Rapidly changing weather is nothing new to pilots. Thankfully, for the purposes of this training flight, the weather is switched back to a nice day. It's going to be a day to learn how to handle seemingly simple scenarios that can grow into problems for professional pilots. Instead of training in a real helicopter or jet, I'm perched about 15 feet above the ground on hydraulic stilts in a full motion simulator made by Canadian CAE. Fast event-based sensors operate asynchronously, and only transmit data from pixels that have changed, so they produce 100 times fewer data in sparse scenes which leads to 100x lower latency at 100x lower power. An asynchronous read-out integrated circuit (ROIC) and the machine learning algorithm processing layer together will enable an integrated event-based camera that can operate on less power than 1.5 Watts. Fiber Bragg grating (FBG) based optic sensors offer a number of advantages over traditional sensors for monitoring or sensing failure of structural integrity of components (i.e. Static Strength, Durability, and Damage Tolerance) in any vehicle or infrastructure. These include immunity to electromagnetic interference, light weight, small size, multiplexing capabilities, ease of installation and durability. If properly packaged within any type of vehicle or infrastructure, FBG sensors can survive the severe conditions. Development of indigenous scenario and sensor simulation toolkit is a software suite that has the functionality of a scenario generator. The suite simulates all tactical entities that are participants of warfare in land, sea or air. It will be part of various kinds of simulations like Performance analysis simulators, hardware in loop simulators and operator training simulators etc. lt provides truth data to integrated dynamic simulation system. We need on-the-move longer ranged precision firepower and jam-free navigation. Any vehicle stationary for 3 to 10 mins has a high chance of getting hit (top-attack). In Ladakh face-off in 2020, PLA quickly came with 20 ZBL-09 vehicles, 9 PCL161 artillery and 28 T-96/T-88c tanks. PLA's ZBL-09 vehicles are protected by Type-105 light tanks and FM-90 air defence. US mechanised infantry uses Bradley and, the replacement for the slower Stryker, the semi-autonomous 40-ton XM30 or OMFV (has 1000hp engine) with ISR drones and jammers. They aren't meant to attack bunkers or tanks. These are, specifically, for fire support to infantry where the enemy isn't expecting tanks, which is hard to do with modern ISR. AS-21 Redback is the best light tank. We need to increase survivability by reducing signal detection of our combat vehicles. To overwhelm air-defences, we need around 55 to 85 low-cost cruise missiles & decoys. We need over-the-horizon (OTH) radar capability, loitering munitions (with larger kg explosives), 60-200 Pralay battlefield missiles/yr, 155mm long-range artillery mounted on wheeled vehicle and non-line-of-sight (NLOS) targetting anti-armour capability on our attack helicopters. We need hypersonic missiles travelling at consistently fly above Mach 10. US Army is buying hundreds of mobile (hard-kill) air-defence, 4x4 carrying a small ku-band radar on raisable mast which is integrated with packs of UV/IR VSHORADS which can destroy drones at max 15kms. We also must develop advance direct Ir countermeasures for protection against IR guided missiles & manpads. We need capacity to produce 10,000 drones per month. China has huge production of munitions and drones. Indigenous attack helicopters also need full-motion simulators and precision guided weapons. We need loitering munition that don't require integration with the helicopter’s electricals or flight controls. No loitering munition has been able to attain the service ceilings of 17,000 to 20,000 feet as desired by India Army. There is currently no effective counter to adversary loitering munitions and drone swarms. US has developed 3D printers for troops to make engine parts for anti-air missiles and atgms at forward depots. US 6th gen are getting tech to neutralize incoming IR missiles. US is developing jam-free magnetic navigation using Ai. US wants 6th gen aircraft with large internal space that carry loyal wingmen. They are developing drones that can "complicate" enemy space-ground targetting system. US is also testing unmanned F-5 supersonic jets that can quick manoeuvre when attacked & rq180 stealth high-altitude ISR uavs. We need hypersonic missiles, awacs & air tankers. https://cepa.org/inbox-the-battle-for-motor-sich/ New version of surveillance, exploration, reconnaissance, targeting (SERT) mounted mast for border with integrated ground radar by Navantia. Manoeuvre contact battles require communication of high-quality targetting data amongst different units. Military sales has long been a US diplomatic mainstay. Former US President Barack Obama wrote in his memoirs that a complete cut-off of military aid to Pakistan wasn't an option, since the US had to rely on the overland routes through Pakistan. The US had also "tolerated" such behaviour and supporting the purported ally with billions of dollars in military and economic aid, despite its complicity with violent extremists and its record as an irresponsible proliferator of nuclear weapons technology in the world. India should not forget that when India’s Ballistic Missile Defence Programme conceptual stage, Americans had blocked the sale of Arrow-2 ABM. When India showed interest in American anti-ballistic missile defense system THAAD, the US promoted deployment of the weapon system in India under it direct military command and crew like in other parts of Asia, to serve its own interests. The active mode of operation of certain parts of operating software (made by US-based OEM) in Western military aircrafts, that are necessary to perform at max levels, requires crypto-keys regulated by the strict US export-control laws. In an imported closed-system, you have no choice but to give up your military sovereignty/independence, so those countries will never like India's mix & match "multi-sourcing" because it wears off the effects of any sanctions. We must also remember President Boris Yeltsin, under American pressure, held back cryogenic engines for ISRO's space programme. "Americans will do the right thing, but only after they have exhausted all other possibilities." The Soviet assistance was key to the early development of China’s own defense industry - in the first half of the 1950s, China had 44 large-scale defense industry enterprises supported by the Soviet Union. Again, Russia was almost the only source of advanced weaponry for the Chinese military in the 1990s. Currently, China is the world leader in terms of land-based precision missiles. Russia has grown cautious in its arms sales with China, holding technology to avoid being copied. 2024: The US Army is making significant investments in the force structure supporting integrated air and missile defense at the corps and division levels. New additions include: Project Akashteer: The Automated Air Defence Control & Reporting System, will empower the Indian Army's Air Defence units. It will enable monitoring of low level airspace over battle areas of Indian Army and effectively control ground-based Air Defence weapon systems.Indian border troops need ciws-type OR modern spaag (self-propelled anti-air gun), on vehicles integrated with anti-drone jammers. ‘Uttam’ AESA radar, has 936 TRMs (234 QTRMs), must be developed to be used as fire-control system. AK-630M solution is being worked upon by ARDE and BEML for IAF. Indian Army has upgraded older guns like the Swedish L-70s and the Soviet-made ZSU-23 guns into drone killers. Indian Army's 200 upgraded L-70 gun has enhanced target acquisition and automatic target tracking capability under all-weather conditions with high-resolution electro-optical sensors comprising a daylight television camera, a thermal imaging camera and a laser-range finder. The gun is also equipped with a Muzzle Velocity Radar for enhancing the accuracy of fire. The BEL Atulya new X-band air-defence target acquisition fire control radar (AD-FCR) LRDE system produced by L&T replaces the old RPK-2 radar for Indian Army's L-70 and ZU-23 anti-aircraft artillery guns used by CADA. This is Ericsson Radar Electronics designed Upgraded Super Fledermaus (USFM) "Super Bat" fire control pulse-radar (doppler) which is license developed by BEL. The radar was first used for mobile anti-aircraft double-barrel gun (SPAAG) by German army (Bundeswehr). The digital system contains a built-in simulator as well as a signal jammer. L-70 has a low rate of fire, so it is only suitable as hard-kill anti-drone. The costs are not known, but are believed to be in the range of Rs 6 to Rs 8 crore per gun upgrade. It will also need newer ammunition like the special proximity-fused ammunition manufactured by Bharat Dynamics Ltd (BDL)—each shell is packed with 1,000 fragments of tungsten that are detonated by a proximity fuse. India buys 40 mm pre-fragmented Proximity-fused ammunition produced by Italy's Simmel Difesa for Indian Army's L-70 gun. India is dependent on critical imports. It is a regrettable fact that such last-minute panic purchases have now become standard crisis-response. India has been one of the world’s top arms importers and alone accounted for about 10% of global arms sales volumes. A known limitation on Indian Army’s capabilities is shortages of imported spares. The Chief of Defence Material in UK, Defence Logistics Agency in US, and Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF) of the PLA's; have all functioned very efficiently. The entire LAC is handled by the Western Theatre Command of the PLA. It's high time, India needs to, at least, create a Joint Logistics Command. "I believe with the Chinese threat, the way to approach that is a very subtle and indirect approach … irregular warfare. My belief is that authoritarian, totalitarian governments fear one thing: Popular discontent and popular uprising… The thing that they fear most is not fleets of aircraft carriers, tanks, or expeditionary logistics. They fear information. And that’s one of the key components of irregular warfare. It will work through it. Let’s go ahead and use a little more … information, economics and diplomacy, and let’s go ahead and back off on the military for a little while, because we have time. If we’re wrong, we can spin things up. If you’re a business person, and you’re in an unpredictable business climate, what do you do? You hedge. We can’t go all in on any one thing. We need to have a wide range of capabilities." Miller said during an April 4 talk with the CATO Institute. “We cannot fight in that case in protracted war because we don’t have sufficient supply of munitions.” Wargames demonstrate that the United States could deplete its entire arsenal of LRASMs within one single week of fighting with China. “Some of the machining tools that are needed to open up new production lines are just very large, complex machines themselves that take time to fabricate and time to install”. High-intensity warfare often dictates that the industrial capabilities of warring states must be re-purposed to support the war effort in order to offset surging demand for replacement equipment or precision-guided munitions, once imported critical parts are expended. Developing nations are having to increase defence budgets to restore pre-war stockpiles, while even the US defence industry is having to re-assess its supply chain capacity to sustain wartime levels of production across an expansive range of weapons systems and platforms. The issue with the US defence industry is that the majority of R&D and manufacturing capabilities had been tailored to supply equipment for low-intensity warfare and counterinsurgency operations. European defence firms (France, Germany and the UK) have the expertise, but they face great difficulty in producing equipment at scale, with the slower tempo of European defence procurement having severely undermined the industry’s ability to ramp-up production to meet wartime needs. India’s dependence on imported platform is also the root of the Indian armed forces equipment shortages. All Indian-made Russian tanks have 8 major parts imported from Russia. Indian Army has no faith in Drdo's CVRDE ability to develop combat vehicles for future battlefields, which is highly demoralising for CVRDE and the Indian industries as a whole. India has to prepare for the fact that it needs to focus more on capable command & control and to add more mobile artillery rocket firepower. China has 2,650 battlefield rocket systems and 3,800 self-propelled artillery, while India has 266 battlefield rocket systems and 235 self-propelled artillery. Unlike India, China also builds its electronic fuses. In 2017, CBI had registered a case against a Delhi-based firm and unidentified officials of the Gun Carriage Factory for China-made parts camouflaged as those 'Made in Germany' finding their way to the production line of Dhanush artillery gun. India's technological dependency has been growing