shallow-water operating conditions, the Bay of Bengal is much deeper. Thirty kilometres off Karachi, the ocean floor is just 40 metres deep; while five kilometres off Visakhapatnam, the depth is 3,000 metres. The Arabian Sea, therefore, is the playground of small conventional submarines.
Simultaneously, the Bay of Bengal offers the deep diving conditions that favour nuclear submarines, which are too large for shallow waters. That is why experts predict India will operate both conventional and nuclear submarines - conventional in shallow water, and nuclear in deep water.
Not very many countries have acquired the capability of developing underwater sensors. Developing sonars is more complex compared with radars because it requires understanding the ocean's depth, salinity and temperature. Sonar (sound navigation and ranging) is the dominating sensor capable of detecting underwater targets. After the successful development of APSOH sonar for leander class of ships, DRDO has not looked back. So far, three types of hull-mounted sonars have been developed for surface ships, i.e.,
HUMSA-NG is being fitted in all new construction ships. In addition, the first submarine sonar PANCHENDRIYA has been proved and an airborne sonar MIHIR is in the final phase of acceptance.
Indian defence scientists have also tried to catch up with the Americans and the Europeans in the ASW. The development of towed array sonar NAGAN is also in progress. NAGAN is a low frequency active cum passive towed array sonar system which has been developed by the NPOL (National Physical and Oceanographic Laboratory, Cochin) in association with the Bharat Electronics and some private sector companies. NAGAN has replaced the French Thales supplied passive towed array sonar system. NPOL scientists claim that the NAGAN has been a major technological breakthrough, which is capable of long range detection.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/56066692/Indian-Indigenous-Underwater-Weapon-Systems-by-DRDO
The import of ATAS was blocked since the mid-1990s because the DRDO was developing an indigenous ATAS called Nagan. In 2012, the Nagan project was officially shut down and the DRDO began work on another system called ALTAS.
Until then, these vessels have only limited sonar capability, provided by a relatively ineffective Passive Towed Array Sonar (PTAS), and a hull-mounted sonar called HUMSA. Without an Advanced Towed Array Sonar, India's most advanced warships - including 25 destroyers, frigates and corvettes built and bought since 1997 - would be sitting ducks.
With the Indian Navy's best warships worryingly incapable of detecting modern submarines, such as Pakistan's Agosta 90B, the ATAS project is therefore a key element of the strategy to secure Indian waters. The project is destined to be rolled out to various classes of ships including Delhi, Talwar, Kamorta, Shivalik and Kolkata. The first six systems will be manufactured at the company's facilities and the follow-on batches would be manufactured in Indian under the Transfer of Technology (ToT) arrangement with Indian public sector unit. Eighty advanced sonars could be tendered over the next three years.
Company officials said the towed array sonar provided by ATLAS permits observation of the sea space at ranges considerably above 60 kilometers, depending on the propagation conditions of the water. This gives the sonar an operational range that by far exceeds that of radars and the weapons range of submarines.
While the Arabian Sea offers tricky, shallow-water operating conditions, the Bay of Bengal is much deeper. Thirty kilometres off Karachi, the ocean floor is just 40 metres deep; while five kilometres off Visakhapatnam, the depth is 3,000 metres. The Arabian Sea, therefore, is the playground of small conventional submarines.
Simultaneously, the Bay of Bengal offers the deep diving conditions that favour nuclear submarines, which are too large for shallow waters. That is why experts predict India will operate both conventional and nuclear submarines - conventional in shallow water, and nuclear in deep water.
Not very many countries have acquired the capability of developing underwater sensors. Developing sonars is more complex compared with radars because it requires understanding the ocean's depth, salinity and temperature. Sonar (sound navigation and ranging) is the dominating sensor capable of detecting underwater targets. After the successful development of APSOH sonar for leander class of ships, DRDO has not looked back. So far, three types of hull-mounted sonars have been developed for surface ships, i.e.,
- APSOH (Advanced Panoramic SOnar Hull mounted),
- HUMVAD (Hull Mounted Variable Depth sonar),
- HUMSA 5 & HUMSA-NG (new generation) (Follow on to the APSOH series; the acronym HUMSA stands for Hull Mounted Sonar Array), S. Kedarnath Shenoy is its architect.
- Nagan (Towed Array Sonar),
- Panchendriya (Submarine sonar and fire control system).
HUMSA-NG is being fitted in all new construction ships. In addition, the first submarine sonar PANCHENDRIYA has been proved and an airborne sonar MIHIR is in the final phase of acceptance.
Indian defence scientists have also tried to catch up with the Americans and the Europeans in the ASW. The development of towed array sonar NAGAN is also in progress. NAGAN is a low frequency active cum passive towed array sonar system which has been developed by the NPOL (National Physical and Oceanographic Laboratory, Cochin) in association with the Bharat Electronics and some private sector companies. NAGAN has replaced the French Thales supplied passive towed array sonar system. NPOL scientists claim that the NAGAN has been a major technological breakthrough, which is capable of long range detection.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/56066692/Indian-Indigenous-Underwater-Weapon-Systems-by-DRDO
Submarines
Submarines are still not able to be part of a 'team' combat effort, as communication difficulties create a lot of uncertainty and confusion. In order to be effective, submarines must be deployed to areas with no friendly activity, leaving them free to manoeuvre and to assume that any contact is an enemy and that they can act accordingly.
In US naval slang, all ballistic missile submarines are colloquial called Boomers. Larger subs are more heavily armed. US only gave Britain the reactor to operationalise its first SSN, HMS Dreadnought, and subsequently the Trident SLBM, but never the entire submarine.
US is currently unable to maintain its submarines. Naval leaders, eager to shift blame towards public yards and union shipbuilders, are not helping matters. Maintenance is an unloved minor specialty, and yard time is often some of the hardest time submarine officers endure over the course of their career.
India initiated work on a nuclear submarine in 1974, three years after the 1971 India Pakistan War, during which the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Enterprise steamed up the Bay of Bengal and a British fleet sailed towards the direction of Mumbai as a warning to India. In response, Russia despatched nuclear-armed submarines and ships from its Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok to prevent a joint US-British strike on India. No nation exports nuclear-powered submarines. The relevance of investment in submarines depends upon the budget, the concept of operations and a nation’s threat perception.
(In the 1960s, the Americans passed on SSBN and SLBM tech to their British cousins as a token of their special relationship. Strategically, however, it is of no significance because the British fleet is not only tiny, but it reportedly cannot fire its missiles without American approval.)
The only other instance is Russia providing assistance to India in building the Arihant. The India-Russia partnership has resulted in a string of successful defence projects, but none is more strategically important than INS Arihant. If successful, India will finally be able to complete its nuclear triad. They give you the ability to retaliate if the enemy destroys your ICBMS or strategic bombers in a surprise attack. A nuclear triad refers to the three components of atomic weapons delivery: strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and SLBMs. The third leg of the nuclear triad is of great significance to India.
The first American SSBNs were the five, 6,000 ton George Washington class submarine. These were basically Skipjack class SSNs that were enlarged to add the missile compartment (for 16 Polaris missiles.) Combining a new high-speed teardrop hull design with nuclear power (innovative S5W pressurized water reactor), these subs were the basis of all future US submarines up to the present day. The 3,000 ton Skipjacks were designed in the early 1950s, and construction of the first one began in 1956 (and entered service in 1959). The U.S. Navy literally modified the hulls of two Skipjack SSNs under construction to accommodate the missile compartment and other less drastic changes. Thus, the construction of the first American SSBN began in 1957, was launched in June 1959 and entered service at the end of 1959. Four more followed and by March 1961 five of these SSBNs were in service.
Submarines are considered the ultimate stealth weapons. Owing to their ability to conduct multiple missions such as anti-ship warfare, intelligence gathering, and limited missile launches, submarines have long been a sought-after vessel for medium fleets. Despite advances in surface and aerial sonar technology over the decades, the art of detecting, tracking and targeting a submerged submarine remains extremely difficult, particularly in the tropical waters of Indian Ocean where the salinity of the sea and the presence of bathy thermal layers of variable water temperatures make submarine detection extremely difficult. The sonar beam gets deflected like light in a prism, called ‘refraction’ or the ‘Layer Challenge’ by Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) Navy officers.
Modern diesel-electric submarines have increasingly taken over from nuclear predecessors when it comes to coastal patrols, emitting a much quieter acoustic signature as they blend with commercial shipping lanes, trawlers and tourists, not to mention coral reefs, schools of fish and even varying concentrations of salt. However, diesel-electric submarines can cruise around 22 Knots where as nuclear submarines can cruise much faster around 30 Knots.
The AIP technology generated more noise and heat than just using batteries for underwater propulsion. Diesel-electric subs operating submerged using battery power are theoretically the quietest. But the older a sub gets, the more components become noisy. Since 2000 the United States has done a lot of sensor related work on improving systems to detect very quiet submerged diesel-electric sub. AIP boats, in particular, were found to have many vulnerabilities. The AIP technology generated more noise and heat than just using batteries for underwater propulsion. The more the U.S. studied AIP subs in operation, the more ways they found these subs could be detected.
China controlled 73% of global lithium cell manufacturing capacity in 2019, followed by the US at 12%.
India and Australia, with the two largest resident submarine fleets in the Indian Ocean, have been looking to rebuild their fleet in recent years. Though initially prompted by the state of their rapidly aging fleets, both countries’ efforts to procure new submarines have been given new impetus by China’s recent assertive behaviour and forays in the IOR. The Indian Navy, which aspires to “blue water” capability, must be capable of sea control in certain sectors, as well as sea denial further away, for example, at the choke points leading into the Indian Ocean from the South China Sea. That requires at least 24 conventional submarines for our coastal waters; and at least five to seven SSNs that can carry out sea denial for extended duration at very long ranges. Requiring at least 30 submarines to fulfill its commitments, the Navy currently has only 13 subs – that too fairly old diesel electric conventional submarines. Shockingly, only half of the strength is operational at any given time.
The Indian Navy, given the variance in its coastal geography, needs small as well as large submarines. The former would be essential in the shallow Arabian Sea, where the waters 25 kilometres from Karachi are just 40 metres deep. In contrast, larger submarines (including nuclear powered boats) can operate freely in the Bay of Bengal, where the waters 5 kilometres out from Visakhapatnam are over 3,000 metres deep.
Indian Navy’s submarine arm had clocked an impressive strength of 21 submarines in the 1980s. In 1960’s, the Great Britain, refused to sell their 'Oberon' class submarines to India citing it lacks infrastructure and experience. After failed attempt from the Great Britain, India accepted Soviet’s offer of 'Foxtrot' class submarines. 8 Foxtrots (Project 641) were also built for the Indian Navy from 1967 to 1974. The Foxtrot class was comparable in performance and armament to most contemporary designs. However, its three screws made it noisier than most Western designs. Moreover, the Foxtrot class was one of the last designs introduced before the adoption of the tear-drop hull, which offered much better underwater performance. The Foxtrot class was completely obsolete by the time the last submarine was launched. The Russian Navy retired its last Foxtrots between 1995 and 2000. The Indian Navy has decommissioned one of her oldest units, INS Vagli in Dec 2010 after 36 years of operational service.
In India, it was initially hoped that submarines would be available as part of the Western military assistance package. In 1963, India requested submarines of recent design from the United Kingdom. However, it was offered only the loan of a World War II vintage vessel then being used as a target submarine for fleet training. The vessel had actually outlived even this function and was shortly due to be scrapped. India subsequently investigated Soviet attitudes towards supplying naval vessels. The contract to buy the submarines was signed in November 1964.
The decision to buy 6 Foxtrot Class submarines from the Soviet Union was a new departure in naval strategy which indicated the pattern of Indian naval thinking, particularly as it related to technology change. Chatterji was one influential voice arguing that the growing vulnerability of surface ships inevitably led to the development of submarines and air forces. Chatterji was also of the belief that India should seek to build nuclear-powered submarines by the late 1980's.
The Soviet Union was apparently reluctant to transfer either nuclear-powered submarines themselves or the technology required for their construction in India. In 1980 and 1982 the only submarines offered seem to have been refurbished Foxtrot Class. As a result, India began evaluating possible alternative conventionally powered submarines to replace the Foxtrot submarines in service. At this point it was already decided that at least some units of the design which was chosen would be built in India, and that the ultimate objective of producing nuclear-powered submarines would not be sacrificed. From the mid 1970's, a number of submarine designs were under consideration from Western Europe and the Soviet Union. European countries involved were France, the FRG, Italy, The Netherlands and Sweden, with the FRG and Sweden the clearly favoured options by 1980.
Indian officials were looking for a design which could offer a chance to learn the production and operating skills relevant to nuclear-powered submarines. The Type-209 design offered by the West German company HDW met some of these criteria. In 1981 HDW won the order based a 'stretched' and heavier version of the Type-209 weighing 1500 tonnes (and consequently designated the Type-1500). West Germany also gained an advantage in negotiations by offering as a package a new generation of torpedoes supplied by the West German company AEG.
The initial order covered the sale of 2 submarines to be built in Kiel and included an option to produce up to four subsequently in India. The signature of the contract was held up, as officials in the FRG were unhappy about a clause in the contract, insisted upon by India, which would guarantee deliveries of spare parts in wartime. However, the option on the production of the submarines at Mazagon Docks in Bombay was exercised in December 1981. Construction began in early 1982 and the West German-built vessels were delivered in 1986-7. Production of the submarines run into problems, finally getting underway in 1984, and delivery of the first of these (originally expected in 1988) was delayed until 1991.
India's first indigenously-constructed diesel-electric submarine, the INS Shalki, a license-produced Type 209 Class 1500, was commissioned on 7 February, 25 years after the Navy established the first submarine squadron. Unlike many other technology transfer projects involving the construction of submarines to Western designs, the Shalki was fabricated entirely in India, and was not simply assembled from partially outfitted hull sections or "work packages" supplied by a Western shipyard. Raw materials such as high-strength HY-80 steel and pipes were imported but were cut, formed and welded in India.
By late 1984, the Soviet Union was apparently prepared to offer India submarines of more modern design in considerable numbers. Vice Admiral Tahiliani, then Vice Chief of Naval Staff, took a leading role in talks in Moscow in September 1984, after which official sources stated that the defense relationship had taken on 'a new dimension'. This has subsequently been interpreted to have meant that the Soviet Union agreed not only to supply more modern types of conventional submarine, but also to allow India access to nuclear-powered submarines. The formal agreement to lease a nuclear-powered submarine from the Soviet Union was signed in 1985.
By selling reactor technology to India, the Soviet Union may get a foothold in a strategically sensitive Indian domain. This would be particularly so if along with a supply of power reactors, the Soviet Union also provided technical and design assistance to make Indian production of its own submarine reactors feasible. The lease of SSN's would give India early operating experience with such reactors. The 'lease' arrangement may be a convenient way of guaranteeing return to the Soviet Union of the submarine reactor fuel. At the same time, other motives may be part of the appeal of this arrangement. The price that India is paying to lease these submarines is considerable (estimated Rs 3,000 crores for 4 to 5 submarines). Moreover, as India Today (31 December 1987) speculates Soviet nuclear-powered submarines operated by India in the Indian Ocean could complicate US Naval surveillance of Soviet submarines in that region.
The Los Angeles Times published an article in February 1988 in which western analysts contradict many of the claims made by the Indian navy concerning the submarine lease. The Indian navy first claimed that the submarine was an old Victor I class, but western analysts said published photographs clearly identify the Chakra as a Charlie class designed to carry eight cruise missiles. The article further states that Pakistan reacted to the lease by trying to purchase Canadian hybrid nuclear powered submarines.
The 1988 submarine deal has ended and future procurement of nuclear-powered submarines appear unlikely. A number of reports have surfaced that India had taken delivery of a second Soviet SSN as a replacement for the first submarine. Reports have appeared that radiation problems on the submarine were responsible for the death of one Indian scientist on board the submarine. These radiation problems may have been the main cause of the cancellation of the contract with the Soviet Union. The nuclear submarine leased from the Soviet Union has been returned, probably to save the annual cost of the lease, which amounts to Rs 120 crores.
Indian scientists lacked metallurgical knowledge of suitable materials for the hull. The selected steel required precise handling, cutting and welding. Having experienced some welding difficulties in the assembly of the German-designed boats, India observed its neighbour Pakistan producing French submarines locally, albeit with considerable delays. India had gained some earlier with the induction of HDW boats but as there was no follow-on programme, allowing the Mazagon Dock facilities to die, all that experience was lost and everyone involved in the project retired. Grade A welders emigrated to Dubai, engineers retired, and eventually all that was left were designers and the knowledge passed on to industry, particularly dynamic companies like Larsen & Toubro, which actually built the hull of INS Arihant. Some of the young naval commanders of the overseeing team eventually became flag officers in charge of putting together the hull sections built by L&T in the Visakhapatnam. India has replaced imported HY-80 steel from Russia for (building parts of arihant class submarine) and HLES-80 from ArcelorMittal (for building the Scorpene submarine), with DMRL-292A & DMR-292B respectively, produced by Rourkela based Alloy Steel Plant of SAIL.
The plan to develop an SSN force in India has not run smoothly, and highlights the enormous technological barriers for a developing country in operating this kind of system. There is currently no harbour facility in India capable of handling radioactive materials, and the submarine reactor is shut down when the vessel is in port.
India has built a Soviet-designed facility called the Special Safety Service at Vishakhapatnam, designed to monitor the health of people working on the INS Chakra and detect any radiation leak emanating from the submarine. In early 1996 pressure from the United States and financial problems facing the Indian navy were reported as the main reason for the freeze. By mid 1996 India had already spent $285.7 million to develop a nuclear submarine. DRDO officials have estimated that the submarine will be completed in five years and will require an additional $714.3 million in financing to complete the project. In 1999, the cabinet approved the navy’s “30-Year Submarine Construction Plan”, which involves the indigenous construction of 24 diesel-electric French submarines by 2029. Two separate construction lines were to build 6 submarines each, one using western technology; and the other with Russian know-how. Project 75, to build 6 Scorpene submarines, is the first part of that. Based on this experience, Indian designers would build the next 12 submarines.
Commissioning a nuclear-powered submarine is a challenge, especially for India, which is new to the technology. China took 30 years to come up with its comparable 094-class submarine, commissioned for sea trial in 2004. Its earlier 093 class was a dud and for display only. It can prowl the South China Sea but cannot cross into the Indian Ocean. To overcome design problems the Chinese also had to purchase technology from Russia. Barring a few powerful Russian-built ships, China’s fleet is poor-quality reverse-engineered copies.
By 2013 India will have two nuclear submarines, one locally built and the other leased from Russia. Along with a French Scorpene submarine and a Russian upgraded aircraft carrier, India will have a formidable force positioned at the western mouth of the Strait of Malacca, should China ever decide to act in haste.
The Indian Navy, given the variance in its coastal geography, needs small as well as large submarines. The former would be essential in the shallow Arabian Sea, where the waters 25 kilometres from Karachi are just 40 metres deep. In contrast, larger submarines (including nuclear powered boats) can operate freely in the Bay of Bengal, where the waters 5 kilometres out from Visakhapatnam are over 3,000 metres deep.
Indian Navy’s submarine arm had clocked an impressive strength of 21 submarines in the 1980s. In 1960’s, the Great Britain, refused to sell their 'Oberon' class submarines to India citing it lacks infrastructure and experience. After failed attempt from the Great Britain, India accepted Soviet’s offer of 'Foxtrot' class submarines. 8 Foxtrots (Project 641) were also built for the Indian Navy from 1967 to 1974. The Foxtrot class was comparable in performance and armament to most contemporary designs. However, its three screws made it noisier than most Western designs. Moreover, the Foxtrot class was one of the last designs introduced before the adoption of the tear-drop hull, which offered much better underwater performance. The Foxtrot class was completely obsolete by the time the last submarine was launched. The Russian Navy retired its last Foxtrots between 1995 and 2000. The Indian Navy has decommissioned one of her oldest units, INS Vagli in Dec 2010 after 36 years of operational service.
In India, it was initially hoped that submarines would be available as part of the Western military assistance package. In 1963, India requested submarines of recent design from the United Kingdom. However, it was offered only the loan of a World War II vintage vessel then being used as a target submarine for fleet training. The vessel had actually outlived even this function and was shortly due to be scrapped. India subsequently investigated Soviet attitudes towards supplying naval vessels. The contract to buy the submarines was signed in November 1964.
The decision to buy 6 Foxtrot Class submarines from the Soviet Union was a new departure in naval strategy which indicated the pattern of Indian naval thinking, particularly as it related to technology change. Chatterji was one influential voice arguing that the growing vulnerability of surface ships inevitably led to the development of submarines and air forces. Chatterji was also of the belief that India should seek to build nuclear-powered submarines by the late 1980's.
The Soviet Union was apparently reluctant to transfer either nuclear-powered submarines themselves or the technology required for their construction in India. In 1980 and 1982 the only submarines offered seem to have been refurbished Foxtrot Class. As a result, India began evaluating possible alternative conventionally powered submarines to replace the Foxtrot submarines in service. At this point it was already decided that at least some units of the design which was chosen would be built in India, and that the ultimate objective of producing nuclear-powered submarines would not be sacrificed. From the mid 1970's, a number of submarine designs were under consideration from Western Europe and the Soviet Union. European countries involved were France, the FRG, Italy, The Netherlands and Sweden, with the FRG and Sweden the clearly favoured options by 1980.
Indian officials were looking for a design which could offer a chance to learn the production and operating skills relevant to nuclear-powered submarines. The Type-209 design offered by the West German company HDW met some of these criteria. In 1981 HDW won the order based a 'stretched' and heavier version of the Type-209 weighing 1500 tonnes (and consequently designated the Type-1500). West Germany also gained an advantage in negotiations by offering as a package a new generation of torpedoes supplied by the West German company AEG.
The initial order covered the sale of 2 submarines to be built in Kiel and included an option to produce up to four subsequently in India. The signature of the contract was held up, as officials in the FRG were unhappy about a clause in the contract, insisted upon by India, which would guarantee deliveries of spare parts in wartime. However, the option on the production of the submarines at Mazagon Docks in Bombay was exercised in December 1981. Construction began in early 1982 and the West German-built vessels were delivered in 1986-7. Production of the submarines run into problems, finally getting underway in 1984, and delivery of the first of these (originally expected in 1988) was delayed until 1991.
India's first indigenously-constructed diesel-electric submarine, the INS Shalki, a license-produced Type 209 Class 1500, was commissioned on 7 February, 25 years after the Navy established the first submarine squadron. Unlike many other technology transfer projects involving the construction of submarines to Western designs, the Shalki was fabricated entirely in India, and was not simply assembled from partially outfitted hull sections or "work packages" supplied by a Western shipyard. Raw materials such as high-strength HY-80 steel and pipes were imported but were cut, formed and welded in India.
By late 1984, the Soviet Union was apparently prepared to offer India submarines of more modern design in considerable numbers. Vice Admiral Tahiliani, then Vice Chief of Naval Staff, took a leading role in talks in Moscow in September 1984, after which official sources stated that the defense relationship had taken on 'a new dimension'. This has subsequently been interpreted to have meant that the Soviet Union agreed not only to supply more modern types of conventional submarine, but also to allow India access to nuclear-powered submarines. The formal agreement to lease a nuclear-powered submarine from the Soviet Union was signed in 1985.
By selling reactor technology to India, the Soviet Union may get a foothold in a strategically sensitive Indian domain. This would be particularly so if along with a supply of power reactors, the Soviet Union also provided technical and design assistance to make Indian production of its own submarine reactors feasible. The lease of SSN's would give India early operating experience with such reactors. The 'lease' arrangement may be a convenient way of guaranteeing return to the Soviet Union of the submarine reactor fuel. At the same time, other motives may be part of the appeal of this arrangement. The price that India is paying to lease these submarines is considerable (estimated Rs 3,000 crores for 4 to 5 submarines). Moreover, as India Today (31 December 1987) speculates Soviet nuclear-powered submarines operated by India in the Indian Ocean could complicate US Naval surveillance of Soviet submarines in that region.
The Los Angeles Times published an article in February 1988 in which western analysts contradict many of the claims made by the Indian navy concerning the submarine lease. The Indian navy first claimed that the submarine was an old Victor I class, but western analysts said published photographs clearly identify the Chakra as a Charlie class designed to carry eight cruise missiles. The article further states that Pakistan reacted to the lease by trying to purchase Canadian hybrid nuclear powered submarines.
