War and change in world politics was rooted in competitions among the great powers, which struggled for security, wellbeing, and leadership. He contended that the great commercial seafaring states in particular would play a leading role in world politics because of the wealth they generated from international trade. In 1480, Spain was a collection of little kingdoms, eager to fight each other. By 1500, Spain held title to half the globe. British control of the seas, combined with a corresponding decline in the naval strength of its major European rivals, paved the way for Great Britain's emergence as the world's dominant military, political, and economic power. At the beginning of the 19th century, as the leader of the industrial revolution, Britain became the workshop of the world. As other countries industrialized, however, they challenged Britain’s leading position in world manufactures. The passing of the era when Britain was the world’s leading industrial power also pointed to a waning of its leadership as a naval power. In 1850, Germany was little more than a no-man's land between the territory of the great powers. To check Russian power in Asia, Britain did take the extraordinary step of breaking out of its “splendid isolation” and concluding a formal alliance with Japan in 1902. This alliance, in turn, emboldened Japan to take on Russia, resulting in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. With British backing, Japan inflicted a stunning defeat on Russia. If Russian leaders had concentrated their navy, massing its naval forces rather than scattering them, or showed more offensive zeal in the war at sea, then Russia would have defeated Japan. President Theodore Roosevelt brokered an end to the fighting by hosting negotiations between Japan and Russia. In recognition of his role, Roosevelt would receive the Nobel Peace Prize. In place of the Russian danger, Germany’s rise as a great naval power. Weltpolitik was the German Empire's demand to attain the status of world power, a place in the sun. By 1871, Germany was the rising, restless, assertive force in Europe. Germany's dramatic demographic and industrial growth meant that it would demand overseas territories as an outlet for its growing population and as markets for its products. In 1935, with an economy in decline, the US wanted nothing more than for the world to leave it alone. During WW-II the Americans mainly exported weapons, industrial equipment, fuel and food. The Americans did this with a population less than a fifth that of China. By WW-II less than 10 percent of Americans were employed in agriculture, produced nearly as much food as China and exported what they did not consume. By 1945, flush with victory, economically prosperous, and in sole possession of the atomic bomb, the US became the single most powerful nation in the World. The Americans were producing most of the new technology. By WW-II the U.S. had the most powerful fleet on the planet, and still do. Their air forces were unmatched and in the 1960s Americans were walking on the moon and returning safely. Back in the 1980s, Chinese leaders calculated that it would take half a century to match and surpass the West in military power. Westerners scoffed at such an idea, but now it is generally agreed that by the 2030s the China will achieve their goal. Early in the 21st century, China poses a comparable challenge as Germany was at the turn of the 20th century. It is being done via the China's Belt and Road initiative, with a maritime version as well. These local investments in Central Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and even Europe will give China enormous political and economic leverage.
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-drops-peaceful-reunification-reference-taiwan-raises-defence-spending-by-2024-03-05/ "Five to seven years was about as far as we could see geopolitically, it was certainly as far as we could see technologically" “I believe we that we are in a fundamental change in the character of war, and by that I mean how you fight, where you fight, the doctrine, the equipment, the tactics, techniques and procedures, and so on,” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley said. “We’re in the middle of a real, unbelievable fundamental change, which is probably the biggest fundamental change in the history of warfare.” It is an apex contest. The powerful enemy will never give up on his suppression, but will only grow more arrogant. We must break through our own limitations, expand our research on military affairs, research war, and research how to fight, exploring the mechanisms for victory that will allow us to use our strengths against the enemy's weaknesses. "We have a saying that the Marine Corps is like a little glass Christmas ornament, if you will. You can drop it, but only once. Once it's gone, it's gone. And the people who built the legacy that we live on, this eagle, globe and anchor, from Iwo Jima, they're gone. You can't apologize to them for soiling the reputation of the Marine Corps."Gen. Eric Smith The evidence-based possibility is that, if USMC were able to change, then the US probably wouldn't need to fight with China. Near peer conflict will see fewer direct-action operations with much of the fighting taking place in a multi-domain. The Marines must stop fighting reality and plan for deeper cuts. "Army is huge. We need a big Army. They win our wars. The Marine Corps doesn't win the wars. We win the battles." "Steeped in tradition, the US military has had a love-hate relationship with innovation and change. And while military leaders will enthusiastically embrace tactical innovation on the front line... during peacetime, leadership is hesitant to support tactical or strategic innovation, especially in organizations more distant from the fight." Fred Brown Special operators are not infantry, and light infantry are not elite troops. Light infantry units are often well suited to conducting offensive actions against the enemy, even if they are not necessarily the decisive factor. Light infantry can be effective against any enemy, so long as it is not used as line infantry. They are best employed forward of the main battle area in small elements tasked with a flurry of quick destruction of multiple enemy targets to rest, resupply, communicate, and think. Special attention should be given to unit size. They not to be confused with reconnaissance or scouts. In unconventional conflicts, light infantry should possess a Jäger mindset. Marines need to have the courage to embrace change and the commitment to see it through. Force Design 2030 offers a vision by the 38th Commandant, General David Berger. It represents a necessary paradigm shift and departure from the ground wars of Iraq and Afghanistan to near-peer, multi-domain conflicts and threats; the obvious pacing threat is China. There is no evidence that Marines are incapable of supporting a multitude of operations or serving as a crisis-response force. The institution is not suffering from “hyper optimization” and clearly has not ignored any one region or combatant command. Public criticisms have been a needless distraction that has sowed the seeds of uncertainty and doubt throughout the ranks.Richard Protzmann When the Marine Corps attempts to overhaul its forces through modernization efforts, some ex-Marines openly criticizes the move. Under these circumstances, what motivates members and leaders to pursue innovative ideas? Ostensibly, ex-Marines members exert their positions to maintain and leverage influence over the organization that they previously led. This criticism creates a bottleneck effect. Innovators fear public backlash for their ideas and actions, institutionalizing doubt toward innovative concepts. As a result, innovators chose to hold their ideas in rather than share them. This public opposition not only demotivates members from proposing new ideas but also casts a shadow of doubt over their endeavors, fostering a conservative atmosphere that deters risk-taking. Such a climate severely limits the Marine Corps' ability to adapt to new challenges and diminishes its overall effectiveness and agility. https://www.businessinsider.in/international/news/the-us-military-is-changing-the-way-it-fights-after-it-failed-miserably-in-a-war-game-against-an-aggressive-adversary-who-knew-its-playbook/articleshow/84804446.cms https://www.marketwatch.com/story/u-s-china-move-back-from-brink-says-ray-dalio-as-different-type-of-war-begins-3863ad31?mod=william-watts https://www.morningstar.com/news/marketwatch/20231114277/us-china-move-back-from-brink-says-ray-dalio-as-different-type-of-war-begins Clausewitz, a Prussian philosopher, said that military leaders must come to grips with how War is fought is changing (the character of war) within the context of the enduring nature of war (the human element: a political clash of opposing wills). Failure to distinguish between war's nature and character have significant and negative impacts on both the preparation and the conduct of war. Marine Littoral Regiment sensing & reconnaissance, maneuverability, deception and enabling of kill chains to kill enemy ship. Marines, special operations units, submarines must be positioned forward in a contested environment, before shots are fired. The Chiefs of Staff have realised an issue that the Combatant Commanders (GCCs) have not. The current tools available to US field commanders are insufficient to enable them to develop and plan creative operations against Chinese military tactics. US Defense officials told the Marine leadership to focus on China as a pacing threat, a threat that should guide the service's man, train, and equip mission. If the Marine Corps has to man, train, and equip to fight China, then tanks, cannons, and infantry may have less value in the Western Pacific theater.