in every sphere of life, and India remains one of the largest net technology importers in all spheres of industry. Even if any end-product is manufactured in India, all the high-end industrial machinery required for mass-production has to be imported. This dependency especially is in the arenas of industrial automation tools, Big Data & Secure Telecommunications technologies, networks & systems for both commercial & military applications. Even if 90% of the missile is fabricated and machined locally, the high-precision machined components (like rubber washers, ball-bearings etc.) must be imported, without which the critical hardware becomes inoperable. We need high capacity to rapidly make guidance kits and fast production of electronics and sub-systems for target acquisition radars. According to Mao Zedong, “it is dangerous for a country to rely exclusively on foreign countries for its arms,” and “for a sovereign country to truly control its own destiny, it must first have a self-reliant defence industry”. Bringing an assembly line will help in improving the manufacturing process, but not in learning the design process. It says a lot about the strategic planning and management of our defence resources, when we are able to design fighters before trainers or launch world-class satellites before designing good rifles. It is essential that the critical sub-systems and spares of weapon systems are manufactured locally, which is not possible with foreign OEM suppliers who will never give away their intellectual property. Allies also won WW2 because they were able to quickly built to resupply their forces. It is easy to build up, not so easy to either build quality or maintain what you build. India’s decision-makers have still not understood what a true knowledge-based society is all about. If we can overcome these hurdles, then we will truly become vishwaguru in technology However, the principal war-waging deficiencies of India are not about the availability or non-availability of arms and ammunition, but about institutional deficiencies like the standalone war-waging postures of the three armed services. Since China has both bigger budget and military industrial base, the three Indian armed services must agree to adopt integrated operations plan for contingency scenarios. This is difficult to execute in any scenario by any country. For the CDS (similar to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) to focus exclusively on doctrines and theaterisation, CDS will need Vice-CDS and a range of Deputy CDSs, with one Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff responsible for capital procurement projects. To give promote joint-ness and synergy amongst the 3 armed services, India needs to start training officers together from junior command courses onwards, and to combine the 3 higher command courses into a single curriculum, under an integrated Joint Training Command under which all training establishments function. Military equipment get refurbished regularly, like how you pimp your cars. Once stripped and updated, they good as new. Base Repair Depots play a crucial role in maintaining the hardware of the forces, and many ‘trade secrets’ are being kept in the process. Real military uses these tough machines till the paint comes off. In fact, only equipment that sit in sparkling conditions are with Saudis like nations. They are nothing more than hanger queens or trophies. Category B equipment is not second-hand equipment. It is a fly worthy component that is removed from a serviceable fighter for utilization in another aircraft with necessary certified residual life. It's kind of fashionable to pull down your own product, especially if it's from a public sector undertaking (PSU). -Mobile Breech-loaded mortars -The new generation missiles and bombs, do not have very long shelf lives and require months to produce (most of which are imported, or critical parts are imported). This means that supply lines must always be open. Indian army needs to manufacture far more long-range fire-power in high-altitude (rocket artillery, both MBRL & SS-BSM are the way forward) for a decade to match China. Easily mobile long-range artillery for hilly terrain with non-line of sight targetting. Using ramjet-propelled rockets, you can go to 200-250 km. As the saying goes, more small shells from long-range, do greater damage than a few large shells. Logistics is the lifeblood in cannon and rocket wars, along with the power of robust precision targeting and integrated air defence. -Remote-controlled direct-energy mobile Air Defence (like American Phaser and THOR systems) integrated with anti-drone jammers. There is currently no effective counter to adversary loitering munitions and drone swarms. "You can see video of tanks being hit by an unmanned aerial system, artillery positions being hit by an unmanned aerial system, troops being hit by an unmanned aerial system". K10 ammo re-supply vehicles for existing K9 artillery for offensive manoeuvre warfare. Currently, without such vehicles, it means that the Indian Army will only be using Ashok Leyland trucks in Ladakh and Sikkim where the plateau terrain is relatively flat (& hard due to freezing cold temperature). -Double the number of High-altitude firing ranges & training facility, and underground logistics warehouses for Indian Army's longer-range systems and heavy mechanised units. Only long-range artillery mounted on vehicles (and aviation, which need time to deploy) will do any good against constantly moving tanks. Unless you have ranges to test fire longer-range systems, you will not know. Although few facilities are available, but you may have to wait for one year to test fire as there is always months long queue. There are not enough test facilities in Northern and Eastern areas in the mountains.
2024: The US Army is making significant investments in the force structure supporting integrated air and missile defense at the corps and division levels. New additions include: Ottawa-compliant landmines Unmanned helicopter that can transport perishable items to high-altitudes ECIL and BEL supply the fuzes imported from Israel or from REUTECH, a subsidiary of South Africa's Denel Group, had supplied 15,000 1989-1990 vintage fuzes in Nov 1999 from the stockpiles of the South African Army to Indian Army for OP Vijay. The technical offer from the REUTECH team had indicated that the M-8513 fuzes have a min shelf-life of 10 years. Although the requirement was projected in June 1999, the contract was concluded only in January 2000, with the deliveries commencing only in May 2000. Since OP Vijay was over by August 1999, 95% of the contracted amount for these fuzes was paid Rs. 17.27 crore by India. Each indigenous 155 mm terminally guided munitions (TGMs) projectile, capable of destroying High Value Targets, would cost around Rs. 80 Lakhs.
After Lahore peace summit, we were surprised by Kargil. And after Mahabalipuram summits we were surprised in Doklam and Ladakh. This is not because analysts are incompetent or unprofessional, but due to lack of integrated real-time data analysis in defence institutions. When interpreting large volumes of contradictory time-sensitive data inputs, analysts can oversimplify or their risk assessments can be too vague to be actionable. PLA through a number of coordinated tactical operations achieved its strategic aim of salami slicing Indian territory and made large tracts of our territory vulnerable for cherry-picking in the event of an escalation. China aim is to counter to India's influence in South Asia. Lt Gen (retired) H.S Panag said, India has been surprised again, like in 1962, 1965, 1999 and 2020 on a strategic and tactical level. This keeps happening again and again. The diversion you are ignoring is the main attack. The wishful thinking and pre-conceptions of policy-makers are most often at fault for our failures. In the Indian thinking, while China is a formidable security threat and therefore strategic foe, the chance of a conventional conflict breaking out was low. Decision-makers fear that worst-case thinking could cause avoidable crisis or even accidental war. Routinisation of false alarm can also lead to cry wolf effect. SIGINT failure on the ground is why we were surprised. PLA can only surprise target us in Leh, from Hotan (in Xinjiang) by using 370 km range version of their rockets while also remain hidden and have cover of integrated air-defence. If they use 300-mm rockets (range 130-160 km) variant, they have to come onto their G-219 highway, and their entry & exit will be visible for miles. So what we need to do first is keep them under surveillance, then hunt them down with our special forces or trans-border patrols. We need to have dedicated surveillance capability. This means our sensor-to-shooter links have to be of a very high order, including communications and procedures, which we don't have now. The Russians have deployed a large number of drones and other forces to carry out 3D reconnaissance, locate the Ukrainian army's HIMARS, understand their movements, and launch fighter-bombers to execute targeted strikes. They employ drones and electronic warfare to find, fix, and attack important Ukrainian artillery systems, particularly HIMARS and counter-battery radars. A basic operational idea of Air-Land Battle requires a battle network, of interconnected sensor grid, to "look deep and shoot deep." The essence of Air power is effective targeting, which depends on acquiring actionable real-time Intelligence and facilitating targeting, you also need to provide the superior kinetic weapons means for the destruction of targets. Indian Air Force's weaknesses lie in having less airborne assets for maintaining persistent ground battlefield surveillance and poor targeting data-link network on Mirage-2000 and Su-30MKI fighter jets. What separates a C4ISR network, from a C4ISRT network is targeting (the 'T') —the ability to use sensor data from a variety of systems to accurately direct long-range fires. Two of the most important elements in combat ops are to get: real-time ISR Intel and jam-free data-link between field units in different domains and the correct HQ Command. AWACS data is real-time, while the satellite photos are hours or days old. The US's DoD is moving away from airborne ISR assets (vulnerable to longer ranged air-to-air missiles), and moving into using unclassified data-links to control ISR satellite constellation which tracks moving targets in real-time, for better resiliency and sustainability. It hardly matters how precise new weapons are if you lack the ISR reach to find targets. Manoeuvre contact battles also require communication of high-quality targetting data amongst different units. Victory often rests on not just in the ability to out-detecting the enemy and then out-communicate that information to your relevant forces (to engage the enemy) but also the ability to outpace the enemy's speed of decision in the fog of war. If you can supply lots of precision weapons rapidly, then the next difficult aspect is the act of signal detection and sharing the information on enemy targets (despite enemy jamming). India's C4ISR joint battle networks of the future must be dynamically reconfigurable mesh networks that are better capable of adapting to threats and disruptions. These networks can split into tactical sub-networks as necessary, reroute data through different systems and alternative pathways in unpredictable ways, and reconnect into larger networks as opportunities emerge. The communications element is the essential component that makes this higher level of interoperability and resilience possible, but the other elements of the battle network must also be adapted to pass data seamlessly across multiple levels of security using compatible data standards and protocols. "The PRC has a robust and redundant IADS architecture over land areas (and within 556kms of its coast) that relies on an extensive early warning radar network, fighter aircraft, and a variety of SAM systems." Central to manoeuvre theory is the proposition that rapid attacks against isolated points of weakness can disorient the enemy, causing the fragmentation and systemic breakdown of the ability to resist or counterattack. This assumption appears inapplicable to addressing sophisticated A2/AD challenges. The decentralized command and control system required by manoeuvre theory would be unable to cope with the scale and interconnectedness of an advanced A2/AD network. The nature of a theatre-sized advanced A2/AD — a network characterized by the mutual support and redundancy of many components – suggests that its wholesale collapse would be difficult to achieve. Manoeuvre concepts require tactical commanders to discover enemy weaknesses by reconnaissance pull. Tactical ISR platforms would soon become priority targets for a capable adversary defending itself against a manoeuvre operation. Against continental adversaries with the ability to exploit buried fiber-optic communications, generating “non-cooperative centres of gravity” seems a tall order.