The 1988 submarine deal has ended and future procurement of nuclear-powered submarines appear unlikely. A number of reports have surfaced that India had taken delivery of a second Soviet SSN as a replacement for the first submarine. Reports have appeared that radiation problems on the submarine were responsible for the death of one Indian scientist on board the submarine. These radiation problems may have been the main cause of the cancellation of the contract with the Soviet Union. The nuclear submarine leased from the Soviet Union has been returned, probably to save the annual cost of the lease, which amounts to Rs 120 crores.
Indian scientists lacked metallurgical knowledge of suitable materials for the hull. The selected steel required precise handling, cutting and welding. Having experienced some welding difficulties in the assembly of the German-designed boats, India observed its neighbour Pakistan producing French submarines locally, albeit with considerable delays. India had gained some earlier with the induction of HDW boats but as there was no follow-on programme, allowing the Mazagon Dock facilities to die, all that experience was lost and everyone involved in the project retired. Grade A welders emigrated to Dubai, engineers retired, and eventually all that was left were designers and the knowledge passed on to industry, particularly dynamic companies like Larsen & Toubro, which actually built the hull of INS Arihant. Some of the young naval commanders of the overseeing team eventually became flag officers in charge of putting together the hull sections built by L&T in the Visakhapatnam. India has replaced imported HY-80 steel from Russia for (building parts of arihant class submarine) and HLES-80 from ArcelorMittal (for building the Scorpene submarine), with DMRL-292A & DMR-292B respectively, produced by Rourkela based Alloy Steel Plant of SAIL.
The plan to develop an SSN force in India has not run smoothly, and highlights the enormous technological barriers for a developing country in operating this kind of system. There is currently no harbour facility in India capable of handling radioactive materials, and the submarine reactor is shut down when the vessel is in port.
India has built a Soviet-designed facility called the Special Safety Service at Vishakhapatnam, designed to monitor the health of people working on the INS Chakra and detect any radiation leak emanating from the submarine. In early 1996 pressure from the United States and financial problems facing the Indian navy were reported as the main reason for the freeze. By mid 1996 India had already spent $285.7 million to develop a nuclear submarine. DRDO officials have estimated that the submarine will be completed in five years and will require an additional $714.3 million in financing to complete the project. In 1999, the cabinet approved the navy’s “30-Year Submarine Construction Plan”, which involves the indigenous construction of 24 diesel-electric French submarines by 2029. Two separate construction lines were to build 6 submarines each, one using western technology; and the other with Russian know-how. Project 75, to build 6 Scorpene submarines, is the first part of that. Based on this experience, Indian designers would build the next 12 submarines.
Commissioning a nuclear-powered submarine is a challenge, especially for India, which is new to the technology. China took 30 years to come up with its comparable 094-class submarine, commissioned for sea trial in 2004. Its earlier 093 class was a dud and for display only. It can prowl the South China Sea but cannot cross into the Indian Ocean. To overcome design problems the Chinese also had to purchase technology from Russia. Barring a few powerful Russian-built ships, China’s fleet is poor-quality reverse-engineered copies.
By 2013 India will have two nuclear submarines, one locally built and the other leased from Russia. Along with a French Scorpene submarine and a Russian upgraded aircraft carrier, India will have a formidable force positioned at the western mouth of the Strait of Malacca, should China ever decide to act in haste.
Diesel-electric powered (Sub-Surface):
India needs a minimum, 8 hunter-killer SSK or 6 hunter-killer SSK with AIP, for defence. Kilo-class SSK is a diesel-electric powered submarine which is specialized for seeking out and destroying surface warships; while Class 209/Type 1500 Class (Shishumar class) SSKs & the Scorpene (Kalvari-class) SSKs are specifically designed for hunting and destroying hostile SSKs. India imports diesel-engines, gearbox, transmission shaft, periscopes & non-hull penetrating optronics masts.
Fuel cells require dangerous fuels like hydrogen. Hydrogen is currently stored in cylinders outside the pressure hull of the sub. FC2G eliminates that with a two stage system that extracts hydrogen from diesel fuel, which is also used for the sub's diesel engines and purifies the hydrogen to a very high degree. The high-quality hydrogen gets more electricity out of the standard fuel cell technology. At the same time, the need for hydrogen storage is eliminated because only as much hydrogen is obtained from diesel fuel.
Swedish Navy Type (A 19) Diesel-powered Attack Submarine, HMS GOTLAND, resting aboard a transport ship as it arrives at San Diego, California (CA).
In 2004, the Swedish government received a request from the United States of America to lease Gotland – Swedish-flagged, commanded and manned, for a duration one year for use in anti-submarine warfare exercises. The GOTLAND will begin a one-year bilateral training effort with the US Navy (USN) Anti-submarine Warfare Forces.
It is the first ship and name-giver of the Gotland class, which is the first operational submarine class in the world to use air-independent propulsion in form of Stirling engines which uses liquid oxygen and diesel as the propellant.
It was built by Kockums, launched in 1995 and subsequently commissioned in 1996.
In 2004, the Swedish government received a request from the United States of America to lease Gotland – Swedish-flagged, commanded and manned, for a duration one year for use in anti-submarine warfare exercises. The GOTLAND will begin a one-year bilateral training effort with the US Navy (USN) Anti-submarine Warfare Forces.
It is the first ship and name-giver of the Gotland class, which is the first operational submarine class in the world to use air-independent propulsion in form of Stirling engines which uses liquid oxygen and diesel as the propellant.
It was built by Kockums, launched in 1995 and subsequently commissioned in 1996.
French (custom built for Pakistan) Agosta 90B aka ‘Khalid class’
Protecting Pakistan’s sea lines of communications (SLOC) is a vital mission that the Agosta 90B performs, as commercial seaborne trade is the lifeline of the country’s economy. Tactically, the Agosta 90B has a distinct advantage in littoral waters, where marine life and the busy shipping lanes originating out of the Strait of Hormuz can easily camouflage the acoustic signature of the submarine.
The French sale succeeded against rival offers by Swedish and German contractors. The sale, and the payment of bribes associated with it - officially termed as commissions - are at the core of what has become known as the 'Karachi affair', currently the subject of two French judicial investigations and which has rocked the French political establishment with its potential far-reaching ramifications within France. A key allegation in the developing affair is that the cancellation of commissions paid out in the submarine deal was the motive behind a suicide bomb attack in Karachi on May 8th, 2002, that left 11 French engineers dead. They were in Pakistan to help build one of the Agosta submarines. Increasing evidence suggests that cancellation of the commissions, ordered by former French president Jacques Chirac, was decided after it was discovered they were in part re-routed back to France to fund political activities of Chirac's principal political rival, Edouard Balladur.
The documents now in possession of Paris-based judge Renaud Van Ruymbeke were found during a French police search in June 2010 of the home of Amir Lodhi , one of the intermediaries involved in securing the Agosta contract. Lodhi held a copy of a report by a Pakistani anti-corruption service, the Ehtesab Cell. Lodhi, 61, the brother of a former Pakistani ambassador to the United Nations, is a close friend of Zardari , who became president of Pakistan in 2008 one year after the assassination of his wife, Benazir Bhutto. The raid on Lodhi's home in the French capital was carried out by detectives from the French police national financial investigation division, the DNIF, (Division nationale des investigations financiers). The Ehtesab Cell documents were the object of a formal report by the DNIF, established on June 17th, 2010, and reveals that Zardari received backhanders worth 6,934,296 euros between October and December 1994. It provides the first clear details about the scale of the payments made to Zardari , amounting to several million euros, as well as the channels used, including offshore companies, bank accounts and a British tax haven, the Virgin Islands.
Protecting Pakistan’s sea lines of communications (SLOC) is a vital mission that the Agosta 90B performs, as commercial seaborne trade is the lifeline of the country’s economy. Tactically, the Agosta 90B has a distinct advantage in littoral waters, where marine life and the busy shipping lanes originating out of the Strait of Hormuz can easily camouflage the acoustic signature of the submarine.
The French sale succeeded against rival offers by Swedish and German contractors. The sale, and the payment of bribes associated with it - officially termed as commissions - are at the core of what has become known as the 'Karachi affair', currently the subject of two French judicial investigations and which has rocked the French political establishment with its potential far-reaching ramifications within France. A key allegation in the developing affair is that the cancellation of commissions paid out in the submarine deal was the motive behind a suicide bomb attack in Karachi on May 8th, 2002, that left 11 French engineers dead. They were in Pakistan to help build one of the Agosta submarines. Increasing evidence suggests that cancellation of the commissions, ordered by former French president Jacques Chirac, was decided after it was discovered they were in part re-routed back to France to fund political activities of Chirac's principal political rival, Edouard Balladur.
The documents now in possession of Paris-based judge Renaud Van Ruymbeke were found during a French police search in June 2010 of the home of Amir Lodhi , one of the intermediaries involved in securing the Agosta contract. Lodhi held a copy of a report by a Pakistani anti-corruption service, the Ehtesab Cell. Lodhi, 61, the brother of a former Pakistani ambassador to the United Nations, is a close friend of Zardari , who became president of Pakistan in 2008 one year after the assassination of his wife, Benazir Bhutto. The raid on Lodhi's home in the French capital was carried out by detectives from the French police national financial investigation division, the DNIF, (Division nationale des investigations financiers). The Ehtesab Cell documents were the object of a formal report by the DNIF, established on June 17th, 2010, and reveals that Zardari received backhanders worth 6,934,296 euros between October and December 1994. It provides the first clear details about the scale of the payments made to Zardari , amounting to several million euros, as well as the channels used, including offshore companies, bank accounts and a British tax haven, the Virgin Islands.
Brazilian nuclear iPWR was developed in-house, hence Brazil has all the design data required for integrating such a PWR with its submarine hull.
1,800 to 2,000 ton displacement Kalvari-class Scorpene (CM-2000 variant) multi-role diesel-attack submarine are specifically designed for Hunting and destroying hostile diesel-attack submarines. India needs 8 Attack (Hunter-Killer) SSK for defence.
The 2016 stolen Malaysia or Chile commercial manuals of generic version, stamped “Restricted Scorpene India” , originated from the hacking of DCNS & THALES (by a former French employee fired in 2011 while providing training in India), included what frequencies the submarines gather intelligence at, what levels of noise they make at various speeds and their diving depths, range and endurance. It also discloses magnetic, electromagnetic and infra-red data as well as the specifications of the submarine’s torpedo launch system and the combat system. It details the speed and conditions needed for using the periscope, the noise specifications of the propeller and the radiated noise levels that occur when the submarine surfaces.
A submarine’s “audio signature” is like a fingerprint. It is unique, and allows sensors like those in maritime reconnaissance aircraft to identify individual submarines, from a bank of “signatures” that navies maintain. Indian Navy's first Scorpene has not yet done its “noise ranging trials”, which would pinpoint its audio fingerprint. Until these trials are completed, there is little possibility of it falling into the wrong hands. Scorpene submarines are operated by Malaysia and Chile, while Brazil will also operate them from 2018. The Indian Scorpene is slightly longer, which would make its audio and magnetic signatures marginally different.
The secret data included details of the capabilities of SM39 anti-ship missile. Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar on Friday, say they are catering for a “best case scenario”, and “worst case scenario”. The latter encompasses the possibility that the full version of the documents have fallen into hostile hands, and 6 Scorpene submarines that will join the navy’s fleet by 2019 have been operationally compromised.
The CM-2000 Scorpene is the next generation diesel-attack submarine with true multi-role capabilities. Scorpene design is a generation ahead of the successful German-built Type 209 class submarine from Howaldtswerke-Deutche Werft (HDW) and Thyssen Nordseewerke. It can be tailored to meet ever changing threat scenarios, from piracy to terrorism to encroachment of territorial waters. It also has the ability to deliver special operation unit underwater in terms of unit insertion and extraction carried out on areas which is out of reach of aircraft or too dangerous for warship to come close. Its co-produced by DCNS and Navantia which derives from the proven Rubis class nuclear attack submarine which is now in service with the French Marine Nationale.
Displacing 1,565 tonnes, it is 67.5 metres long and 12.3 metres high, the submarine has 360 battery cells, each weighing 750 kg, to power the a quiet Permanently Magnetised Propulsion Motor that drives it underwater at 20 knots (37 kmph), or 12 knots (22 kmph) when surfaced. The propulsion system consists of two 1,250 kW MAN diesel engine sets to charge the batteries (providing 1,250kW of power) coupled with the 2,900kW electric motor. There are plans to equip the last 2 Scorpenes with advanced “air independent propulsion”.
Its weapon system is based on Submarine Tactical Integrated Combat System, which can process information in detecting target with help of Sonar. The Scorpène submarines—which India calls the Kalavri class— is armed with advanced Exocet SM39 underwater-launched anti-ship missile, which the lead ship, INS Kalvari, flight tested last year. The Exocet has a range of 50 kms and can also be fired at lower-than-periscope depths. They are manned by a crew of 43 sailors. Its search-and-attack periscope is equipped with infrared and low-light-level attack cameras and laser range finders to spot targets on the surface of the sea.
Build in modular configuration and applying latest technology in acoustic signature reduction and fitted with integrated command and control system. The submarine incorporates a high level of system redundancy to achieve an average 240 days at sea a year for each submarine. The submarine is manned by a standard crew of 31, with additional space for 6 special operations personnel. The entire operational and living area is air-conditioned, and the latest safety systems to allow for the operation of a Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle (DSRV) are present. The elastic mounting of equipment inside the pressure hull on shock absorbing cradles, further minimizes noise. Submerged, the Scorpene is quieter than most submarines due to the utilization of advanced hydrodynamics with an albacore bow shape, with fewer appendages and an optimised propeller.
Submarines are made out of immensely strong steel, but when they go deep the water pressure makes their hulls flex and change shape. This places the adhesive behind the coating under immense strains. Add to this the long patrol, unforgiving salt water, rust and temperature changes involved and you have one of the most challenging operating environments on earth. So when you next see a submarine with tiles missing and rust stains, it may tell you more about the way it is being used than the maintenance standards of its owners. Iranian imported Kilo class submarines are often seen sailing around with most of the tiles removed, leaving a very uneven surface, which may greatly increase the noise signature of the submarine. The use of high-tensile steels has reduced the weight of the pressure hull, allowing a larger load of fuel and ammunition. The reduced complement minimises training costs and increase combat efficiency by making more space. To make the Scorpene submarines especially stealthy, India's design uses, according to Naval Technology, HLES-80 “high-yield stress-specific steel, supplied by ArcelorMittal, which allows the submarine to dive almost 1150 feet (300 metres) under the surface at 20 knots (37 kmph) and achieve an average of 240 days at sea per year per submarine. While that metric is pretty commonplace for American and Russian subs, this will be India's first ultra deep-diving submarine.
The Franco-Spanish Scorpene diesel submarines and extensive technology transfer deal was finalized until late 2005. The cost had been subject to varying estimates over the life of those multi-year negotiations, and continued to change after the contract was awarded, but the final figure for the first 6 boats is now generally accepted as being about $4 billion. Six Scorpene submarines are currently being built under Project 75, but when they come on stream by late 2018 an almost equivalent number will have retired from the current fleet. Building a submarine fleet The Indian Navy makes do with 14 old-style, diesel-electric submarines, of which just 7 or 8 are operational at any time.
The original Rs 18,798 crore cost of 6 Scorpenes has now gone up to Rs 23,562 crore. Meanwhile, the MoD must ensure that the expensive (Rs 6,000 crore) technology that it bought for the Scorpene, and will buy for the Russian submarine line, fructifies into a world-class indigenous design. This will require close involvement from the navy’s integral design establishment. A concurrent role must be allocated to NIRDESH, the newly set up National Institute for Research and Development in Defence Shipbuilding.
All 6 Scorpene submarines, which were originally scheduled to be inducted between 2012 and 2017, are now slated for induction only by 2021, i.e. 4 years behind schedule. INS Kalvari took 8 years to build and has been inducted 5 years behind schedule. This is indeed a repeat of history. Slightly over a quarter of a century ago, India in February 1992 inducted INS Shalki, a German-origin submarine that similarly took 8 years and 4 months (100 months) to license, build and assemble at the MDL, instead of the originally scheduled 42 months (three-and-a-half years). The second German-origin submarine, INS Shankul, commissioned in May 1994, had taken even longer to build—10 years (120 months).
The 2016 stolen Malaysia or Chile commercial manuals of generic version, stamped “Restricted Scorpene India” , originated from the hacking of DCNS & THALES (by a former French employee fired in 2011 while providing training in India), included what frequencies the submarines gather intelligence at, what levels of noise they make at various speeds and their diving depths, range and endurance. It also discloses magnetic, electromagnetic and infra-red data as well as the specifications of the submarine’s torpedo launch system and the combat system. It details the speed and conditions needed for using the periscope, the noise specifications of the propeller and the radiated noise levels that occur when the submarine surfaces.
A submarine’s “audio signature” is like a fingerprint. It is unique, and allows sensors like those in maritime reconnaissance aircraft to identify individual submarines, from a bank of “signatures” that navies maintain. Indian Navy's first Scorpene has not yet done its “noise ranging trials”, which would pinpoint its audio fingerprint. Until these trials are completed, there is little possibility of it falling into the wrong hands. Scorpene submarines are operated by Malaysia and Chile, while Brazil will also operate them from 2018. The Indian Scorpene is slightly longer, which would make its audio and magnetic signatures marginally different.
The secret data included details of the capabilities of SM39 anti-ship missile. Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar on Friday, say they are catering for a “best case scenario”, and “worst case scenario”. The latter encompasses the possibility that the full version of the documents have fallen into hostile hands, and 6 Scorpene submarines that will join the navy’s fleet by 2019 have been operationally compromised.
The CM-2000 Scorpene is the next generation diesel-attack submarine with true multi-role capabilities. Scorpene design is a generation ahead of the successful German-built Type 209 class submarine from Howaldtswerke-Deutche Werft (HDW) and Thyssen Nordseewerke. It can be tailored to meet ever changing threat scenarios, from piracy to terrorism to encroachment of territorial waters. It also has the ability to deliver special operation unit underwater in terms of unit insertion and extraction carried out on areas which is out of reach of aircraft or too dangerous for warship to come close. Its co-produced by DCNS and Navantia which derives from the proven Rubis class nuclear attack submarine which is now in service with the French Marine Nationale.
Displacing 1,565 tonnes, it is 67.5 metres long and 12.3 metres high, the submarine has 360 battery cells, each weighing 750 kg, to power the a quiet Permanently Magnetised Propulsion Motor that drives it underwater at 20 knots (37 kmph), or 12 knots (22 kmph) when surfaced. The propulsion system consists of two 1,250 kW MAN diesel engine sets to charge the batteries (providing 1,250kW of power) coupled with the 2,900kW electric motor. There are plans to equip the last 2 Scorpenes with advanced “air independent propulsion”.
Its weapon system is based on Submarine Tactical Integrated Combat System, which can process information in detecting target with help of Sonar. The Scorpène submarines—which India calls the Kalavri class— is armed with advanced Exocet SM39 underwater-launched anti-ship missile, which the lead ship, INS Kalvari, flight tested last year. The Exocet has a range of 50 kms and can also be fired at lower-than-periscope depths. They are manned by a crew of 43 sailors. Its search-and-attack periscope is equipped with infrared and low-light-level attack cameras and laser range finders to spot targets on the surface of the sea.
Build in modular configuration and applying latest technology in acoustic signature reduction and fitted with integrated command and control system. The submarine incorporates a high level of system redundancy to achieve an average 240 days at sea a year for each submarine. The submarine is manned by a standard crew of 31, with additional space for 6 special operations personnel. The entire operational and living area is air-conditioned, and the latest safety systems to allow for the operation of a Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle (DSRV) are present. The elastic mounting of equipment inside the pressure hull on shock absorbing cradles, further minimizes noise. Submerged, the Scorpene is quieter than most submarines due to the utilization of advanced hydrodynamics with an albacore bow shape, with fewer appendages and an optimised propeller.
Submarines are made out of immensely strong steel, but when they go deep the water pressure makes their hulls flex and change shape. This places the adhesive behind the coating under immense strains. Add to this the long patrol, unforgiving salt water, rust and temperature changes involved and you have one of the most challenging operating environments on earth. So when you next see a submarine with tiles missing and rust stains, it may tell you more about the way it is being used than the maintenance standards of its owners. Iranian imported Kilo class submarines are often seen sailing around with most of the tiles removed, leaving a very uneven surface, which may greatly increase the noise signature of the submarine. The use of high-tensile steels has reduced the weight of the pressure hull, allowing a larger load of fuel and ammunition. The reduced complement minimises training costs and increase combat efficiency by making more space. To make the Scorpene submarines especially stealthy, India's design uses, according to Naval Technology, HLES-80 “high-yield stress-specific steel, supplied by ArcelorMittal, which allows the submarine to dive almost 1150 feet (300 metres) under the surface at 20 knots (37 kmph) and achieve an average of 240 days at sea per year per submarine. While that metric is pretty commonplace for American and Russian subs, this will be India's first ultra deep-diving submarine.
The Franco-Spanish Scorpene diesel submarines and extensive technology transfer deal was finalized until late 2005. The cost had been subject to varying estimates over the life of those multi-year negotiations, and continued to change after the contract was awarded, but the final figure for the first 6 boats is now generally accepted as being about $4 billion. Six Scorpene submarines are currently being built under Project 75, but when they come on stream by late 2018 an almost equivalent number will have retired from the current fleet. Building a submarine fleet The Indian Navy makes do with 14 old-style, diesel-electric submarines, of which just 7 or 8 are operational at any time.
The original Rs 18,798 crore cost of 6 Scorpenes has now gone up to Rs 23,562 crore. Meanwhile, the MoD must ensure that the expensive (Rs 6,000 crore) technology that it bought for the Scorpene, and will buy for the Russian submarine line, fructifies into a world-class indigenous design. This will require close involvement from the navy’s integral design establishment. A concurrent role must be allocated to NIRDESH, the newly set up National Institute for Research and Development in Defence Shipbuilding.
All 6 Scorpene submarines, which were originally scheduled to be inducted between 2012 and 2017, are now slated for induction only by 2021, i.e. 4 years behind schedule. INS Kalvari took 8 years to build and has been inducted 5 years behind schedule. This is indeed a repeat of history. Slightly over a quarter of a century ago, India in February 1992 inducted INS Shalki, a German-origin submarine that similarly took 8 years and 4 months (100 months) to license, build and assemble at the MDL, instead of the originally scheduled 42 months (three-and-a-half years). The second German-origin submarine, INS Shankul, commissioned in May 1994, had taken even longer to build—10 years (120 months).
The 2,700-ton Lada is 72 meters (236 feet) long, and carries a crew of 35. Lada class (its export version is called Amur) submarines are a series of Russian diesel-electric submarines developed in the late 1990s. Mono-hull design was used during the sub's construction for the first time since 40s. The project general designer is Yury Kormilitsyn. Unique feature of the project is combination of small size and low noise with powerful torpedo and missile armament; use of hydrogen-oxygen fuel cells generating electricity. It has six 533mm (21 inch) torpedo tubes, with 18 torpedoes and/or missiles carried. As many as 44 mines can be carried instead of torpedoes and missiles and deployed via the torpedo tubes.
Project 677 Lada fast attack submarine was designed for (defense of naval bases, seashore and sea lanes) anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare, as well as or conducting maritime reconnaissance. Maximum depth is about 300 meters (984 feet). Allegedly, this submarine has eight times the acoustic performance of “Kilo” class submarines. This is mainly due to the surface of the muffler coatings and submarines quieter propulsion. This was accomplished by using anechoic (sound absorbing) tile coatings on the exterior, as well as a very quiet (skewed) propeller. Moreover, the machinery design of the submarine are all taken into account within the silencer elements. Including active and passive sonar submarine sonar, passive sonar, including drag.
Project 677 Lada fast attack submarine was designed for (defense of naval bases, seashore and sea lanes) anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare, as well as or conducting maritime reconnaissance. Maximum depth is about 300 meters (984 feet). Allegedly, this submarine has eight times the acoustic performance of “Kilo” class submarines. This is mainly due to the surface of the muffler coatings and submarines quieter propulsion. This was accomplished by using anechoic (sound absorbing) tile coatings on the exterior, as well as a very quiet (skewed) propeller. Moreover, the machinery design of the submarine are all taken into account within the silencer elements. Including active and passive sonar submarine sonar, passive sonar, including drag.