Its storied history and rich service culture make it an organization notoriously resistant to critical change. Incremental change fails to achieve the objective of the change. Adding capabilities, such as unmanned systems, to an infantry battalion or Information-Related Capabilities (IRCs) to a MEU does not move the needle. The purpose of the Marine Corps’ evolution is to frustrate the adversary’s plans to mitigate Marine capabilities. A current Marine infantry battalion, equipped and enabled with legacy systems, represents a dangerous and noteworthy quantity, but a known one. These have existed long enough in their current forms that adversaries have developed counters to reduce their deterrent value. The best way for the Marine Corps to be a relevant, capable resource to Combatant Commanders is to be a force that can create those ambiguous, chaotic situations and then use its advantage in them to win. The inherent challenges of the modern battlefield cannot be met by legacy structures and systems. Jesse Schmitt No one is going to give the Marine Corps unlimited amounts of money. You have to divest, in order to invest in the Marine Corps, in order to face the Chinese. FD2030 has been approved by US Defense Secretary Mark T. Esper & US Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer. MCSC began large-scale divestment efforts in 2019 when the Marine Requirements Oversight Council (MRCO) released a decision memorandum ordering the divestment of equipment. Headquarters is also pushing indications, warnings and cueing down to the forward-sensing forces. If the Marines gave up on the missile-shooting and convert to simple surveillance, then the Campaign of Learning would have been worth the effort and the Marines would have a worthwhile, if exceedingly small, mission. It’s fairly easy to be lethal, to pull a trigger – whether that trigger is in the from a rifle or all the way up to using a Naval Strike or a Tomahawk Missile, or some other huge asset and you’re targeting a capital asset. Even if the Marine Corps establishes all three planned MLRs, the service is larger than three regiments. This does not turn the Corps into a unidimensional organization devoted to a single scenario. Defenders of Force Design 2030 believe that a force optimized for the Indo-Pacific area will also possess the agility to swing to crises elsewhere. The Corps must shed its traditional focus on the tactical level of war (frontal assault attack enemy bases or forced entry to seizing and hold ground) and instead embrace the operational level of war in an era of great power competition. The purpose of EABO is a paradigm shift. The purpose now is, once we do seize and secure, to be able to support the naval campaign by bringing that awareness of the battlespace. To be able to impose asymmetric threats on the enemy and to enable the transit of a carrier strike group. It’s understanding what your target is, where it is, and the effect that it’s going to have on the network that you’re influencing. The need is to understand what you’re doing and understand immediately what’s going to happen. It hardly matters how precise new weapons are if you lack the ISR reach to find targets. And that’s what Stand-in Forces bring, is they bring that whole package to the naval expeditionary force that really closes a pretty significant gap. You can translate this capability directly from what we were doing in COIN, with the effect on an insurgent network, all the way to a peer threat. However, many retired Combatant commanders and Generals, firmly believe that the “littoral force” Marines in Force Design 2030 will result in Marines, which is a separate service, become eventually folded back as a component of the US Navy. They think that magtf will be able to close in and destroy the Chinese in a high-intensity war and hold on key terrain in the South China Sea. They feel USMC primary value is in the ability to close in to destroy the enemy and hold on to key terrain matters. No matter how their doctrine changes. This must remain true to its past capabilities. You don’t, you do not divest until you have that capability. (During the 1980s, General Gray, a veteran of the wars in Korea and Vietnam, served as a champion of the maneuver warfare revolution. The Marine Corps began the process of crystallizing its maneuver warfare revolution in 1989 when General Alfred M. Gray, signed the first official copy of Warfighting, Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM). While today’s Corps broadly accepts maneuver warfare as an innate aspect of the organization’s culture, due to its institutionalization and reinforcement among generations of Marines, the theory, as with all revolutions, required a crisis to foment its inception in the late 1980s. Unlike other military organizations that employ attrition-focused warfare to destroy an enemy’s capacity to fight, the Marine Corps adopted maneuver warfare as its preferred style, aiming to defeat enemies through a system-centric approach that focused the application of force at a decisive point at the correct time.) Why risk Marines by positioning them inside the Chinese weapons engagement zone, before the onset of hostilities, where even the US Navy warships dare not go? If Marines are being asked to give up so much for the US's China doctrine, then why has the US Navy not investing anything to be able to effectively project power from the Pacific Ocean into the Chinese mainland? How the Navy will safely sustain transport to those “littoral force” Marines in an environment deemed too hostile is unresolved? Why should Marines be babysitting like some coast-watchers and live-off the land on some island and risk catching diseases? Defensive chain can be outflanked. How does a drone work in the jungle? How does a loitering munition work in the jungle? These Marines veterans of Vietnam & Korean wars believe that Marines should mainly be the tip of the spear (frontal assault attack or forced entry) during amphibious reinforced infantry for seizure of enemy bases or conduct land operations from the peripheries/flanks. They feel that it's no longer the Marine Corps without the ability to manoeuvre (magtf) for a mech warfare. Why can't allies like Japan, Taiwan and S. Korea use their counter-recon troops to be the “littoral force” to help our US Navy in South China Sea while some US Marines can train those light troops (without getting rid of Marines heavy armor units)? "Marines kept the Japanese off balance by striking when and where least expected. The Marine Corps being designed today is purely defensive in nature. FD2030 is the antithesis of warfare as envisioned in MCDP 1, Warfighting. Subordinating Marine Corps Forces to FMF status gives up the Marine Component’s seat at the table and violates the spirit and intent of Goldwater-Nichols by limiting Marine Corps contributions to the joint force. Marine Corps forces are being tailored for integrated operations with the Navy Fleet Commander, not for combined arms operations with the joint commander. The Marine responsibility for ‘every clime and place’ is being replaced by ‘only islands in the southwest Pacific.’ Naval Strike Missiles (NSM) and Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM-Block IV and V) will not make up for losses needed to conduct combined arms, close and rear battle, and sustained expeditionary operations. Its myopic focus on precision long-range fires at the expense of maneuver forces (infantry, armor, cannon artillery, ground mobility, assault support aviation, light attack aviation strike/fighter aircraft, and combat support capabilities) has robbed the Marine Corps of its offensive orientation and capabilities for operational maneuver. The Marine Corps is no longer a force of combined arms as mandated in Title X, USC. EABO and SIF are ill-suited to support other crises and contingences across the spectrum of conflict, inside or outside the Indo-Pacific Regions. Marine Corps' radical transformation from a mobile, middleweight, expeditionary, combined arms, global response force supporting all combatant commanders, into a smaller, specialized missile force sitting and waiting along the island chain, will come to be seen as pure folly."Retired Brigadier General Jerry McAbee (USMC, artillery officer) China plans to organise and equip its forces for offensive and defensive action on the island bases in the Pacific Ocean. "The way to approach that is a very subtle and indirect approach … irregular warfare. The thing that they fear most is not fleets of aircraft carriers, tanks, or expeditionary logistics. They fear information. And that’s one of the key components of irregular warfare. It will work through it. Let’s go ahead and use a little more … information, economics and diplomacy, and let’s go ahead and back off on the military for a little while, because we have time. If we’re wrong, we can spin things up. If you’re a business person, and you’re in an unpredictable business climate, what do you do? You hedge. We can’t go all in on any one thing. We need to have a wide range of capabilities." Miller said during an April 4 talk with the CATO Institute. When China gets control of an area, they gaslight the World by saying, there can be "no invasion" by China since the area now belongs to them and how can you be invader of your own land. China claims most of the South China Sea despite protests from Southeast Asian nations, including Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia. US relations projects are insufficient to offset the economic pain China can inflict on smaller US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. China conducts state-sponsored maritime intimidation operations, while remaining just below the level of armed conflict. Rather than focusing on seizing uninhabited tiny islands (in WW2), USMC is looking to hold developed allies disputed islands which can provide substantial opportunities for cover/concealment, and local (by host nation) resupply of fuel, resources etc. Forces that can operate inside the range of China's long-range precision fires are more relevant than forces which rapidly positions outside. USMC will have to protect their visible and electromagnetic spectrum signature on the ground, from air threats and cruise missiles, while also employing systems that can direct fires to sink enemy ships. “None of this is fabricated by one or two people,” Gen. David Berger said, with less than a month left in her term as the top Marine leader. “It is driven by a gigantic machine of very experienced, very smart people.” “Any time there’s data that says we need to change to be modern, more lethal or ready, I’m in favor of that, and I’m committed to change wherever change is required,” Gen. Eric Smith told US Congress. “We’re all in agreement that there’s one commandant at a time,” Smith said. “Right now, that’s me.” Philippine had begun a review of relations with the US after the Communist take‐overs in Cambodia and South Vietnam, questioning both the credibility of US guarantees to its Asian allies. Interlocutors in the Philippines are questioning the US commitment to defend the de facto territories in the Spratlys, after the long-time American ally lost ground to China and had to watch as China built now fully militarized artificial islands in the area. The memories of U.S. inaction when, in 2012, Chinese forces wrested Scarborough Shoal from Philippines's control remain an emotional trigger. Philippines had to wait five more years until the Trump administration publicly committed American power toward the defense of Philippine-held territories in the South China Sea, "a betrayal". https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ha76ZOt_-Cw The bilateral defense guidelines (1951's Mutual Defense Treaty) on defending Philippines in South China Sea from Chinese attacks were also updated in 2023 to include references to other tactics, including “grey zone” warfare, in which China is accused of using to continue asserting its claims of control over most of the waters. “Recognizing that threats may arise in several domains – including land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace – and take the form of asymmetric, hybrid, and irregular warfare and grey-zone tactics, the guidelines chart a war forward to build interoperability in both conventional and non-conventional domains”. "It doesn't mean that if there's a run-in between a Chinese coast guard [vessel] and the Philippine coast guard vessel, we automatically start World War III. But if the Philippines calls on American aid under the Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States will answer." https://www.manilatimes.net/2023/08/10/news/national/ph-us-finalize-joint-maritime-patrol-pact/1904616 https://www.reuters.com/world/us-military-talks-develop-port-philippines-facing-taiwan-2023-08-30/ A successful military requires the trust and support of its citizens. The Iraq war initiated by a Republican President under the pretence of eliminating weapons of mass destruction ultimately transformed Iraq into an Iranian satellite. American citizens realized that the promised liberation had instead sown chaos and instability. Republican voters want to win, and this desire for victory is palpable. They question why should they support any U.S. wars when leadership decisions may negate the potential for enduring achievements. The conversation, regarding increasing isolationism and decline in military recruitment numbers, should include holding failed leaders accountable. While soldiers face the consequences of failed missions, higher-ranking officials often escape scrutiny. Rebuilding trust in the government's ability to conduct successful military campaigns demands accountability for our failures. Simone Ledeen Screening involves military operations to frustrate enemy scouting, including direct attacks on threatening enemy positions. EABO is based on maneuver warfare foundation, but with smart munitions which can outrange traditional lethal ways. If it fails, then the joint web kill will be used while the enemy is distracted by EAB. Navy-Marine Corps team power rest in their ability to maneuver anytime, anywhere the seas reaches. Many retired Combatant commanders and Generals, have questions about how Marines “littoral force” will be able to surprise manoeuvre at sea (magtf) carrying long-range high-end fire but without supporting units like artillery smoke shells? You have to learn all about, like some of us learned 30 