Cognitive Reactive Electronic Warfare (also offensive jammers): It targets electronic emissions of all types, but EW system's effectiveness depends on surprise. Turkey stated early on that terrorists are good at defending a specific area using anti-tank missiles and air-defenses against low-flying aircrafts, helicopters, UAVs but militants don't conduct electronic warfare operations or use UAVs for coordinating artillery units. While Chinese drones are great for scanning huge swathes of area to look for potential targets of interest during 10 hours of flight time. They also rely entirely on satellite data-links that could be degraded during a time of war. Electronic warfare proved decisive in Vietnam, when USAF B-52 and F-4 carried jammer pods to minimise losses from SA-2 SAMs. Space Exploration Technologies Corp's (SpaceX) Starlink, a constellation of satellites for high-speed internet, was able to resist Russian jamming of their satellite network by software update. US Army can become survivable within enemy territory with Modular Electromagnetic Spectrum Deception Suite (MEDS) to deal with Radar/communications (radio fingerprints), HF/VHF/UHF jamming interference and weaken enemy's heavy defenses. This surprise element is important when it comes to electronic gear in general, which is much more effective if the other side does not know much about how it works. India still doesn't have a dedicated Electronic Warfare planning Agency that can help manage jamming of enemy communications, remotely controlled explosives, radar systems, and other RF assets while safeguarding our RF systems. US realized that EW and organic ISR are essential on the modern battlefield. "Right now, about 75 to 85% of how we enable and understand long-range precision fires is through a SIGINT picture". They are looking at loitering munitions, and tools that allow each squad to manage their electronic signature. How to change the equation of three-attacker-to-defender force ratio, when you don't have any non-organic indirect fire support? The solution has always been clear: Provide each squad (that has real-time ISR info and EW to locate & jam enemy tactical radio communications while protecting theirs by creating noise fog) with their own lethal weapons systems like "swarm" of loitering guided munitions to destroy in priority order: enemy light armoured vehicles, crew-served weapons, command and control locations, and then target groups of three or more combatants in trench line. PLA believes cyber deterrence and reconnaissance should make up a single integrated effort, to achieving information (AI) superiority. In Chinese military, this is as important as space and nuclear deterrence. Since the 90s, after the Gulf War, China developed its own offset strategy, for some means of asymmetrically through its PLA Rocket Force's missiles to attack U.S. kill-chain battle networks & sensors, compensating for PLA's disadvantage, particularly in a direct military competition. Now China believes cyber deterrence and reconnaissance should make up a single integrated effort, to achieving information (AI) superiority. Their ability to disaggregate adversary's ISR capabilities (anti-satellite or space warfare) is as important as space and nuclear deterrence. China is focusing on asymmetric and hybrid attrition warfare, not using PLA troops, but by blending Chinese confrontation with cooperation, called 'Unrestricted Warfare' (using AI-based, all-effects multi-domain military-civil power & mobile military technologies), that affect adversary's ability to make decisions and take critical actions in the early stages of conflict i.e. strategic cognitive overmatch. AI-enabled machines can gather intelligence, identifying intent, and monitoring operations. However, AI is currently nowhere close to out-thinking or outflanking humans. AI tools cannot yet do deliberative or critically thinking and evaluating. China spends the highest amount of money on data-driven war-gamed realistic precision-strike combat training, since many PLA officers are known to be unable to deal with unexpected situations. Live-fire tests supported with electronic combat data have been carried out at high altitudes for most new weapons. The PLA has had difficulty addressing the shortage of officers who can make decisions by themselves (when they are cut-off from their chain of command) and have a deep knowledge of joint combat operations. China's aims at developing an in-depth precision strike munitions system backed by integrated persistent surveillance and reconnaissance, and C2 capabilities to operate in Taiwan and Tibet. In a short war, China will have a capability edge over India as they have integrated their ground-based & space-based multi-Sensor network grid for various target navigation (and C2). China has also tested this at high-altitude. The Pentagon report on China confirmed Indian intelligence reports that PLA had laid optical fibre cables along the contested 1597 km Ladakh LAC for faster war deployment and decision-making. "The enemy diversion you are ignoring is the main attack." The suggestion that the Chinese outposts are vulnerable because of a lack of survivable, redundant systems misses the point. The Chinese bases collectively present a big "quality is quantity" threat. Chinese bases primarily act as "information hard-points," harbouring and enabling significant communications and reconnaissance capabilities, as well as counters to adversary information control. China's integrated communications network capabilities include redundant ISR & EW drones, fiber-optic cable, multi-band satellite communications, high-frequency broadband arrays, tropospheric-scatter communications, frequency-diverse radar systems, electronic intelligence systems, and half a dozen microwave over-the-horizon radars, relocatable ESM and cell-phone communications towers.
China saw the Sino-Vietnamese border conflict of 1979 to 1990 as a way to evolve the PLA by testing new doctrines and equipment on its border. The cognitive evolution to Competition with China must proceed through three steps: (1) acknowledging the limitations of the historical conceptualization of operational art and re-define operational art for today's strategic environment; (2) embracing the different warfare perspectives, specifically how China understand warfare; and (3) the military application, in China's "instrument of national power (DIME)", in US-China competition. In 1999, two PLA colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui wrote that, the "boundaries lying between the two worlds of war and non-war, of military and non-military, will be totally destroyed" so that even the "rules of war may need to be rewritten." China has both bigger budget and big domestic military industrial base compared to India. China envisions further improving joint operations and towards application of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. AI-enabled machines can aid target recognition and be expected to perform tasks and change tactics at speeds that human operators cannot. It can shrink the time radius of OODA loops: observe, orient, decide, and act. PLA’s theory of victory is based on using precision strikes by PLA rocket force, to permanently disrupt, misdirect or destroy India Air force and Army’s critical operational architecture essential nodes and sensors (C3, space and firepower navigation capabilities), and asymmetric information dominance to be able to manipulate the perceptions of India's top decision-makers which will affect decisions and critical actions in the early stages of conflict. Indian leadership may not be able to handle cognitive overload and confusing narratives, which will adversely affect at strategic level. Military dictatorships are immune to this, but democracies are highly susceptible to this type of warfare. At this level, the troops may win the battle, but the war is lost. The term “political warfare” comes from George Kennan, and it refers to activities below the threshold of armed conflict. It includes economic coercion, human intelligence operations, and cyber operations includes information and disinformation campaigns on social media platforms. These activities are designed to preserve and expand CCP power while weakening adversaries. FBI and Homeland security do not have enough agents or intelligence analysts to deal with a growing Chinese counter-intelligence campaign—in addition to Russian, Iranian, and other counter-intelligence activity in the US. There is also substantial legal and illegal influence within Congress, corporations and universities, involving lobbyists with links to China. Major General Vladimir Slipchenko, in the aftermath of US's Gulf War in 1991, spoke of “no-contact warfare” as the optimal form for 6th gen ‘Political Warfare’. It targets enemy sensitivities rather than its vulnerabilities, thereby forcing the enemy to react. It looks at employing diversionary methods and deceptions to undermine the enemy OODA loop, thus creating false orientation, resulting in decision dilemma and disorder. The goal is to attack the political and military leadership in order to quickly achieve the stated strategic objectives like the destruction of the enemy’s economic potential and subverting the adversary’s political system. While a war is being conducted on the battlefield, in the strategic cognitive domain, a narrative is concurrently created to control the perception of the war. Large social media platforms have become the ‘main battleground for cognitive games and the main channel to influence people’s cognition.’ On these platforms, various short videos have become the ‘first scene’ for the public to understand various major events like a conflict or war. If one is technologically able to disrupt the adversary’s ability to communicate, it is possible to effectively suppress an adversary’s narrative. Military operations have a key supporting role to live updates on social media and allow for targeted disruption of the adversary. In fast-changing conditions, an ad hoc approach don't work. You need to use the whole of government, both offensively and defensively. This requires a shift of gears from strategy as planning, to strategy as learning. Embedding this adaptive capability is the only route to a sustainable advantage. Cognitive agility is the intersection point of effect that brings knowledge to capability and provides decision advantage. While the character of war — its technical dimension, changes; the nature of war as the “art of war” does not. The character and nature of war are imperfect; together, they reinforce the chaos in wars. To prevail in any strategic competition, we must quickly secure technological advantage, as well as the cognitive agility to employ it effectively. PLA-SSF's Network Systems Department (NSD) is responsible for signals intelligence and information warfare, with the critical mission of operationalizing PLA's integrated network, cyber, EW operations, and psychological warfare. NSD also helms the PLA-SSF's corps leader training facility, called Information Engineering University. Technical Reconnaissance & Electronic countermeasures focused, General Staff Department (GSD) Third Department (also called GSD's 3PLA) constitutes the backbone of the NSD. The GSD's 4PLA deals with Information warfare. The Strategic guidelines direct the PLA to win in “Informatized Local Wars,” when the dominant mode of warfare is confrontation between “information-based systems-of-systems”. PLA's operational system-of-systems is composed of 5 sub-systems:
China's war objective is specifically to preserve their power sources, by fighting better armed enemies in small conflicts. All domains can be contested for control of resources or degrade the position of the adversary. China's bases near Indian northern border, possess sustain robust battlespace information awareness capabilities that are often dismissed by Indian Army and AirForce who believe the bases will be easily neutralized in a conflict. Indian Army's firepower and maneuver are certainly important, but equally important is the ability to preserve information for one's own weapon systems while simultaneously starving battlespace information to one's adversary critical operational systems. Chinese are not "ten feet tall" but Indian Army should not take such PLA information capabilities dominance for granted. It hardly matters how precise new weapons are if the Army lacks the ISR reach to find targets. Indian security officials are seeking (to keep an eye on China) IAF to get 5 additional Global 5000 surveillance aircraft (SIGINT) to conduct signal intelligence and communications jamming intelligence, airborne ground battlefield surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (COMJAM & Raytheon supplied ISTAR equipments) duties inside 180 km inside the neighbours’ territories. For battlefield surveillance, a side-looking radar antenna is preferred, as it would help make the battlespace on the ground more transparent with strategic alert capability. These jets are being uploaded with Signals electronic Intelligence collection packages (also Air & Ground Jamming) in Israel. It can fly close to 5,000 nautical miles (9,300 km) non-stop at Mach 0.85 (907 kmph) and can climb to 43,000 feet in 23 minutes. With both China and Pakistan deploying missiles and building logistics aimed at India, the spy jets will help make the battlefield more transparent with strategic alert capability. However, a Pentagon report on China confirmed Indian intelligence reports that PLA had laid optical fibre cables along the contested 1597 km Ladakh LAC for faster war deployment and decision-making. Pakistan Army's strategic use of state-sponsored proxies means Indian Army has to focus on COIN-OPS, which has slowly weakened the capabilities of Indian Army operation environment level by loss of brave Indian Army officers and generating intense interests in COIN-OPS. Moreover, the 3- and 4-star Indian Army Generals during peacetime, have better chance to rise in COIN-OPS, than strengthening the Indian Army's Air-Land Battle capabilities in operation environment level for future wars that they may never command. If the existing sensors on-board the UAVs of all services could be married to the TFs, the ‘Sensor to Shooter’ cycle would be drastically reduced, especially in the scenario of Air Strikes (CAS). Today, a 4K capable camera drone with a loiter time of about 30 minutes costs barely USD1,000. If front-line units are equipped with such drones, the relay of information to the command centres would be real-time. Decisions would be better facilitated, and planning and execution of responses will be faster. Besides acquiring actionable real-time intelligence and facilitating targeting, you also need to provide the superior kinetic weapons means for the destruction of targets. High altitude UAVs equipped with side-looking SAR sensors provides more actionable intelligence rather than overhead satellites. However, UAV do not engage in terrain-masking, as that will lead to loss of data-link control. The precision afforded by high-altitude UAV comes with top-end technology that can be expensive. However, once the conflict starts, these drones can become susceptible. You can’t win a war by sending arms drones into well-defended enemy air-space. Presently, there is a blurring of lines between war and peace as hybrid conflicts take centre-stage. Therefore, China makes the most of ISR drones when there is no war, no peace at its border. The higher you go, the more you see. Aerostats are not able to sustain deployments in high-altitude areas due to strong winds. Chinese drones are great for scanning huge swathes of area to look for potential targets of interest during 10 hours of flight time. They are part of ISR and gathering of reconnaissance. Chinese Airforce's key strength is in SIGINT that backs its Army. General-purpose and attack helicopter units and UAVs, provide combined armed units and engineers regiment with a highly manoeuvrable and versatile platform for reconnaissance, command and control, and fire support. Starting in 2011, the PLAAF began deploying KJ-500 AEW and BZK-05 UAVs (also fighters for protection) to various airfields, including Lhasa Gonggar and Shigatse Peace Airport, which is about 250 miles west of Lhasa, for a short-term rotational basis, usually from July to September, but some might be there all year. Both airfields are dual-use, so civil aircraft fly in all year long and the runway is built for civil aircraft. The PLAAF also has airfields in Hotan (Hetian) and Kashgar in western Xinjiang, where the PLAAF deployed two J-20s in August 2020. J-20 stealth fighters are tasked to be the network backbone for ground strike force, since Chinese fighters cannot carry full weapons load around the Himalayas due to poor aero jet engines and their side having thinner air. Since 2013 China's Airforce main roles have been ISR for "maintaining battlefield transparency" and AWACS, but they have not been able to use H-6K nuke bomber, strategic air transport and air-lift to fly over the Himalayas, again due to their poor aero jet engines. The first phase would involve construction of 36 NGHAS blast pens requiring a cash outflow of Rs 270 crore. Pathankot, Srinagar, Udhampur, Bagdogra, Naliya, Hasimara, Jaisalmer and Uttarlai are some of the bases that are located within 100 km of the border. https://www.royalihc.com/defence/defence-equipment/seabed-crawler
The India Navy has cut its order for minesweepers from 12 to 8 due to lack of funds. India urgently requires 8 MCMVs. Indian Navy currently has only 2 minesweeper ships at its disposal to safeguard sea lanes and ports spread across thousands of kilometres of coastlines in the eastern and western seaboards. India had bought 6 MCMVs from the erstwhile Soviet Union in the 1970s. Indian Navy believes it can keep a few of the elderly Russian mine hunters operational until 2021. But these ships use technology that is practically useless against modern mines. The failed talks with the Korean yard over pricing have left the government with no choice but to begin a fresh global hunt for minesweepers. The effort fell apart, apparently because South Korea's Kangnam Shipbuilding Corporation refused to accept responsibility if an Indian manufacturer failed to maintain quality standards. The real shock came when Kangnam Shipbuilding falsely claimed that its MCMV designs were indigenous, until Italy's Intermarine officially intervened to prove that its IPRs were being violated by Kangnam Shipbuilding Corporation. Goa Shipyard and Kangnam Shipbuilding Corporation was going to build 12 such Mine Counter Measure Vessels (MCMVs) for the Indian Navy for 32,000 crore ($4.9 billion). South Korea's Kangnam Shipbuilding Corporation 885 ton mine-hunters are $120 million per ship. The value of the transfer of technology contract from Kangnam Shipbuilding Corporation was about 20% of the total value of the contract. Each of these MCMVs has a crew of 77 and is armed with two twin 30mm autocannon for defense. Top speed is 28 kilometers an hour, but the ship tends to operate at much slower speeds. It is India’s third failed attempt in a decade to build MCMVs locally. The Indian Navy needs at least 24 MCMVs to plug the shortfall -- 16 on the west coast and 8 on the east coast, to keep major Indian ports open in wartime. The navy began a formal search for a new mine hunter in 2005. China, on the other hand, has more than 100 minesweepers and mine countermeasure vehicles. In 2014, the government had scrapped a contract to build minesweepers in India in partnership with Kangnam Corporation amid allegations that the Korean firm had hired middlemen to swing the deal in its favour. A March 2017 parliamentary report on the declining levels of naval force had warned that India would be without a single minesweeper in 2021 even if the Korean deal went through. Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL) may take 5 years to build the 12 minesweepers that will have 60% indigenous content. The latest setback means that the navy will be without minesweepers even beyond 2021-22. Facilities have been created at GSL for building glass-reinforced plastic hulls, a design that reduces the ship’s magnetic signature, allows safer navigation through mine-infested waters. These underwater weapons can detonate on contact, or be activated by magnetic and acoustic signatures. HSL and world's largest shipbuilder, Hyundai Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. (HHI), were teaming-up to build 5 fleet-support ships costing about $1.5 billion. Indian navy's future warships design (to counter Type-052d & Type-055) needs multi-island super-structure (an integrated mast), which means that the ship is able to carry more high-power sensors & electronic equipment. UK, Russia, Italy and Japan have mastered that type of design (e.g. 30FFM (previously, known as 30DX) frigate, fremm & type-45 destroyer), making their warships more making it more survivable. This is a complex, compact, integrated suite that must manage its electronic noise interference. However, Norwegian Helge Ingstad frigate (built by Navantia shipyard) was already unstable due to its multi-island super-structure and easily capsized when it was slightly hit by a tanker vessel at very low speed. The naval industrial bases of China, Japan and South Korea have seen the induction of advanced tech, such as machine-learning systems and digital capabilities. Automatic full-field multi-Laser-based 3D mid-size (or medium-format) machine: consistent Additive series Manufacturing (series production) of highly-complex components directly from any CAD formats, including direct fabrication of medical and industrial parts, in-situ synthesis of metal matrix composites and aluminium alloys, and functionally graded materials. "Shore-based strike has its own place to support naval operations, and the aircraft carrier has a completely different role to play. To show that shore-based facility is a replacement of aircraft carriers is a complete fallacy." Former Admiral Arun Prakash India needs two operational aircraft carriers (which are like mobile military bases), and one in reserve, for sea control of the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. India’s carrier in operation, the Russian-made INS Vikramaditya, cost a whopping $2.35 billion. INS Vikrant is expected to cost $2.8 billion. However, carrier serve around 45 years (twice the life of any other warship), “the cost is peanuts”. Indian Government wants to spend its funds on more nuclear submarine and on IAF aircrafts. The threat from submarines rises if it can remain undetected. India relies on P-8 maritime aircrafts & also US-Japan-Australian undersea network to monitor Chinese submarines. China has 2 carriers, while building a third and planning for 2 more. China is seeking to permanently position 4 destroyers and its newest Type-09-3G attack submarines, in the Indian Ocean. The threat assessment is that if China decides to send three aircraft carriers into the Indian Ocean by 2028, then no amount of submarines, destroyers or frigates can tackle it. Aircraft carriers are the only answer to such a situation. The Indian Navy chief wants 65,000-ton carrier with twin-engined fighters to counter Chinese destroyers and Type-075 in the Indian Ocean. Australia, France, Italy and Spain each have one carrier. Any nation that has the design technology to built mini-nuke reactors for submarines can also build nuclear aircraft carriers. However, developing a nuclear propulsion system for just one carrier is cost-prohibitive. At the start of the Cold War, when the US acquired carrier after carrier, while the Soviet Union went for fleet after fleet of silent submarines. The trends led to two rival maritime doctrines—of sea control by US carriers and sea denial by Soviet submarines. Modern navies currently are seeking to balance both carriers and submarines for both doctrines - sea control and sea denial. US achieved air-superiority in the Gulf War with the use of aircrafts from carriers. Each Aircraft Carrier requires either 4 escorting destroyers or 6 frigates, plus 1 nuclear submarine carrying guided-missiles. It is an apex contest. The powerful enemy will never give up on his suppression, but will only grow more arrogant. We must break through our own limitations, expand our research on military affairs, research war, and research how to fight, exploring the mechanisms for victory that will allow us to use our strengths against the enemy's weaknesses. India imports high-grade steel for nuclear submarines inner steel frame, however, India has achieved 90% indigenisation in the “float” (hull, superstructure) component of a warship through the development of high-grade steel by DRDO and SAIL, among other things. But the “move” (propulsion) and “fight” (weapons and sensors) components lag behind at 50-60% and 30%, respectively. N.S. Mohan Ram recalls in his book, the human and technical resources available to them were limited and challenges of designing the ship were many. The most critical of these was the power plant needed to obtain a higher speed in a bigger ship. The navy’s existing frigates used steam propulsion, though gas propulsion was emerging as the cutting-edge technology. The Directorate of Naval Design (DND) advocated continuing with steam to ensure that the design challenges were kept manageable, and came up with a brilliant solution to ensure that the top speed of the ship remained the same even if fuel consumption was higher. The navy’s engineering branch, however, pushed for a shift to gas propulsion. Following an intense debate, the naval staff decided to go with the DND’s plan. Thereafter, the DND worked closely with the Mazagon Docks (the DPSU in charge of production) to ensure timely delivery of the frigates. The successful completion of this project underscored the importance of the navy’s organic capability for design. This capability had been built systematically from 1951 onwards. In 1957, the navy began to recruit naval architects from the Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur and sending them to Britain for a two-year “Long Naval Architecture Course”. These officers became the nucleus of the DND. By contrast, the Army and the AirForce did not build up a cadre of in-house design specialists. From the outset, the army relied on the ordnance factories and later the DRDO to perform these functions. The air force had some rudimentary capability in the early years, but gave up its designers to the DPSUs. These services had no institutional capacity to understand the technological challenges involved. In the absence of a design interface between the users and developers, it proved exceedingly difficult to reconcile their competing views and imperatives of the users and the designers. However, the Indian Navy's Project 15B DDGs and Project 17A FFGs has cost escalations, ranging from 150% to 250%, which is simply not sustainable. Indian Navy must stop wasting 2.5 times more money by late freezing of designs & selection of weapons due to inefficient methodologies & practices, followed by several departments