China has agreed to buy four (export version of Lada-class) Amur-class submarines from Russia as a joint project, 2 build in Russia and 2 in China. The Ladas are designed to be fast attack and scouting boats. They are intended for anti-surface and anti-submarine operations as well as naval reconnaissance.
Construction on the first Lada began in 1997, but money shortages delayed work for years. The first Lada boat was finally completed in 2005. While the first Lada was “accepted” by the navy in 2010, the second two were canceled in 2011. A year after cancelling its Lada class diesel-electric submarines for the Russian Navy, Russia has revived the project as part of a joint development effort with an Italian firm (Fincantieri). While Fincantieri has never built subs (just destroyers, aircraft carriers, and patrol craft), it is one of the largest ship builders in Europe and has access to a lot of Western military technology.
Lada was developed in the 1990s, as the successor to the Kilo class, but it was determined that there was not enough difference between the Lada and the improved Kilos being built. That said these boats are, however, claimed to be 8 times quieter than the Kilos. This was accomplished by using anechoic (sound absorbing) tile coatings on the exterior and a very quiet (skewed) propeller. All interior machinery was designed with silence in mind. The sensors include active and passive sonars, including towed passive sonar.
Originally, the Russian Navy wanted the Project 677, the lead Lada class submarine, St. Petersburg construction on the first Lada began in 1997, but money shortages delayed work for years. The first Lada test boat was finally completed in 2005. After eight years of trials, the Navy decided to terminate the project and opt for an updated version of the proven 636 design, which dated back to the 1990s. Construction of the Novorossiisk submarine began in August 2010 at Admiralty Shipyards, followed by the second submarine construction Rostov-on-Don in November 2011 and the third submarine of the class Stary Oskol in August 2012.
These boats will not see action in either the Russian or the Italian navy. Instead, they will be sold exclusively to third-party countries. This effort will build the S-1000 submarine, as well as revive other export versions of Lada called the Amur 950. This was what the export version of the Lada was to be called, but working with an Italian shipbuilder the Amur 950 has been transformed into the cheaper (less than $200 million each) S-1000 class submarine. This less complex version of Lada-class, called the Amur, was offered for export, but Russia was unable to obtain any export sales and the project was cancelled in 2013. Amur would have been dead soon anyway because of the sanctions imposed on Russia because of the 2014 invasion of Ukraine.
“Our potential opponents call it the ‘Black Hole’ due to the very low noise emission and visibility of the submarine,” Konstantin Tabachny, captain of the Novorossiysk. From the beginning, Lada was designed to accept an AIP, but the long-promised system was never ready. This was supposed to be a key feature of Lada.
Construction on the first Lada began in 1997, but money shortages delayed work for years. The first Lada boat was finally completed in 2005. While the first Lada was “accepted” by the navy in 2010, the second two were canceled in 2011. A year after cancelling its Lada class diesel-electric submarines for the Russian Navy, Russia has revived the project as part of a joint development effort with an Italian firm (Fincantieri). While Fincantieri has never built subs (just destroyers, aircraft carriers, and patrol craft), it is one of the largest ship builders in Europe and has access to a lot of Western military technology.
Lada was developed in the 1990s, as the successor to the Kilo class, but it was determined that there was not enough difference between the Lada and the improved Kilos being built. That said these boats are, however, claimed to be 8 times quieter than the Kilos. This was accomplished by using anechoic (sound absorbing) tile coatings on the exterior and a very quiet (skewed) propeller. All interior machinery was designed with silence in mind. The sensors include active and passive sonars, including towed passive sonar.
Originally, the Russian Navy wanted the Project 677, the lead Lada class submarine, St. Petersburg construction on the first Lada began in 1997, but money shortages delayed work for years. The first Lada test boat was finally completed in 2005. After eight years of trials, the Navy decided to terminate the project and opt for an updated version of the proven 636 design, which dated back to the 1990s. Construction of the Novorossiisk submarine began in August 2010 at Admiralty Shipyards, followed by the second submarine construction Rostov-on-Don in November 2011 and the third submarine of the class Stary Oskol in August 2012.
These boats will not see action in either the Russian or the Italian navy. Instead, they will be sold exclusively to third-party countries. This effort will build the S-1000 submarine, as well as revive other export versions of Lada called the Amur 950. This was what the export version of the Lada was to be called, but working with an Italian shipbuilder the Amur 950 has been transformed into the cheaper (less than $200 million each) S-1000 class submarine. This less complex version of Lada-class, called the Amur, was offered for export, but Russia was unable to obtain any export sales and the project was cancelled in 2013. Amur would have been dead soon anyway because of the sanctions imposed on Russia because of the 2014 invasion of Ukraine.
“Our potential opponents call it the ‘Black Hole’ due to the very low noise emission and visibility of the submarine,” Konstantin Tabachny, captain of the Novorossiysk. From the beginning, Lada was designed to accept an AIP, but the long-promised system was never ready. This was supposed to be a key feature of Lada.
The A26 was originally envisioned as a 62m boat with about 1,800t displacement when surfaced, and more when fully submerged. It would be designed to excel in littoral operations, while remaining a capable ocean-going vessel. As a point of comparison, that size is a bit larger than the German U212A/214, and about the same as the Scorpene AM-2000 AIP, all of which are ocean-going boats. Envisaged weapons include torpedoes and mines, but not anti-ship missiles. The lock system makes it easy for commandos to enter and exit the boat, and is large enough to allow the launch and retrieval of Unmanned Underwater Vehicles. The A26’s AIP system will be Kockums’ Stirling, which also equips Sweden’s 3 Gotland and 2 Sodermanland Class submarines, Singapore’s Archer Class Sodermanlund variant, and Japan’s Soryu Class.
To date, Swedish submarines have been renowned for their quietness. HMS Gotland performed well enough in Mediterranean naval exercises to earn an invitation and eventual 2-year lease from the USA, which brought the boat and crew to San Diego to help train its forces against an advanced diesel-electric boat.
That reputation for stealth was dented somewhat by Australia’s much-enlarged 3,400t (submerged) Collins Class boats, which were designed by Kockums based on the 1,150t Vastergotland Class and built in Australia. For various reasons, the AIP-less Collins Class are known to be rather noisier than they ought to be.
It is now known that the A26 will have a “ghost mode”(Genuine HOlistic STealth) that makes the sub virtually undetectable while submerged. This includes the ability to sit on the sea floor, as if it were inert wreckage, while divers from the sub can still move in and out to plant mines or perform other functions. In short the A26 will emphasize stealth and the ability to dominate shallow and “busy” (lots of inlets, rivers and islands) coastal waters.
To date, Swedish submarines have been renowned for their quietness. HMS Gotland performed well enough in Mediterranean naval exercises to earn an invitation and eventual 2-year lease from the USA, which brought the boat and crew to San Diego to help train its forces against an advanced diesel-electric boat.
That reputation for stealth was dented somewhat by Australia’s much-enlarged 3,400t (submerged) Collins Class boats, which were designed by Kockums based on the 1,150t Vastergotland Class and built in Australia. For various reasons, the AIP-less Collins Class are known to be rather noisier than they ought to be.
It is now known that the A26 will have a “ghost mode”(Genuine HOlistic STealth) that makes the sub virtually undetectable while submerged. This includes the ability to sit on the sea floor, as if it were inert wreckage, while divers from the sub can still move in and out to plant mines or perform other functions. In short the A26 will emphasize stealth and the ability to dominate shallow and “busy” (lots of inlets, rivers and islands) coastal waters.
Chinese made Pakistan's Type 032 Qing-class double-hulled diesel-electric "experimental" submarine
Pakistan will build Project S-26 and S-30 submarines under license. The S-30 submarines are based on the Chinese 3,000-tonne Qing class conventional submarines which can launch three 1,500-km range nuclear-tipped cruise missiles from its conning tower. The Type 032 SSB was initially called the Type 043 by some sources, creating some confusion. The new Type 032 submarines is a variant of the Type 041A Improved Yuan-class SSK with lots of additional improvements to the structure and performance. It is Chinese navy's new submarine test bed.
It is armed with YJ-2 (YJ-82) anti-ship missiles and a combination of Yu-4 (SAET-50) passive homing and Yu-3 (SET-65E) active/passive homing torpedoes. The export by China to Pakistan of the 1,500km-range CJ-10K cruise missile would be a clear violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime.
The submarine can carry about 50 special forces personnel, the use of special operations or underwater unmanned underwater vehicle submerged secrets to perform short-range combat missions. US Navy nuclear submarine equipped with special forces adopt such tactics in the war on terror repeatedly perform penetration missions.
China-developed Stirling Engine air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems. The AIP system for the Qing-class SSK was developed by the 711th Research Institute of CSIC. R&D work began in June 1996, with a 100-strong team of scientists and engineers led by Dr Jin Donghan being involved in developing the Stirling-cycle engine, while another team led Professor Ma Weiming of China’s Naval Engineering University began developing the all-electric AIP system. The two projects entered the production engineering stage in 2007, with the Shanghai Qiyao Propulsion Technology Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of the 711th Institute, becoming the principal industrial entity charged with producing the AIP system. Incidentally, the Qing-class SSK's all-electric propulsion system is a derivative of a similar system that was developed about a decade ago for the PLA Navy's six Type 093 Shang-class SSGNs and three Type 094 Jin-class SSBNs.
It was rumored that China has surpassed an earlier Japanese record for the world’s largest conventional submarine. Its submerged displacement was said to be 6,628 tons making the Qing-class the world’s largest diesel-electric submarine. In fact the double-hulled Qing-class SSK, with a submerged displacement close to 3,600 tonnes, bears a close resemblance to the Russian Type 636M SSK, and features hull-retractable foreplanes and hydrodynamically streamlined sail. It had a lot of lada/kilo influence and was launched in Wuchang shipyard back in 2010; and is set to conduct weapons tests later in 2013. At the time, we thought it might be a new conventional submarine class to replace Yuan. However, it turns out this is basically a one ship class that will be used to replace the old No. 200 Golf-class ballistic missile test bed. This will likely be used to test out ballistic missiles as well as new vertical launch system. Type 032 Qing-class is a lot of submarine to be carrying only three torpedo sized cruise missiles. Most reporting suggests that the PLAN is only buying one of this type as an SLBM test platform, and the reported three units is too many for test purposes but not enough for operational applications.
The Type 032 is a potential threat to the US because it can remain submerged for up to 30 days, giving it the potential to infiltrate Pacific waters close enough to the US to target it with JL-2A missiles which have a range of 4,500 miles.
Pakistan will build Project S-26 and S-30 submarines under license. The S-30 submarines are based on the Chinese 3,000-tonne Qing class conventional submarines which can launch three 1,500-km range nuclear-tipped cruise missiles from its conning tower. The Type 032 SSB was initially called the Type 043 by some sources, creating some confusion. The new Type 032 submarines is a variant of the Type 041A Improved Yuan-class SSK with lots of additional improvements to the structure and performance. It is Chinese navy's new submarine test bed.
It is armed with YJ-2 (YJ-82) anti-ship missiles and a combination of Yu-4 (SAET-50) passive homing and Yu-3 (SET-65E) active/passive homing torpedoes. The export by China to Pakistan of the 1,500km-range CJ-10K cruise missile would be a clear violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime.
The submarine can carry about 50 special forces personnel, the use of special operations or underwater unmanned underwater vehicle submerged secrets to perform short-range combat missions. US Navy nuclear submarine equipped with special forces adopt such tactics in the war on terror repeatedly perform penetration missions.
China-developed Stirling Engine air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems. The AIP system for the Qing-class SSK was developed by the 711th Research Institute of CSIC. R&D work began in June 1996, with a 100-strong team of scientists and engineers led by Dr Jin Donghan being involved in developing the Stirling-cycle engine, while another team led Professor Ma Weiming of China’s Naval Engineering University began developing the all-electric AIP system. The two projects entered the production engineering stage in 2007, with the Shanghai Qiyao Propulsion Technology Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of the 711th Institute, becoming the principal industrial entity charged with producing the AIP system. Incidentally, the Qing-class SSK's all-electric propulsion system is a derivative of a similar system that was developed about a decade ago for the PLA Navy's six Type 093 Shang-class SSGNs and three Type 094 Jin-class SSBNs.
It was rumored that China has surpassed an earlier Japanese record for the world’s largest conventional submarine. Its submerged displacement was said to be 6,628 tons making the Qing-class the world’s largest diesel-electric submarine. In fact the double-hulled Qing-class SSK, with a submerged displacement close to 3,600 tonnes, bears a close resemblance to the Russian Type 636M SSK, and features hull-retractable foreplanes and hydrodynamically streamlined sail. It had a lot of lada/kilo influence and was launched in Wuchang shipyard back in 2010; and is set to conduct weapons tests later in 2013. At the time, we thought it might be a new conventional submarine class to replace Yuan. However, it turns out this is basically a one ship class that will be used to replace the old No. 200 Golf-class ballistic missile test bed. This will likely be used to test out ballistic missiles as well as new vertical launch system. Type 032 Qing-class is a lot of submarine to be carrying only three torpedo sized cruise missiles. Most reporting suggests that the PLAN is only buying one of this type as an SLBM test platform, and the reported three units is too many for test purposes but not enough for operational applications.
The Type 032 is a potential threat to the US because it can remain submerged for up to 30 days, giving it the potential to infiltrate Pacific waters close enough to the US to target it with JL-2A missiles which have a range of 4,500 miles.
Project Kalina is a proposed fifth-generation diesel-electric submarine currently being developed by the Russian Navy. It will be fitted with air-independent propulsion technology, and may be sold to China.
Type 39A/B/C (Yuan class) diesel-electric attack submarine, with AIP, replaces the Ming-class (redesign of Type 033 / Soviet Romeo-class) submarines. It was also called Type 41 (Yuan class) in the beginning, because it has a tear-drop shaped hull (similar to Russian Kilo-class), but later it was called Type 39 (Yuan class), due to NATO classification for different classes of ships with common prime mover (engine & gearbox etc), when it was found to contain the submarine had the same prime mover as the older class.
The tear-drop shaped double-hull and large sail of the Type-039A Yuan class again suggest heavy Kilo influence. The teardrop shape also suggests a pressurized double hull design inherited from the Kilo. A pair of foreplanes are positioned in the middle of the sail. Yuan-class is a 're-engineered' Kilo. The latest Yuans still appear like Kilos, but may be part of an evolution. The export variant of Type 39 SSK (improved Kilo) is Thailand and Pakistan's S-20 SSK which costs around $500-$600 million.
Pakistan's S20 has a cruising speed of 28 km to 40 km per hour and endurance of 60 days. The crew of 38 operates a highly automated sub that has 6 torpedo tubes & 16 torpedoes, cruise missiles or mines. 4 numbers of these will be built, with air-independent propulsion (AIP) in China for Pakistani Navy and delivered by 2023; while at the same time Chinese personnel will assist Pakistan in building rest 4 in Pakistan by 2028.
The Type-039 (Yuan class) SSK is the successor to the Type-039G upgraded “Song” class. The 14 nos. of Type 39B SSK built displaces approximately 2,700 tons when surfaced, and 3,600 tons when submerged; whereas larger than 4 nos. of the 1,800 ton Type 39A. Both have with crews of 60-70 sailors and six 533 mm torpedo tubes. Type 039A was first launched at Wuhan Shipyard. However, the Type-039 SSK had very little resemblance to Type 039G (Song class). So the western media call it Type 041 in early reports.
Since the late 1980s China has been designing and building a rapidly evolving collection of "Song" (Type 39) class diesel-electric submarines. The Songs look a lot like the Russian Kilo class, and that was no accident or coincidence. The Chinese had built 14 nos. of the original Type-039G “Song” class SSK, this was the first time China teardrop-shaped case design is based on “Kilo” class before the “Romeo” class submarines built for the foundation. The submarine was not fully operational until 1999 due to serious design flaws, including unsatisfactory underwater performance and noise level. It was redesigned as a variant, Type 039G (Song-II). The changes have been so great that the four Songs completed in 2013 were recognized as a new type and designated the Yuan class (Type 39A or 41).
A new, improved "A" variant was also launched. Type 039 submarine is considered to be “Song” class submarines improved version, but after careful observation, especially after the Russian side of the observation, it was found that the submarine like the “Kilo” class submarine clone with a German clone engine. Overall, the Song class reveals a technological standard generally similar to that of Western submarines built during the 80s. China's Type-035 Ming III class diesel/electric submarine is hull is from the 1,475-ton Type 033 (Soviet Romeo class) submarines which is based on the Zulu & Whiskey class which is itself based on the German Type XXI submarine of World War II. Its top speed is 22 knots (40 km/hr), but less sustained speed. Ming class subs stealth design is further enhanced by the use of similar to the Russian submarine Kilo class anechoic tiling. Romeo class submarines are considered obsolete, but still have some value as training and surveillance vessels. China currently has 14 “Song” class submarines (9 nos. of Type 039G1 upgraded Song-class, 4 nos. of Type 039G Song-class & one original experimental Song class), three “meta” class submarines and 25 “Romeo” class submarines.
Engine: China got a German MTU 16V396 design engine (1800rpm), or its blueprints, and hired independent German engineers to re-engineer it as a Chinese copy. This is the engine that is in both the Song-class and Yuan-class submarines. Since it is a well-known engine, we know that the loudest noise from this engine comes from its oil pump and when you know the pump ratio formula, you can look for the exact frequency to find it on sonar. The submarine is equipped with indigenously developed cabin-raft (shock absorbers) system that helped to reduce noise level by over 35dB. Additionally, the submarines are covered with rubber anti-sonar protection tiles to reduce the risk of detection.
Sensors: Three Chinese diesel Song-class submarines carried Thales TSM 2233 ELEDONE / DSUV-22 & Thales TSM 2255 / DUUX-5 from France beginning around 1988 and early 1990s. China was known to have copied them. It also has access to a wide range of modern Russian sonar systems (MG-519 MOUSE ROAR, MGK-500 SHARK GILL) through its purchase of the Kilo Class. Comparable systems are expected to be installed for the Type 041. The Type 041 is likely to be fitted with a comparable surface/air search radar similar to the MRK-50 SNOOP TRAY, a commercial navigation radar like a Furuno unit observed on a number of SONG class and ESM system is comparable to the Type 921-A.
Sterling heat-exchanging engine AIP: The first Chinese air-independent propulsion (AIP) had less power and reliability and does not appear to be nearly as capable as Russian or Western models. In part, this was because that AIP sued lead-acid batteries. The Chinese kept improving on their AIP, and the last half dozen AIP systems were designed to use a more efficient lithium battery system. This AIP 2.0 has numerous other tweaks. Since the AIP systems onboard western submarines usually rate at 150 kW to 300 kW, so it is safe to assume that similar systems onboard Chinese submarines would also be consisted of at least two units just like its western counterpart.
The tear-drop shaped double-hull and large sail of the Type-039A Yuan class again suggest heavy Kilo influence. The teardrop shape also suggests a pressurized double hull design inherited from the Kilo. A pair of foreplanes are positioned in the middle of the sail. Yuan-class is a 're-engineered' Kilo. The latest Yuans still appear like Kilos, but may be part of an evolution. The export variant of Type 39 SSK (improved Kilo) is Thailand and Pakistan's S-20 SSK which costs around $500-$600 million.
Pakistan's S20 has a cruising speed of 28 km to 40 km per hour and endurance of 60 days. The crew of 38 operates a highly automated sub that has 6 torpedo tubes & 16 torpedoes, cruise missiles or mines. 4 numbers of these will be built, with air-independent propulsion (AIP) in China for Pakistani Navy and delivered by 2023; while at the same time Chinese personnel will assist Pakistan in building rest 4 in Pakistan by 2028.
The Type-039 (Yuan class) SSK is the successor to the Type-039G upgraded “Song” class. The 14 nos. of Type 39B SSK built displaces approximately 2,700 tons when surfaced, and 3,600 tons when submerged; whereas larger than 4 nos. of the 1,800 ton Type 39A. Both have with crews of 60-70 sailors and six 533 mm torpedo tubes. Type 039A was first launched at Wuhan Shipyard. However, the Type-039 SSK had very little resemblance to Type 039G (Song class). So the western media call it Type 041 in early reports.
Since the late 1980s China has been designing and building a rapidly evolving collection of "Song" (Type 39) class diesel-electric submarines. The Songs look a lot like the Russian Kilo class, and that was no accident or coincidence. The Chinese had built 14 nos. of the original Type-039G “Song” class SSK, this was the first time China teardrop-shaped case design is based on “Kilo” class before the “Romeo” class submarines built for the foundation. The submarine was not fully operational until 1999 due to serious design flaws, including unsatisfactory underwater performance and noise level. It was redesigned as a variant, Type 039G (Song-II). The changes have been so great that the four Songs completed in 2013 were recognized as a new type and designated the Yuan class (Type 39A or 41).
A new, improved "A" variant was also launched. Type 039 submarine is considered to be “Song” class submarines improved version, but after careful observation, especially after the Russian side of the observation, it was found that the submarine like the “Kilo” class submarine clone with a German clone engine. Overall, the Song class reveals a technological standard generally similar to that of Western submarines built during the 80s. China's Type-035 Ming III class diesel/electric submarine is hull is from the 1,475-ton Type 033 (Soviet Romeo class) submarines which is based on the Zulu & Whiskey class which is itself based on the German Type XXI submarine of World War II. Its top speed is 22 knots (40 km/hr), but less sustained speed. Ming class subs stealth design is further enhanced by the use of similar to the Russian submarine Kilo class anechoic tiling. Romeo class submarines are considered obsolete, but still have some value as training and surveillance vessels. China currently has 14 “Song” class submarines (9 nos. of Type 039G1 upgraded Song-class, 4 nos. of Type 039G Song-class & one original experimental Song class), three “meta” class submarines and 25 “Romeo” class submarines.
Engine: China got a German MTU 16V396 design engine (1800rpm), or its blueprints, and hired independent German engineers to re-engineer it as a Chinese copy. This is the engine that is in both the Song-class and Yuan-class submarines. Since it is a well-known engine, we know that the loudest noise from this engine comes from its oil pump and when you know the pump ratio formula, you can look for the exact frequency to find it on sonar. The submarine is equipped with indigenously developed cabin-raft (shock absorbers) system that helped to reduce noise level by over 35dB. Additionally, the submarines are covered with rubber anti-sonar protection tiles to reduce the risk of detection.
Sensors: Three Chinese diesel Song-class submarines carried Thales TSM 2233 ELEDONE / DSUV-22 & Thales TSM 2255 / DUUX-5 from France beginning around 1988 and early 1990s. China was known to have copied them. It also has access to a wide range of modern Russian sonar systems (MG-519 MOUSE ROAR, MGK-500 SHARK GILL) through its purchase of the Kilo Class. Comparable systems are expected to be installed for the Type 041. The Type 041 is likely to be fitted with a comparable surface/air search radar similar to the MRK-50 SNOOP TRAY, a commercial navigation radar like a Furuno unit observed on a number of SONG class and ESM system is comparable to the Type 921-A.
Sterling heat-exchanging engine AIP: The first Chinese air-independent propulsion (AIP) had less power and reliability and does not appear to be nearly as capable as Russian or Western models. In part, this was because that AIP sued lead-acid batteries. The Chinese kept improving on their AIP, and the last half dozen AIP systems were designed to use a more efficient lithium battery system. This AIP 2.0 has numerous other tweaks. Since the AIP systems onboard western submarines usually rate at 150 kW to 300 kW, so it is safe to assume that similar systems onboard Chinese submarines would also be consisted of at least two units just like its western counterpart.
China has been working on AIP since 1975 and the first working prototype was available by 1998, but required over a decade to become reliable. Chinese AIP (based on the Swedish Stirling AIP system) performed about as well as early Western AIP systems. According to the Chinese press releases, their AIP sub stayed under for over two weeks at a time, which is typical of what a Stirling AIP system can do.
Russia could not get their AIP to work, and that became obvious when AIP equipped Chinese subs were being offered to export customers. Kilo may never have AIP, and Russia still gets exports sales for Kilo because not every customer is looking for AIP. The Chinese AIP appears to have encountered no major problems, but Chinese naval commanders have concluded that AIP is not always worth the additional cost.