years ago, camouflage, decoys, deception." Obscurants, such as fine carbon fibers, add to the array of defeat mechanisms. Testing and research (including wargames, analysis, and fleet experiments) will refine the concept. Col. John Lynch, MARSOC deputy commander, points out, "It starts with being a problem solver, one that never becomes complacent but instead remains adaptable and forward-thinking." However, the present US Marine littoral regiment structure does nothing that will cause it to be more likely to be invited by US allies during this time of peacetime peer competition. USMC says the approach to logistics is, that "it can't be a chain; it has to be a web." Unlike the Marine Corps, the US Army can afford to add missiles (MLRs), without losing any of its legacy capabilities. Outranging the adversary is a very basic way of improving effective lethality, as is increased precision and munition flexibility. Balancing rocket and tube artillery platforms, buying loitering munitions, and developing longer-range precision cruise missiles to increase the range and precision of the force will yield substantial increases in indirect-fire lethality. The Marine Corps must also find a way to circumvent what the moral psychologist Johnathan Haidt describes as the rationalist delusion, wherein a group loses the ability to think rationally about the things it holds sacred. Reinforcement theory provides an explanation for this phenomena by emphasizing the tendency of humans to engage in and actively pursue behaviors that have been reinforced through specific experiences and desirable outcomes. This phenomenon is further supported by what psychologist and economist Daniel Kahneman refers to as theory-induced blindness, wherein organizations and individuals find increasing difficulty in detecting flaws in accepted theories. According to Richard K. Betts, with the passage of time, organizations tend to “become oriented, not to the larger political aims they are enlisted to pursue, but to their own stability.” Dakota L. Wood, explains this paradoxical impact of recent conflict on the Corps: ...battle blinds the Corps because of the service’s preference for such combat. It is easy to envision. It creates an environment for the maximum use of all the skills a combat-focused service spends so much time developing. It generates funding, attention, glory, stories and career advancement. Furthermore, it also provides a great deal of independence, enabling the Corps to conduct multi-unit, large-scale combat operations in a way that leverages the full power of magtf. As General Charles C. Krulak, the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps, wrote in his introduction to the 1997 edition of Warfighting (MCDP 1), “Military doctrine cannot be allowed to stagnate, especially an adaptive doctrine like maneuver warfare.” "You fought only the enemy you could see, but not the enemy that you could not see. You fought the wrong war." The Great Powers marched confidently into battle in 1914 prepared for previous wars, resulting in horrific casualties. A particular strategic policy must be devised for every war; each war is a special case, which requires its own particular logic rather than any kind of stereotype or pattern, no matter how splendid it may be. The cognitive evolution to Competition with China must proceed through three steps: (1) acknowledging the limitations of the historical conceptualization of operational art and re-define operational art for today's strategic environment; (2) embracing the different warfare perspectives, specifically how China understand warfare; and (3) the military application, in China's "instrument of national power (DIME)", in US-China competition. In 1999, two PLA colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui wrote that, the "boundaries lying between the two worlds of war and non-war, of military and non-military, will be totally destroyed" so that even the "rules of war may need to be rewritten." Taiwan’s Impossible Choice: Be Ukraine or Hong Kong: https://www.wsj.com/articles/taiwan-china-ukraine-russia-hong-kong-military-war-517b87d?mod=hp_lead_pos7 "The multi-pronged activities of the PLA across 4 points along the LAC’s western & central sectors is aimed at securing a heavy/vital concession from India, notably the reversing of India’s 2010 decision of not reiterating that TAR is an inalienable part of the PRC. India, it may be recalled, had stopped mentioning TAR as being an integral part of China in 2010 after China continued to issue stapled-paper visas to Indians residing in both J&K & Arunachal Pradesh. And China's combative diplomacy involving successive PLA-initiated stand-offs in Ladakh began in 2013. Now China wants India to go back to its pre-2010 stance on TAR because Beijing fears another round of widespread uprisings inside Tibet after the Draconian legislations regarding HongKong SAR are ratified by Beijing’s National People’s Congress." trishul-trident.blogspot Why does China so crave these remote mountain territories that it is willing to repeatedly risk war with India? Tibet has a population of just 3 million, but Tibetan territories represent roughly a quarter of the land area of modern China. China's expansionism along Tibet's southern border with India has a much more limited aim, to widen the buffer zone that surrounds Tibet. Trucks and trains may not stream across the India-China frontier, but people and yaks do. China wants to cut off all contact across the border, whether physical or even online. Chinese have in fact obliterate the autonomous character of Tibet. The Tibet ethnic unity law, which is similar to the Hong Kong security law, makes ethnic Tibetans themselves responsible for embracing the "motherland" of China made (at the expense of their own Tibetan religion, culture and way of life) and contains a provision encouraging the relocation of majority Han Chinese people to Tibet. China is attempting to shore up relations with landlocked countries like Nepal and Bhutan, that are home to many Tibetan refugees. Much like Xinjiang but much less reported in the international media, China has turned Tibet into a virtual police state within the larger Chinese police state. As it has shown with the Hong Kong security law, the Communist Party is willing to pay any economic price to achieve its political goals. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/China-s-boarding-schools-strip-Tibetan-children-of-language-study
Everyone thought the latest plate carrier or boots were going to turn them into tactical Jesus. It never happened. You've got to Train more and worry less about gear, that being said make sure your gear works and is functional. Don't wear under/oversized boots, kit that doesn't fit your body, and make sure your rifle is zeroed and your mags feed properly. Basics over sex appeal. And being tough isn't a virtue, it's just stupid 90% of the time. Being smart is finding a way to do less and achieve more. "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Mao Zedong. Chinese officials feel that India is still sleepwalking to the fact that China is more powerful, so it will do what it wants to, and India must deal with reality on the ground. China says that Indians have an unrealistic expectation, which is not in line with their real military power. China said India had made "unreasonable and unrealistic demands" and "should cherish the hard-won situation in China-India border areas". In other words, China doesn't care about honouring legally binding bilateral agreements, especially when India, lacks leverage to force China to do so. This grey-zoning maneuver ends with China formalizing its aggrandizement and eventually claiming sovereign rights over the terrain it has snatched. The intense bullying of Taiwan and a more hawkish stance towards India are manifestations of that tactic. China views gray zone activities as a natural extension of how countries exercise power.
China is countering US's lethal battle 'network information system-of-system' capabilities with Sunzi-style asymmetric and hybrid attrition warfare (tactical operational design that causes the cumulative destruction of the enemy’s material strength), not using troops, but that blends confrontation with cooperation, called 'Unrestricted Warfare', which using AI-based, all-effects all-domain 全域作战 national power, mobile military technologies, to disaggregate adversary's ISR capabilities (anti-satellite or space warfare) and affect its adversary's ability to make decisions & take critical actions in the early stages of conflict i.e. strategic cognitive overmatch (military-civil grey-zone multi-domain war). China employed nearly 80 different gray zone tactics across all instruments of national power. US doctrine does not recognize hybrid warfare by unarmed actors with respect to impactful information effects. This causal chain also spawns unintended consequences. It led the US to adopt the Multi-Domain Operations approach and China is attempting to counteract with Multi-Domain Precision Warfare focusing on operation of space assets for combat. CCP is focusing on exploiting what their enemies expectations are. Strategic cognitive overmatch (military-civil grey-zone multi-domain war) and tactical anti-satellite (space) warfare. Political leadership may not be able to handle cognitive overload and confusing narratives, which will adversely affect at strategic level. Military dictatorships are immune to this, but democracies are highly susceptible to this type of warfare. At this level, the troops may win the battle, but the war is lost. Cognitive agility is the intersection point of effect that brings knowledge to capability and provides decision advantage. While the character of war — its technical dimension changes; the nature of war as the “art of war” does not. The character and nature of war are imperfect; together, they reinforce the chaos in wars. To prevail in any strategic competition, we must quickly secure technological advantage, as well as the cognitive agility to employ it effectively. After Japanese encroachment on China in 1915, and between 1917-1921, a sociopolitical reform took place in China, called the May Fourth Movement, also known as Wusi. This was a student movement that was directed toward national independence, emancipation of the individual through practicality in life, and anti-imperialist re-building of the Chinese society and culture. However, Liang Shuming, based on stereotypes, concluded that Indian culture was regressive, over religious and must be rejected by Chinese society completely, while Western culture was highly scientific, but became greedy and materialistic due to human suffering. He thought Chinese culture (like Confucian laws of human nature) gave balance to humans, and so China must bring change to the mindset in Western societies. Xi called Karl Marx "the greatest thinker in human history." “Some people think that communism can be aspired to but never reached, or even think that it cannot be hoped for, cannot be envisioned, and is a complete illusion. . . . Facts have repeatedly told us that Marx and Engels’s analysis of the basic contradiction of capitalist society is not outdated. . . . Western anti-China forces conspire to overthrow the CCP, so the party must stamp out “false ideological trends,” including constitutional democracy, the notion that Western values are Universal, the concept of Civil Society, journalistic independence, challenges to the party’s version of history. We must not let down our guard.” He emphasized that the party's ideology and social system are fundamentally incompatible with the West. Xi said in his speech published in April 2021 the current historical period as one of great risk and opportunity. The Soviet collapse haunts CCP leadership. "The process of China's realization of the great undertaking of national rejuvenation must ultimately follow from testing and struggle against the system of American hegemony." Xi required party leaders at all levels to watch a six-part documentary titled "A 20-Year Memorial for the Soviet Loss of Party and Country." US has always had unrealistic good wishes for the Chinese communist regime, eagerly hoping that [it] would become more liberal, even democratic, and a ‘responsible’ power in the world. Modernisation theory—and South Korea’s and Taiwan’s real-world experiences—suggests that when per capita annual income approaches US$10,000, a middle class will emerge, and autocracy becomes harder to maintain, compared to the poor peasant society that came before. ‘When Mr. Xi took over in 2012, China was changing fast. The middle class was growing, private firms were booming, and citizens were connecting on social media. A different leader might have seen these as opportunities. The 1648 Treaties of Westphalian System were founded on the notion of a balance of power. But it has proven unable to achieve a stable world order. Xi says a new world order is now under construction that will surpass and supplant the Westphalian System. Mr. Xi saw only threats.’ Mao Zedong essay "On Contradiction", he argues that contradiction is the primary law of dialectics. Mao had paraphrased Stalin's rendering of Friedrich Engels's theories about the application of the laws of physics to the processes of social development. Xi's phrase “the tools of dictatorship” — the idea that it is essential for the party and especially its top leader to control the military, the security apparatus, propaganda, government data, ideology, and the economy; would recur again and again in Xi’s speeches and official guidance over the next decade. Everyone inside the Great Wall of China know that all disasters and deaths are caused by the Chinese Communist Party. Under the Chinese system, starting with Mao, no one can restrict or limit the power of the highest leader. Since people don't tell him the truth or hide it from him, he doesn't necessarily know the truth. So it is inevitable that he will make wrong decisions. Secondly, even if you are not corrupt, he will make up corruption charges. If he says you are corrupt, you are corrupt. They can imprison you for any little thing. When the Chinese use the term “China,” they are not usually referring to the country or nation so much as Chinese civilization. The Chinese word "China" refers to the "center" of the world. It's the missionaries who translated the term as "middle" Kingdom. China has considered itself as "the sole sovereign government of the world'' since its unification in 221 BC". CCP believes that after regaining its status as a great power, it should resume its historical position as the "center/middle of the world". The fate of Hong Kong and other issues that China considers central to its sovereignty and national pride. On the other hand, China’s Communist Party, in order to preserve its hold on to power, cannot be seen to be letting HK SAR & Taiwan become independent. China still talk extensively about what they call the "century of humiliation" ("the opium wars" to WW2) because they still have memories of imperial powers essentially deciding what China's borders were going to be. A critical juncture for China was a trade dispute between the British and the Chinese Qing Dynasty that led to "Opium Wars". To aid in dealing with the Chinese, the British contacted France, Russia, and the US about forming an alliance. The war's settlement forced Chinese ports open and gave Hong Kong to Britain. China is systematically using its economic and MIC power to replace US with its own brand of domination in Southeast Asia. CCP's territorial expansionism has no limits, unlike other economic and technological powers like US, UK, France, Japan, Germany, Australia. The US has not indulged in territorial expansionism, but the world's policeman, now appears exhausted after two decades of war, while at the same time, China has rocketed from a starving nation to a wealthy nation. In 2018, China scrapped the two-term limit on the presidency. Xi Jinping avowed aim is to create a new international structure, where China is the dominating dragon in size and power. In contrast, India's policy or end goals are Not the same as those during colonial times. India sees the value in working with the imperfect world order that exist since WW2, while reforming it through treaties. China doesn't have any old treaties since their government had to flee to Taiwan. This is why China keeps talking about international treaties being unequal with China. China believes that democratic values have become obsolete and CCP's vision for the future is going to be very popular in Asia-Pacific, once they replace the US from its position. The 'Chinese Dream' is to reposition itself to become the power fulcrum of world order, or 'tianxia'. China’s perception of itself as the ‘Center/Middle Kingdom’ is also because its very large empire was surrounded by smaller states, so there was this sense that China is the centre of civilisation, and as you move away from that centre, you have less and less civilised states. Maybe the history that China presents is not a manufactured history, but it is certainly a selective history — trying to put forth a vision that is only partially true. There were situations in which China was itself a supplicant and a tributary to others — for example after they were defeated by the Tibetans, for quite some time, the Chinese empire paid tribute to the Tibetans — and China was also occupied by others, for example, the Mongols (thunderbolt). Tibet was not ruled by the Chinese government prior to the 1950 invasion. The country maintained its own national flag, currency, stamps, passports and army and maintained diplomatic relations with neighbouring countries. Ironically, the leadership in the Communist party of China wants to expand its territories to what it was under Manchu imperial rule during the Qing dynasty (1644-1911). The Chinese communist govt. has categorically rejected the McMahon Line and does not recognise Kashmiri territories as separate from Xinjiang and Tibet. In fact, being part of famous old Silk route; Srinagar, Kargil, Gilgit-Baltistan and parts of Afghanistan has also been claimed as belonging to China. Beijing has offered no coherent legal basis for its claims. As per international law, no claim can be pressed forward in the absence of documentation. In 2018, China scrapped the two-term limit on the presidency. Chinese has gone through many dynasties, but a common point is the construction of the Great Wall again and again. A fence is as strong as its weakest link. The intense Indian Army presence in Indo-Pak LoC, has not prevent large-scale infiltration into Kashmir or the years of skirmishes. Walls are more useful to keep cattle inside. Researchers from the Hebrew University speculate Chinese emperors had the wall built to control the movement of people and cattle. Border walls are not a symbol of strength, but of controlling minds. It is not unheard of defenders turning to cannibalism to survive. Modern China is a police state in which people have a superiority attitude, developed out of the need to overcome their deeply repressed lives. China is in a major food crisis as floods hit farmlands, pushing the second-largest wheat producer in the world to import heavily. Domestic soya prices doubled 30% despite release of inventories. China cannot feed itself, and imports of US corn are at its highest since 2014. Unemployment is become high as US and Europe is shutting off their vast markets. You can kill an idea, only with another idea taking its place. Mongolia itself had been essentially a client state of the Soviet Union since 1921. In the late 1930s, there were a number of border incidents between Soviets and Japanese, which led to the Neutrality Pact of 1941. The Neutrality Pact freed up forces from the border incidents and enabled the Soviets to concentrate on their war with Germany, and the Japanese to concentrate on their expansion into Asia. With success at Stalingrad, and the eventual defeat of Germany becoming increasingly certain, the Soviet started building up forces and supplies in the Far East. At the Yalta Conference (February 1945), amongst other things, Stalin secured from Roosevelt the promise of Stalin's Far Eastern territorial desires, in return for agreeing to enter the Pacific War within 2 or 3 months of the defeat of Germany. By early 1945 it had become apparent to the Japanese that the Soviets were preparing to invade Mongolian-Manchuria, though they were unlikely to attack prior to Germany's defeat. By the middle of March 1945, things were not going well in the Pacific for the Japanese, and they withdrew their elite troops from Manchuria to support actions in the Pacific. Meanwhile, the Soviets continued their Far Eastern build-up. The Japanese had been monitoring Trans-Siberian Railway traffic and Soviet activity to the east of Manchuria, but Soviet high command of the armed forces had concealed the build-up of a force of 90 divisions. The Soviets had decided that they did not wish to renew the Neutrality Pact. The terms of the Neutrality Pact required that 12 months before its expiry, the Soviets must advise the Japanese of this, so on 5 April 1945 they informed the Japanese that they did not wish to renew the treaty. The Soviets went to great efforts to assure the Japanese that the treaty would still be in force for another 12 months, and that the Japanese had nothing to worry about. The Soviets did nothing to discourage these Japanese hopes, and drew the process out as long as possible (whilst continuing to prepare their invasion forces). Japanese military intelligence failed, and the Japanese were caught completely by surprise when the Soviets declared war. Also, Japanese were expecting any Soviet attack was going to start from the west. However, Soviets launched their attack simultaneously on all 3 fronts in Inner Mongolian desert region of north-east China and in south-central Manchuria. As a secondary objective, the 1st Far Eastern Front was to prevent Japanese forces from escaping to Korea, establishing in the process what later became North Korea. Additionally, by the time of the Soviet invasion, the few remnants of its fleet were stationed and tasked for the defense of the Japanese home islands in the event of an invasion by US forces. Soviet doctrine and operational art (tactical operational design that causes the cumulative destruction of the enemy’s material strength) evolved from relatively predictable battle plans in the 1960s, to agile, dynamic operations in the 1970s that included an independent maneuver "shock" force to rapidly penetrate NATO territory. The largest Soviet shock-troop special force is called the VDV (Vozdushno-Desantnye Vojska) who spearheaded strategic peripheral operations. They are also used as elite force that provide security for regular troops to carry out their combat operations. Their training is much more rigorous than that in ordinary Soviet units, and is similar to US Marine. The divisions are smaller than regular motorized rifle divisions. They are a highly mobile, rapid-action, ground force who are often able to achieve surprise. These motor rife units fly in but do not parachute in. They also have titles like 'air-transportable' but that is simply because they carry air-droppable light armoured vehicle with little mechanized equipment (trained to be mounted units if required) and have their own helicopters units (close air support / airpower). They have little capability to withstand direct mechanised attack. Their training is the best traditional sort - tough, demanding exercises with a focus on the basics of light infantry. In 1968 in Czechoslovakia, it was the VDV that took over the Prague airport and captured much of the Czech leadership. The Soviet leadership uses the VDV where the other tough guys fail. In Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1987, ethnic disputes got out of the control of the local police. The Interior Army was called in. They couldn't handle it. The VDV was called in. They are often mistaken for the GRU Spetsnaz. Currently, VDV are adding more firepower, while there are plans to make VDV expeditionary. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) believes that only the strong has rights, i.e. "law of the jungle", so they feel the need to flex their military power to threaten their opponents with territorial disputes in order to display to their people that they are getting respect in this world. It doesn't believe in friendly-nations, only gullible or weak nations. China's Communist regime talks about being a "force for peace" and wanting a multi-polar world, but it practices one doctrine, one leader, one party, and one Han-centric nation. For 40 years, it has declared that China has no territorial desire or "China has never taken one inch of land from other countries", while it tries to claim and 'convince' other nations that large swathes of sovereign territory in these nations belongs to China. This is indeed believing that only the strong has rights, i.e. "law of the jungle". The direct consequence is that this will endanger world peace. As expected, this fiery intention has made democratic nations to draw their swords. Power is a means to achieve greater security and China is doing the work. China seeks to paralyze or destroy their opponent's "system" of warfighting rather than the opponent's hard/soft deterrence capabilities. Chinese Communist game is to make their opponents get into self-delusion, that it's beneficial to behave, in the way China what's them to. They are hoping America will just give up. To subdue your competitor without fighting is the acme of skill. This aspect stresses the importance of shaping the conditions and to being prepared in advance. "Shaping" on the ground, means to go beyond the mode of managing differences, shape bilateral relations actively and accumulate positive momentum. Confrontation and conciliation can be used together. They talk peace, however, the world can now see they are full of deception. In their mindset, they believe they are fully consistent and rational, but other nations are delusional or failing to comprehend them. "Military-Civil Fusion" (MCF) 军民融合 is a national strategy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Govt worldwide pick vendors based on lowest price, so getting low-interest rates help vendors to quote lower price. Every nation is averse to lending funds for big projects or technology start-ups. Lending institutions are suffering due to bad loans. However, Chinese Govt gives the lowest interest rate loans, but they will only do so if you agree to lock every transaction for your business and your supply chain ecosystem, within their own financial platform and buy & hire only from China. Thereby de-industrialising developed nations. If you want to do business in China, there is to be no discussion of Chinese dominion over Tibet, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Clearly, what the Chinese are doing is 'deterrence by punishment' posturing. We need to respond to it with 'deterrence by denial'. Xi's policy had fundamentally shifted to a more aggressive foreign policy because it now has the means to do so, economically, militarily, and diplomatically. This has major implications for every nation in Asia. https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d00828/ https://www.nippon.com/en/features/h00321/ https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14588033 Chinese civilization and pre-history starts with the tiny Xia dynasty, which left very few records. The most archaic written history and bureaucratic system of China began during the Bronze Age in China around Yellow River valley (Tang dynasty in 1600 BC), but traditionally Chinese imperial culture starts from the Zhou dynasty (1046 BC). China's first dynasty began with the Han dynasty, when Buddhism arrived and the Silk road trading began with Europe and Asia. In 202 BC. This is when Confucius began. Although Tang Dynasty (China's golden period) was one of the most prosperous for China, it was the Song (Sung) Dynasty that became the most technological and scientifically advanced nation in the world. Song played a major role in creating iconic China, and many of the world’s greatest inventions were brought about by the great innovators of this dynasty. Many of the things people today associate with China originated in the Song dynasty, e.g. Rice, tea, gunpowder. In addition to all the inventions and reforms, the Song left behind a wealth of architecture that you can visit in many Chinese cities. During the Song period, the government had built a navy, to trade heavily with foreign powers; commerce developed to an unprecedented extent; trade guilds were organized, paper currency came into increasing use, and several cities flourished along the principal waterways and the southeast coast. The population had exploded, doubling in size during the 10th and 11th centuries. In