involved in the programme. This reduces the amount of funds available to Indian Navy with each passing year and only help to make the case for imports from foreign shipbuilders. Our military is also overlooking the fact that, modernising our military, they need more and more costly military-grade electronics, and we will need to buy more and more in the future, but these technologies get outdated quickly. Ships are just another platform, but I think the cost includes all the various expensive weapon systems like its radars, military grade computer chip & imported gyro for missiles navigation on air-defence systems etc. Each branch can save money, if they can agree to buy these items in larger quantity & then assemble it as per each requirement. The EW system on warships and army's ground vehicles can also be the same. The electronics on all types of radars can be bought in bulk, together for IAF, army and navy. Each branch has separately bought imported image intensifier or night visions. Ironically, the ATGMs imported by India don't have night-capability. The reason the Indian Navy was able to become a builder’s navy was because throughout the 1950s & 1960s, hundreds of IN personnel were sent to the UK to oversee the refit & upgrade of various Royal Navy warships that were declared as surplus stock. These were therefore offered for sale at mouth-watering prices and which India acquired. As a result, the Indian Navy was exposed to every aspect of warship-building in the warship designers’ offices, the shipyards & at the test-ranges. Hence, the IN rapidly learned to scale the learning curve of warship design, development & building at a quick pace. However, almost the entire fleet of Indian Navy warships, though produced in India, have imported engines. Indian Navy weapons & sensors components lag behind at 30%. Design and planning of warship building is also dogged by capacity limitations. All four public sector warship yards – Mazagon Dock (Mumbai); Garden Reach (Kolkata); Goa Shipyard (Goa) and Hindustan Shipyard (Visakhapatnam) – are located in metropolitan areas with little scope for expanding facilities. Hence, this has forced the navy to look overseas to Russia to build four follow-on frigates of the Talwar-class. Since 2014, 27 soldiers were killed in 403 accidents due to faulty ammunition and 159 wounded, apart from the cumulative losses of Rs 960 crore. A 15-page report prepared by the Army details the many accidents they have had with a range of artillery and tank ammunition comprising the 40 mm L-70 air defence guns, 105 mm light field guns, 130 MA1 medium guns and also the 125 mm ammunition for the Arjun, T-90 and T-72 tanks manufactured by the OFBs. Between 1999 and 2004 the Army has reported a total 3,210 defects in OFB supplied products. The CAG quoted the Army’s DGOS saying that unserviceable ammunition was deteriorating and posed a potential fire risk. This was subsequently proven in the 2016 and 2018 blasts at Pulgaon. There have been over 40 accidents of the 125mm high-explosive ammunition fired by tanks in the last 5 years. A large quantum of OFB 40mm high-explosive ammunition has also been found defective during their shelf-lives due to poor packaging and quality control. The availability of 83 (55%) types of ammunition (both for standard and high calibre weapons) was below the minimum acceptable risk level (MARL) of ammunition stocks for 20 days and 61 (40%) types were at a critical level (less than 10 days). Availability of high-calibre ammunition for tanks and artillery are in a more alarming state. Moreover, in the absence of fuses, 83% of the high-calibre ammunition currently held by the Army is not in a state to be used operationally. Ideally, the reserve should last for 40 days of intense war, giving enough time to the ordnance factories for ramping up production of required ammunition and supply the same to the military. Make-In-India push is also blamed for poor defence procurement. Though, the programme is well intended, but it further delayed bureaucratic clearances. The 4 units identified for the Public-private partnership (PPP) model are Small Arms Factory (SAF) in Kanpur, Ordnance Factory Tiruchirappalli (OFT), Rifle Factory Ishapore (RFI) in Bengal and Ordnance Factory Korwa in UP. The 4 factories manufacture 9mm carbines, 7.62mm and 5.56mm rifles, 5.56mm light-machine guns, artillery guns and other infantry weapons alongside other items. With this (PPP model), even weapons will be in private hands. Three years ago the Army recorded its probably the worst peace time mishap in the country’s post-Independence history when on 31 May 2016 the Army lost a Lieutenant Colonel, a Major and 17 more soldiers in a devastating explosion at the Central Ammunition Depot (CAD) in Pulgaon, the country’s largest storage area for ordnance spread over 7,000 acres and located about 120 km from Nagpur. Many more soldiers were wounded, 17 of them seriously, when about 20,000 defective anti-tank mines packed with about 134,000 kg of TNT caught fire and caused a massive explosion. Another blast involving defective 23 mm Shilka anti-aircraft ammunition occurred in the very same CAD. This time six persons comprising a soldier, an OFB employee and four labourers were killed, while between 10 and 18 persons were reportedly injured. India has imported the chip fabrication machine from either Applied Materials or Lam Research Corp. Technology gets outdated quickly, so sooner or later, you need newer machines. We should start to making our own machines and tools. India has a large defence budget every year, however, DRDO capital allocation of Rs 10,484.43 crore is mere 6% of the total defence budget. Budget for DRDO in 2023 is 23,264 crores (increase of 9% than previously). PM Modi's 5 pillars - Economy, Infrastructure, System, Vibrant Demography and Demand. http://www.makeinindiadefence.com/ "I don’t think we are right yet to claim to be vishwa guru. We are not a great generator of knowledge or great innovators. We are actually an importer of knowledge, of technology, of ideas. Of course, this can change but not today... The world is much more realistic. The world measures your material power, hard power, your economy, your military strength, and your ability to run your own affairs well." ~ says Shivshankar Menon who believes that the country cannot rely only on atmanirbharta. Modi has skilfully ensured that India is perhaps the only country in the world, which has growing, good relations with all major regional powers— Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel and Egypt yet maintaining this geopolitical balance in the Gulf will continue to prove challenging for India in the present scenario. India has been cautious about expanding its military presence in the Gulf and Arabian Sea area. The region’s various governments are sharply divided in their support for the various local protagonists in the civil wars of Syria, Iraq and Yemen. A known limitation on Indian Army’s capabilities is shortages of imported spares from major arms supplier nations. Defense exports are best expressed as 5-year averages. US & Russia (56%) and Western Europe (27%) account for nearly 84% of all arms exports. Top exporters are the US (34%), Russia (22%), France (6.7%), Germany (5.8%), China (5.7%), Britain (4.8%), Spain (2.9%), Israel (2.9%), Italy, (2.5%) and Netherlands (2.1%). India’s dependence on imported weapons platform are at the root of the Indian armed forces equipment shortages. India has been one of the world’s top arms importers and alone accounted for about 10% of global arms sales volumes. In a first, the defence ministry has listed out 23 major projects such as 125mm smooth bore gun barrel for battle tanks, targets for torpedo firing, advance pilot-less target aircraft, mine layers and diesel engines for naval boats. Besides technical specifications of the equipment, the ministry has also specified quantities to make it easier for the industry to plan investments into technology. For example, the IAF has listed its requirement of long-range glide bombs thousand per year and it wants to acquire them at the earliest. Similarly, the Army wants to annually acquire 5 pilot-less target aircraft starting next 2-3 years. Only Brahmos and Barak-8 are 2 joint-development military projects, with big weapons manufacturing nations, has become success stories. India hoped to use its buying power to not just secure the lowest prices, but also force foreign vendors to plough back a percentage of the overall contract value back into the country through 30% offsets. The objective has been to use these capital acquisitions as a bargaining chip to bring in high-end technologies to the country and attract foreign direct investments, so as to become part of the global defence OEMs [original equipment manufacturers] ecosystem and expose India’s workforce to train it in world-class technology. But none of the objectives was really met. Given the protracted negotiations and contract-drafting process, hike up the cost of procurement by 30%. The only success was in the limited promotion of the export of civilian aerospace parts and components. Moreover, whatever technology is transferred is quickly outpaced by continuous technology advances. Instead of this, we have attempted to treat offsets purely as counter-trade [exchange of goods for goods], not a partnership between the buyer and the seller. Yes, the vendor will pad up costs when you ask for technology. For offsets to work, the government needs to be involved and highly-targeted in identifying what technologies we need and can absorb. It cannot be left to industry alone to handle it. The extra costs are worth it, provided we know what we need. The problem today is most OEMs aren’t complete entities. Not even Russian OEMs. They are integrators. So they may not be even possessing all the technology that we want transferred. Also, handholding being a time-consuming affair, OEMs get frustrated. Not to mention the 20 windows and three Ministries they have to wade through. The overall monitoring mechanism for directing offset activity towards desired objectives was ineffective, as it was created without a clear definition of its objectives and role. It thus remained only a paper exercise. Part of the difficulty in India is that foreign companies have been facing issues because of the backlog with the ministry of defence — many are still waiting for the documents to be signed. There were 4 specific issues these companies struggle with, related to the offset contracts in India — 1) finding a reliable enough local partner, 2) going through 2 year registration process to qualify as an offset partner, 3) fulfilling their contract obligations 4) getting it certified as completed by the government. The monitoring mechanism also needs to be reviewed to ensure effective implementation. We need an offset policy that is more realistic and process and procedures that are practically implementable. No point in getting technology, like we did in the case of the Sukhoi-30 deal with Russia. That technology wasn’t even used in the development of the indigenous Tejas light combat aircraft programme. Also, with technical offsets being difficult to define, and the vendor highly reluctant to pass on any meaningful technology, offset negotiations take years to complete, delaying procurement in the process. It is equally true that Indian companies are incapable of meaningfully absorbing much of this technology. TAL was awarded the first contract to manufacture floor beams for the Dreamliner family of airplanes in 2011, and the first set of floor beams was shipped in 2014. Sources at TAL say that it took TAL five years before it could even meet Boeing’s quality standards. Meanwhile, Chinese have forced foreign bidders to set up joint ventures with local Chinese companies in order to meet RFP requirements. Even companies that had steadfastly refused to set up production facilities outside of their territories were forced to yield. Besides insisting that top-of-the-line technology flowed to Chinese companies, China has also made sure that within a period of time these OEMs deployed Chinese nationals in at least in the second rung of leadership. China’s participation in the European Union’s Galileo project is cited as an example of how China was able to gain technology that allowed it to manufacture navigational satellites that also have a military application. Brazil, during negotiations with Sweden’s SAAB for the purchase of 36 Gripen fighters, a deal valued at $4.1 billion, received an industrial offset/trade compensation package worth $9 billion. We are not endorsing China’s centralized, top-down model, at the same time, we believe government should do more. Still, balancing economic and national security policy is no easy task. If taken too far, restricting or constraining key industries in the name of national security could undermine national competitiveness. The government needs to promote long-term developmental state support in sectors where large first-mover have advantages. The government should identify technologies or desired capabilities that would yield significant dual-use benefits. India should target government investments towards low-risk early stage technologies research with asymmetric upside (CAD softwares, high-end computing, metamaterials, bio-synthetics, energy storage etc). But not all sectors require innovation support, so government should not always turn to R&D even when such funding seems necessary, rather the government can complement it with additional measures to protect supply chains of industries in India. 