Type 39A/B/C (Yuan class) diesel-electric attack submarine has three versions, since China improved the design twice. It is basically, Chinese 're-engineered' version of Kilo class submarine. The Russians now believe that the entire Song/Yuan project is part of a long-range plan to successfully copy the Kilo. The Type 39AG have all been upgraded to Type 39B. Type 39B has additional side low-frequency sonar arrays, designed for deep waters. The Type 39C has additional ASW attack capability.
In the late 1990s, the Chinese began ordering Russian “Kilo” class submarine, which is the time to get the most advanced diesel-electric submarines. The recent appearance of the two “meta” class submarines seems to have improved. After two “meta” class submarines will eventually be subject to further development. Before the "meta" class, the first two submarines were replica of the early model “Kilo” class submarines (Type 877), while the second pair (Chinese Type 39B Yuan class) is obviously replica of the new “Kilo” class submarines (Type 636) of the replica.
Russia’s new “Kilo” class submarine is priced at $200 million, only about half the price of similar submarine of Western countries. North Korea and Iran have also purchased a “Kilo” class submarines. Russia has been unable, after several attempts, to develop a Kilo replacement while China has succeeded. This is why China is retiring its Kilos. The Russians now believe that the entire Song/Yuan project is part of a long-range plan to successfully copy the Kilo.
“Kilo” class submarine weight 2300 tons (surface displacement), the installation of six torpedo tubes, capable of carrying 57 crew. They carry 18 torpedoes or SS-V-27 anti-ship missiles (range of 300 kilometers, through the underwater torpedo tube launch). Such submarines are very quiet, able to sneak about 5 miles per hour nearly 700 km. Quiet features, coupled with submarines carrying cruise missiles, making it quite dangerous for the U.S. aircraft carrier.
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Russia’s new “Kilo” class submarine is priced at $200 million, only about half the price of similar submarine of Western countries. North Korea and Iran have also purchased a “Kilo” class submarines. Russia has been unable, after several attempts, to develop a Kilo replacement while China has succeeded. This is why China is retiring its Kilos. The Russians now believe that the entire Song/Yuan project is part of a long-range plan to successfully copy the Kilo.
“Kilo” class submarine weight 2300 tons (surface displacement), the installation of six torpedo tubes, capable of carrying 57 crew. They carry 18 torpedoes or SS-V-27 anti-ship missiles (range of 300 kilometers, through the underwater torpedo tube launch). Such submarines are very quiet, able to sneak about 5 miles per hour nearly 700 km. Quiet features, coupled with submarines carrying cruise missiles, making it quite dangerous for the U.S. aircraft carrier.
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INS Sindhukirti went through 10 year long modernisation in Zvezdochka Ship Repair Centre (Severodvinsk) and has been re-equipped with modern Russian Club-S cruise missiles systems (export version of the Calibre system developed by NPO Novator), becoming a full-fledged multi-purpose submarine, able to strike surface targets from the water.
India's Sindhughosh-class or Kilo Class (Type 877EKM ‘Paltus’) diesel-electric submarine each have a displacement of 2,300 tonnes, a maximum diving depth of 300 metres and a top speed of 18 Knots. They are able to operate solo for 45 days with a crew of over 50.
The submarine is a single-shaft vessel with a double hull. The bow planes are positioned close to the midship to improve the performance of the sonar. To reduce the submarine's acoustic signature, the flooding ports have been removed from the forebody. It also has a new gas-freeing system, and the hull is covered with rubber anti-sonar protection tiles to reduce the risk of detection.
Part of the refit involved installation of equipment for Klub-S (3M54E1 anti-ship and 3M14E land attack) cruise missiles and over 10 Indian and foreign-made systems, including the Ushus hydro-acoustic (sonar) system and CSS-MK-2 radio communications system.
In addition, the boat's cooling system was modified, a "Porpoise" radio-locater fitted and other work carried out "increasing the boat's military capacity and safety".
The boat is due to set sail for Mumbai Jan 29 via the North Sea route off Britain. It will be accompanied by Russian ice-breakers. It will be the first time an Indian submarine has undertaken a handover in ice conditions.
The boat displaces 2,300 tonnes, carries 52 crew members, has a top speed of 19 knots (35 km per hour) and diving depth of 300 metres. Zvezdochka, which specialises in repair and refit of nuclear-powered boats, has already refitted four of India's diesel-electric fleet -- Sindhuvir (S58), Sinduratna (S59), Sindhugosh (S55) and Sindhudvhaj (S56).
There are three variants of the Kilo class: the original Project 877 which came into service with Russian Navy in the 80s; the improved fire control system 877K and the wire guided torpedo variant of 877M; while the export variant would be the 877EKM which is being operated by Indian Navy along with Russian and Iranian counterparts. India operates 10 Kilo class submarines, purchased from the Soviet Union and Russia between 1986 and 2000. The 10 Indian 877EKM is equipped with Novator 3M-54E1 anti ship missile and was retrofitted to fire Novator 3M14 land attack cruise missile. Four of the older submarines have been modernised at the Zvezdochka shipyard in Severodvinsk, which included a complete overhaul of hull structures; improvements to control systems, sonar, electronic warfare systems, and an integrated weapon control system; as well as adding SS-N-27 anti-ship missiles. An Improved Kilo class which also being exported internationally, including China. Meanwhile the Vietnamese had received 2 Project 636 Kilo class submarine from Russia and awaiting for remaining 4 subs to complete construction.
Russians use their Kilos are mostly for home defense. The Kilo class was the first with a teardrop shaped hull which meant it was faster underwater than on the surface. Russia has 17 Kilos in service (plus 6 in reserve) and 6 Improved Kilos have been ordered. India, on the other hand, uses the Kilos as their primary combat subs.
The submarine is a single-shaft vessel with a double hull. The bow planes are positioned close to the midship to improve the performance of the sonar. To reduce the submarine's acoustic signature, the flooding ports have been removed from the forebody. It also has a new gas-freeing system, and the hull is covered with rubber anti-sonar protection tiles to reduce the risk of detection.
Part of the refit involved installation of equipment for Klub-S (3M54E1 anti-ship and 3M14E land attack) cruise missiles and over 10 Indian and foreign-made systems, including the Ushus hydro-acoustic (sonar) system and CSS-MK-2 radio communications system.
In addition, the boat's cooling system was modified, a "Porpoise" radio-locater fitted and other work carried out "increasing the boat's military capacity and safety".
The boat is due to set sail for Mumbai Jan 29 via the North Sea route off Britain. It will be accompanied by Russian ice-breakers. It will be the first time an Indian submarine has undertaken a handover in ice conditions.
The boat displaces 2,300 tonnes, carries 52 crew members, has a top speed of 19 knots (35 km per hour) and diving depth of 300 metres. Zvezdochka, which specialises in repair and refit of nuclear-powered boats, has already refitted four of India's diesel-electric fleet -- Sindhuvir (S58), Sinduratna (S59), Sindhugosh (S55) and Sindhudvhaj (S56).
There are three variants of the Kilo class: the original Project 877 which came into service with Russian Navy in the 80s; the improved fire control system 877K and the wire guided torpedo variant of 877M; while the export variant would be the 877EKM which is being operated by Indian Navy along with Russian and Iranian counterparts. India operates 10 Kilo class submarines, purchased from the Soviet Union and Russia between 1986 and 2000. The 10 Indian 877EKM is equipped with Novator 3M-54E1 anti ship missile and was retrofitted to fire Novator 3M14 land attack cruise missile. Four of the older submarines have been modernised at the Zvezdochka shipyard in Severodvinsk, which included a complete overhaul of hull structures; improvements to control systems, sonar, electronic warfare systems, and an integrated weapon control system; as well as adding SS-N-27 anti-ship missiles. An Improved Kilo class which also being exported internationally, including China. Meanwhile the Vietnamese had received 2 Project 636 Kilo class submarine from Russia and awaiting for remaining 4 subs to complete construction.
Russians use their Kilos are mostly for home defense. The Kilo class was the first with a teardrop shaped hull which meant it was faster underwater than on the surface. Russia has 17 Kilos in service (plus 6 in reserve) and 6 Improved Kilos have been ordered. India, on the other hand, uses the Kilos as their primary combat subs.
The first incident began on August 2013 when the INS Sindhurakshak caught fire and exploded while docked near Mumbai. The 16 year old submarine had recently returned from Russia after an $80 million refurbishment. Russian-built submarine INS Sindhurakshak sank after an explosion killing 18 sailors in August 2013 and two officers were killed in a fire on INS Sindhuratna the following year, an accident that led to then navy chief Admiral DK Joshi’s resignation. The submarine was disposed in June 2017 and its final resting point is 3,000 metres under the Arabian Sea. Submarine authorities concerned did not properly assess the crew fatigue, besides, the submarine was holding ammunition nearing life expiry.
The second incident was that Sindhuratna has also gone through a recent refurbishment and that should have included replacing the 240 batteries. That was standard procedure because as these batteries get older they are more prone to these types of fires. But the Sindhuratna batteries were not replaced because procurement bureaucrats never got around to authorizing it. That is a common failing of the Indian procurement bureaucracy, in this case triggered by fears that anti-corruption investigators might uncover bribes being paid for the new batteries and bringing suspicion on all the procurement officials involved with the Sindhuratna refurbishment, whether they were guilty or not. In cases like that the procurement bureaucrats tend to do what is safe for them and that often means doing nothing. Indian investigators initially feared that key problems with the fires in both subs was poor Russian quality control. That proved not to be the case.
The second incident was that Sindhuratna has also gone through a recent refurbishment and that should have included replacing the 240 batteries. That was standard procedure because as these batteries get older they are more prone to these types of fires. But the Sindhuratna batteries were not replaced because procurement bureaucrats never got around to authorizing it. That is a common failing of the Indian procurement bureaucracy, in this case triggered by fears that anti-corruption investigators might uncover bribes being paid for the new batteries and bringing suspicion on all the procurement officials involved with the Sindhuratna refurbishment, whether they were guilty or not. In cases like that the procurement bureaucrats tend to do what is safe for them and that often means doing nothing. Indian investigators initially feared that key problems with the fires in both subs was poor Russian quality control. That proved not to be the case.
Russia's Varshavyanka class diesel-electric submarine are upgraded Kilo Class (modified Project 636.3)
These new series improved non-nuclear submarines provide optimum combination of acoustic stealth and target detection range; the latest inertial navigation system; modern automated information management system; powerful high-speed torpedo-missile weapons. Although absent of AIP, it features low noise, advanced hull architecture and an optimal level of control process automation, the submarines provide high reliability and require low maintenance. It is capable of accommodating a crew of 52 on-board, the submarines can patrol for up to 45 days. Its standard weapons configuration are 18 torpedoes or 12 heavy torpedoes HWTs; and six 3M-54E or four 3M-14E missiles. It can reach a speed of 20 knots (37 kilometres per hour), with a cruising range of 400 miles on electric propulsion and max submission of 300 meters.
It features advanced acoustic ‘stealth’ technology derived from the Kilo and Lada designs; an extended combat range and is mainly intended for anti-shipping and anti-submarine missions in relatively shallow waters. The submarine uses anechoic tiles to absorb sound waves emitted by active sonar, thus reducing probability of detection by surface vessels, anti-submarine aircraft or enemy submarines. These tiles help attenuate sounds emitted from inside the submarine, adding its ability to shut-down the diesel engines when submerged, it reduces the range by which the sub may be detected by passive sonar.
Russia requires at least 10 Varshavyanka-class submarines to protect its interests in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Starting from 2014, the Admiralty Shipyards began delivering two ships per year to the Russian Navy, with the first two submarines, Novorossiysk and Rostov-on-Don, joining the Navy in August and December 2014. The third and fourth, Stary Oskol and Krasnodar, were transferred to the Black Sea fleet in July and November 2015. The fifth, The Great Novgorod, was delivered in October 2016.
Construction on the submarine named Kolpino began in October 2014, and it was launched in May 2016. Its construction was a milestone in the realization of a long-term plan of the Ministry of Defense alert restore Russia's Black Sea Fleet, and programs to improve the diesel-electric submarines for Navy fleet of Russia.
These new series improved non-nuclear submarines provide optimum combination of acoustic stealth and target detection range; the latest inertial navigation system; modern automated information management system; powerful high-speed torpedo-missile weapons. Although absent of AIP, it features low noise, advanced hull architecture and an optimal level of control process automation, the submarines provide high reliability and require low maintenance. It is capable of accommodating a crew of 52 on-board, the submarines can patrol for up to 45 days. Its standard weapons configuration are 18 torpedoes or 12 heavy torpedoes HWTs; and six 3M-54E or four 3M-14E missiles. It can reach a speed of 20 knots (37 kilometres per hour), with a cruising range of 400 miles on electric propulsion and max submission of 300 meters.
It features advanced acoustic ‘stealth’ technology derived from the Kilo and Lada designs; an extended combat range and is mainly intended for anti-shipping and anti-submarine missions in relatively shallow waters. The submarine uses anechoic tiles to absorb sound waves emitted by active sonar, thus reducing probability of detection by surface vessels, anti-submarine aircraft or enemy submarines. These tiles help attenuate sounds emitted from inside the submarine, adding its ability to shut-down the diesel engines when submerged, it reduces the range by which the sub may be detected by passive sonar.
Russia requires at least 10 Varshavyanka-class submarines to protect its interests in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Starting from 2014, the Admiralty Shipyards began delivering two ships per year to the Russian Navy, with the first two submarines, Novorossiysk and Rostov-on-Don, joining the Navy in August and December 2014. The third and fourth, Stary Oskol and Krasnodar, were transferred to the Black Sea fleet in July and November 2015. The fifth, The Great Novgorod, was delivered in October 2016.
Construction on the submarine named Kolpino began in October 2014, and it was launched in May 2016. Its construction was a milestone in the realization of a long-term plan of the Ministry of Defense alert restore Russia's Black Sea Fleet, and programs to improve the diesel-electric submarines for Navy fleet of Russia.
Vietnam's Improved Kilo Class (Project 636) diesel-electric submarine. In December 2009, Vietnam's Defence Ministry awarded a $2bn contract to Russia to deliver a total of six submarines to strengthen its naval capabilities and better defend the country.
Combat effectiveness of the submarine of Project 636 is significantly increased at the expense of upgrading its equipment missile complex "Club-S" in conjunction with the installation of new advanced electronic weapons systems, ensuring its use.
On the submarine propulsion scheme adopted single-shaft installation, the axially symmetric shape of the hull, optimized ratio of its length and diameter. It is possible not only to reduce hydrodynamic noise submarines and sonar noise operation, but will also provide increased full submerged speed and distance swimming underwater. To improve the stealth motion was adopted by a brand new gas extraction system, leaving virtually no trace of the stern while driving under the RDP. PL architecture ensures its above-water status on emergency filling one compartment and two adjacent to one side of the main ballast tanks. The improved body shape and design of steering systems provide high maneuverability submarine while swimming in shallow water and on the working depth can hold steady at periscope depth development of the sea waves.
The power plant is designed as follows full electric propulsion, which would be flexible electricity system to optimize driving modes under the RDP and the charging of the batteries. Back-up provided a submarine propulsion system to confidently swim underwater and above water in case of damage of the main shaft and propeller, to overcome the minefields, as well as maneuvering in shallow and restricted waters when docking.
The optimization of management processes combat systems and hardware submarine was achieved rational combination of automated and manual processes, enabling high reliability and efficiency of management to reduce the number of crew.
Combat effectiveness of the submarine of Project 636 is significantly increased at the expense of upgrading its equipment missile complex "Club-S" in conjunction with the installation of new advanced electronic weapons systems, ensuring its use.
On the submarine propulsion scheme adopted single-shaft installation, the axially symmetric shape of the hull, optimized ratio of its length and diameter. It is possible not only to reduce hydrodynamic noise submarines and sonar noise operation, but will also provide increased full submerged speed and distance swimming underwater. To improve the stealth motion was adopted by a brand new gas extraction system, leaving virtually no trace of the stern while driving under the RDP. PL architecture ensures its above-water status on emergency filling one compartment and two adjacent to one side of the main ballast tanks. The improved body shape and design of steering systems provide high maneuverability submarine while swimming in shallow water and on the working depth can hold steady at periscope depth development of the sea waves.
The power plant is designed as follows full electric propulsion, which would be flexible electricity system to optimize driving modes under the RDP and the charging of the batteries. Back-up provided a submarine propulsion system to confidently swim underwater and above water in case of damage of the main shaft and propeller, to overcome the minefields, as well as maneuvering in shallow and restricted waters when docking.
The optimization of management processes combat systems and hardware submarine was achieved rational combination of automated and manual processes, enabling high reliability and efficiency of management to reduce the number of crew.
German-made Singapore's Type 218SG (also known as Invincible class) has AIP and X-plane rudder, replace the Republic of Singapore Navy's (RSN) current Archer-class and Challenger-class submarines. Type 218 Invincible-class submarine design by ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems was optimised for the shallow Sea (for example, the waters 40 kilometres off Karachi are just 40 metres deep). Type 218SG Invincible-class submarines can be fitted with AIP that uses Siemens proton exchange membrane (PEM) compressed hydrogen fuel cells.
South Koreans developed the KSS-I submarine, which was itself derived from the Type 209 diesel-electric attack submarine that was license-built from Germany's Thyssenkrupp. KSS-I to KSS-III were steadily progressed, from developing a 1,200-ton displacement vessel to 1,800-ton displacement to now 3,000-ton KSS-III submarines, incorporating 80% of the indigenous content. KSS-III batch-II will have 3,600 tons (surface displacement) and will be capable of carrying 10 SLBMs, 4 more than KSS-III batch-I. The first three KSS-2s were built using German components, but because of some defective South Korean components and poor construction techniques that left the three boats noisy. Eventually, German specialists were called in, and by 2011 the problems had been fixed. The Type 214 boats use fuel cells, enabling them to stay underwater 400 meters (1,220 feet) for up to two weeks. However, none of DSME's submarines designs can be exported, since Germany's Thyssenkrupp will object to its IPRs being violated.
North Korea's 40m long Sang-O II class Shark Coastal Submarine. North Korea has 86 submarine
35m Sang-O was introduced in the early 1990’s and represent the backbone of the submarine fleet. It has a range long enough to operate independently at a significant distance from base. However, weighing in at 275 to 340 tons surfaced depending on the variant it is far to small to be considered a full size Conventional Attack Submarine. The Submarine has been steadily replacing the antiquated WHISKEY and only sightly more viable 1,475-ton ROMEO class submarines for a number of years with more than 40 Sang-O’s of all variants now in service according to KPA Journal. It is known that there is a recon/infiltration variant of SSC Sang-O I which has no torpedo tubes but instead posesses chambers to facilitate insertion of divers. (This allows the Sang-O to deploy maritime SOF while submerged)
35m Sang-O was introduced in the early 1990’s and represent the backbone of the submarine fleet. It has a range long enough to operate independently at a significant distance from base. However, weighing in at 275 to 340 tons surfaced depending on the variant it is far to small to be considered a full size Conventional Attack Submarine. The Submarine has been steadily replacing the antiquated WHISKEY and only sightly more viable 1,475-ton ROMEO class submarines for a number of years with more than 40 Sang-O’s of all variants now in service according to KPA Journal. It is known that there is a recon/infiltration variant of SSC Sang-O I which has no torpedo tubes but instead posesses chambers to facilitate insertion of divers. (This allows the Sang-O to deploy maritime SOF while submerged)
The Americans pioneered the development and use of VLS technology and in the 1980s began installing 12 VLS tubes in its last 31 (out of 62) Los Angeles class SSNs (nuclear-powered attack submarines) and continued that in the subsequent Virginia class and in a late 1990s conversion of four older SSBN (nuclear-powered ballistic missile sub) to replace the ballistic missiles with 154 Tomahawks. These submarine VLS launched Tomahawks have been used in combat regularly since then. |
A hot-launched missile is on where the main rocket booster ignites while it is still inside the launcher, while a cold-launched is ejected in some fashion, often using a compressed gas generator, first, before the booster ignites. India has not yet succeeded in developing a cold-launch missile ejection system for the VLS of a submerged SSBN. Hence, Indian-made nuclear submarines cannot carry any type of SLBM on-board. In 2007 funds were released to develop a cold-launch system for SLBMs, which is meant for installation on the S-4 SSBN for technology demonstrator.
It has become evident that no diesel-electric attack submarine can launch SLBMs or even VLS cruise missiles while staying fully submerged (undetected by radar and satellites) because of the weight of the missile which has to be compensated for their ejection from their silos. This requires far greater quantum of pumps, piping & additional electrical power for the submerged SSK to quickly restore its buoyancy-levels. Hence, no submerged diesel-electric attack submarine will be able to launch such SLBMs & SLCMs from vertical silos. The same problem exists for diesel-electric SSGNs (guided cruise missile submarines) that cannot even launch the SLCM from its launchers without it being either inclined or have to be torpedo (650 mm) tube-launched.
India’s current nuclear sub is equipped to carry cruise missiles, which limits its deterrence potential. India's current SLGMs range are ineffective against a big country like China. India has so far planned 3 missiles in the K-series. India will require at least 36 SLBMs, for strategic deterrent, which are capable of carrying multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) warheads
3,500 km range 17 ton K-4 tactical nuclear-capable submarine-launched missile combines the aspects cruise missile into the ballistic missile. The missile, capable of cruising at hypersonic speed, also features an “innovative” system of weaving in three dimensions during flight as it approaches its target.
K-4 with less than 2 tons payload, it will be able to hit from Bay of Bengal into deeper Chinese cities while staying far away from coast waters of china. On 17 December, the K-4 missile did not activate during the test following the draining of its battery after commanded to launch. India is looking forward for it as it is being developed for the nuclear triad and is capable of taking down targets under water. K-4 intermediate ballistic missile will be game changer for India in many ways, not only it will complete India’s third leg of the nuclear deterrent (air and ground-launched weapons being the other two) and will also be ideal invulnerable second strike weapon stated in the nuclear doctrine.
K-4 with less than 2 tons payload, it will be able to hit from Bay of Bengal into deeper Chinese cities while staying far away from coast waters of china. On 17 December, the K-4 missile did not activate during the test following the draining of its battery after commanded to launch. India is looking forward for it as it is being developed for the nuclear triad and is capable of taking down targets under water. K-4 intermediate ballistic missile will be game changer for India in many ways, not only it will complete India’s third leg of the nuclear deterrent (air and ground-launched weapons being the other two) and will also be ideal invulnerable second strike weapon stated in the nuclear doctrine.
Tactical Nuclear-tipped 5,000 km range K-5 (problematic R-39 Rif / SS-NX-20 Sturgeon) missile (comparable in many ways to India’s Agni-III land-based missile) with a range of 3,500 kilometres, is rumoured to be longer-legged variant of the K-4 incorporating many of the systems and guidance packages of K-4 itself.
8,500km-range K-06 SLBM
No other strategic ballistic missile has been as reliable as the U.S. Navy's UGM-133A Trident II D5. It had a failure rate of 13% while in development. The original guidance systems was from 1980s. It currently used the upgraded Mk 6 guidance system. Each Trident II costs about $65 million and first entered service in 1990. Each missile can carry 8 to 14 nuclear warheads.
JL-3 solid-fueled submarine-launched ballistic missile (range 9,000 km) is believed to incorporate technologies from the new DF-41 ICBM and similar to Trident II (D5) carrying multiple MIRV, with various features such as a variable trajectory, a radar-evading stealth warhead, and fast-burning rocket motors.
Initially JL-3 was called the JL-2A but it turned out that the JL-2A was the JL-3, a different design but similar in size to the JL-2. JL-3 may be the first Chinese submarine-launched ballistic missile reliable enough to use regularly in Chinese ballistic-missile carrying submarine and allow them to operate at sea frequently and reliably. JL-3 is expected to enter service in the mid-2020.
Initially JL-3 was called the JL-2A but it turned out that the JL-2A was the JL-3, a different design but similar in size to the JL-2. JL-3 may be the first Chinese submarine-launched ballistic missile reliable enough to use regularly in Chinese ballistic-missile carrying submarine and allow them to operate at sea frequently and reliably. JL-3 is expected to enter service in the mid-2020.
2nd gen JL-2c (JuLang -2 'Giant Wave' or CSS-N-14) submarine-launched ballistic missile are naval versions of the existing and successful land-based 42-ton DF-31 ICBM.