the decorative arts, the Song dynasty wares are noted for their simplicity of shape and the purity of colour and tone of their glazes. The Song dynasty is particularly noted for the great artistic achievements that it encouraged and, in part, subsidized. The Song dynasty begun a renewal of literature and the arts. A school of oral storytelling in the vernacular arose, and conventional poetry enjoyed wide cultivation. Widespread printing of the Classics and the use of movable type, beginning in the 11th century, brought literature and learning to the people. Flourishing private academies and state schools graduated increasing numbers of competitors for the civil service examinations that allowed commoners to rise to leadership positions. The administration developed a comprehensive welfare policy that made this one of the most humane periods in Chinese history. However, the many mistakes by the Song empire decades after the death of Emperor Taizu, led to China’s first foreign (non-Han) dynasty, or the Empire of the Great Khan, the Great Yuan dynasty established by Kublai Khan, leader of the Mongolian Borjigin clan. The East Turkistan Republic was the primary product of an independence movement led by Uyghur and other Turkic people living in East Turkistan, and multi-ethnic and Turkic in character, including Kazakhs, Kyrgyz Uzbeks, Tatars, and Mongols. Following the assassination of its leaders in a tragic "plane crash" in August 1949, along with an invasion by the then newly established China, the East Turkistan Republic was overthrown on December 22, 1949. China, is a big place with four times the population of the US, has lots of very distinct and different cultures. The big divide is between the “wheat eaters” north of the Yangtze River and the “rice eaters” to the south. The southerners are collectivist and reflective, while the northerners are more individualistic and analytical. In short, the southerners fit the Western stereotype for all East Asians, while the northerners are more “Western” in their attitudes. The northerners are less numerous than those rice eaters down south and also had to deal with centuries of “Northern Barbarians”. The worst of these were the Huns (who later ravaged the Roman Empire), the Mongols (thunderbolt) and the Manchus (critical thinkers). The last two managed to conquer most of China but were eventually absorbed by the more numerous, better educated and persistent Chinese Han (ethnic Chinese). In the south life was easier and the more militaristic and analytical northerners were resented, but feared and often obeyed. The emperor was usually from the north and lived up there. But as southerners loved to say; “the mountains are high, and the emperor is far away.” Han-jian denotes a “traitor to the Han race.” It began with the original Han (ethnic Chinese) whose civilization first appeared north of the Yangtze River (Tang dynasty in 1600 BC). The Han people did not originally live as far south as Guangdong (Canton) or as far southwest as Sichuan, nor in the far northern areas. There are some genetic differences between the Northern Han and Southern Han (including Cantonese) that persist to the present day. Up there the main grain crops were wheat, barley and the like. Rice is a much more productive crop (in terms of calories produced per unit of land) but is more labour-intensive and require a higher degree of organization and discipline. It also requires more water, which is why the drier north (north of the Yangtze River) remained reliant on non-rice grains. It took centuries to perfect rice cultivation (nearly 10,000 years ago), which is a more complex process than for other grains. The lesson for the West is that while the Chinese may appear monolithic, they are anything but. China also has two main Muslim groups: Hui Muslims and Uyghurs of Uttarakuru (now Xinjiang). “Trung” means “Chinese”. In the late 1940s, as India won Independence and the People’s Republic of China was founded, it was a time of great hope that history was returning to Asia. Through much of history, at least in Asia, there were only two major powers, India and China, and it is said that at least up to the 18th century, 50% of the world’s GDP was accounted for by them. Although Tang Dynasty (China's golden period) was one of the most prosperous for China, it was the Song (Sung) Dynasty that became the most technological and scientifically advanced nation in the world. Song played a major role in creating iconic China, and many of the world’s greatest inventions were brought about by the great innovators of this dynasty. Two of the richest, millennia-old civilizations of the world were ready to come back into their own after a phase of (colonial) darkness and oppression. Due to Asia's size and history, India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had dreamed of both China and India, becoming the centre of the world, with the decline of European powers. China considers itself and Japan as modern eastern civilization. Nehru was also busy promoting China's cause at various international forums. Indians currently lead some of the most powerful tech companies of the World. In contrast, China considers India belonging to a bygone era similar, to the Greek civilization and one that has no relevance for modern times. The imaginary line called Heihe Tengchong line was drawn by Chinese geographer Hu Huanyong in 1935. It divides China into two distinctly different regions. West of this line, China’s 64% of land area supports only 4% of its population, where as 96% of its population lives in the eastern side of the line. Thus, Agni V, which has a range of 5000 km should be able to reach key economic installations in any part of this area. This will be a key deterrent to Chinese aggression in Indian ocean. However, the best type of nuclear deterrent is second-strike capability (submarine-carrying long-ranged slbm).
If you want to understand China, read about India-China. |
| |
In terms of weapons and equipment, the PLA has overwhelming superiority (over India) … but the most challenging enemy in the winter is not weapons, but the weather. Antony Wong Tong
Although China recognised Sikkim as being part of India back in 2003, China at the same time also stated that the boundary with Sikkim, however, was Not yet settled. This very argument was forwarded by China during the Doklam / Donglang standoff back in 2017 when India had a face-off with China for 72 days. India negotiated a mutual withdrawal. China vacated the spot first, and so did India. But India declared victory. Then, what did the Chinese do? They came back and occupied the rest of the plateau. Satellite images have released evidence of at least three villages constructed by China inside Bhutan. Once you are trapped into this narrative, then China can play that to create outcomes.
In Doklam / Donglang, China aim was to build roads & helipad infrastructure, near the Bhutanese border, a permanent forward troop presence too and carry out military training. The entire reason was china trying to prove to Bhutan that Bhutanese security cannot be secure without Chinese hand above them. However, due to the Indo-China agreement, China could not bring additional troops unless India matched their troop numbers. So the Chinese created a dispute by coming a few kilometers to build a road inside the Indian patrol area, which led to both sides amassing huge troop numbers.
India and China had in 2012 reached an agreement that the tri-junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be on the “basis of alignment” of the India-China border in the Sikkim sector. However, China interpreted this to mean that the tri-junction point had been settled, while India claimed that the phrase ‘basis of’ meant that the final settlement had not been reached. In the past, the Chinese have offered 495 sq km of territory in the northern part of the Himalayan nation to Bhutan. In return, they insisted that Bhutan give China 269 sq km of the disputed territory in the west—an area of rich grazing pasture, central to the livelihood of Bhutanese pastoralists. The Chinese have claimed four areas in western Bhutan: Charithang, Sinchulimpa, the Dramana pasture land and Doklam, the present bone of contention.
The ultimate slap in the face was the June 2020 expansion of the Chinese claims over Bhutan, by bringing to the fore, one claim that had not figured in any of the 24 rounds of Bhutan-China border talks till now. The Chinese action in unilaterally making the Mochu river the border and occupying all of Doklam goes against the 1890 Anglo Chinese Convention that China invoked in 2017. This clearly said that the border would be at “the crest of the mountain range, separating waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mochu.” But today, the Chinese are not on the watershed, but at the very banks of Mochu. Further, all this is in violation of their own solemn commitment in 1998 that during the period the two sides are trying to work out a border settlement, “the status quo of the boundary prior to March 1959 be upheld.”
In Doklam / Donglang, China aim was to build roads & helipad infrastructure, near the Bhutanese border, a permanent forward troop presence too and carry out military training. The entire reason was china trying to prove to Bhutan that Bhutanese security cannot be secure without Chinese hand above them. However, due to the Indo-China agreement, China could not bring additional troops unless India matched their troop numbers. So the Chinese created a dispute by coming a few kilometers to build a road inside the Indian patrol area, which led to both sides amassing huge troop numbers.
India and China had in 2012 reached an agreement that the tri-junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be on the “basis of alignment” of the India-China border in the Sikkim sector. However, China interpreted this to mean that the tri-junction point had been settled, while India claimed that the phrase ‘basis of’ meant that the final settlement had not been reached. In the past, the Chinese have offered 495 sq km of territory in the northern part of the Himalayan nation to Bhutan. In return, they insisted that Bhutan give China 269 sq km of the disputed territory in the west—an area of rich grazing pasture, central to the livelihood of Bhutanese pastoralists. The Chinese have claimed four areas in western Bhutan: Charithang, Sinchulimpa, the Dramana pasture land and Doklam, the present bone of contention.
The ultimate slap in the face was the June 2020 expansion of the Chinese claims over Bhutan, by bringing to the fore, one claim that had not figured in any of the 24 rounds of Bhutan-China border talks till now. The Chinese action in unilaterally making the Mochu river the border and occupying all of Doklam goes against the 1890 Anglo Chinese Convention that China invoked in 2017. This clearly said that the border would be at “the crest of the mountain range, separating waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mochu.” But today, the Chinese are not on the watershed, but at the very banks of Mochu. Further, all this is in violation of their own solemn commitment in 1998 that during the period the two sides are trying to work out a border settlement, “the status quo of the boundary prior to March 1959 be upheld.”
Pakistan Army's XII Corps (known as Southern Command) is located in Quetta in Balochistan Province and is responsibe for guarding the Bolan Pass. In 2004, the Balochistan conflict restarted. Pakistan Army's XI Corps (called Army Reserve Center) located in Pashtun-majority Peshawar, is responsibile for covering the Khyber Pass against Soviets. The XI Corps command was the primary support and logistic base for the Taliban. After 9/11, it was involved fighting Al-Qaida for U.S's war on terror in Waziristan and the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan. With the end of the Cold War, 9 Infantry Division of XI Corps had been reorientated to Gulteri in the eastern border, opposite to Dras sector in Kargil district of Ladakh in India. Here, the 9 Infantry Division of XI Corps, is under the Pakistan Army's X Corps located in Rawalpindi, which has four mountain divisions near India-Pakistan LoC had been reinforced with the three brigades that have moved into Skardu.
https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/tibetan-re-education-camp-journal-tells-chinas-tactics-now-used-uighurs
https://nypost.com/2018/10/17/chinas-obscene-excuse-for-its-mass-re-education-camps/
https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/02/1133212
https://nypost.com/2018/10/17/chinas-obscene-excuse-for-its-mass-re-education-camps/
https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/02/1133212
It is impossible to keep the existing Karakoram Highway (KKH-1) functional for 5 months a year at best because of adverse weather. A landslide and flooding (from Attabad Lake) in 2010 blocked the KKH-1 for more than one year. Eventually, a new route comprises 5 tunnels and several bridges, along the southeastern side of the Attabad Lake was added in 2015. Another all-weather alternative transportation route, Karakoram Highway (KKH-2) will enter the highest mountains in PoK from the Pamir Plateau inside Xinjiang via the Mintaka Pass and then proceed into Hunza. This road will be expensive, estimated by Pakistan to cost more than US$11 billion. Hotan is an important military HQ of the PLA. The Hotan-Golmud Highway links Xinjiang and reduces the distance between Gilgit and Golmud to almost half. China has also built feeder roads eastward through the Shaksgam Valley (part of the Trans-Karakoram Tract) linking Gilgit with Hotan. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-has-lost-access-to-26-out-of-65-patrolling-points-in-eastern-ladakh-says-research-paper/article66428193.ece
"The biggest challenge of battle at the high altitude is to provide sustainable logistics and armament support. In the 1962 China-India border conflict, China failed to protect its fruits of victory due to poor logistics support. Although local Tibetan residents provided soldiers with temporary support, it was not sustainable," Chinese military expert. The Qinghai-Tibet Plateau has an adverse climate and complex topography. Over a long period of time, it is very difficult to provide soldiers with logistics and armament support. A single western theatre PLA command handles the border with India, integrating the earlier Chengdu and Lanzhou military regions.