5G appears to be a winner-take-all sector, where control of the infrastructure equates to control of data — data that will drive the emerging global economy and prove essential to effective national defense. "We don’t have to do co-development on Day One. You would [first] do some co-assembly, co-production and then graduate to co-development. Indian industry will have to learn how to: crawl, walk, and then run. It has technology absorption challenges, as there are with anyone that starts this journey. You have to start somewhere, build a work force, build infrastructure… It’s not insurmountable." The first step is to identify specific technology pathways. This entails a targeted approach that encourages accountability, as opposed to a diffused one. All efforts must converge within the stipulated period and towards a goal to serve in building Indian capability in a set of technologies and nurturing a culture of innovation. The second step is to unleash a host of policy levers that will converge in the same singular goal. Some of these policies will be designed for short-term reforms, and others for longer-term structural changes. Two steps to product development: 1) technology demonstration. 2) life-cycle management of weapon. Bare-bone cost is the frame and engine, and total cost includes spare parts, weapons package, fuel-efficiency, training; however the true cost should include: runways, hangars and ground support equipment. India doesn't have the technology/skills for BLING welding of turbine stator. Instead, turbine's disks are, either machined or BLISK welded, to the rotor. India needs stable engine know-how such as corrosion proof repairing of engine blades, long-duration, high-stress, fracture mechanics & fatigue models; simulation program to test flutter, distortion/bending related properties (of ceramic matrix composite components); off-design combustion output in different altitudes & speeds; predictive behaviour & efficiency of internal flows; complex manufacturing (like titanium or ceramic composite blades integrated with disc or bonded to titanium ring); advanced manufacture of engine exhausts & fluid nozzles (made of ceramic and high-temp titanium matrix composites, also vents & compressor liners); high-stress operation simulation program to test and analysis structural flutter & inlet distortion; engine parts count to 10 or 20 to increase thrust-to-weight ratio of engine; control engine entry temperature; ceramic composite welding and linear friction welding; designing better front frame (made of polymer composite matrix) that prevents damage by any foreign objects; optical high-temp sensors & built-in thin, smart sensors in turbine blades. India doesn't have the technology/skills for BLING welding of turbine stator. Instead turbine's disks are, either machined or BLISK welded, to the rotor. India has never prioritised aero engine and gas turbine engine development, and put vision, money and manpower into this. Given the fact that almost 70% to 80% of the value capture is done at the design level, it was strange that no provision existed till now to encourage the design and development in India. Engine components and systems needs twice the number of R&D and manufacturing quality when compared to aircraft design. In 2019 the US stated that its export control regime prevented transfer of core technology that was requested by India due to which talks between both countries had failed. India had sought the core engine or hot section technology for jet engines under the India-US Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI) but was turned down. A joint working group on jet engine technology under the DTTI framework was thereafter disbanded in 2019. Safran initially will manufacture 3 core and 4 prototype engines at its facility in France where the GTRE team will depute and will be using the Rafale fighter jet as a Flying Testbed for the engine program. India has been assured ToT for the Core engine that includes the right to carry out improvements and up-gradation of the critical components. Safran has been ensured that it will be the default consultant for all future variants of the engine that includes an upscaled 130kN engine. Safran will continue to hold most of the IP rights that will happen on the core engine. The talks had hit a deadlock after it emerged in detailed studies that a part of the 3.5 billion euro offsets could be utilised for the for the project while the remaining 500 million euros had to be raised by the government. Currently, India's Kaveri engine blades, even with thermal barrier coating, gets burned-out very quickly at high temperature since it's radial or circumferential pattern factor is quite high at 12% to 35%. India needs stable 1900K combustion output engine know-how such as long period of high-stress fracture mechanics, fatigue models, distortion/bending data & safe operation related properties of ceramics matrix composite components, high-stress operation simulation program to test and analysis structural flutter & inlet distortion, fan & compressor blades, off-design combustion output in different altitudes & speeds, and predict behaviour & efficiency of internal flows; advanced manufacture of engine exhausts & fluid nozzles (made of ceramic and high-temp titanium matrix composites, also vents & compressor liners); reducing engine parts count to increase thrust-to-weight radio of engine from 7.4 or 7.8 to 10 or 20; how to control engine entry temperature; ceramic composite welding and linear friction welding; complex manufacturing (like titanium or ceramic composite blades integrated with disc or bonded with titanium ring); designing better front frame (made of polymer composite matrix) that prevents damage by any foreign objects; optical high-temp sensors and built-in thin, smart sensors into turbine blades. India also lacks in-country design and repair of corrosion-proof turboprop propellers for hovercraft and seaplanes. Also needs long- and short- term, multi-level R&D infrastructure and programs for oil-less and mechanical gear-less motors. While we have focussed on testing and quality assurance, but have not yet focussed on standardisation in defence manufacturing. Manufacturing & Design technology of any kind is Never transferred during licensed-production programmes, instead vendors can only get introduced to are the latest/best practices developments. Full ToT technologies will not be given to anyone in the world. Billions of dollars are spent over decades to make military-grade engines and what makes military-grade engines unique in the world is hot-sectioned technology and codings and those are crown-jewel technologies. HAL and DRDO have over the past two decades had discussions with the French engine manufacturer Snecma regarding this, but nothing has come out of them. Informed sources point out that Snecma at one point suggested a 15-year programme for the absorption of the technology by HAL. But HAL wanted the technology to be assimilated in seven years. The French refused. Likewise, the erstwhile Soviet Union’s Antonov Design Bureau (now in the Ukrainian SSR) had suggested an 18-year programme for Indian entities to go from licence production of their aircraft, to technical absorption to innovation. SAAB has promised full technology transfer, but there is a catch, as it lacks critical technology and imports 70% of the components from elsewhere. It is highly unlikely that the proprietors would allow transfer of those tech to India. Only a handful of aviation players have the main technologies in terms of radar, engines, stealth, EW systems, etc. and India is the largest market..., they would not want India to become independent. India wants US solutions for unsolved technology challenges, such as high temperature alloys and single crystal blades for the “hot end” of the Kaveri. US would never grant export control licences for critical engine technology. The best India can hope for is the transfer of manufacturing line blueprints for building engines in India, if it would advantage US fighter vendors in on-going procurements of fighter aircrafts. Indians understood this would provide a controversial back door into India’s aircraft procurement cycle. The focus, till now, has been, at best, on getting the technology and becoming low-cost manufacturing coolies at best. There was irony, when Mr Parrikar visited Bengaluru to inaugurate a new 25 kiloNewton (kN) engine built by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) for its trainer aircraft. Overlooked was the fact that, three decades ago, HAL had developed a 25kN engine for upgrading its successful Kiran trainer into the Kiran Mark II. When that engine was nearing completion, the defence ministry decided to ground the (also indigenous) HF-24 Marut fighter. This made available the (slightly used) engines of 174 Marut fighters --- the Orpheus 703 engine, built by Bristol-Siddeley. Those 30 kN engines were de-rated to 25 kN and put into the Kiran Mark II. HAL’s indigenous engine went to the scrap heap. In 2006, HAL sealed a deal worth $275 million with Russia to licence produce Klimov RD-33 turbofan engines as part of a refurbishment programme for its air force fleet of MiG-29 fighters. Most global defense companies prefer licensed manufacturing in India because they don’t want to risk losing a “prized innovation,” according to Rahul Madhavan, a senior manager at the Washington-based U.S.-India Business Council, which represents the top 10 American defense manufacturers. US-Origin Communication devices are known for being far more secure and are less prone to external hacking, but it also provides US direct backdoor entry access to data transfer or voice communication. India has no industrial R&D centre with engineering expertise in India capable of developing home-grown diesel engines (for trucks or SUV). India made a nuclear submarine INS Arihant (a private sector co. made the hull), a niche technology, but it does not make its own conventional (diesel-electric) submarine that is less complex to make. It has made its own aircraft carrier, again a niche technology, but does not make a minesweeper ships. The propulsion components lag behind at 50%. Another dichotomy is that though India makes and launches its own satellites and nuclear missiles, it still imports rifles for its infantry troops. The indigenous battle tank, Arjun, has 55% imported elements and German spares are not easy to come by. The Agni series of missiles has 15% imported content, and so is the case with Prithvi missile. It is well-known in the international defence trade that buying weaponry over-the-counter from large international “original equipment manufacturers” (OEMs) is invariably cheaper than building the same equipment in the buyer country. That is because the OEM has already set up a production line and partially or completely amortized the development costs. The even more expensive path is to design and develop a platform indigenously, since that requires expensive R&D in addition to production line costs. However, indigenous development often works out cheaper in the long term, since it equips a country to sustain the platform through its service life-span, which involves costs like spares, maintenance, training aids and simulators, overhauls and mid-life upgrades. It was seen as a diplomatic triumph when Egypt’s Defence Minister, was quoted in 1980, proclaiming that the United States had agreed to 'in principle’ to sell the expensive F-15 (reserved only for first tier partners) to Egypt but it was in fact a meaningless statement. India has all types of artillery and ballistic missile tech, however, India still imports all high-precision engineering consumables from Germany for all its military equipments, including in Indian-made Indian-developed missiles and artillery. India also does not have any leading chipmakers and is heavily reliant on China for the same. China leads in chemicals, machinery, basic & fabricated metals, electrical equipment, and electronics. The central government of India should incentivize more research scholarships programs to student and provide greater funding, data, job-training and infrastructure support to universities. These programs have their faults, but multi-year fellowships could fill known gaps in agency workforces and bring in technologists, entrepreneurs. Israel, for example, hand-picks young students with a high cyber aptitude to join Unit 8200 of the Israel Defense Forces. This has significant knock-on effects, as those individuals often stay in the military long term. In US from 2006-12, 25% of all new high technology developed in US private sector, half of it was done by high-skill visa-program workers, mainly India & China. This is because US encourages hi-tech academic & scientific research. The ability to keep foreign talent has always been a competitive advantage for US. There are substantial risks to forming national innovation policies and centralizing authority, but fear of failure should not get in the way of innovation, which is a costly, inefficient process. While accountable parties and regular oversight are necessary, the policymaking process ensures some measure of risk-tolerance. Government will have to give research and development projects some freedom to fail and learn from those failures, and the government will have to enforce ethics accountability. Governments have a unique capacity to facilitate information sharing by opening channels for public-private information sharing and engagement. Doing so would help rebuild the relationships among the