42-ton JL-2 are Chinese second-generation intercontinental-range submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) with a two-stage, solid–liquid-fuelled propulsion design. The missiles are thought to be able to deliver nuclear payloads (multiple warheads) between ranges of 8,000 and 14,000 km. JL-2's design is based on the mobile land-based DF-31 ballistic missile.
The missile was supposed to have entered service by 2008 but it kept failing. After several years of delay, the PLA Navy could now able to launch submarine-based ballistic missiles at a near wartime frequency. Its development started in the early 90s. Chinese Navy Type 032 test submarine was used development and trials of the JL-2. JL-2 is now fully deployed onboard Type 094, and 12 will be deployed onboard each chinese SSBN (Type 096).
42-ton JL-2 are Chinese second-generation intercontinental-range submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) with a two-stage, solid–liquid-fuelled propulsion design. The missiles are thought to be able to deliver nuclear payloads (multiple warheads) between ranges of 8,000 and 14,000 km. JL-2's design is based on the mobile land-based DF-31 ballistic missile.
The missile was supposed to have entered service by 2008 but it kept failing. After several years of delay, the PLA Navy could now able to launch submarine-based ballistic missiles at a near wartime frequency. Its development started in the early 90s. Chinese Navy Type 032 test submarine was used development and trials of the JL-2. JL-2 is now fully deployed onboard Type 094, and 12 will be deployed onboard each chinese SSBN (Type 096).
North Korea's KN-11 submarine launched ballistic missile from a submersible barge, not a Sino-class submarine, and that the missile flew only a short period (only a hundred meters or so). It is important to note that this does not mean the entire test was a fake. It is normal to conduct an ejection test, followed by only a partial burn of the missile’s fuel. But it does raise the question of how quickly North Korea might conduct a full-range flight test (or something close to it). They would also need satellite navigation to use the missile. China is sharing its Beidou satellite navigation technology with North Korea. North Korea has also covertly obtained several SS-N-6 SLBMs from Russia.
A second possibility is that the new submarine is (with Chinese assistance) a copy or modification of a decommissioned Soviet-era Golf-class missile-firing submarine. 40 such subs were purchased by Pyongyang — ostensibly for scrap metal — in the mid-1990s. They may have used the past 20 years to reverse-engineer it. China, which has produced a version of the Golf known as the Type-031 and which was used until 2013 as an SLBM test platform.
North Korea’s current submarine force includes around 70 submarines. Most of the vessels are older diesel submarines, including 22 Romeo-class or Chinese design Type-031 subs. More than two dozen, are small, Sango-class mini-submarines used for covert commando operations to infiltrate South Korea during a conflict. They also have four 1940s-design Whiskey-class submarines from Russia.
A second possibility is that the new submarine is (with Chinese assistance) a copy or modification of a decommissioned Soviet-era Golf-class missile-firing submarine. 40 such subs were purchased by Pyongyang — ostensibly for scrap metal — in the mid-1990s. They may have used the past 20 years to reverse-engineer it. China, which has produced a version of the Golf known as the Type-031 and which was used until 2013 as an SLBM test platform.
North Korea’s current submarine force includes around 70 submarines. Most of the vessels are older diesel submarines, including 22 Romeo-class or Chinese design Type-031 subs. More than two dozen, are small, Sango-class mini-submarines used for covert commando operations to infiltrate South Korea during a conflict. They also have four 1940s-design Whiskey-class submarines from Russia.
Shourya or Shaurya submarine-launched Quasi-ballistic Missile (TERMINATED)
One of the new weapon systems with India is the Shaurya missile – a submarine-launched medium-range ballistic missile, capable of carrying one ton of a conventional, or nuclear armed warhead over a range of 750 km. The Shaurya is specially designed for the new Indian submarines, offering India ’second strike’ capability, significantly adding to the country’s strategic deterrence.
It is a submarine-launched medium-range ballistic missile, capable of carrying one ton of a conventional, or nuclear armed warhead over a range of 750 km. The Shaurya is specially designed for the new Indian submarines, offering India 'second strike' capability, significantly adding to the country's strategic deterrence. Together with the Agni III missile, that has a range of 3500 km, Shaurya could reach all major cities in mainland China, like Beijing, Nanjing and Shanghai, when launched from a submarine off the China coast. It can also cover all the area of Pakistan from off-shore positions in the Arabian Sea. India's first nuclear-powered submarine, INS Arihant is currently under construction and could be equipped with the new missile. Shaurya was developed in parallel to the K-15 'Sagarika' ballistic missile, built with significant help from Russia.
The Shaurya can be launched from underwater as well as from land. The missile is contained in a gas-filled canister stored inside the submarine's hull and uses a two-stage solid propelled rocket after launch. To achieve high accuracy, the missile is capable of performing trajectory corrections using an on-board inertial navigation system. Described as a 'hybrid' missile, Shaurya can shape its descent trajectory, posing a difficult target for missile interceptors. Overall, the missile has an accuracy of 20-30 meters Circular Error Probable (CEP), contributing to effective conventional attack capability, in addition to the nuclear strike option.
One of the new weapon systems with India is the Shaurya missile – a submarine-launched medium-range ballistic missile, capable of carrying one ton of a conventional, or nuclear armed warhead over a range of 750 km. The Shaurya is specially designed for the new Indian submarines, offering India ’second strike’ capability, significantly adding to the country’s strategic deterrence.
It is a submarine-launched medium-range ballistic missile, capable of carrying one ton of a conventional, or nuclear armed warhead over a range of 750 km. The Shaurya is specially designed for the new Indian submarines, offering India 'second strike' capability, significantly adding to the country's strategic deterrence. Together with the Agni III missile, that has a range of 3500 km, Shaurya could reach all major cities in mainland China, like Beijing, Nanjing and Shanghai, when launched from a submarine off the China coast. It can also cover all the area of Pakistan from off-shore positions in the Arabian Sea. India's first nuclear-powered submarine, INS Arihant is currently under construction and could be equipped with the new missile. Shaurya was developed in parallel to the K-15 'Sagarika' ballistic missile, built with significant help from Russia.
The Shaurya can be launched from underwater as well as from land. The missile is contained in a gas-filled canister stored inside the submarine's hull and uses a two-stage solid propelled rocket after launch. To achieve high accuracy, the missile is capable of performing trajectory corrections using an on-board inertial navigation system. Described as a 'hybrid' missile, Shaurya can shape its descent trajectory, posing a difficult target for missile interceptors. Overall, the missile has an accuracy of 20-30 meters Circular Error Probable (CEP), contributing to effective conventional attack capability, in addition to the nuclear strike option.
The first SLBM was the U.S. Polaris A1, which began development in the 1950s and entered service in 1961. Like the K15, it was a two stage solid fuel missile. The Polaris A1 weighed 13 tons, had a range of 2,200 km, and a 1 ton warhead.
Nuclear-powered Strategic submarines (SSN):
- SSN is for fighting wars, unlike SSBNs, which are for deterrence.
-US has the largest submarine force in the world, with 54 SSN and 14 SSBN. The US has 49 attack submarines (SSN) available, but 18 of those are in maintenance, versus their goal of at least 66 SSNs in active service. Naval leaders, eager to shift blame towards public yards and union shipbuilders, are not helping matters. Maintenance is an unloved minor speciality, and yard time is often some of the hardest time submarine officers endure over the course of their career.
- India needs 3 large SSBN (ballistic missile carrying submarine) & 9 SSGN (guided cruise missile carrying submarine)
- Attack (Hunter-Killer) SSN have max speed of 25 to 33 knots, as they are faster than diesel-electric powered attack submarine
Nuclear submarines have been used in once in combat in 1982, when a British SSN sank an Argentinean cruiser. Unlike a nuclear missile armed submarines (SSBN) that is designed to carry out a nuclear strike, nuclear propelled attack boats (SSNs) are considered less sensitive, with their primary role being hunting vital enemy naval ships and submarines. While nuclear submarines are not harmful for the crew, the cost of disposing of spent nuclear fuel is much higher and increases the operating cost manifold. |
SSGN Ohio Class nuclear-powered guided-missile hunter submarines are the largest submarines ever built for the US Navy: Noise-generating equipment is placed on sound-isolating mounts. The nuclear missile silos, laid out in 2 rows behind the sail, are flush with the hull to decrease flow noise. The subs also mount 2 steam turbines, one for quiet operation.
France has decided to buy 6 new Barracuda class SSNs in service by 2030, for about $1.5 billion each. The "Scorpene" employs the HLES 80 steel in its construction, while the "Barracuda" must use the HLES 100 steel in its construction. The lifespan of Suffren type SSNs will be more than 35 year and serve the French Navy at least up to 2060.
The "Barracuda" is nuclear-powered, with a PWR reactor K15 power of 150MW and 10MW two electric motors. The nuclear power plant must be refueled every 10 years. They will have two propulsion turbines, two turbo generators and two electric motors driving a single ducted propeller (pump-jet). For a small fleet of nuclear subs, this drives up the cost per sub.
Hence French has chosen a different design that used commercial (not weapons) grade nuclear fuel. This meant French nuclear subs had to be refueled more often but this was made easier by building the hull with special large hatches that could be quickly opened for the once every 7-10 refueling then sealed again. France is the only nation using this type of ship power plant and has to handle development and maintenance procedures itself.
At 4,700 ton displacement when it moves on the surface and submerged displacement its 5,300 ton. It is 99.4 meters long and 8.8 meters in diameter. It has a speed of 25 knots and a maximum diving depth of more than 350 m. It will have crew complement of 65 (including 12 commandos). The dry deck shelter will also allow the deployment of underwater vehicles.
The Barracuda SSNs have 4 torpedo tubes. 20 weapons are carried, the mix of F21 heavy-weight torpedoes, FG29 mines and Exocet SM39 Block2 anti-ship missiles depending on the mission. MdCN naval land-attack cruise missile with a range of 1,000 km, is the sea-launched variant of the SCALP EG air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) developed by MBDA.
Compared to their predecessors, the 3G SSBNs will be longer and heavier. The nuclear propulsion reactor of the SNLE 3G program is a link between the lower-power reactor of the Barracuda-class submarine and the reactor of the future PANG aircraft carrier. Known as K22, this reactor will deliver significantly higher power.
The "Barracuda" is nuclear-powered, with a PWR reactor K15 power of 150MW and 10MW two electric motors. The nuclear power plant must be refueled every 10 years. They will have two propulsion turbines, two turbo generators and two electric motors driving a single ducted propeller (pump-jet). For a small fleet of nuclear subs, this drives up the cost per sub.
Hence French has chosen a different design that used commercial (not weapons) grade nuclear fuel. This meant French nuclear subs had to be refueled more often but this was made easier by building the hull with special large hatches that could be quickly opened for the once every 7-10 refueling then sealed again. France is the only nation using this type of ship power plant and has to handle development and maintenance procedures itself.
At 4,700 ton displacement when it moves on the surface and submerged displacement its 5,300 ton. It is 99.4 meters long and 8.8 meters in diameter. It has a speed of 25 knots and a maximum diving depth of more than 350 m. It will have crew complement of 65 (including 12 commandos). The dry deck shelter will also allow the deployment of underwater vehicles.
The Barracuda SSNs have 4 torpedo tubes. 20 weapons are carried, the mix of F21 heavy-weight torpedoes, FG29 mines and Exocet SM39 Block2 anti-ship missiles depending on the mission. MdCN naval land-attack cruise missile with a range of 1,000 km, is the sea-launched variant of the SCALP EG air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) developed by MBDA.
Compared to their predecessors, the 3G SSBNs will be longer and heavier. The nuclear propulsion reactor of the SNLE 3G program is a link between the lower-power reactor of the Barracuda-class submarine and the reactor of the future PANG aircraft carrier. Known as K22, this reactor will deliver significantly higher power.
Columbia-class guided-missile hunter submarine (formerly known as the Ohio Replacement Submarine or SSBN-X Future Follow-on Submarine) are similar to the Ohios they are replacing but less expensive to operate (due to tech from the new Virginia class). One of the major new tech is a nuclear reactor that will last the full 40 years (instead of normal 5–20 years). Ohios carried 24 SLBM while Columbias will carry 16 SLBM and will devote its extra space to torpedoes, propulsion and quieting features. Columbia-class is to be equipped with an electric-drive propulsion train, as opposed to the mechanical-drive propulsion train. Columbia SSBN costs 15 Billion dollars.
Russia's top-end Yasen-M class (Project 885M) & Yasen class "ash tree" (Project 885) 4th gen nuclear-powered attack submarine (NATO:"Severodvinsk", also known erroneously as the Graney class) and are preceded by the Akula Class. The 9,500 ton Yasen were built after the Cold War but from Cold War era designs and are armed with 32 P-800 (SS-N-26 Oniks) anti-ship missiles fired from 8 VLS (vertical launch system) silos. The 3 ton P-800 has a range of 600 km. There are also 10 torpedo tubes (eight 650 mm and two 533 mm).
The submarine's hull is built with low magnetic steel to reduce its magnetic signature. The submarine is smaller than the Akula Class vessels, but possesses more firepower. While the Oscar-II class, like the ill-fated “Kursk” submarine, can carry cruise-missiles with a limited range, these submarine carries an assortment of long-range cruise missiles, able to hit targets from 5,000 to 1,500 kilometers away. Such distance nearly erases the traditional classifications of what is a strategic submarine and an attack submarine. Armed with long-range cruise missiles and eight vertical launching system tubes for cruise missiles, the 119m-long and 12m-wide Yasen-class submarines can strike against submarines, surface warships and land-based targets.
Its main armament consists of 24 supersonic Oniks (SS-N-26) and Kalibr (SS-N-27) cruise missiles, self-guided torpedoes and mines. The vessel has a hull made from high-resilience low-magnetic steel, and so can dive to a depth of more than 600 metres (conventional boats cannot go deeper than 300 metres), which effectively puts it out of reach of all types of modern anti-submarine weapons. Its maximum speed is more than 30 or 31 knots (about 60 kilometres per hour). Fitted with an OK-650KPM nuclear reactor, the submarine is equipped with an escape pod for the whole crew. The submarine has a full load displacement of around 13,800 tons and is powered by a KPM-type pressurised water reactor and steam turbine. She has a crew of 90.
The first submarine of the class, Severodvinsk (K-329) SSGN was launched in June 2010 for commissioning in 2012. The second submarine, Kazan, was laid down in July 2009. It is expected to be launched during 2013-14 for commissioning before 2015. The Yasen-M Class will replace the Akula Class and Oscar Class submarines. The Kazan will feature more advanced equipment and weaponry than the Severodvinsk. The third submarine of its class, Novosibirsk, is under construction.
The ships will compete with the latest American Seawolf-class nuclear submarines in terms of their noise profile and will be world leaders in terms of fire-power. Moscow plans to acquire at least 10 of these boats by 2020.
The submarine's hull is built with low magnetic steel to reduce its magnetic signature. The submarine is smaller than the Akula Class vessels, but possesses more firepower. While the Oscar-II class, like the ill-fated “Kursk” submarine, can carry cruise-missiles with a limited range, these submarine carries an assortment of long-range cruise missiles, able to hit targets from 5,000 to 1,500 kilometers away. Such distance nearly erases the traditional classifications of what is a strategic submarine and an attack submarine. Armed with long-range cruise missiles and eight vertical launching system tubes for cruise missiles, the 119m-long and 12m-wide Yasen-class submarines can strike against submarines, surface warships and land-based targets.
Its main armament consists of 24 supersonic Oniks (SS-N-26) and Kalibr (SS-N-27) cruise missiles, self-guided torpedoes and mines. The vessel has a hull made from high-resilience low-magnetic steel, and so can dive to a depth of more than 600 metres (conventional boats cannot go deeper than 300 metres), which effectively puts it out of reach of all types of modern anti-submarine weapons. Its maximum speed is more than 30 or 31 knots (about 60 kilometres per hour). Fitted with an OK-650KPM nuclear reactor, the submarine is equipped with an escape pod for the whole crew. The submarine has a full load displacement of around 13,800 tons and is powered by a KPM-type pressurised water reactor and steam turbine. She has a crew of 90.
The first submarine of the class, Severodvinsk (K-329) SSGN was launched in June 2010 for commissioning in 2012. The second submarine, Kazan, was laid down in July 2009. It is expected to be launched during 2013-14 for commissioning before 2015. The Yasen-M Class will replace the Akula Class and Oscar Class submarines. The Kazan will feature more advanced equipment and weaponry than the Severodvinsk. The third submarine of its class, Novosibirsk, is under construction.
The ships will compete with the latest American Seawolf-class nuclear submarines in terms of their noise profile and will be world leaders in terms of fire-power. Moscow plans to acquire at least 10 of these boats by 2020.
US has the largest submarine force in the world with 54 SSN and 14 SSBN. The US has 54 attack submarines (SSN), but 18 of those are in maintenance.
SSN is for fighting wars, unlike SSBN (ballistic missile carrying submarine), which are for deterrence.
India needs 3 large SSBN (ballistic missiles carrying submarine) & 9 SSGN (guided cruise missiles carrying submarine).
Australia will obtain 8 American Virginia-Class nuclear attack submarines. The first three will be transferred from the US, with the first one arriving in 2033. The other 5 will be built in Australia, with some modifications requested by Australia, which will technically make the Australian Virginia-Class a variant of the American Virginia-Class. The first 3 will arrive from the US in the 2030s. The Australians had bought into the AUKUS promise of Americans sharing nuclear-submarine technology. Now they are caught in a maze of export control regulations such as International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and Export Administration Regulations (EAR). Frustrated Australians are blaming the delay on "permafrost layer of middle management" in the US government.
For $20-billion 9 new 10,200 ton Virginia Block V nuclear attack submarine (2019-2022) will be built with 30% longer hull by 84 feet to accommodate 4 additional "Payload Module" vertical missile large-diameter tubes in the centre of the submarine, which was designed by Electric Boat, increasing the fixed strike capacity of the ship by more than 230% and will enable enhanced use of Special Forces. It has a length of 460 feet. These subs with 28 VPM tubes are designed to fire 40 Tomahawk missiles. Top speed is over 50 kilometres an hour, max depth is more than 250 meters (over 800 feet).
The main problem with the Virginias is the larger size. These boats can last 30–35 years before they must be retired or undergo extensive (over half a billion dollars’ worth) of refurbishment and refuelling. This can take 4–5 years and will keep the sub going for another 10–15 years. But there’s barely enough money to keep building Virginias and no time or cash to refurb elderly Los Angeles class boats. That was why the number of Virginia submarines planned was increased to 66 and the tempo of construction speeded up. US Navy is spending a lot of money on is new SSBNs but many of the experienced shipyard workers are retiring and, because of a nationwide shortage of skilled workers, it is difficult to find and attract qualified workers to replace the retired ones and maintain the rapid pace of constructing. At that point, the Virginias were taking 5–6 years (instead of 2 SSBNs per year) to build and arriving at the rate of one a year. Shipbuilders have driven delivery timelines from 88 months in Block I to a current average rate of 68 months.
It's also getting harder and harder to recruit sailors for SSBN duty, and the only other way to solve that problem is with bonuses, on top of the $100,000 in annual pay and benefits, and several times that just to train SSBN sailors.
The main problem with the Virginias is the larger size. These boats can last 30–35 years before they must be retired or undergo extensive (over half a billion dollars’ worth) of refurbishment and refuelling. This can take 4–5 years and will keep the sub going for another 10–15 years. But there’s barely enough money to keep building Virginias and no time or cash to refurb elderly Los Angeles class boats. That was why the number of Virginia submarines planned was increased to 66 and the tempo of construction speeded up. US Navy is spending a lot of money on is new SSBNs but many of the experienced shipyard workers are retiring and, because of a nationwide shortage of skilled workers, it is difficult to find and attract qualified workers to replace the retired ones and maintain the rapid pace of constructing. At that point, the Virginias were taking 5–6 years (instead of 2 SSBNs per year) to build and arriving at the rate of one a year. Shipbuilders have driven delivery timelines from 88 months in Block I to a current average rate of 68 months.
It's also getting harder and harder to recruit sailors for SSBN duty, and the only other way to solve that problem is with bonuses, on top of the $100,000 in annual pay and benefits, and several times that just to train SSBN sailors.
Virginia (SSN-774) class Block II nuclear attack submarine littoral
It's designed for a broad range of flexible open-ocean and littoral missions. They are considered the most capable, quiet, and effect nuclear atack submarines in the world, thought the United Kingdom Astute Class SSNs are very close in capabilities and quietness. Each Virginia-class submarine cost $3.4 billion. There are 4 Block 1 SSBNs, 8 Block 2 SSBNs, 8 Block 3 SSBNs, 10 Block 4 SSBNs and 10 Block 5 SSBNs.
Virginia is clearly better as a littoral support in shallow waters and carry a mini Delivery Vehicle. Originally designed as a less expensive alternative to the larger Cold War-era Seawolf Class attack submarines, the Virginia class is slated to replace the aging Los Angeles class submarines. Think of Virginia as a Los Angeles size hull with Seawolf tech. Seawolf and Virginia uses a new nuclear reactor design, having sufficient nuclear material to last 33 years, that eliminates the need for the elaborate (taking apart the reactors, and part of the ship) refuelling process.
More important are the large number of electronic systems carried. An advanced electromagnetic signature reduction system built will first appear on the USS California (SSN-781). Through an advanced interfacing software system this will allow the crew to monitor and reduce the vessel's electromagnetic signatures as needed. Instead of periscopes, the subs have a pair of extendable photonics masts outside the pressure hull. Each contains several high-resolution cameras with light-intensification and infrared sensors, an infrared laser rangefinder, and an integrated Electronic Support Measures (ESM) array. Signals from the mast sensors are transmitted through fiber optic links through signal processors to the control center. The subs also make use of pump-jet propulsors for quieter operations.
It's designed for a broad range of flexible open-ocean and littoral missions. They are considered the most capable, quiet, and effect nuclear atack submarines in the world, thought the United Kingdom Astute Class SSNs are very close in capabilities and quietness. Each Virginia-class submarine cost $3.4 billion. There are 4 Block 1 SSBNs, 8 Block 2 SSBNs, 8 Block 3 SSBNs, 10 Block 4 SSBNs and 10 Block 5 SSBNs.
Virginia is clearly better as a littoral support in shallow waters and carry a mini Delivery Vehicle. Originally designed as a less expensive alternative to the larger Cold War-era Seawolf Class attack submarines, the Virginia class is slated to replace the aging Los Angeles class submarines. Think of Virginia as a Los Angeles size hull with Seawolf tech. Seawolf and Virginia uses a new nuclear reactor design, having sufficient nuclear material to last 33 years, that eliminates the need for the elaborate (taking apart the reactors, and part of the ship) refuelling process.
More important are the large number of electronic systems carried. An advanced electromagnetic signature reduction system built will first appear on the USS California (SSN-781). Through an advanced interfacing software system this will allow the crew to monitor and reduce the vessel's electromagnetic signatures as needed. Instead of periscopes, the subs have a pair of extendable photonics masts outside the pressure hull. Each contains several high-resolution cameras with light-intensification and infrared sensors, an infrared laser rangefinder, and an integrated Electronic Support Measures (ESM) array. Signals from the mast sensors are transmitted through fiber optic links through signal processors to the control center. The subs also make use of pump-jet propulsors for quieter operations.
Borei-(A)-II-class Project 955/A (NATO: Dolgorukiy-class) is upgraded Project 955 Borei-class multipurpose 4th gen nuclear-powered submarine armed not with ballistic missiles, but with lots of long-range cruise missiles SLBMs. Russia is planning to build at total of 10 to 14 submarines. The original plan called for construction of 8 submarines of the Project 955 class. The submarine is 170 meters (580 feet) long, has a hull diameter of 13 meters (42 feet), a crew of 107, including 55 officers, a maximum depth of 450 meters (about 1,500 feet) and a submerged speed of about 29 knots. They will also have an escape capsule for all crewmembers.
It is the first class of submarines developed by Russia since the Soviet era. The Borey class submarines are expected to become the core of the Russian strategic submarine fleet, replacing the aging Project 941 (NATO Typhoon class) and Project 667 class (Delta-3 and Delta-4) now in Russian Navy service. Project 955B or Borei-B, has proved to be too expensive and complex, would have included a quiet pump-jet propulsion system.