The difference between China and India is that PLA has high-altitudes firing ranges, training grounds, SAM sites, underground logistics warehouses, heliports and garrison barracks. India still lacks high-altitude firing ranges and training facility, and underground logistics warehouses for Indian Army's longer-range systems and heavy mechanised units. If we don't test our rockets at high altitude, we are in trouble. In 2019, China's declared budget is $174 (USD) whereas India's total defence budget is $61.7 (USD). China spends the highest amount of money on data-driven war-gamed realistic combat training.
"The biggest challenge of battle at the high altitude is to provide sustainable logistics and armament support. In the 1962 China-India border conflict, China failed to protect its fruits of victory due to poor logistics support. Although local Tibetan residents provided soldiers with temporary support, it was not sustainable," Chinese military expert. The Qinghai-Tibet Plateau has an adverse climate and complex topography. Over a long period of time, it is very difficult to provide soldiers with logistics and armament support. A single western theatre PLA command handles the border with India, integrating the earlier Chengdu and Lanzhou military regions.
The difference between China and India is that PLA has high-altitudes firing ranges, training grounds, SAM sites, underground logistics warehouses, heliports and garrison barracks. India still lacks high-altitude firing ranges and training facility, and underground logistics warehouses for Indian Army's longer-range systems and heavy mechanised units. If we don't test our rockets at high altitude, we are in trouble. In 2019, China's declared budget is $174 (USD) whereas India's total defence budget is $61.7 (USD). China spends the highest amount of money on data-driven war-gamed realistic combat training.
Chinese war objective is specifically to preserve their power sources, by fighting better armed enemies in small conflicts. China's aims at developing an in-depth precision strike munitions system backed by integrated persistent surveillance and reconnaissance, and C2 capabilities to operate in Taiwan and Tibet. In a short war, China will have a capability edge over India as they have integrated their ground-based & space-based multi-Sensor network grid for various target navigation (and C2). The Pentagon report on China confirmed Indian intelligence reports that PLA had laid optical fibre cables along the contested 1597 km Ladakh LAC for faster war deployment and decision-making.
PLA believes cyber deterrence and reconnaissance should make up a single integrated effort, to achieving information (AI) superiority. In Chinese military, this is as important as space and nuclear deterrence. China is focusing on attrition warfare, not using troops, but using AI-based, all-domain 全域作战, mobile, warfare tech, to disaggregate adversary's ISR capabilities and affect its adversary's ability to make decisions & take critical actions in the early stages of conflict. AI can gather intelligence, identifying intent, and monitoring operations. Pattern-recognition capabilities and data analytics can help navigation and target recognition, as is expected on-board US military’s Optionally-Manned platforms, as well as maintenance predictions and improved logistics. But generating the curriculum takes resources: time, data and manpower.
PLA high-altitude outposts has been equipped with oxygen stations and set-up high-pressure oxygen (for troops to recover stamina, reduce breathing difficulties and altitude stress), which are specially designed portable barracks for its troops stationed in the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau to boost combat capability in the high-altitude ranges where oxygen levels are low. PLA has also been equipping Tibetan military bases with portable barracks, specifically designed for plateau areas. The barracks’ design and material make them sturdy, moisture-proof and cold-resistant, even keep the room temperature at 15 degrees Celsius even during bad snow storms.
The terrain in Tibetan Plateau is dry, and the soil there is hard as there is no rain (due to clouds being obstructed by the Himalayan mountain range); and hence vehicles can move easily. Exactly the opposite holds true for India where, the clouds are forced to get concentrated due to the Himalayas and consequently road-building is a near impossibility. Hence, air transportation by both fixed-wing transport aircrafts and helicopters becomes critical for mobility. However, engine's Horse-Power loses as much as 25% power due to lighter atmosphere in high-altitude.
China has a credible mix of multi-role fighters and precision strike artillery. They have got adequate reserve to replenish after attrition. They have multi-layered air defence systems and rocket forces with EMP generating warheads. For them, the geography works against them, especially in the Tibet Autonomous Region. They have an inherent operational disadvantage due to altitude, very cold temperatures. Engine efficiency & Ballistic trajectories are different on high plateaus as the air is thinner at altitude, which demands greater ability from pilots to project and adjust the firing. The oxygen deficit on plateaus is also physically challenging for pilots. (Z stands for Tibet / Xizang)
PLA believes cyber deterrence and reconnaissance should make up a single integrated effort, to achieving information (AI) superiority. In Chinese military, this is as important as space and nuclear deterrence. China is focusing on attrition warfare, not using troops, but using AI-based, all-domain 全域作战, mobile, warfare tech, to disaggregate adversary's ISR capabilities and affect its adversary's ability to make decisions & take critical actions in the early stages of conflict. AI can gather intelligence, identifying intent, and monitoring operations. Pattern-recognition capabilities and data analytics can help navigation and target recognition, as is expected on-board US military’s Optionally-Manned platforms, as well as maintenance predictions and improved logistics. But generating the curriculum takes resources: time, data and manpower.
PLA high-altitude outposts has been equipped with oxygen stations and set-up high-pressure oxygen (for troops to recover stamina, reduce breathing difficulties and altitude stress), which are specially designed portable barracks for its troops stationed in the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau to boost combat capability in the high-altitude ranges where oxygen levels are low. PLA has also been equipping Tibetan military bases with portable barracks, specifically designed for plateau areas. The barracks’ design and material make them sturdy, moisture-proof and cold-resistant, even keep the room temperature at 15 degrees Celsius even during bad snow storms.
The terrain in Tibetan Plateau is dry, and the soil there is hard as there is no rain (due to clouds being obstructed by the Himalayan mountain range); and hence vehicles can move easily. Exactly the opposite holds true for India where, the clouds are forced to get concentrated due to the Himalayas and consequently road-building is a near impossibility. Hence, air transportation by both fixed-wing transport aircrafts and helicopters becomes critical for mobility. However, engine's Horse-Power loses as much as 25% power due to lighter atmosphere in high-altitude.
China has a credible mix of multi-role fighters and precision strike artillery. They have got adequate reserve to replenish after attrition. They have multi-layered air defence systems and rocket forces with EMP generating warheads. For them, the geography works against them, especially in the Tibet Autonomous Region. They have an inherent operational disadvantage due to altitude, very cold temperatures. Engine efficiency & Ballistic trajectories are different on high plateaus as the air is thinner at altitude, which demands greater ability from pilots to project and adjust the firing. The oxygen deficit on plateaus is also physically challenging for pilots. (Z stands for Tibet / Xizang)
China saw the Sino-Vietnamese border conflict of 1979 to 1990 as a way to evolve the PLA by testing new doctrines and equipment on its border. The PLA’s performance in the 1979 war was a result of its reliance on Korean War-style infantry assault tactics, due to their operational inflexibility and stagnation of military thought. PLA's command structure, and the infrastructure that supported it, could not support maneuver warfare. In 1984 the situation presented itself for testing many of the reforms and reorganizations occurred within the PLA. Flexible command allowed the attacks to be postponed until the opportune time. Vietnamese veterans recalled being shelled by Chinese artillery even at nighttime, due to the deployment of new Chinese night-vision devices to the frontline. A Chinese artillery commander remarked that in repelling the counterattacks, he could execute as many fire missions as he wished without worrying about ammunition supply. Chinese logistics achieved new levels of efficiency. In one Chinese general’s words, the Sino-Vietnamese border conflict “allowed him to achieve his dream of waging modern war by modern methods.” Charlie Gao
The Chinese strategy and operational considerations were focused on the Western sector that comprised Ladakh, the Kameng frontier divisions, Lohit Frontier Division and Subansiri and Siang frontier division. The first phase was the battle of Namka Chu in October 1962. The second phase was the capture of Tawang and in the third phase, it was the battle of Sila, Bomdila and Derang. In November 1962, India launched an attack in the north-east India, which was the only place where India launched an attack. However, the Chinese preponed their attack and outflanked the Indians, thereby bringing the battle to an end. India did not use air force because India had no fighters with night capabilities. In 2020, India troops in the border, still does not have drones and infantry fighting vehicles with night capabilities. BMP-2 now is in the process of getting night-vision. India still lacks high-altitude firing ranges & training facility and underground logistics warehouses for Indian Army's longer-range systems and heavy mechanised units. Unless you have ranges to test fire longer-range systems, you will not know. In this area, Indian Army is not self-sufficient.
Labelling transportation networks as 'strategic' will only invite the ire of China. That's exactly why India has never been able to object to any of China's border transportation infrastructure development/expansion projects, because Beijing has always justified them by saying that such projects are an economic necessity and also for boosting tourism. Rail is fast but expensive, and no one would do that except as a propaganda ploy or in the absence of huge subsidies. China mega-projects military-specific transportation infrastructure since the 1990s undertaken in Tibet is defined as being the minimum required for primarily for spurring regional economic growth and promotion of international tourism. India began upgrading her transportation infrastructure in Ladakh, they were all labelled as being military-specific and that too targeted against China. At no stage did anyone talk about the enormous benefit to the resident civilian people in these states. Its also pragmatic to reduce hype attached to construction and inauguration of infrastructure in sensitive areas. India should follow the chinese tactic of practicing Taiji i.e. maneuvers appearing benign that accomplish goals while not inviting suspicion.
| | |
Commanders take lessons from the fact that Sumdorong Chu stand-off started in 1986, which was resolved after 9 years of comprehensive diplomacy and disengagement. And still the threat from China remains so high for the Indian Army has been physically guarding the Siachen Glacier since 1984. The about the 10 Indian soldiers taken captive by the PLA that night defies reason. 10 Indian soldiers were in PLA captivity in 2020 for the first time since 1962, but the Indian government was silent about their capture. Journalists seeking confirmation were initially stonewalled by the army, but, as they became insistent, the army changed its tone to a request to keep it off the news. When the New York Times said in an article on 17 June that a number of Indian troops were captured, the army issued a statement more than 24 hours later: “It is clarified that there are no Indian Troops Missing in Action.” Since the New York Times had never claimed that the troops were missing, but had reported that they had been captured by the PLA. China wants us to go from the south bank of Pangong Tso. There is no question of vacating our only advantageous position first. The Indian official said, adding, "we have told China that the solution has to be a package (disengagement from all friction points). China had previously shown willingness to pull back its troops from Finger 4 to Finger 8 on the north bank of Pangong Tso, but that has now changed.