innovation triangle — the public sector, private industry, and academia. With AI and machine learning in mind, the government ought to facilitate access to data by creating more open-source datasets, and expand access to cloud computing resources. When the government identifies a specific area of need, it should consider not only support for basic and applied research, but also ways to provide sustained funding. Government contracts are the most direct means, but the central government can also help increase access to capital to support innovative small- and mid-size firms. Government-backed venture funds serve that purpose as well. Government should also remove licensing requirements during the early innovation cycle, which hinder productivity and limit opportunities for broad-based innovation. We remain mindful of the risks inherent in innovation policy. Close public-private partnerships can become politicized, introducing cronyism and preferential investment. But those risks, and the potential for inefficient capital allocation, can be mitigated somewhat through clear decision criteria, transparency, and oversight. However, risk does come with the territory. Unlike India, Russia does not suffer from the intellectual brain-drain is because, even with a much smaller GDP, Russia is decades ahead of India in education and R&D on weapons. The creation of the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) under the Cabinet rank National Security Advisor (NSA), is the biggest military reform as it brings operational acquisitions to the Prime Minister’s direct attention. The Defence Planning Committee (DPC), consists of three armed service chiefs and three senior bureaucrats from the MoD, Union Finance Ministry & the Ministry of External Affairs. Thus, with the DPC, the armed service chiefs have been brought into the policy-making loop without altering the Govt of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961, while the Raksha Mantri, who is a member of the Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS), has been left out of the policy-formulation procedure, now to be done exclusively by bureaucrats, technocrats and the armed service chiefs. The earlier longish procurement chain had comprised the RM presiding over the MoD’s Defence Acquisition Committee (DAC) to clear military hardware procurements. The file then went to the Union Finance Ministry for clearance, after which it came back to the MoD for onward submission to the CCNS for final approval before the signing of the contract. All this has now been dramatically shortened. The Defence Minister no longer has any control over capital allocations. Now, once the MoD’s Defence Procurement Committee (DPC) approves a proposal drafted by the DAC, the Defence Minister would only be required to sign it before the CCNS clearance. The single biggest point that I saw in that committee's report, was related to the non-availability of the technical specifications for defence materials and products, that becomes a bigger drawback. "First and foremost step we need to take is develop technical specifications in collaboration with research institutions and labs, followed by the development of manufacturing processes. Secondly, make one procedure under Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) to develop these identified materials with the support of the government. Thirdly, we should develop testing and certification facilities. So, we will like to set up a task force under the Directorate of Standardization for developing these testing and certification facilities in the country." Dr Sanjay Kumar Jha
The idea of private sector "strategic partner" for defence-related technology areas, is the brainchild of the Dhirendra Singh Committee that the defence ministry-constituted in 2014-15. Subsequently, the VK Aatre Task Force was asked to specify criteria for nominating firms. Two strategic partners each were recommended for 3 technology segments --- metallic materials and alloys; non-metallic materials; and ammunition (including smart munitions). Separate strategic partners are to be chosen in 10 defence manufacturing areas like --- warships, submarines, aircraft, helicopters, aero engines, guns and artillery, and armoured vehicles etc. The target is for becoming self-reliant in 13 weapons platforms, which constitute the 60% of our imports, and generate $26 billion in defence goods and services excluding possible exports by 2025. To bring in private players to the defence sector, the Indian Government has equipped the Ministry of Commerce's Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion (DIPP) with the power to grant licences to companies for manufacturing defence equipment. According to the policy, the promoters, owners and directors of a company are mandated to give self declarations regarding any criminal history on their part, which reduced the period required to give security clearance from 4.5 months earlier to 4-6 weeks now. MoD also prohibits its strategic partners from working in more than one segment. The licence to manufacture drones in India has so far been granted to 17 Indian companies including BHEL, Ashok Layland, and Dynamic Technology. The new Strategic Partner policy, as communicated to industry so far, doesn't acknowledge the development of Tier-1, Tier-2 and Tier-3 chain of high-tech manufacturing of complex materials and component for creation of a defence eco-system – not to forget the capability to service and upgrade complex weapon platforms. Nor does it account for multiple tiers of independent vendors working for global OEMs. The MoD has now declared that “Make” projects would be progressed under the “Make 2” category and has decided to give up on “Make 1” category i.e government reimbursing the cost of developing complex, high technology defence platforms. “During the current year, 95% of the acceptance of necessity (AON), that means clearance for procurement are either IDDM (Indigenously Designed Developed and Manufactured) or Buy India. Which means, virtually 95% of the almost Rs 96,000 crore worth of products for which we have given approvals this year, belongs to these 2 categories. That shows the importance of change in mindset in the procurement procedure. These are for capital procurement,” Manohar Parrikar said. The most significant change that has provided an impetus to defence exports has been the issue of end-user certificate for exporting components. Under earlier orders, the exporting Indian company had to give a certificate on the purpose of the component, get it signed by the importing foreign company, and countersigned by that country’s government. The cumbersome requirement of a foreign government’s countersignature on every equipment meant that Indian companies were not preferred by foreign importers. The framing of SQRs has been criticised by many – but most trenchantly by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) in a 2007 report that audited 37 separate defence acquisitions between 2003 and 2006. After scrutinising 11 SQRs, the CAG found that four had spelt out requirements that were unavailable anywhere in the world. In 4 more cases, the requirements did not meet the military’s stated operational needs. And in 7 cases, there was no way of testing whether or not the equipment even met the SQRs. Many suggest that a key reason behind unrealistic SQRs is the military’s desire to get the “best of the best”. Officers framing SQRs combine the best qualities of several different equipment types into one, disregarding the well-known fact that weapons design involves trade-offs between different parameters. For example, a tank designer has to balance mobility, firepower and protection. The more armour is slapped on for additional protection, the less mobile that tank will be. For that reason, a tank cannot simultaneously be the world’s best protected, most heavily armed, and also the most mobile. Similarly, in framing SQRs for a fighter, the more weaponry one wants the aircraft to carry, the less space there will be for fuel, reducing its range. An SQR cannot demand high weapons load as well as long range. Yet, by combining top-of-the-range parameters, officers have often arrived at SQRs that simply cannot be met. The government has got just 6 FDI proposals worth a paltry Rs 96 crore ($15.3 million) in the defence production sector, with only 2 of them being for 49%. In an op-ed article, Ashok Atluri, who heads simulator design company, Zen Technologies, argues that FDI limits need not be raised since the Indian defence market is anyway too large for foreign vendors to ignore. He fears foreign OEMs will use higher FDI limits to enter the market and then “kill” Indian competitors by underpricing products until they establish a monopoly. The Guidelines of the Ministry of Defence for Penalties in Business Dealings with Entities specify 6 offences that could lead to suspension or banning of a vendor. The first 4 causes, which involve corruption, would invoke bans of at least 5 years. These are (a) violations of contractual integrity pacts; (b) adopting corrupt/unfair means to win contracts; (c) misuse of agents or agency commissions, and (d) national security considerations. The OFB, from 2021 October 1, will be split into 7 new defence PSUs (also called DPSUs), namely, Munition India Limited, Armoured Vehicles Nigam Limited, Advanced Weapons and Equipment India Limited, Troop Comforts Limited, Yantra India Limited, India Optel Limited and Gliders India Limited There was a drop of 15-20% in quality while OFB assembling completely knocked-down kits of armoured vehicles, vis-a-vis the imported version. The loss in quality increased to 25-30% when OFB manufactured these through transfer of technology. Over 19,325 defective anti-tank mines had exploded primarily due to leakage of explosives from some of the mines stored at the Central Ammunition Depot in Pulgaon. The sources said the High Energy Materials Research Laboratory (HEMRL) in Pune in 2012 had clearly called the quality of TNT in the anti-tank mines as safety hazard but the OFB stated it to be a world-wide phenomenon. Ordnance factories are avoiding accountability but corporatisation of BSNL decades ago did not make BSNL profitable. Corporatisation of the largest and oldest departmentally run production organisation is not commercially viable because of fluctuations in orders, long gaps between orders, uneconomical order quantity, and life cycle support required for 30-40 years after introduction of equipment. The nearly 200-year-old 41 OFB instead can be transform or converted into a public-listed entity like L&T with government investment reduced from 100% to 30% share-holding. The state-run Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) with its 41 production units as well as Defence Public Sector Undertakings also undertake limited research and development activities, besides manufacturing equipment after the transfer of technology or licence manufacture. The OFB began in 1775 as part of the British East India Company (which colonized, unified and industrialized India) which sought to create a local source of gunpowder and other munitions while also controlling who had access to it. However, the quality of defence equipment at OFB and other manufacturing organizations has been a major concern for the Indian Army, which had been pointed out by several Parliamentary Standing Committees and even the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, besides independent panels like Raman Puri committee. India has failed to set up an independent Defence Quality Assurance Board. A draft order proposal was almost give a go-ahead in 1989. The CAG, in 2004, said that there needs to be an independent board, if the government doesn’t want the quality to suffer. Documents show that there are serious quality concerns at ordnance factories — from the case of missing safety sleeves in artillery ammunition at the Central Ammunition Depot, Pulgaon, to 500 defective rifles being supplied from Rifle Factory, Ishapore. In three years, 429 types of defence equipment worth Rs 449.40 crore, including 52 types of ammunition and 162 kinds of weapons, were sent back over quality concerns. Sources in the Directorate General of Quality Assurance (DGQA), under the Department of Defence Production (DDP) of the ministry of defence (MoD), point out DDP doesn’t want to lose control over quality assurance as there are a lot of projects it is responsible for that may be affected. DGQA has been headless as the post has been lying vacant for 20+ months. The biggest problem I faced was Defence PSUs considered after sales service as an expense and not an investment. Manohar Parrikar It is impossible for MoD to side with the private-sector when MoD's Secretary for Defence Production & Supplies continues to be a sitting member of the Board of Directors of all Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSU). If Indian managers can run biggest companies (like Apple, Microsoft, Cisco, Sun Microsystems & Google); then I am sure there are many people from IIM, who can run defence factories instead of old bureaucrats. I think we should remove all bureaucrats from Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSU) & Ordnance Factories. Part-production like the fuselage (body) and the wings of Tejas LCA, has been outsourced to 3 Indian private companies. In the past, a private company made the hull (body) of the nuclear submarine INS Arihant. The HAL CMD said the second part of the “increase-production plan” is to use the existing facility of the hawk trainer jets and a