The Knyaz Oleg will become the first serial upgraded version of Project 955A submarines. They will have smaller hulls and cons, better acoustic characteristics and lower noisiness. All the Borey class strategic submarines will be able to carry up to 16 Bulava (NATO: SS-NX-30) ballistic missiles with multiple warheads (MIRVs) and are armed with 533mm torpedo tubes. The Bulava has been assigned the GRAU index 3M30. In international treaties, the common designation RSM-56 is used.
Compared to the original Project 955 Borei-class design, the Borei-(A)-II-class Project 955/A have other major structural differences, including the streamlining of the hull to remove the box-like missile tube. Borei-(A)-II-class Project 955/A submarine is quiter than older Virginia (SSN-774) class Block II nuclear attack submarine.
It is the first class of submarines developed by Russia since the Soviet era. The Borey class submarines are expected to become the core of the Russian strategic submarine fleet, replacing the aging Project 941 (NATO Typhoon class) and Project 667 class (Delta-3 and Delta-4) now in Russian Navy service. Project 955B or Borei-B, has proved to be too expensive and complex, would have included a quiet pump-jet propulsion system.
The Knyaz Oleg will become the first serial upgraded version of Project 955A submarines. They will have smaller hulls and cons, better acoustic characteristics and lower noisiness. All the Borey class strategic submarines will be able to carry up to 16 Bulava (NATO: SS-NX-30) ballistic missiles with multiple warheads (MIRVs) and are armed with 533mm torpedo tubes. The Bulava has been assigned the GRAU index 3M30. In international treaties, the common designation RSM-56 is used.
Compared to the original Project 955 Borei-class design, the Borei-(A)-II-class Project 955/A have other major structural differences, including the streamlining of the hull to remove the box-like missile tube. Borei-(A)-II-class Project 955/A submarine is quiter than older Virginia (SSN-774) class Block II nuclear attack submarine.
United Kingdom HMS Astute Class SSNs The service life of the UK Royal Navy's Astute Class submarines, designed to replace the Swiftsure Class submarines launched between 1973 and 1977, began with the commissioning of HMS Astute in August 2010. United Kingdom Astute Class SSNs are very close in capabilities and quietness of Virginia (which is clearly better as a littoral support).
Britain maintains a force of only four double-hull SSBNs in service because that is the minimum number to ensure that one is always at sea, ready to launch its SLBMs.
Britain maintains a force of only four double-hull SSBNs in service because that is the minimum number to ensure that one is always at sea, ready to launch its SLBMs.
Merely producing nuclear submarine is only half of the requirement, with the other half comprising of construction of survivable bases, warhead storage, and missile & fuel loading/unloading, within such submarine bases.
Impoved Project 670M SKAT-M (Nato: Charlie-II class) INS Chakra Akula class submarine that India leased in the 1990’s for 3 years.
The accident involving the INS Chakra that caused the hull-mounted sonar dome to crack had caused US$20 million loss. The then CO of the SSGN was to be held guilty accountable but he resigned from the Indian Navy.
Submarine lease In August 2010, Russia officially transferred an 6,000 ton Akula-II class submarine to India, which will lease it for 10 years. An Indian crew is currently in Russia being trained to operate the submarine. Three hundred Indian Navy personnel were trained in Russia for the operation of the submarine. The lease is the result of a 2004 deal through which India invested 650 million dollars in completing construction on the submarine. It was due to be transferred in 2008, but technical problems during construction, followed by a deadly malfunction of the automatic fire extinguishing system during sea trials, delayed the transfer.
Chakra, the filler of strategic space
A strategic posture of a nation is a declaration, more by deed than articulation, of its orientation, will and intent. It purports to mould and shape a future that would benefit its larger objectives. The process is fraught with the hazards of conflicting interests and therefore it demands the weight of the nation's comprehensive power both soft and hard.
In an era when the face of soft power is that of an Assange and its voice, that of Gandhi, Gibran, Che and Osama; a critical instrument to uphold posture is the State's military power and the talent to distinguish between the maintenance of armed forces and their use.
The operational canvas is a transient that abhors futuristic force planning. So it was, year-after-every-five year the planner was condemned to an exercise that perceived threats and building force structures to cope.
STATE OF ART
In terms of the platform, the Akula II represents the state of art in SSN design, the programme having been launched in the mid 1990s. The nearest in terms of design vintage is the British ‘Astute' class also of the mid 1990s,but in terms of capabilities it is smaller and less accomplished; while the American Los Angeles class predates the Chakra by a decade. Also, the design philosophy harmonises with the orientation of our strategic nuclear submarine project.
As far as the economics of the matter is concerned, $920 million for a 10-year lease with certain support features attached must be viewed in perspective of what the SSN represents and the fact that a new SSN of similar capability with a 30-year life would have a price tag of about $3billion and a through life cost of (thumb rule) $9 billion would suggest that the deal is a sound one.
As any nation that has committed to operating maritime nuclear force will fully appreciate that kudos are due to our planners who visualised a theory, saw a form and translated it to a force plan and now have given substance to each step of the way.
Not much of a sea-based deterrent
Just when the Russian nuclear-powered Akula-II submarine joins the Indian Navy as INS Chakra on a 10-year lease at a cost of over $one billion, the moot question is: does it contribute to India's sea-based nuclear deterrence?
To put matters in perspective, India in 1988 had procured the Soviet Charlie I class nuclear attack submarine, renamed INS Chakra on a three-year lease. The vessel came without strategic weapons, with the sole purpose of familiarising naval personnel on training and maintenance of nuclear-powered submarines. The rules of engagement spelt out that INS Chakra would not be used in war. The hidden part of the deal was that Soviets would help India in its indigenous Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV), both materially and intellectually. While the promised assistance to the ATV programme which culminated in the launch of 80MW nuclear reactor S-2 vessel (to be called INS Arihant on commissioning) by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on 26 July 2009 came in fits and starts, the technology of the 6,000 tonne vessel is between first and second generation vintage. By comparison, the U.S. has ninth generation nuclear-powered subs which do not require refuelling throughout their lifetime.
LONG GESTATION
Admittedly, the gestation period has been long; it is recognised the process has been challenged by a fragmented approach (the Chakra in its first avatar came to us in 1988) and plagued by the economics and the geopolitics of the times. But these are challenges that any strategic project must expect to face and defy.
The nuclear attack submarine (SSN) being completely independent of air for propulsion frees it from the need to surface frequently, the enormous power generated permits a bigger hull to operate at high speeds with large payloads for durations that is limited by human fatigue and replenishment of consumables only (reactors require refuelling at intervals of 25 years). In real terms, it is critical to understand what the Chakra represents. Working the submarine to our operational challenges and demands is just the tip of the iceberg, training and building a bank of specialised personnel; creating the necessary infrastructure to maintain nuclear submarines; unique logistic management practices; development of doctrines and procedures; generating design feature for the indigenous programme and, most importantly, building an ethos of efficient and safe nuclear submarine stewardship and exertions, these are the 8/9th submerged part of the iceberg. Strategically SSNs in numbers provide a vital element of a riposte to any “sea control strategy” that an adversary may contemplate or a “denial strategy” that we may plan.
‘INTIMIDATION AND ACCRETION'
It was, therefore, the ‘instantaneous intimidation' that drove plans and consequently resulted in ‘a tail chasing' accretion of forces. Unfortunately to some, this inspiration continues to be the pretender that fills strategic space. The case of our strategic maritime posture as a function of the declared ‘Look East' policy is a study in point. Here the need for a theory to make transparent the complexity of the problem and invite the necessary intellectual rigour to not just ‘chart a course' but also to analyse and cater for the hurdles that may beset policy is the first imperative.
As Julian Corbett so eloquently put it, theory may not be a substitute for judgment and experience, but is a means to fertilize both.
Significantly, the recent acquisition on a 10-year lease of the ‘Chakra' (Russian Akula II class nuclear attack submarine) is an extremely perspicacious departure from the past for it is a concrete step towards the translation of the theory and realisation of the larger strategic maritime posture that serves policy.
The accident involving the INS Chakra that caused the hull-mounted sonar dome to crack had caused US$20 million loss. The then CO of the SSGN was to be held guilty accountable but he resigned from the Indian Navy.
Submarine lease In August 2010, Russia officially transferred an 6,000 ton Akula-II class submarine to India, which will lease it for 10 years. An Indian crew is currently in Russia being trained to operate the submarine. Three hundred Indian Navy personnel were trained in Russia for the operation of the submarine. The lease is the result of a 2004 deal through which India invested 650 million dollars in completing construction on the submarine. It was due to be transferred in 2008, but technical problems during construction, followed by a deadly malfunction of the automatic fire extinguishing system during sea trials, delayed the transfer.
Chakra, the filler of strategic space
A strategic posture of a nation is a declaration, more by deed than articulation, of its orientation, will and intent. It purports to mould and shape a future that would benefit its larger objectives. The process is fraught with the hazards of conflicting interests and therefore it demands the weight of the nation's comprehensive power both soft and hard.
In an era when the face of soft power is that of an Assange and its voice, that of Gandhi, Gibran, Che and Osama; a critical instrument to uphold posture is the State's military power and the talent to distinguish between the maintenance of armed forces and their use.
The operational canvas is a transient that abhors futuristic force planning. So it was, year-after-every-five year the planner was condemned to an exercise that perceived threats and building force structures to cope.
STATE OF ART
In terms of the platform, the Akula II represents the state of art in SSN design, the programme having been launched in the mid 1990s. The nearest in terms of design vintage is the British ‘Astute' class also of the mid 1990s,but in terms of capabilities it is smaller and less accomplished; while the American Los Angeles class predates the Chakra by a decade. Also, the design philosophy harmonises with the orientation of our strategic nuclear submarine project.
As far as the economics of the matter is concerned, $920 million for a 10-year lease with certain support features attached must be viewed in perspective of what the SSN represents and the fact that a new SSN of similar capability with a 30-year life would have a price tag of about $3billion and a through life cost of (thumb rule) $9 billion would suggest that the deal is a sound one.
As any nation that has committed to operating maritime nuclear force will fully appreciate that kudos are due to our planners who visualised a theory, saw a form and translated it to a force plan and now have given substance to each step of the way.
Not much of a sea-based deterrent
Just when the Russian nuclear-powered Akula-II submarine joins the Indian Navy as INS Chakra on a 10-year lease at a cost of over $one billion, the moot question is: does it contribute to India's sea-based nuclear deterrence?
To put matters in perspective, India in 1988 had procured the Soviet Charlie I class nuclear attack submarine, renamed INS Chakra on a three-year lease. The vessel came without strategic weapons, with the sole purpose of familiarising naval personnel on training and maintenance of nuclear-powered submarines. The rules of engagement spelt out that INS Chakra would not be used in war. The hidden part of the deal was that Soviets would help India in its indigenous Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV), both materially and intellectually. While the promised assistance to the ATV programme which culminated in the launch of 80MW nuclear reactor S-2 vessel (to be called INS Arihant on commissioning) by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on 26 July 2009 came in fits and starts, the technology of the 6,000 tonne vessel is between first and second generation vintage. By comparison, the U.S. has ninth generation nuclear-powered subs which do not require refuelling throughout their lifetime.
LONG GESTATION
Admittedly, the gestation period has been long; it is recognised the process has been challenged by a fragmented approach (the Chakra in its first avatar came to us in 1988) and plagued by the economics and the geopolitics of the times. But these are challenges that any strategic project must expect to face and defy.
The nuclear attack submarine (SSN) being completely independent of air for propulsion frees it from the need to surface frequently, the enormous power generated permits a bigger hull to operate at high speeds with large payloads for durations that is limited by human fatigue and replenishment of consumables only (reactors require refuelling at intervals of 25 years). In real terms, it is critical to understand what the Chakra represents. Working the submarine to our operational challenges and demands is just the tip of the iceberg, training and building a bank of specialised personnel; creating the necessary infrastructure to maintain nuclear submarines; unique logistic management practices; development of doctrines and procedures; generating design feature for the indigenous programme and, most importantly, building an ethos of efficient and safe nuclear submarine stewardship and exertions, these are the 8/9th submerged part of the iceberg. Strategically SSNs in numbers provide a vital element of a riposte to any “sea control strategy” that an adversary may contemplate or a “denial strategy” that we may plan.
‘INTIMIDATION AND ACCRETION'
It was, therefore, the ‘instantaneous intimidation' that drove plans and consequently resulted in ‘a tail chasing' accretion of forces. Unfortunately to some, this inspiration continues to be the pretender that fills strategic space. The case of our strategic maritime posture as a function of the declared ‘Look East' policy is a study in point. Here the need for a theory to make transparent the complexity of the problem and invite the necessary intellectual rigour to not just ‘chart a course' but also to analyse and cater for the hurdles that may beset policy is the first imperative.
As Julian Corbett so eloquently put it, theory may not be a substitute for judgment and experience, but is a means to fertilize both.
Significantly, the recent acquisition on a 10-year lease of the ‘Chakra' (Russian Akula II class nuclear attack submarine) is an extremely perspicacious departure from the past for it is a concrete step towards the translation of the theory and realisation of the larger strategic maritime posture that serves policy.
K-322 Kashalot Akula-I class (Project 971 Shchuka-B meaning pike) ) nuclear-powered attack submarine.
S-1 Kamini Mini Prototype 3rd gen Fast-Breeder nuclear test reactor at Kalpakkam: Those nuclear weapons are 100% indigenous. We take credit for that, we did it ourselves. India has acknowledged expertise only on PHWR, not PWR. Two earlier attempts in the 1970s and 80s had been abandoned. It started under Raja Ramanna in the late ’70s. According to Praful Bidwai, the DAE’s original design of 1975 proved totally unviable and had to be abandoned after about Rs 100 crore (or Rs 1 billion in today’s terms) was spent on it. By the mid-1980s the project had soaked up as much as Rs 2,500 crore (Rs 25 billion) in research and development costs. The project failed because the concerned agencies couldn’t fabricate high-quality components and equipment. When a critic with a reactor engineering doctorate, then navy Captain B.K. Subba Rao, voiced his doubts about its design, he was arrested on his way abroad for an academic conference and charged with espionage – an accusation he successfully disproved after long periods in jail. But the project was re-launched in 1985 to build the submarine in parallel with dry-running the reactor at Kalpakkam began by Vice Admiral M.K. Roy, to start the now famous codename Advanced Technology (ATV) programme to build a nuclear submarine in the mid-’80s. It would be impossible without 143 Russian engineers, designers and all-round consultancy, precision equipment based on their VM-5 reactor, technology transfer of miniaturising the reactor, technical services and training, technical 'know-how'.
"The Russia designed the 3rd generation 83mWT PRP at Kalpakkam was not an experimental PWR, but was tailor-made to fit into the hull of an SSBN from the outset. India and Russia Atomstroyexport signed on November 20, 1988 for the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project (KKNPP) officially involved the construction of two 1,000MWe Russian VVER-1000-type light water reactors (at a cost of US$3.5 billion) at Kudankulam in Tirunelveli district in Tamil Nadu State. However, a secret annexure of this contract also called for Moscow to offer its ‘consultancy’ and ‘vendor-development’ services, along with the supply of two KLT-40C PWR mock-ups (built by Afrikantov OKBM and designed to deliver 23.5mWe from the 82.5mWt reactor and using 45% enriched uranium-aluminium alloy clad in zircaloy), their related heat exchangers and steam generators, plus their detailed engineering drawings off-the-shelf—all for the double-hulled SSBNs, and similar military-industrial assistance (FSUE Central Design Bureau RUBIN) for building the larger double-hulled SSBNs. Moreover, the design data have not been shared by Russia with any other nation, especially its reactor engineering and hence without these one cannot either upscale or downscale the PWR design, or change the design configuration of the reduction gearbox and power transmission system that is presently designed for operating within a double-hull submarine. Another IGA to be inked in Goa last year as part of a secret annexure of the contract for building Units 3 and 4 of the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project (KKNPP) concerns the in-country construction of six 5,000-tonne, single-hulled, fifth-generation attack submarines (SSN), powered by 60mWt (about 25mWe) high-density integral pressurised water reactors (PWR), designed by the St Petersburg-based FSUE Central Design Bureau RUBIN for Marine Technology. India needs to further refine the design of this PWR, which has only a 10-year lifespan which is too costly (which means the Arihant, if it is to remain in service for 20 years, would require two such PWRs, each with a lifespan of 10 years)." trishul-trident.blogspot
The Indian Navy was able to lease and operate a Charlie class Soviet submarine for three years beginning 1988, which was critical for the Indians to learn its secrets. In the early 1990s, Indian Navy initiated the plan for the design and construction of domestic nuclear submarines. The Russians retired the last of their Charlie II submarines in 1994, but former Russian President Boris Yeltsin shared its basic design data with India as a gesture of goodwill. The construction of the Advanced Technology (ATV) submarine’s hull began in 1998. The technical heart of this undoubtedly massive achievement was laid with the German HDW project. First, Mazagon Dock would learn how to actually construct the body of the submarine. Second group, to commercially order parts from abroad. And third group, formed the backbone of the construction team after learning how to design submarines from the small German Ingenieurkontor Lübeck (IKL) submarine design firm.
One key decision was that we did not want to reinvent the wheel, so we decided that we would buy the design from Russian agency and proceed with that. Here, we primarily wanted the ‘know how’ and the ‘know why’ of the design. Companies generally never tell you anything of the normatives—this is their intellectual property. Our Russian supplier was very kind, though we paid a very tidy sum for it, we got the normatives. We are not designing a submarine de-novo, we are just developing and indigenously building with outside agencies.
The advantage was that with these, we could alter the design to our requirements or update it. For example, [suppose] we had designed a submarine with a maximum diving depth of 100 metres, but later, wanted to increase that to 150 or 200 metres. To do that, we do not have to reinvent the wheel—we already have the normatives, so we update the design and change it as required. With this we had made designs for an SSBN. We have also been quite successful in modifying the design for an SSN. We should be able to develop future submarine programmes ourselves.
The second key decision was that the Navy wanted the private sector to enter the field. We followed the norms set up by the Government on this. We were very open with it—we had several agencies for the job, had several discussions, and eliminated the firms who were not serious contenders. If there were 10-12 firms that had applied for a particular task, we selected two to four and then conducted background checks on those companies and then selected one. There were various features incorporated in the selection process. And like I said, the agencies themselves were very keen to join the project, even though it was never an advertised programme. Every company that we worked with kept two or three positions open for retiring Naval officers so as to ensure continuity in the projects.
"The Russia designed the 3rd generation 83mWT PRP at Kalpakkam was not an experimental PWR, but was tailor-made to fit into the hull of an SSBN from the outset. India and Russia Atomstroyexport signed on November 20, 1988 for the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project (KKNPP) officially involved the construction of two 1,000MWe Russian VVER-1000-type light water reactors (at a cost of US$3.5 billion) at Kudankulam in Tirunelveli district in Tamil Nadu State. However, a secret annexure of this contract also called for Moscow to offer its ‘consultancy’ and ‘vendor-development’ services, along with the supply of two KLT-40C PWR mock-ups (built by Afrikantov OKBM and designed to deliver 23.5mWe from the 82.5mWt reactor and using 45% enriched uranium-aluminium alloy clad in zircaloy), their related heat exchangers and steam generators, plus their detailed engineering drawings off-the-shelf—all for the double-hulled SSBNs, and similar military-industrial assistance (FSUE Central Design Bureau RUBIN) for building the larger double-hulled SSBNs. Moreover, the design data have not been shared by Russia with any other nation, especially its reactor engineering and hence without these one cannot either upscale or downscale the PWR design, or change the design configuration of the reduction gearbox and power transmission system that is presently designed for operating within a double-hull submarine. Another IGA to be inked in Goa last year as part of a secret annexure of the contract for building Units 3 and 4 of the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project (KKNPP) concerns the in-country construction of six 5,000-tonne, single-hulled, fifth-generation attack submarines (SSN), powered by 60mWt (about 25mWe) high-density integral pressurised water reactors (PWR), designed by the St Petersburg-based FSUE Central Design Bureau RUBIN for Marine Technology. India needs to further refine the design of this PWR, which has only a 10-year lifespan which is too costly (which means the Arihant, if it is to remain in service for 20 years, would require two such PWRs, each with a lifespan of 10 years)." trishul-trident.blogspot
The Indian Navy was able to lease and operate a Charlie class Soviet submarine for three years beginning 1988, which was critical for the Indians to learn its secrets. In the early 1990s, Indian Navy initiated the plan for the design and construction of domestic nuclear submarines. The Russians retired the last of their Charlie II submarines in 1994, but former Russian President Boris Yeltsin shared its basic design data with India as a gesture of goodwill. The construction of the Advanced Technology (ATV) submarine’s hull began in 1998. The technical heart of this undoubtedly massive achievement was laid with the German HDW project. First, Mazagon Dock would learn how to actually construct the body of the submarine. Second group, to commercially order parts from abroad. And third group, formed the backbone of the construction team after learning how to design submarines from the small German Ingenieurkontor Lübeck (IKL) submarine design firm.
One key decision was that we did not want to reinvent the wheel, so we decided that we would buy the design from Russian agency and proceed with that. Here, we primarily wanted the ‘know how’ and the ‘know why’ of the design. Companies generally never tell you anything of the normatives—this is their intellectual property. Our Russian supplier was very kind, though we paid a very tidy sum for it, we got the normatives. We are not designing a submarine de-novo, we are just developing and indigenously building with outside agencies.
The advantage was that with these, we could alter the design to our requirements or update it. For example, [suppose] we had designed a submarine with a maximum diving depth of 100 metres, but later, wanted to increase that to 150 or 200 metres. To do that, we do not have to reinvent the wheel—we already have the normatives, so we update the design and change it as required. With this we had made designs for an SSBN. We have also been quite successful in modifying the design for an SSN. We should be able to develop future submarine programmes ourselves.
The second key decision was that the Navy wanted the private sector to enter the field. We followed the norms set up by the Government on this. We were very open with it—we had several agencies for the job, had several discussions, and eliminated the firms who were not serious contenders. If there were 10-12 firms that had applied for a particular task, we selected two to four and then conducted background checks on those companies and then selected one. There were various features incorporated in the selection process. And like I said, the agencies themselves were very keen to join the project, even though it was never an advertised programme. Every company that we worked with kept two or three positions open for retiring Naval officers so as to ensure continuity in the projects.
6,000 ton S-2 ‘Half Boat’ Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) project is India's costliest and largest defence programme, estimated at Rs. 90,000 crore. Apart from the first submarine S-73, three more Arihant class submarines are planned to be built with minor changes/ improvements, in successive boats, to their displacement, reactor design, and missile-carrying capacity. The Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) project involves building four SSBNs, each costing upwards of Rs 4,000 crore, not counting the infrastructure for submarine launched ballistic missiles and nuclear reactors.
Project-S is the codename for India’s nuclear submarines. The main challenge lies in building the S-5 lies in its propulsion plant, a 4th gen OK-650B 190 megawatt nuclear reactor (originally developed by Russia for icebreaker ships). An additional unit, the S-4* (Star) was sanctioned in 2012 when it became clear that the S-5 would take a longer development cycle and would result in the ATV line being idle.
Project-S is the codename for India’s nuclear submarines. The main challenge lies in building the S-5 lies in its propulsion plant, a 4th gen OK-650B 190 megawatt nuclear reactor (originally developed by Russia for icebreaker ships). An additional unit, the S-4* (Star) was sanctioned in 2012 when it became clear that the S-5 would take a longer development cycle and would result in the ATV line being idle.
The Arihant SSGN design can easily be modified into a hunter-attack submarine design without risk. India hunter-attack submarines will take priority over nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.
The first American SSBNs were the five 6,000-ton boats of the George Washington class. These were basically an SSN design that was enlarged to add a missile compartment for 16 Polaris SLBM. The first of these boats entered service in 1960 and was soon joined by five of the 6,900-ton Ethan Allen class, which was designed from the start as an SSBN. These entered service in the early 1960s. Basically, this was an improved George Washington class.
The first American SSBNs were the five 6,000-ton boats of the George Washington class. These were basically an SSN design that was enlarged to add a missile compartment for 16 Polaris SLBM. The first of these boats entered service in 1960 and was soon joined by five of the 6,900-ton Ethan Allen class, which was designed from the start as an SSBN. These entered service in the early 1960s. Basically, this was an improved George Washington class.
Arihant SSBN / SSGN (slayer of enemies)
The S-2 or INS Arihant (slayer of enemies) S-73 SSBN is an updated model of second-generation Project Del'fin 667BDRM (Nato: Delta IV class) submarine.