Located in Panagarh in West Bengal, Indian Army's XVII Mountain Strike Corps in the eastern theatre is built as a quick reaction force and as well as counter offensive force against China. Two Infantry Divisions (and First Armoured Division) of Indian Army's First Strike Corps in Mathura in Uttar Pradesh, which was earlier responsible only for the western theatre (bordering Pakistan), is now being re-aligned to also focus at the northern theatre (bordering China). While both the II Pivot Corps (called Kharga) in Ambala in Haryana and the XXI Pivot Corps in Bhopal in Madhya Pradesh, will retain all their offensive options against Pakistan. The Indian Army HQ is also planning to strengthening its offensive options in case of any protracted conflict with China by re-aligning another division from an existing Corps to focus exclusively on the Central sector with China.
Indian Army has decided to shelve all new raising for a China-specific Mountain Strike Corps due to financial constraints. Mountain Strike Corps was to fight in high-altitude peaks, but any mechanized war in Ladakh can be only fought in high-altitude plateau. So, instead, ITBP will raise 9 more battalions (around 9,000 men) for border policing in new outposts. Local technical intel can flag movements, it's the final validation that counts. The new posts will also help reduce the time taken by the troops to travel on this arduous terrain, help in supplies of rations to the posts located at the altitude of 12,000 to 18,000 feet and also help in keeping a close watch over the Chinese army build-up in a tense situation. It is said that there are as many as 23 spots where there are differences of "perception" from Ladakh to the east of Arunachal state. Since China has both bigger budget and military industrial base, the three Indian armed services must agree to adopt integrated operations plan for contingency scenarios.
China produces ukrainian 1200 hp air-cooled for its type-96 tank (also called type-88) but has no additives to quick-start the engine in cold temperature. There are 28 medium-light armoured tanks in two heavy Tri-combined arms battalion of PLA. T-72m1-cia is India's light tank that has replaced t-55. India has managed to produce T-72's engine (780hp). India has additives to quick-start the engine in cold temperature. However, India still import T-90 engine, gearbox, power-packs, gun & stabilization from Russia. Indian Army also uses T-90 tanks to work as artillery mounted on truck. The thermal sights on Indian tanks are french but assembled by India's BEL. China manufactures Russian 125 mm apfsds while India imports Russian 3BM-42 Mango & 3VBM17 apfsds. India only license-makes invar, our tanks will be teeth-less, if we don't produce 125 mm apfsds. India's OFB have not been able to make apfsds. Indian army uses bmp-2 that lacks night capabilities and remote-controlled weapon. Pla uses modified bmp-1 & zbd-09 (made of Russian bmp-3 parts). There are 10 motorized vehicles in every PLA's Tri-combined arms battalion. US has these capabilities in day/night and Chinese is catching up fast, therefore Indian Army's Air-Defence systems also needs more support. China unlike the Russians keep their latest equipment in the rear as reserves. China envisions further improving joint operations and shifting towards “intelligentized warfare,” defined by the application of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. Indian Army has to prepare for the fact that it needs to focus more on capable command & control and to add more mobile artillery rocket firepower. Chinese drones rely entirely on satellite data-links that could be countered by Electronic warfare (jamming).
India Strike Corps has brahmos land-attack cruise missiles & barak-8 air-defence system. In development are cheaper systems like pralay land-attack missile (a ver. of shaurya missile) & QR-Sam air-defence system. India has more than enough ballistic missiles: Prithvi 2 (350 km) & 3 (750 km) and Agni 3 & 4. Agni-4 missiles launched from northeast India can reach Beijing. Unlike India, China also builds its electronic fuses. Indian Army's Air-Defence systems also needs more support. Understanding the enemy Army is not just about its hardware. India must also not forget that the PLARF is the world leader in terms of land-based precision missiles. China's Central Base Depot, which stores warheads, is strategically located inside Mt. Taibai among the Qin Mountains in Central China. China is likely to use ballistic missiles to attack Indian airbases or armour reinforcements. Chinese own missiles are df-15 (redesigned df-11) & df-26 (or df-21d). Df-12 is a copy of Russian Iskander missile. China latest yj-18 anti-ship missile is a copied version of Russian kalibr missile & cj-10 cruise missile is a copy of Russian kh-55 cruise missile. Hq-16 is a copy of Russian buk missile.
China produces ukrainian 1200 hp air-cooled for its type-96 tank (also called type-88) but has no additives to quick-start the engine in cold temperature. There are 28 medium-light armoured tanks in two heavy Tri-combined arms battalion of PLA. T-72m1-cia is India's light tank that has replaced t-55. India has managed to produce T-72's engine (780hp). India has additives to quick-start the engine in cold temperature. However, India still import T-90 engine, gearbox, power-packs, gun & stabilization from Russia. Indian Army also uses T-90 tanks to work as artillery mounted on truck. The thermal sights on Indian tanks are french but assembled by India's BEL. China manufactures Russian 125 mm apfsds while India imports Russian 3BM-42 Mango & 3VBM17 apfsds. India only license-makes invar, our tanks will be teeth-less, if we don't produce 125 mm apfsds. India's OFB have not been able to make apfsds. Indian army uses bmp-2 that lacks night capabilities and remote-controlled weapon. Pla uses modified bmp-1 & zbd-09 (made of Russian bmp-3 parts). There are 10 motorized vehicles in every PLA's Tri-combined arms battalion. US has these capabilities in day/night and Chinese is catching up fast, therefore Indian Army's Air-Defence systems also needs more support. China unlike the Russians keep their latest equipment in the rear as reserves. China envisions further improving joint operations and shifting towards “intelligentized warfare,” defined by the application of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. Indian Army has to prepare for the fact that it needs to focus more on capable command & control and to add more mobile artillery rocket firepower. Chinese drones rely entirely on satellite data-links that could be countered by Electronic warfare (jamming).
India Strike Corps has brahmos land-attack cruise missiles & barak-8 air-defence system. In development are cheaper systems like pralay land-attack missile (a ver. of shaurya missile) & QR-Sam air-defence system. India has more than enough ballistic missiles: Prithvi 2 (350 km) & 3 (750 km) and Agni 3 & 4. Agni-4 missiles launched from northeast India can reach Beijing. Unlike India, China also builds its electronic fuses. Indian Army's Air-Defence systems also needs more support. Understanding the enemy Army is not just about its hardware. India must also not forget that the PLARF is the world leader in terms of land-based precision missiles. China's Central Base Depot, which stores warheads, is strategically located inside Mt. Taibai among the Qin Mountains in Central China. China is likely to use ballistic missiles to attack Indian airbases or armour reinforcements. Chinese own missiles are df-15 (redesigned df-11) & df-26 (or df-21d). Df-12 is a copy of Russian Iskander missile. China latest yj-18 anti-ship missile is a copied version of Russian kalibr missile & cj-10 cruise missile is a copy of Russian kh-55 cruise missile. Hq-16 is a copy of Russian buk missile.
China's artillery modernization plan aims at developing multi-domain 全域作战 multi-sensor grid target navigation for in-depth precision strike systems with integrated ISR, and control capabilities to operate in Taiwan and Tibet. PLA joint war campaigns feature forces of two or three services under a joint command, like a theater command. Division (10,000+ to 15,000 troops) has to be almost done away and replaced by Tri-combined arms battalion (called Group Army), similar to US's Joint Task Force. The PLA has had difficulty addressing the shortage of officers who can make decisions by themselves (when they are cut-off from their chain of command) and have a deep knowledge of joint combat operations. China spends the highest amount of money on data-driven war-gamed realistic precision-strike combat training, since many PLA officers are known to be unable to deal with unexpected situations.
China has copied the Russians, and transformed their PLA tank regiments into a Tri-combined arms battalion (mix of medium-light armour, motorized infantry sub-units & artillery battalion at unit level) that offers more flexibility and eliminates the necessity for the tank commander to reinforce each tank regiment with motorized regiment's assets. The addition of an artillery battalion to the tank regiment, gives a great deal more firepower under direct control of the regimental commander. The division commander then has greater flexibility in the use of his artillery resources to influence the battle. 122 mm PCL-161 & PLL-09 and 155 mm caliber self-propelled artillery PCL-181 (and also 9 mobile 81 mm mortars or 120 mm caliber gun vehicles, in every PLA's tri-combined arms battalion) for direct-fire and 370 mm MLRS & 300 mm PHL-03 MLRS to fire deep into the enemy’s rear, have increased the firepower available to army and front commanders. PLA believes that it can outgun the US in artillery development with hostile electronic environment. However, UAV used, do not engage in terrain-masking, as that will lead to loss of data-link control. PLA have a combined arms structure as well as a comprehensive array of combat-support elements, but it does not include the airborne units (its most important feature is its light-armoured mechanized force). Anti-radar seeker sub-munitions and smart loiter munitions are going to extend the range of PLA artillery and its lethality, thus altering the deterrence correlation in the future. These improvements, along with anti-tank capabilities (ATGM), greatly enhance area coverage and counter-battery support to subordinate divisions. General-purpose and attack helicopter units (and UAVs) now provides combined arms & engineers regiment with a highly maneuverable and versatile platform for reconnaissance, command and control (C2), and fire support. China has a capability edge over India as they have integrated their ground-based & space-based multi-Sensor network grid target navigation (and C2). The Pentagon report on China confirmed Indian intelligence reports that PLA had laid optical fibre cables along the contested 1597 km Ladakh LAC for faster war deployment and decision-making. China is focusing on attrition warfare, not using troops, but using AI-based, all-domain 全域作战, mobile, warfare tech, to disaggregate adversary's ISR capabilities and affect its adversary's ability to make decisions & take critical actions in the early stages of conflict.