pilot project has already started. The third part involves outsourcing to private companies, thus turning HAL into an integrator – a concept adopted by leading foreign manufacturers. The new Godrej & Boyce facility for Rubber and Composite materials will manufacture rubber and composite components such as Ablative lining for Solid Motor Casings, Reinforced Airframe Seals, Conductive Seals, EFI/RFI Shielded Seals, Aero-engine components, Composite motor casing, Sandwich panels (honeycomb/ foam, Ceramic Matrix Composite (CMC) Sic-Sic, NOBBED and other High-temp Aero-engine parts. Jindal Stainless becomes India’s first company to commercially manufacture high nitrogen steel for the defence sector under the transfer of technology from DRDO. is manufactured at JSHL unit at Hisar with triplex refining route and manufacturing process has already been optimized for industry scale production. JSHL has its operations integrated, both backward and forward, starting from melting, casting, hot rolling to cold rolling and other value additions. It is also the world's largest producer of stainless steel strips for razor blades and India's largest producer of coin blanks, serving the needs of Indian and international mints. High Nitrogen Steel is corrosion resistant and provides exceptional ballistic/blast protection than the existing material at a much reduced thickness along with longevity which increases the fuel and mass efficiency. High Nitrogen Steel exhibits higher energy absorption level, enhances crash-worthiness to the entire artillery system and has significantly higher impact values as compared to Rolled Homogenous Armour (RHA) which make High Nitrogen Steel a far superior material for blast protection. High Nitrogen Steel has passed multiple levels of ballistic tests in different calibers with 8-10 times higher impact/blast protection. This major development will not only accelerate the indigenization process of Indian defence arsenal in line with government’s ‘Make in India’ drive but will also help in easy availability of best material for manufacturing lighter armour vehicles. High Nitrogen Steel has potential application in all armoured vehicles including Infantry Combat Vehicle (ICV), Light Specialty Vehicle (LSV), Light Armoured Multipurpose Vehicle (LAMV), Futuristic Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV), Main Battle Tank (MBT), Future Ready Combat Vehicle (FRCV), Aviation and Naval systems. HAL is currently producing the Su-30MKI at a flyaway cost of around Rs 269.77 crore ($62 million) per aircraft, which is almost “Rs 150 crore” ($22 million) higher per aircraft, than the Su-30 jet supplied by Russia Rs 269.77 crore. The reason for the higher cost is that the warranty agreements states that the imports must of raw materials, fabricated blocks, proprietary components & kits must be from Russian firms (OEMs) and the HAL assembled SU-30MKI have specifications that has enhanced capability than Russian SU-30. HAL had offered to manufacture additional Su-30MKI without warranty at a much lower court, but IAF turned down the offer. Russia has expressed willingness to transfer technology of 332 components of the Sukhoi Su-30MKI fighter aircraft under the ‘Make-in-India’ program. These components, also called line replacement units (LRUs) refer to both critical and non-critical components and fall into 4 major heads such as
The Indian army, navy and air force have been complaining about DPSUs “gold plating” pricing their defence-related products. Each Hawk aircraft manufactured Britain in 2004 cost Rs 78 Crore. Those manufactured at HAL would have cost Rs 88 crore that year. Cost escalation from 2005 for the Hawk jet is normal but in 2010, the cost shot-up to Rs 98 crore and in 2016, Rs 153 crore was “primarily due to lesser efficiency and exorbitant man hour rates. We need to definitely look into why something that can be made in 100 hours would require 257 hours. Are we faltering somewhere. Can we bring it down? Can we negotiate on that? The Indian army, navy and air force have been complaining about DPSUs “gold plating” pricing their defence-related products. HAL has also pointed to supply chain issues adding to cost. “Given that multiple agencies get involved in our manufacturing process, kit cost from OEMs and other delays like raw material and spare part supply issues, which are also endemic to the aerospace industry in India. The U.S. has an old contractor practice of deliberately making an unreasonably low estimate of cost when proposing a design. Everyone goes along with this, in the interest of getting Congress to approve the money. The design undergo numerous minor (and sometimes major) changes during their 20-30 year service life. But it’s most expensive to do it while you are building it. This drives up costs. Since Congress has a short memory, and nobody take much heat for this never ending “low ball” process. Many admirals, members of Congress, and even a few shipbuilding executives, have called for reform. But it just doesn’t happen. IAF wants transport aircraft with capacity to swiftly transport Indian army's self-propelled (tracked) artillery-gun vehicles to high-altitude border areas. Russia MC-21 long-narrow-body jetliner (which cannot accommodate a BMP-2) / earlier Ilyushin IRTA-21 / IL-214 / IL-276 wide-body transport aircraft (MTA) which can accommodate a BMP-2 Russia's MC-21 airliner rolled off the runway during tests of its emergency braking systems and simulated failure of one engine. Brazilian Embraer already has been pushing its C-390 Millennium to fill the gap. One of the reasons why the (JSC) UAC-(OAK-TS) HAL's IL-214 multi-role medium transport aircraft (MTA) initially developed by Ilyushin Aviation for the freight market. The first MTA aircraft is expected to perform its maiden flight in 2017 and entering into service in 2019. Russia and India would take delivery of 105 and 45 such aircraft respectively. The new transport aircraft development is valued at $600 million and is intended to replace 45 ageing planes such as Antonov An-32 transport aircrafts in Indian Air Force's service and An-12, An-26 and An-30 in Russian service. In 2016, it was announced that the HAL would no longer be involved in the project and that Russia would proceed with the project alone. Russia would assume full responsibility for detailed design and production and in 2017 the aircraft received its new official designation of IL-276 multi-purpose transport aircraft (MRTA). The Russian side also wants to increase the program development budget to potentially US$3 billion dollars, something that India vehemently opposes. Despite this writing on the wall, no one in either Russia or India even bothered to co-develop a commercial air transport variant of the IL-214, which would have created the required extra demand for such aircraft. HAL was required to do was finance while Russia possessed all the infrastructure and human resources. As a result, HAL would not have benefitted in any manner as far as prototype development of the IL-214 was concerned. The IL-214 MTA will feature a high wing monoplane design, glazed in nose, T-shaped tail empennage, semi-monocoque fuselage, two telphers, a cargo winch and rollers comprising cargo handling equipment. The high thrust-to-weight ratio ensures the MTA’s operability from airfields in high mountains (on the altitude of up to 3,300 m above the sea-level) both from paved and unpaved runways (capable to sustain pressure up to 8 kg/cm2, that allows its operations on more than 90% of the Russian airfields). However, the project has ground to a halt is because the aircraft will not meet IAF's high-altitude performance requirements. India wants the MTA to operate in higher altitudes than the current technical configuration would allow. Assuming it does get built, the MTA is expected to have a payload of between 15 and 20 tonnes and a range of some 2,500 to 2,700 km, which will put it in the same class of airlifter as the Lockheed Martin C-130 Hercules (22 tonnes) and the Embraer KC-390 (both 23 tonnes). It may be worthwhile to try to revive this project, otherwise India may be left with the only option of buying more C-130 or the new A-400M. The cabin size would be similar to the multi-purpose four-engined strategic air-lifter Ilyushin Il-76, but will be half the length. The MTA’s size of the airtight cargo compartment’s cross section is identical to this of the heavy Il-76MD military transport aircraft. This allows employing all existing loading and unloading equipment, transportation and air dropping equipment and tools. As a military transport aircraft MTA can perform the following tasks:
"A year and a half back, HAL took the initiative and proposed that it would like to form a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). Now we are looking at two ways -- brand India aircraft or co-develop a Regional Transport Aircraft (RTA)" The National Aerospace Laboratories (NAL) and HAL had jointly planned to set up a special purpose vehicle for a regional transport aircraft RTA-70 but this was later scrapped because of funding issues. NAL had in 2007 settled on a design and selected a turboprop engine from Pratt & Whitney for the plane that did not take off from the drawing board. G Madhavan Nair, former chairman of the Indian Space Research Organisation, had headed a committee to identify local partners for the project. India has built trainers, planes and helicopters for the military, but its commercial aircraft programme is yet to find its feet. The MTA, a joint project, would have to be developed around an engine available either in India or Russia. Two schools of thought always existed – the turbofan and turboprop -- and many feasibility studies were also held. India is decades away from developing a fuel efficient high bypass turbofan that could power the MTA. Russian turbofans have lower fuel efficiency and higher life cycle costs than western engines. As such, India would want the MTA designed around a western engine, but the Russians maybe averse to powering a military transport with western engine, particularly after western sanctions were imposed upon the country consequent to the Ukrainian crises. JSC Irkut Aviation & Industrial Association (JSC IAIA) was selected by Russia as the lead industrial partner, while HAL was chosen by India. HAL revealed the withdrawal of JSC IAIA from the project in March 2008. In its place, Ilyushin Aviation Complex (IAC) was selected as the new lead industrial contractor from Russia. According to the publication, Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) wants to adopt a modified version of the Aviadvigtel PS-90A-76 turbofan that already powers the Ilyushin Il-76 ‘Candid’ platform, while representatives from India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) are insisting that a totally new engine that features full authority digital engine control (FADEC) be developed instead. Russia is saying that this FADEC requirement has been added too late, and that it is not needed anyhow. Earlier the MC-21 flew with the the Ameican PW1400G engine which was denied to it under US sanctions imposed in 2017 against Russian Aerospace entities. The parts of its wings and fuselage were made of composites made by Russia as US denied it to acquire composite material from an American firm. In Dec 2020, the Russian-made PD-14 engine was equipped with the MC-21 narrow-body jetliner. The MC-21 jetliner fitted with PD-14 turbofan engine has been re-designated as MC-21-310 while the earlier designation was MC-21-300 which flew with the P&W engine. The new PD-14 engine was developed after PW1400G engine was denied due to US sanctions. The new PD-14 engine was designed and developed in conjunction with the national 2013-2025 Aviation Industry Development Programme, a project initiated by the United Engine Corporation (UEC). The PD-14 engine's FADEC consists only of advanced hardware components built in Russia. The engine has a takeoff thrust from 9 to 18 tons. Hansa, a two-seat passenger airplane, has been a commercial flop, while Saras, a 14-seat passenger plane that was grounded after a crash killed three people on a test flight, were designed and built by NAl. In 2000, HAL had planned a joint venture with Franco-Italian aircraft maker ATR, now owned by Airbus, to make small planes in India but later aborted it. Indian defence exports have increased, not coz of winning any international contracts, but because of sub-contracts coming from defence offsets. For example, the Barak-2 system, the propulsion system is produced in India, is being 'exported' to IAI for final assembly there. So, someone within the MoD has done is to club all these items as 'exports', in order to show an increase in Made-in-India products destined for foreign countries. But they will not qualify as export items in the true sense of the term. Both India and Saudi Arabia, accounts for 11% of the global defence imports. For every Rs.100 for an advanced electronic product, you are paying Rs.60 for the IP and marketing, while Rs.30 to Rs.40 is in manufacturing the electronic parts. By value, out of 100, only Rs.4 is the value for assembling the various parts to make the final product, which Indian Govt is focusing on. So the profits actually lie in the IP and marketing. https://archive.org/details/principlesofwar00foch (supplemented by Flesh and Steel during the Great War: The Transformation of the French Army and the Invention of Modern Warfare by Michel Goya) "Gentlemen, we have run out of money; now we have to think."
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