First sanctioned in 1970, the project was approved in 1984. Del'fin 667BDRM is a small Soviet nuclear ballastic-missile submarine (1970s) that can complement future Russian Akula-class hunter-attack submarine.
The construction of the submarine’s hull began in 1998, and a basically Russian OK-350 pressurised-water-cooled reactor was fitted in the hull 9 years later. However, the Russians did not pass its nuclear reactor technology to India. India’s quest to build a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN, in U.S. Navy parlance), reportedly began in 1970 under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Code-named the Advanced Technology Vehicle (ATV) program, its existence was kept under wraps for more than three decades ago before the former chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission, PK Iyengar, revealed it at a public forum back in 2007. “Indian scientists and technologists are capable of making light water reactors and we are already constructing an LWR at Kalpakkam in south India for the submarine”. INS Arighat nuclear submarine was launched in 2017. India needs 16 nuclear-powered submarines.
The heart of the S-2 Arihant is its 3rd-generation OK-700A (VM-4SG) nuclear propulsion plant, an Indian built (and also produced by Russia's Afrikantov OKBM) and designed by Russia’s OJSC N A Dollezhal Scientific Research & Design Institute of Energy Technologies (also known as NIKIET), now part of JSC Atomenergoprom, 83 or 89.2 megawatt pressurised water-cooled reactor, and producing 18,000hp, that uses 44% enriched uranium as fuel and light water as a coolant and moderator. This will allow it to operate quietly and stay submerged for about 2 months at a time. Such PWRs have a total technical service life of 35 years and require refuelling after 17 years. In India, JSC Atomenergoprom authorised the DAE to licence-produce such PWRs. The 83 or 89.2 megawatt Pressurized water-cooled reactors (PWRs) used on Arihant might be under-powered but adequate enough since not all nuclear submarines even if they have similar displacement and size have different reactor power, E.g. first generation Chinese Ballistic nuclear submarine introduced in 80’s had 50 or 64 megawatt reactors which gradually was increased to higher powered ones over the years.
INS Arihant nuclear reactor has a short refuelling cycle and therefore a limited endurance capacity. Arihant will require frequent refueling and complex overhauls (RCOHs) which means Arihant hardly will be available for operational patrol even for one-fifth of its lifespan. Only few nations have submarine reactor with longer effective core life of more than three decades particularly US made SSN and SSBN submarines due to advancement of reactor technology and many Western Nuclear submarines citing example of yet to be deployed French Barracuda-class submarine which will require major refueling and complex overhauls (RCOHs) every 10 years this explains that there is no particular standard for core reactor overhaul or refuelling in nuclear submarines operated by very few countries.
Del'fin 667BDRM (Nato: Delta IV class) submarines used two Gen-3 PWRs each rated at 89.2mWt. Building the 85 or 89.2 megawatt pressurized water reactor that powers the Arihant posed tremendous problems. India’s Bhabha Atomic Research Center contributed the core design, uranium enrichment and related functions while the Defense Research and Development Organization handled the rest of its construction. Miniaturizing the design to fit the submarine was the main problem that BARC faced. Without Russian technical help it would have taken another five years to complete. A replica of this reactor has been operating on land for the past four years. Nevertheless, critical processes of the Arihant’s reactor are not yet functioning. For the uranium core reaction to sustain itself usually takes two to three years. However, every step is a new learning curve for Indian scientists, and taking it slowly is not a bad approach.
The Arihant SSGN design can easily be modified into a hunter-attack submarine design without risk. SSN version will be the same as that of the Arihant SSGN, but minus the VLS cells. It can either carry 12 BrahMos-1 or 4 K-4 SLBMs (comparable in many ways to Agni-3 land-based missile) which have a range of 3,500 kilometres. An SLBM force cannot be less than 6 submarines. India hunter-attack submarines will take priority over nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. India needs to have atleast 8 or 9 hunter-attack submarine. A double-hulled design weighs more, but in nuclear-powered submarines, extra weight does not matter at all.
All but one type of Soviet submarine class, used two reactors and two propellers. Like American submarines, and unique among Soviet combat nuclear submarines, the Charlie class used a single reactor and a single propeller shaft. Arihant uses a GTZA-631 turbine that in turn drives the five-blade propellers. The Arihant’s surface and submerged displacement ranges from 6,000 to 7,000 tons compared to the 4,000 to 5,000 tons of Charlie II. Its submerged speed is also higher at 25-35 knots compared to Charlie’s 25-30 knots. The S-2 Arihant can dive to 300 meters. Indian Navy desperately needs strategic nuclear submarines, while as a nation India needs ballistic missile-firing one. We are building S-5, S-6 & S-7. She is designed to carry 4 nuclear-tipped submarine-launched ballistic missiles called the K-4 (comparable in many ways to Agni-III land-based missile) which have a range of 3,500 kilometres or 12 Indian-built K-15 missiles, renamed as B-05 which can strike targets about 750 kilometres away, and 6 torpedo tubes.
The US, which has the best rocket technology, is able to put its 8,000-mile ICBM within a 12.8 metre hull. The Russians were unable to confine an ICBM within a 12-metre hull and so their missile tubes protruded two metres outside the pressure hull.
The Arihant’s VLS silos are not capable of housing a 5,000km-range SLBM but future submarine models are expected to have that capacity. The Arihant has a diameter of about 10 metres. Submarine diameters are the key dimension. The future of India’s nuclear submarine project is entirely in the hands of the rocket scientists. DRDO has not yet succeeded in developing a cold-launch missile ejection system for the VLS of a submerged SSBN. Hence, neither the Arihant nor Arighat can carry any type of SLBM on-board. Since 2007 funds were released to develop a cold-launch system for SLBMs, which is meant for installation on the S-4 SSBN for technology demonstrator. The first generation INS Arihant S-73 SSGN is a small ballastic-missile and is half in size of Akula (Project 971 Shchuka-B), and capable of housing 6 VLS cells each carrying 1 BrahMos-1 supersonic ASCM. Two more Arihant-class submarines are currently under construction at the shipyards in Visakhapatnam. Component and sub-systems manufacturing is done in Russia, while the pressure hull is being fabricated by L&T. Final assembly will be done at Vizag. Once the design of the new K-5/6 SLBM is finalised, the follow-on submarines will be built larger and incorporate further improvements over the lead boat. Arihant is the first of 5 nuclear–powered ballistic missile submarines that India is planning to build. The first-in-class boat reportedly cost $2.9 billion to complete.
Indigenous INS Arihant SSBN propulsion compartment suffered major damage after water entered the area, while it was at harbour, more than 10 months ago; because of possible human error. Under normal circumstances, it is not possible for sea water to enter the submarine, and certainly not via a ‘non-existent hatch’. There are no external hatches in the compartment that houses the steam turbine, gearbox, generator and shaft that drives the propeller. Besides other repair work, many pipes had to be cut open and replaced. Indian authorities likely felt that pipes exposed to corrosive seawater couldn't be trusted again, particularly pipes that carry pressurized water coolant to and from the ship’s 83 megawatt nuclear reactor. One naval source said the “cleaning up” is a laborious task in a nuclear submarine which is why there has been a delay in getting it back to sea. It has taken 30 years to build it, at a high cost. It is powered by a Russian-designed 83 or 89.2 MW pressurised light-water reactor with 44% enriched uranium. The incident came to light just a few weeks after the Navy admitted nuclear submarine INS Chakra’s SONAR, known as the eyes and ears of a submarine in the water, was damaged in early October 2016 after either hit something or while docking at Vishakhapatnam.
Building the hull was not easy either. India had lost its strategic vision and simply allowed the Mazagon Dock facilities to die. Grade A welders emigrated to Dubai, engineers retired, and eventually all that was left were designers and the knowledge passed on to industry, particularly dynamic companies like Larsen & Toubro, which actually built the hull of INS Arihant. Some of the young naval commanders of the overseeing team eventually became flag officers in charge of putting together the hull sections built by L&T in the Visakhapatnam. Indian scientists lacked metallurgical knowledge of suitable materials for the hull. The selected steel required precise handling, cutting and welding. At times it appeared that Indian hull builders could not accomplish this, which added to manufacturing delays and cost overruns. Three extra years were added to perfect fabrication techniques. This explains why it took 10 years from the formal design to the actual commissioning of the submarine. Now India has replaced imported HY-80 steel from Russia for (building parts of arihant class submarine) with DMR-292B.
On the east coast, L&T (which has gained experience building India’s nuclear submarine, S-2 christened as Arihant) should be permitted to join hands with Hindustan Shipyard Ltd (HSL), the MoD’s new shipyard in Visakhapatnam, for building a second line of submarines with Russian technology. The L&T-HSL JV should also be designated the node for developing and building a line of SSNs, which remains a glaring hole in India’s defence capabilities. Plate-bending is done by L & T in Hazira. Fabrication and welding of various compartments and hull casings is all done at SBC in Vizag with Godrej & Boyce, BHEL Tiruchy, Walchandnagar Industries Ltd & MIDHANI. Every other country with nuclear submarine capability first built SSNs before developing the technology for SSBNs, as nuclear ballistic missile submarines are called. India alone has begun with a complex SSBN (the INS Arihant) and is continuing building more SSBNs without taking on the simpler design challenge of SSNs.
The S-2 or INS Arihant (slayer of enemies) S-73 SSBN is an updated model of second-generation Project Del'fin 667BDRM (Nato: Delta IV class) submarine.
First sanctioned in 1970, the project was approved in 1984. Del'fin 667BDRM is a small Soviet nuclear ballastic-missile submarine (1970s) that can complement future Russian Akula-class hunter-attack submarine.
The construction of the submarine’s hull began in 1998, and a basically Russian OK-350 pressurised-water-cooled reactor was fitted in the hull 9 years later. However, the Russians did not pass its nuclear reactor technology to India. India’s quest to build a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN, in U.S. Navy parlance), reportedly began in 1970 under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Code-named the Advanced Technology Vehicle (ATV) program, its existence was kept under wraps for more than three decades ago before the former chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission, PK Iyengar, revealed it at a public forum back in 2007. “Indian scientists and technologists are capable of making light water reactors and we are already constructing an LWR at Kalpakkam in south India for the submarine”. INS Arighat nuclear submarine was launched in 2017. India needs 16 nuclear-powered submarines.
The heart of the S-2 Arihant is its 3rd-generation OK-700A (VM-4SG) nuclear propulsion plant, an Indian built (and also produced by Russia's Afrikantov OKBM) and designed by Russia’s OJSC N A Dollezhal Scientific Research & Design Institute of Energy Technologies (also known as NIKIET), now part of JSC Atomenergoprom, 83 or 89.2 megawatt pressurised water-cooled reactor, and producing 18,000hp, that uses 44% enriched uranium as fuel and light water as a coolant and moderator. This will allow it to operate quietly and stay submerged for about 2 months at a time. Such PWRs have a total technical service life of 35 years and require refuelling after 17 years. In India, JSC Atomenergoprom authorised the DAE to licence-produce such PWRs. The 83 or 89.2 megawatt Pressurized water-cooled reactors (PWRs) used on Arihant might be under-powered but adequate enough since not all nuclear submarines even if they have similar displacement and size have different reactor power, E.g. first generation Chinese Ballistic nuclear submarine introduced in 80’s had 50 or 64 megawatt reactors which gradually was increased to higher powered ones over the years.
INS Arihant nuclear reactor has a short refuelling cycle and therefore a limited endurance capacity. Arihant will require frequent refueling and complex overhauls (RCOHs) which means Arihant hardly will be available for operational patrol even for one-fifth of its lifespan. Only few nations have submarine reactor with longer effective core life of more than three decades particularly US made SSN and SSBN submarines due to advancement of reactor technology and many Western Nuclear submarines citing example of yet to be deployed French Barracuda-class submarine which will require major refueling and complex overhauls (RCOHs) every 10 years this explains that there is no particular standard for core reactor overhaul or refuelling in nuclear submarines operated by very few countries.
Del'fin 667BDRM (Nato: Delta IV class) submarines used two Gen-3 PWRs each rated at 89.2mWt. Building the 85 or 89.2 megawatt pressurized water reactor that powers the Arihant posed tremendous problems. India’s Bhabha Atomic Research Center contributed the core design, uranium enrichment and related functions while the Defense Research and Development Organization handled the rest of its construction. Miniaturizing the design to fit the submarine was the main problem that BARC faced. Without Russian technical help it would have taken another five years to complete. A replica of this reactor has been operating on land for the past four years. Nevertheless, critical processes of the Arihant’s reactor are not yet functioning. For the uranium core reaction to sustain itself usually takes two to three years. However, every step is a new learning curve for Indian scientists, and taking it slowly is not a bad approach.
The Arihant SSGN design can easily be modified into a hunter-attack submarine design without risk. SSN version will be the same as that of the Arihant SSGN, but minus the VLS cells. It can either carry 12 BrahMos-1 or 4 K-4 SLBMs (comparable in many ways to Agni-3 land-based missile) which have a range of 3,500 kilometres. An SLBM force cannot be less than 6 submarines. India hunter-attack submarines will take priority over nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. India needs to have atleast 8 or 9 hunter-attack submarine. A double-hulled design weighs more, but in nuclear-powered submarines, extra weight does not matter at all.
All but one type of Soviet submarine class, used two reactors and two propellers. Like American submarines, and unique among Soviet combat nuclear submarines, the Charlie class used a single reactor and a single propeller shaft. Arihant uses a GTZA-631 turbine that in turn drives the five-blade propellers. The Arihant’s surface and submerged displacement ranges from 6,000 to 7,000 tons compared to the 4,000 to 5,000 tons of Charlie II. Its submerged speed is also higher at 25-35 knots compared to Charlie’s 25-30 knots. The S-2 Arihant can dive to 300 meters. Indian Navy desperately needs strategic nuclear submarines, while as a nation India needs ballistic missile-firing one. We are building S-5, S-6 & S-7. She is designed to carry 4 nuclear-tipped submarine-launched ballistic missiles called the K-4 (comparable in many ways to Agni-III land-based missile) which have a range of 3,500 kilometres or 12 Indian-built K-15 missiles, renamed as B-05 which can strike targets about 750 kilometres away, and 6 torpedo tubes.
The US, which has the best rocket technology, is able to put its 8,000-mile ICBM within a 12.8 metre hull. The Russians were unable to confine an ICBM within a 12-metre hull and so their missile tubes protruded two metres outside the pressure hull.
The Arihant’s VLS silos are not capable of housing a 5,000km-range SLBM but future submarine models are expected to have that capacity. The Arihant has a diameter of about 10 metres. Submarine diameters are the key dimension. The future of India’s nuclear submarine project is entirely in the hands of the rocket scientists. DRDO has not yet succeeded in developing a cold-launch missile ejection system for the VLS of a submerged SSBN. Hence, neither the Arihant nor Arighat can carry any type of SLBM on-board. Since 2007 funds were released to develop a cold-launch system for SLBMs, which is meant for installation on the S-4 SSBN for technology demonstrator. The first generation INS Arihant S-73 SSGN is a small ballastic-missile and is half in size of Akula (Project 971 Shchuka-B), and capable of housing 6 VLS cells each carrying 1 BrahMos-1 supersonic ASCM. Two more Arihant-class submarines are currently under construction at the shipyards in Visakhapatnam. Component and sub-systems manufacturing is done in Russia, while the pressure hull is being fabricated by L&T. Final assembly will be done at Vizag. Once the design of the new K-5/6 SLBM is finalised, the follow-on submarines will be built larger and incorporate further improvements over the lead boat. Arihant is the first of 5 nuclear–powered ballistic missile submarines that India is planning to build. The first-in-class boat reportedly cost $2.9 billion to complete.
Indigenous INS Arihant SSBN propulsion compartment suffered major damage after water entered the area, while it was at harbour, more than 10 months ago; because of possible human error. Under normal circumstances, it is not possible for sea water to enter the submarine, and certainly not via a ‘non-existent hatch’. There are no external hatches in the compartment that houses the steam turbine, gearbox, generator and shaft that drives the propeller. Besides other repair work, many pipes had to be cut open and replaced. Indian authorities likely felt that pipes exposed to corrosive seawater couldn't be trusted again, particularly pipes that carry pressurized water coolant to and from the ship’s 83 megawatt nuclear reactor. One naval source said the “cleaning up” is a laborious task in a nuclear submarine which is why there has been a delay in getting it back to sea. It has taken 30 years to build it, at a high cost. It is powered by a Russian-designed 83 or 89.2 MW pressurised light-water reactor with 44% enriched uranium. The incident came to light just a few weeks after the Navy admitted nuclear submarine INS Chakra’s SONAR, known as the eyes and ears of a submarine in the water, was damaged in early October 2016 after either hit something or while docking at Vishakhapatnam.
Building the hull was not easy either. India had lost its strategic vision and simply allowed the Mazagon Dock facilities to die. Grade A welders emigrated to Dubai, engineers retired, and eventually all that was left were designers and the knowledge passed on to industry, particularly dynamic companies like Larsen & Toubro, which actually built the hull of INS Arihant. Some of the young naval commanders of the overseeing team eventually became flag officers in charge of putting together the hull sections built by L&T in the Visakhapatnam. Indian scientists lacked metallurgical knowledge of suitable materials for the hull. The selected steel required precise handling, cutting and welding. At times it appeared that Indian hull builders could not accomplish this, which added to manufacturing delays and cost overruns. Three extra years were added to perfect fabrication techniques. This explains why it took 10 years from the formal design to the actual commissioning of the submarine. Now India has replaced imported HY-80 steel from Russia for (building parts of arihant class submarine) with DMR-292B.
On the east coast, L&T (which has gained experience building India’s nuclear submarine, S-2 christened as Arihant) should be permitted to join hands with Hindustan Shipyard Ltd (HSL), the MoD’s new shipyard in Visakhapatnam, for building a second line of submarines with Russian technology. The L&T-HSL JV should also be designated the node for developing and building a line of SSNs, which remains a glaring hole in India’s defence capabilities. Plate-bending is done by L & T in Hazira. Fabrication and welding of various compartments and hull casings is all done at SBC in Vizag with Godrej & Boyce, BHEL Tiruchy, Walchandnagar Industries Ltd & MIDHANI. Every other country with nuclear submarine capability first built SSNs before developing the technology for SSBNs, as nuclear ballistic missile submarines are called. India alone has begun with a complex SSBN (the INS Arihant) and is continuing building more SSBNs without taking on the simpler design challenge of SSNs.
"It was in 1984 that construction began of India’s Rattehalli Rare Materials Plant (RMP), located near Mysore in Karnataka State, which is a pilot-scale gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant with several hundred gas centrifuges, and is capable of producing several kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) each year. Construction of the pilot-scale gas centrifuge enrichment facility at began in 1987, took four years to complete, and began operating in 1991. The plant is operated by Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL), which is a subsidiary of India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). The DAE first confirmed the existence of the plant in 1992. Items that the IREL initially imported to outfit the RMP, such as vacuum pumps, vacuum furnaces, machine tools, vacuum bellows-sealed valves, and canned motors for centrifugal pumps, were subsequently indigenised. Thereafter, work began on producing low enriched uranium (LEU) for submarine-based pressurised water reactors (PWR) at a large uranium enrichment centrifuge complex, the Special Material Enrichment Facility (SMEF), in Challakere Taluk, Chitradurga District of Karnataka. Between 2009 and 2010, an area of approximately 10,000 acres in the Chirtradurga District of Karnataka was diverted for various military-technical and military-industrial purposes." Prasun K. Sengupta
Type 09-IVa (Jin) ballistic-missile nuclear submarine
The Type 09-IVa (Jin-class) SSBN (ballistic missile carrying nuclear-powered boat), represents China's first sea-based credible deterrent capability. The technological improvements of the Improved Type 09-IIIG were mirrored in the Type 09-IVa, specifically with regard to silencing.
The newest Type 09-IVa (Jin-class) SSBN carry at least 6 nos. of the JL-2 which was longer than the JL-1, and hence a large missile compartment had to be incorporated, as a result of which the boat had a massive hump, and looks like a Victor III. It incorporates a great deal of Russian technology and will replace the Type 092 (Xia-class) submarine.
The Type 09-IVa SSBN differ from the first two Type 094 to include a different shaped sail, and the rear ends of the Type 09-IVa SSBN now have storage space for a towed sonar array. There were also upgrades to the torpedo tubes and missile silos that can handle either the JL-2 or JL-3 SLBM. The Type 09-IVa SSBN is comparable to American Franklin class SSBN that served into the 1990s, when they were replaced by the much-improved Ohio class.
However, China’s new Jin-class ballistic missile submarine is the Type 09-IV (2017), falsely called Type-95 nuclear-powered attack submarine, is estimated to be noisier than the Russian Akula I SSN built 20 years ago or even the Russian Delta III-class submarines built more than 30 years ago, according to a report produced by the U.S. Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI).
The pictured submarine, on your right, appear to have 12 JL-2 (JuLang -2 or CSS-N-14) missile tubes. It is not clear whether four of these are the vessels were spotted or whether these are two additional vessels, bringing the total to 6 vessels. The first-of-class was constructed at Huludao Shipyard in Huludao, Liaoning and launched in July 2004.
The old Type 09-IV submarines will be replaced by the Type 09-VI.
Taking a SSN design and adding extra compartments to hold the ballistic missiles was a method pioneered by the United States in the 1950s to produce the first SSBNs. VLS (vertical lunch system) tubes were pioneered with the later models of the U.S. Los Angeles class submarines.
The Type 09-IVa (Jin-class) SSBN (ballistic missile carrying nuclear-powered boat), represents China's first sea-based credible deterrent capability. The technological improvements of the Improved Type 09-IIIG were mirrored in the Type 09-IVa, specifically with regard to silencing.
The newest Type 09-IVa (Jin-class) SSBN carry at least 6 nos. of the JL-2 which was longer than the JL-1, and hence a large missile compartment had to be incorporated, as a result of which the boat had a massive hump, and looks like a Victor III. It incorporates a great deal of Russian technology and will replace the Type 092 (Xia-class) submarine.
The Type 09-IVa SSBN differ from the first two Type 094 to include a different shaped sail, and the rear ends of the Type 09-IVa SSBN now have storage space for a towed sonar array. There were also upgrades to the torpedo tubes and missile silos that can handle either the JL-2 or JL-3 SLBM. The Type 09-IVa SSBN is comparable to American Franklin class SSBN that served into the 1990s, when they were replaced by the much-improved Ohio class.
However, China’s new Jin-class ballistic missile submarine is the Type 09-IV (2017), falsely called Type-95 nuclear-powered attack submarine, is estimated to be noisier than the Russian Akula I SSN built 20 years ago or even the Russian Delta III-class submarines built more than 30 years ago, according to a report produced by the U.S. Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI).
The pictured submarine, on your right, appear to have 12 JL-2 (JuLang -2 or CSS-N-14) missile tubes. It is not clear whether four of these are the vessels were spotted or whether these are two additional vessels, bringing the total to 6 vessels. The first-of-class was constructed at Huludao Shipyard in Huludao, Liaoning and launched in July 2004.
The old Type 09-IV submarines will be replaced by the Type 09-VI.
Taking a SSN design and adding extra compartments to hold the ballistic missiles was a method pioneered by the United States in the 1950s to produce the first SSBNs. VLS (vertical lunch system) tubes were pioneered with the later models of the U.S. Los Angeles class submarines.
Type 09-VI ballistic-missile nuclear submarine
The new 3rd gen Type 09-VI Tang class SSBN rumoured to have armed with 24x JL-2 missiles. Type 096 will be the successor and simultaneously also complement the existing Type 094 Jin class SSBN. The new Type 096 are rumoured to be able to carry 24 SLBMs, compared to the 12 of the existing Type 094 Jin class SSBN.
The new 3rd gen Type 09-VI Tang class SSBN rumoured to have armed with 24x JL-2 missiles. Type 096 will be the successor and simultaneously also complement the existing Type 094 Jin class SSBN. The new Type 096 are rumoured to be able to carry 24 SLBMs, compared to the 12 of the existing Type 094 Jin class SSBN.
Type-09-V attack submarines
While many have argued that the new Type 09-V and 09-VI subs will be built in Bohai shipyard in China, it is only now that the infrastructure is largely ready. China’s next-generation Type-09-V Sui class attack submarines, which are approaching first launch. The old Type-09-III submarines will be replaced by the Type 09-V. If the Chinese Navy plans to patrol into the Indian Ocean, then the larger Type-09-V will be a major boost to their capabilities.
While many have argued that the new Type 09-V and 09-VI subs will be built in Bohai shipyard in China, it is only now that the infrastructure is largely ready. China’s next-generation Type-09-V Sui class attack submarines, which are approaching first launch. The old Type-09-III submarines will be replaced by the Type 09-V. If the Chinese Navy plans to patrol into the Indian Ocean, then the larger Type-09-V will be a major boost to their capabilities.
Improved Type-09-IIIG "Shang-2" class upgraded nuclear-powered attack submarines has a vertical launch systems (VLS) with land-attack/anti-ship cruise missiles. It features superconductivity electromagnetic propulsion system and has quite a few vector propulsion devices at various locations on its body, it is able to maneuver at various angles.
Type 098 G & Type 098 T 4th-gen nuclear attack submarine, an upgraded version of the improved Type-09-III, and features superconductivity electromagnetic propulsion system without any propellers, which is why it is noiseless and has high performance. As it has quite a few vector propulsion devices at various locations of its body, it is able to maneuver at various angles.
Improved Type 09-IIIG are upgraded nuclear-powered attack submarines will replace outdated Type-09-1 (Han-class) SSN which had poorer propeller design and long list of more minor defects as well. The technological improvements were mirrored in the Type 09-IVa, specifically with regard to silencing.
The upgraded Type 09-IIIB SSGNs have a vertical launch systems installed, as well as the capability to fire the YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missiles. This gives it the same capabilities as US Los Angeles class submarines of the 1980s. Aside from being an anti-ship missile, the YJ-18 is also capable of attacking land targets, making it an equivalent to the US Tomahawk missile.
Improved Type 09-IIIG are upgraded nuclear-powered attack submarines will replace outdated Type-09-1 (Han-class) SSN which had poorer propeller design and long list of more minor defects as well. The technological improvements were mirrored in the Type 09-IVa, specifically with regard to silencing.
The upgraded Type 09-IIIB SSGNs have a vertical launch systems installed, as well as the capability to fire the YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missiles. This gives it the same capabilities as US Los Angeles class submarines of the 1980s. Aside from being an anti-ship missile, the YJ-18 is also capable of attacking land targets, making it an equivalent to the US Tomahawk missile.
China's four nos. of older Type 09-IIIA Shang-II class nuclear attack submarine are basically a longer than the original Type 09-III Shang-I SSN design and with VLS (vertical launch system) tubes added behind the sail for anti-ship and cruise missiles. Type 09-3 is a transition platform to try to catch up technologically. Shang Class is nuclear-powered, so it has virtually unlimited range. They have a long list of more minor defects as well.
The Type 093s look a lot like the three decade old Russian Victor III class SSN design. In 2009, USN ONI listed both of the original Type 093 "Shang-1" class SSN as being far noisier than Soviet Victor III-class submarines, which entered service in 1979.
Taking a SSN design and adding extra compartments to hold the ballistic missiles was a method pioneered by the United States in the 1950s to produce the first SSBNs. VLS (vertical lunch system) tubes were pioneered with the later models of the U.S. Los Angeles class submarines.
The Type 093s look a lot like the three decade old Russian Victor III class SSN design. In 2009, USN ONI listed both of the original Type 093 "Shang-1" class SSN as being far noisier than Soviet Victor III-class submarines, which entered service in 1979.
Taking a SSN design and adding extra compartments to hold the ballistic missiles was a method pioneered by the United States in the 1950s to produce the first SSBNs. VLS (vertical lunch system) tubes were pioneered with the later models of the U.S. Los Angeles class submarines.
2nd gen Type 09-II Xia class ssbn is Chinese only ballistic nuclear missile submarine, the Changzheng 6 is a modified Han class (NATO designation) nuclear-powered attack submarine. It was laid down in 1978 and launched in 1981. The 092 had only four missile tubes and rarely went to sea.
Currently, there is only three Chinese “Han” class nuclear submarines, nuclear-powered submarine because China still faces many problems to ask. Now, the “Han” class submarines in service, but they still are very noisy, and can easily be detected by Western sensors.
Their first generation Chinese SSBN, the 6,500 ton 092 entered service in the early 1980s, as a stretched version of the 091 class SSNs. The 091s were more dangerous to their crews than to any enemy. Radiation leaks and general unreliability made these boats, which entered service in the 1970s, much feared by Chinese sailors. China has spent a lot of time developing solutions to all these problems.
Currently, there is only three Chinese “Han” class nuclear submarines, nuclear-powered submarine because China still faces many problems to ask. Now, the “Han” class submarines in service, but they still are very noisy, and can easily be detected by Western sensors.
Their first generation Chinese SSBN, the 6,500 ton 092 entered service in the early 1980s, as a stretched version of the 091 class SSNs. The 091s were more dangerous to their crews than to any enemy. Radiation leaks and general unreliability made these boats, which entered service in the 1970s, much feared by Chinese sailors. China has spent a lot of time developing solutions to all these problems.
The Sino-Indian strategic relationship is rapidly evolving and tensions are building up as was underlined in an incident in 2009 when an Indian kilo-class submarine and Chinese warships, on their way to the Gulf of Aden to patrol the pirate-infested waters, reportedly engaged in rounds of manoeuvring as they tried to test for weaknesses in each other’s sonar systems.
China now has the world's second-largest defense budget after the United States and the fastest growing military market. Many of Europe's biggest defense contractors have been unable to resist its allure. Transfers of European technology to the Chinese military are crucial for the PLA as it builds the fire-power to enforce Beijing's claims over disputed maritime territory and challenge the naval dominance of the U.S. and its allies in Asia. However, the engines and technology the PLA is incorporating from Europe and Russia fall short of the latest equipment in service with the United States and its allies in Asia, including Japan, South Korea and Australia.
“Nobody sells entire weapons systems,” says Otfried Nassauer, director of the Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic Security and an expert on Germany's arms trade. “But components, especially pricey high tech components, that works OK.”
Most of China's advanced surface warships are powered by German and French-designed diesel engines. Chinese destroyers have French sonar, anti-submarine-warfare helicopters and surface-to-air missiles. BA spokesman for Man Diesel & Turbo said about 250 of its engines had been made under license in China and supplied to the Chinese navy. But perhaps the most strategic item obtained by China on its European shopping spree is below the waterline: the German-engineered diesels inside its submarines.
China is building a powerful submarine fleet, including domestically built Song and Yuan-class boats. The beating hearts of these subs are state-of-the-art diesel engines designed by MTU Friedrichshafen GmbH of Friedrichshafen, Germany. Submarine diesel technology is hardly new, but these engines are built to exacting standards to ensure reliability under extreme conditions. MTU has been building them for more than 50 years. Alongside 12 advanced Kilo-class submarines imported from Russia, these 21 German-powered boats are the workhorses of China's modern conventional submarine force. The engine delivered to China for the Song and Yuan classes, the MTU 396 SE84 series, is one of the world's most widely used submarine power plants. Some have also been fitted to nuclear submarines as back-up power plants,
In 2006, a Song class submarine shocked the U.S. Navy when it surfaced about five miles from the U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk, well within torpedo range, in waters off the Japanese island of Okinawa. The Chinese boat had been undetected while it was apparently shadowing the U.S. carrier and its escorts
China was known to have imported the Thales TSM 2233 ELEDONE / DSUV-22 and Thales TSM 2255 / DUUX-5 from France during the 1980s and early 1990s. It also has access to a wide range of modern Russian sonar systems (MG-519 MOUSE ROAR, MGK-500 SHARK GILL) through its purchase of the Kilo Class. Comparable systems are expected to be installed for the Type 041. The Type 041 is likely to be fitted with a comparable surface/air search radar similar to the MRK-50 SNOOP TRAY, a commercial navigation radar like a Furuno unit observed on a number of SONG class and ESM system is comparable to the Type 921-A.
In the last 10 years, it received 10 submarines and four modern destroyers, and several naval defense systems, all from Russia. Future plans include building aircraft carriers and matching fighter aircraft. Additional modernization includes landing ships and nuclear powered submarines, and long-term plans include building a navy capable of sailing long distances. The new naval base on Hainan Island is a challenge to the U.S. 7th Fleet. The latest Pentagon report on the modernization of Chinese military warns India about the rapid advances Beijing is making in improving infrastructure near the border areas with India and in strengthening its deterrence posture by replacing liquid-fueled nuclear capable CSS-2 IRBMs with more advanced and survivable solid-fueled CSS-5 MRBM systems. The PLA navy will be building several additional aircraft carriers to enhance its naval fleet in addition to the Kuznetsov-class carrier (Varyag). It is likely that Beijing will have its first indigenous carrier achieving "operational capability" as early as 2015. The United States has also suggested that China's aircraft-carrier-killing ballistic missile, the DF-21D, has reached initial operational capability. The import of AWACS from Israel would have changed the ball game. However, timely U.S. intervention prevented the technology transfer.
Eighty percent of China-bound oil and liquid natural gas passes through the Indian Ocean. Therefore China is attaching special importance to building strategic naval assets in the Indian Ocean. The building of the Gwadar port in Pakistan was part of this plan. Its naval listening facility in Myanmar is also augmenting China's blue water capabilities. Standing in the way of Chinese mastery of Indian Ocean shipping lanes is the Indian naval facility in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal, opposite the Malacca Straits. In addition, India's modernization of its navy and its proposed acquisition of nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers are not sitting well with the Chinese. From these small islands, India can interdict most of China's energy imports. Conversely, China could stage a Pearl Harbor-style attack on these islands and start a war. This explains why China is maintaining an uncompromising posture in its claim over areas of Arunachal Pradesh in northeast India. China's oil and gas import needs are immense. The bulk of these supplies must pass through the Indian Ocean. In the last five years, China has been building up its naval fleet to safeguard its supply route.
The Strait of Malacca is where the Pacific Ocean meets the Indian Ocean. It is the route that China-bound oil shipments take. All India must do to prevent a Chinese invasion of its northeast or Kashmir is to block this route. India has U.S.-made submarine hunter-killer planes – Boeing P-8s equipped with Harpoon missiles – one Russian and one Indian-made aircraft carrier, French Scorpene attack submarines and an Indian-built nuclear submarine with missiles reaching hundreds of miles. It can arm its Russian and Indian-made destroyers and frigates with Brahmos sea-denial missiles, and has shore-based naval attack capability. The Chinese could not cope with this formidable force. Add to this India’s growing network-centric capability and the Chinese are completely outmaneuvered. If China put together a large force to neutralize India at the western end of the Strait of Malacca, it would weaken its home naval defenses in the South China Sea.
With aircraft carriers, Scorpene submarines, Brahmos missiles and nuclear submarines, India’s naval punch is far superior to China’s. They can easily handle the Chinese if they cross the Strait of Malacca. China’s base in Hainan Island would be 13 days away, while India’s land bases would be only a day or two away. Besides, India’s land-based planes could keep the Chinese flotilla within its gun sights at all times. Currently India has the edge in terms of maritime capabilities but China is catching up rapidly. China's focus is pre-occupied on acquiring dominance in the Yellow Sea, the Taiwan Straits, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. The Indian Ocean falls second in the present order of priority.
China now has the world's second-largest defense budget after the United States and the fastest growing military market. Many of Europe's biggest defense contractors have been unable to resist its allure. Transfers of European technology to the Chinese military are crucial for the PLA as it builds the fire-power to enforce Beijing's claims over disputed maritime territory and challenge the naval dominance of the U.S. and its allies in Asia. However, the engines and technology the PLA is incorporating from Europe and Russia fall short of the latest equipment in service with the United States and its allies in Asia, including Japan, South Korea and Australia.
“Nobody sells entire weapons systems,” says Otfried Nassauer, director of the Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic Security and an expert on Germany's arms trade. “But components, especially pricey high tech components, that works OK.”
Most of China's advanced surface warships are powered by German and French-designed diesel engines. Chinese destroyers have French sonar, anti-submarine-warfare helicopters and surface-to-air missiles. BA spokesman for Man Diesel & Turbo said about 250 of its engines had been made under license in China and supplied to the Chinese navy. But perhaps the most strategic item obtained by China on its European shopping spree is below the waterline: the German-engineered diesels inside its submarines.
China is building a powerful submarine fleet, including domestically built Song and Yuan-class boats. The beating hearts of these subs are state-of-the-art diesel engines designed by MTU Friedrichshafen GmbH of Friedrichshafen, Germany. Submarine diesel technology is hardly new, but these engines are built to exacting standards to ensure reliability under extreme conditions. MTU has been building them for more than 50 years. Alongside 12 advanced Kilo-class submarines imported from Russia, these 21 German-powered boats are the workhorses of China's modern conventional submarine force. The engine delivered to China for the Song and Yuan classes, the MTU 396 SE84 series, is one of the world's most widely used submarine power plants. Some have also been fitted to nuclear submarines as back-up power plants,
In 2006, a Song class submarine shocked the U.S. Navy when it surfaced about five miles from the U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk, well within torpedo range, in waters off the Japanese island of Okinawa. The Chinese boat had been undetected while it was apparently shadowing the U.S. carrier and its escorts
China was known to have imported the Thales TSM 2233 ELEDONE / DSUV-22 and Thales TSM 2255 / DUUX-5 from France during the 1980s and early 1990s. It also has access to a wide range of modern Russian sonar systems (MG-519 MOUSE ROAR, MGK-500 SHARK GILL) through its purchase of the Kilo Class. Comparable systems are expected to be installed for the Type 041. The Type 041 is likely to be fitted with a comparable surface/air search radar similar to the MRK-50 SNOOP TRAY, a commercial navigation radar like a Furuno unit observed on a number of SONG class and ESM system is comparable to the Type 921-A.
In the last 10 years, it received 10 submarines and four modern destroyers, and several naval defense systems, all from Russia. Future plans include building aircraft carriers and matching fighter aircraft. Additional modernization includes landing ships and nuclear powered submarines, and long-term plans include building a navy capable of sailing long distances. The new naval base on Hainan Island is a challenge to the U.S. 7th Fleet. The latest Pentagon report on the modernization of Chinese military warns India about the rapid advances Beijing is making in improving infrastructure near the border areas with India and in strengthening its deterrence posture by replacing liquid-fueled nuclear capable CSS-2 IRBMs with more advanced and survivable solid-fueled CSS-5 MRBM systems. The PLA navy will be building several additional aircraft carriers to enhance its naval fleet in addition to the Kuznetsov-class carrier (Varyag). It is likely that Beijing will have its first indigenous carrier achieving "operational capability" as early as 2015. The United States has also suggested that China's aircraft-carrier-killing ballistic missile, the DF-21D, has reached initial operational capability. The import of AWACS from Israel would have changed the ball game. However, timely U.S. intervention prevented the technology transfer.
Eighty percent of China-bound oil and liquid natural gas passes through the Indian Ocean. Therefore China is attaching special importance to building strategic naval assets in the Indian Ocean. The building of the Gwadar port in Pakistan was part of this plan. Its naval listening facility in Myanmar is also augmenting China's blue water capabilities. Standing in the way of Chinese mastery of Indian Ocean shipping lanes is the Indian naval facility in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal, opposite the Malacca Straits. In addition, India's modernization of its navy and its proposed acquisition of nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers are not sitting well with the Chinese. From these small islands, India can interdict most of China's energy imports. Conversely, China could stage a Pearl Harbor-style attack on these islands and start a war. This explains why China is maintaining an uncompromising posture in its claim over areas of Arunachal Pradesh in northeast India. China's oil and gas import needs are immense. The bulk of these supplies must pass through the Indian Ocean. In the last five years, China has been building up its naval fleet to safeguard its supply route.
The Strait of Malacca is where the Pacific Ocean meets the Indian Ocean. It is the route that China-bound oil shipments take. All India must do to prevent a Chinese invasion of its northeast or Kashmir is to block this route. India has U.S.-made submarine hunter-killer planes – Boeing P-8s equipped with Harpoon missiles – one Russian and one Indian-made aircraft carrier, French Scorpene attack submarines and an Indian-built nuclear submarine with missiles reaching hundreds of miles. It can arm its Russian and Indian-made destroyers and frigates with Brahmos sea-denial missiles, and has shore-based naval attack capability. The Chinese could not cope with this formidable force. Add to this India’s growing network-centric capability and the Chinese are completely outmaneuvered. If China put together a large force to neutralize India at the western end of the Strait of Malacca, it would weaken its home naval defenses in the South China Sea.
With aircraft carriers, Scorpene submarines, Brahmos missiles and nuclear submarines, India’s naval punch is far superior to China’s. They can easily handle the Chinese if they cross the Strait of Malacca. China’s base in Hainan Island would be 13 days away, while India’s land bases would be only a day or two away. Besides, India’s land-based planes could keep the Chinese flotilla within its gun sights at all times. Currently India has the edge in terms of maritime capabilities but China is catching up rapidly. China's focus is pre-occupied on acquiring dominance in the Yellow Sea, the Taiwan Straits, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. The Indian Ocean falls second in the present order of priority.
Advantages aside, China has been notorious for attempting to fake a number of military technology advances or augment platforms with cosmetic allusions to technology that it does not really possess, leading to some speculation that AIP is not a near-term concern. Iran has an estimated 3 diesel electric submarines, plus 25 mini-submarines, and North Korea owns 20 with a supplementary 50 mini-submarines, all of which can be operated reasonably well on limited skill and experience.
It is no coincidence that multinational forces with shared interests have this year been involved in the largest ever mine countermeasure (MCM) and related operations exercise in the Strait of Hormuz, a choke-point span of water that strategists believe Iran could try to cut off if beginning hostilities in an attempt to starve oil reserves, of which it has already threatened.
The simplest and economical way to incapacitate ships and submarines is to damage their underwater hull by use of explosives so that the hull gets flooded with seawater and it sinks. Two types of weapons can damage the underwater hull of a ship — torpedoes and mines. Torpedoes can be fired from ships and submarines or dropped from aircraft. Mines can either be moored at varying depths or laid on the seabed. To ensure that the explosion occurs as close to the hull as possible, torpedoes and mines have mechanisms that avail of the natural characteristics of ships and submarines. For example, ship and submarine hulls are made of steel and steel has a magnetic field. In addition, ships’ propellers make noise.
Mines are basically of two types. Their explosion can be initiated by a ship’s magnetism or by a ship’s acoustic noise or a combination of both. Countermeasures against such serious damage comprise electric cables in the ship that carry exactly the right amount of electric current to minimise its unique magnetic signature. Similarly, if the source of ship noise can be accurately pin-pointed, action can be taken to mitigate that source. When at sea during war, acoustic noisemakers can be used to trigger mines from a distance and avoid damage to the ship.
Underwater ranges therefore meet two basic requirements:
The submarine-launched CJ-10K LACM has been developed by the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp's (CASIC) Hubei-based Ninth Academy (also known as the Sanjiang Aerospace Group, or 066 Base) on cooperation with the Third Academy's Beijing-based Xinghang Electromechanical Equipment Factory (159 Factory). Final assembly of the CJ-10K is undertaken by the Beijing-based Hangxing Machine Building Factory (239 Factory). The CJ-10K features an imaging infra-red optronic system for terminal homing, and it makes use of a ring laser gyro-based inertial navigation system combined with a GPS receiver to receive navigational updates from China's 'Beidou' constellation of GPS navigation satellites.
China unabashedly showed off its naval might in April this year with 25 vessels, two of which were nuclear submarines. It has built a large naval base at the southern tip of Hainan Island (Sanya Island), with the capability to hide multiple nuclear submarines. Interestingly, concurrent to their naval display, China spread false rumors that a Chinese naval ship had forced an Indian submarine to surface off Somalia’s coast during pirate patrol duty. China later denied the incident, which is an indication of how seriously they view India’s naval developments.
In the East, the fast growing Chinese Navy, guided by late Deng Xiaoping’s directions to it, has been cautious to first concentrate and build nuclear and conventional submarine forces to thwart the US Navy aircraft carriers coming to the aid of Taiwan, and surface fleet to safeguard its claims over the Takashima, Kurile, Senkaku, Sprately and Parcel islands before frittering away resources on aircraft carriers. In the interim, the Chinese have acquired the decommissioned HMAS Melbourne from Australia, and later the Minsk and Variag from Russia to imbibe carrier building and design technology, which is special as aircraft carriers have large bridge super structures on the starboard side which poses centre of gravity challenges. Presently the Variag is being made a sea training platform to fly Su-33s in preparation for the Chinese navy (called People’s Liberation Army-Navy or PLA-N) own home-built aircraft carrier project.
It is no coincidence that multinational forces with shared interests have this year been involved in the largest ever mine countermeasure (MCM) and related operations exercise in the Strait of Hormuz, a choke-point span of water that strategists believe Iran could try to cut off if beginning hostilities in an attempt to starve oil reserves, of which it has already threatened.
The simplest and economical way to incapacitate ships and submarines is to damage their underwater hull by use of explosives so that the hull gets flooded with seawater and it sinks. Two types of weapons can damage the underwater hull of a ship — torpedoes and mines. Torpedoes can be fired from ships and submarines or dropped from aircraft. Mines can either be moored at varying depths or laid on the seabed. To ensure that the explosion occurs as close to the hull as possible, torpedoes and mines have mechanisms that avail of the natural characteristics of ships and submarines. For example, ship and submarine hulls are made of steel and steel has a magnetic field. In addition, ships’ propellers make noise.
Mines are basically of two types. Their explosion can be initiated by a ship’s magnetism or by a ship’s acoustic noise or a combination of both. Countermeasures against such serious damage comprise electric cables in the ship that carry exactly the right amount of electric current to minimise its unique magnetic signature. Similarly, if the source of ship noise can be accurately pin-pointed, action can be taken to mitigate that source. When at sea during war, acoustic noisemakers can be used to trigger mines from a distance and avoid damage to the ship.
Underwater ranges therefore meet two basic requirements:
- De-Gaussing Ranges (DG Ranges). These are required for degaussing ships, i.e. demagnetising their hulls to reduce their magnetic signature and thereby minimise the chances of activating magnetic mines. Since magnetic field varies with distance, DG Ranges are of two types — for shallow draught ships and for deep draught ships.
- Acoustic Ranges. They are required for noise ranging ships and submarines so as to record their unique noise signature and thereby:-
- Reduce their vulnerability to acoustic mines and acoustic homing torpedoes.
- Minimise the range at which their machinery noise can be heard by the passive sonars of adversary submarines.
The submarine-launched CJ-10K LACM has been developed by the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp's (CASIC) Hubei-based Ninth Academy (also known as the Sanjiang Aerospace Group, or 066 Base) on cooperation with the Third Academy's Beijing-based Xinghang Electromechanical Equipment Factory (159 Factory). Final assembly of the CJ-10K is undertaken by the Beijing-based Hangxing Machine Building Factory (239 Factory). The CJ-10K features an imaging infra-red optronic system for terminal homing, and it makes use of a ring laser gyro-based inertial navigation system combined with a GPS receiver to receive navigational updates from China's 'Beidou' constellation of GPS navigation satellites.
China unabashedly showed off its naval might in April this year with 25 vessels, two of which were nuclear submarines. It has built a large naval base at the southern tip of Hainan Island (Sanya Island), with the capability to hide multiple nuclear submarines. Interestingly, concurrent to their naval display, China spread false rumors that a Chinese naval ship had forced an Indian submarine to surface off Somalia’s coast during pirate patrol duty. China later denied the incident, which is an indication of how seriously they view India’s naval developments.
In the East, the fast growing Chinese Navy, guided by late Deng Xiaoping’s directions to it, has been cautious to first concentrate and build nuclear and conventional submarine forces to thwart the US Navy aircraft carriers coming to the aid of Taiwan, and surface fleet to safeguard its claims over the Takashima, Kurile, Senkaku, Sprately and Parcel islands before frittering away resources on aircraft carriers. In the interim, the Chinese have acquired the decommissioned HMAS Melbourne from Australia, and later the Minsk and Variag from Russia to imbibe carrier building and design technology, which is special as aircraft carriers have large bridge super structures on the starboard side which poses centre of gravity challenges. Presently the Variag is being made a sea training platform to fly Su-33s in preparation for the Chinese navy (called People’s Liberation Army-Navy or PLA-N) own home-built aircraft carrier project.
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