In contrast with India, Chinese airforce's key strength is in SIGINT that backs its Army. China is trying hard to quickly catch up with the US and UK as it plans to develop 3 low-Earth orbit constellations - Hongyun with 864 satellites, Hongyan with 320 satellites. Starting in 2011, the PLAAF began deploying KJ-500 AEW, and BZK-05 UAVs (and J-10s, J-11s, JH-7s for protection) to various airfields, including Lhasa Gonggar and Shigatse Peace Airport, which is about 250 miles west of Lhasa, for a short-term rotational basis, usually from July to September, but some might be there all year. Both airfields are dual-use, so civil aircraft fly in all year long and the runway is built for civil aircraft. The PLAAF also has airfields in Hotan (Hetian) and Kashgar in western Xinjiang, where the PLAAF deployed two J-20s in August 2020. Since 2013 China's airforce main roles have been ISR for "maintaining battlefield transparency", AWACS, H-6K nuke bomber and strategic air transport & air-lift. Another increasingly important element is electronic warfare. It's also tasked with safeguarding air-defences, countering enemy's air-defence with high-tech weapons, countering air-raids, anti-missile deterrence, integrating air and near-space capabilities. Pla's hq-9b is vapourware, otherwise why would China buy s400. yj-62 & yj-12b (& hq-12), both are obsolete in front of spyder air-defence system. Chinese-made Air-Defence can be neutralised by the IAF. Stealth fighters are tasked to be the backbone of the ground strike force. Chinese fighters cannot carry a full weapons load around the Himalayas due to their side having thinner air and their POOR aero jet engines. They don't have the kind of combat aircraft or attack helicopters capable of delivering stand-off precision-guided munition. Indian fighters carry mica-ir missiles (except, Indian MiGs) whereas Chinese fighters carry 18ft-long pl-15 missiles that has longer range.
China has copied the Russians, and transformed their PLA tank regiments into a Tri-combined arms battalion (mix of medium-light armour, motorized infantry sub-units & artillery battalion at unit level) that offers more flexibility and eliminates the necessity for the tank commander to reinforce each tank regiment with motorized regiment's assets. The addition of an artillery battalion to the tank regiment, gives a great deal more firepower under direct control of the regimental commander. The division commander then has greater flexibility in the use of his artillery resources to influence the battle. 122 mm PCL-161 & PLL-09 and 155 mm caliber self-propelled artillery PCL-181 (and also 9 mobile 81 mm mortars or 120 mm caliber gun vehicles, in every PLA's tri-combined arms battalion) for direct-fire and 370 mm MLRS & 300 mm PHL-03 MLRS to fire deep into the enemy’s rear, have increased the firepower available to army and front commanders. PLA believes that it can outgun the US in artillery development with hostile electronic environment. However, UAV used, do not engage in terrain-masking, as that will lead to loss of data-link control. PLA have a combined arms structure as well as a comprehensive array of combat-support elements, but it does not include the airborne units (its most important feature is its light-armoured mechanized force). Anti-radar seeker sub-munitions and smart loiter munitions are going to extend the range of PLA artillery and its lethality, thus altering the deterrence correlation in the future. These improvements, along with anti-tank capabilities (ATGM), greatly enhance area coverage and counter-battery support to subordinate divisions. General-purpose and attack helicopter units (and UAVs) now provides combined arms & engineers regiment with a highly maneuverable and versatile platform for reconnaissance, command and control (C2), and fire support. China has a capability edge over India as they have integrated their ground-based & space-based multi-Sensor network grid target navigation (and C2). The Pentagon report on China confirmed Indian intelligence reports that PLA had laid optical fibre cables along the contested 1597 km Ladakh LAC for faster war deployment and decision-making. China is focusing on attrition warfare, not using troops, but using AI-based, all-domain 全域作战, mobile, warfare tech, to disaggregate adversary's ISR capabilities and affect its adversary's ability to make decisions & take critical actions in the early stages of conflict.
In contrast with India, Chinese airforce's key strength is in SIGINT that backs its Army. China is trying hard to quickly catch up with the US and UK as it plans to develop 3 low-Earth orbit constellations - Hongyun with 864 satellites, Hongyan with 320 satellites. Starting in 2011, the PLAAF began deploying KJ-500 AEW, and BZK-05 UAVs (and J-10s, J-11s, JH-7s for protection) to various airfields, including Lhasa Gonggar and Shigatse Peace Airport, which is about 250 miles west of Lhasa, for a short-term rotational basis, usually from July to September, but some might be there all year. Both airfields are dual-use, so civil aircraft fly in all year long and the runway is built for civil aircraft. The PLAAF also has airfields in Hotan (Hetian) and Kashgar in western Xinjiang, where the PLAAF deployed two J-20s in August 2020. Since 2013 China's airforce main roles have been ISR for "maintaining battlefield transparency", AWACS, H-6K nuke bomber and strategic air transport & air-lift. Another increasingly important element is electronic warfare. It's also tasked with safeguarding air-defences, countering enemy's air-defence with high-tech weapons, countering air-raids, anti-missile deterrence, integrating air and near-space capabilities. Pla's hq-9b is vapourware, otherwise why would China buy s400. yj-62 & yj-12b (& hq-12), both are obsolete in front of spyder air-defence system. Chinese-made Air-Defence can be neutralised by the IAF. Stealth fighters are tasked to be the backbone of the ground strike force. Chinese fighters cannot carry a full weapons load around the Himalayas due to their side having thinner air and their POOR aero jet engines. They don't have the kind of combat aircraft or attack helicopters capable of delivering stand-off precision-guided munition. Indian fighters carry mica-ir missiles (except, Indian MiGs) whereas Chinese fighters carry 18ft-long pl-15 missiles that has longer range.
The fact is that Indian Army has been caught by surprise from 1962 to 2020, also shows that the SIGINT failure (to conduct signal electronic intelligence, airborne ground surveillance and reconnaissance) is why Indian military was not prepared. The IAF weaknesses are less AWACS & poor data-link (targeting data network) on mirage-2000 & Su-30mki. The essence of Air power is effective targeting which depends on accurate, actionable, and real-time intelligence. Besides acquiring actionable real-time intelligence and facilitating targeting, you also need to provide the superior kinetic weapons means for the destruction of targets. The IAF needs long-range missiles on su-30mki to counter Chinese AWACS.
The IAF requires much lighter electronics: seekers, navigation & sensors for jammers, drones, anti-tank missiles. To improve this, the Air Force must be aware of its internal biases and have embedded liaison officers directly & closely working with the Army command level who were coordinating manoeuvre on the battlefield. These force must have “bake in” integration and train “like they fight, fight like they train.” When it comes to China, the Indian Army has to come out of its COIN-OPS and policing the border mindset (which is less about military training but more about public projection to help politicians).
Pakistan Army's strategic use of state-sponsored proxies means Indian Army has to focus on COIN-OPS, which has slowly weakened the capabilities of Indian Army operation environment level by loss of brave Indian Army officers and generating intense interests in COIN-OPS. Moreover, the 3- and 4-star Indian Army Generals during peacetime, have better chance to rise in COIN-OPS, than strengthening the Indian Army's Air-Land Battle capabilities in operation environment level for future wars that they may never command.
The IAF requires much lighter electronics: seekers, navigation & sensors for jammers, drones, anti-tank missiles. To improve this, the Air Force must be aware of its internal biases and have embedded liaison officers directly & closely working with the Army command level who were coordinating manoeuvre on the battlefield. These force must have “bake in” integration and train “like they fight, fight like they train.” When it comes to China, the Indian Army has to come out of its COIN-OPS and policing the border mindset (which is less about military training but more about public projection to help politicians).
Pakistan Army's strategic use of state-sponsored proxies means Indian Army has to focus on COIN-OPS, which has slowly weakened the capabilities of Indian Army operation environment level by loss of brave Indian Army officers and generating intense interests in COIN-OPS. Moreover, the 3- and 4-star Indian Army Generals during peacetime, have better chance to rise in COIN-OPS, than strengthening the Indian Army's Air-Land Battle capabilities in operation environment level for future wars that they may never command.
pla_rocket_force.pdf | |
File Size: | 4936 kb |
File Type: |
IAF's C-17 can easily airlift MBTs (T-72 & T-90S Bhishma) to Leh and high-altitude landing grounds in Arunachal Pradesh due to operational advantage on Indian side. IAF has activated 6 high-altitude landing grounds near the border – Walong, Ziro, Along, Tuting, Passighat and Mechuka. A total of 3,000 sensitive bases, including 600 highly sensitive installations of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force have been identified. A parliamentary panel had come down hard on the defence ministry for failing to take any concrete measures to beef up security at frontline "vulnerable" military bases. Defence ministry has identified four strategic rail lines along the India-China border -- Missamari-Tenga-Tawang (378 km), Bilaspur-Manali-Leh (498 km), Pasighat-Tezu-Rupai (227 km) and North Lakhimpur-Bame-Silapathar (249 km). India will build 96 more temperature controlled integrated ITBP border outposts (BoPs) along the 3,488 km long India-China border bringing a total to 272. 42 roads out of 59, with a length 1,530.38 km has already been completed.
The UPA government signed off on the border infrastructure boost in 2006 with its ‘China Study Group’ headed by the NSA, setting ambitious targets to complete 61 Indo-China Border Roads (ICBR) across the various Indian states facing the LAC by 2012. The Border Road Organisation (BRO), however, was unable to deliver. BRO had been given the task to build 61 of the 73 strategic Indo-China Border Roads (ICBRs) having a total length of 3,409 kilometers. Apart from the 231 roads being constructed/upgraded, 133 completed roads are exclusively entrusted to Border Roads Organisation in J&K for maintenance. A CAG report tabled in Parliament in 2017 noted that only 15 of the planned 61 roads had been completed. The projects had incurred massive cost overruns, 98% of the Rs 4,644 crore estimate had been swallowed in building just 22 roads. Only seven of the remaining 46 roads were complete by March 2016, with the deadline for the remaining ones extended to 2021.
There were various reasons for this, chief among them being the peculiar structure and diffused accountability of the BRO. Created in 1960, it built roads for the military but was under the Ministry of Road Transport & Highways (MoRTH). Its in-house General Reserve Engineer Force (GREF) cadre sparred with IA engineers who manned the BRO. An agency created with a unique character lost its uniqueness and envisaged efficiency, it had dual controls, it was under the administrative control of the MoD but the MoRTH released its funds. Add to that the natural obstacles of building roads along the world’s highest mountain range. Based on the Indian Army’s strategic requirement, 231 roads of a total length of 7122.47 km in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) have been included in the long-term roll-on works plan (LTRoWP) for construction/upgrading out of which 157 roads are planned for completion up to 2020 and the remaining 73 or 74 roads after 2020. All 60 existing bailey-bridges in Ladakh need to be converted into bridges built of concrete. Only 20 concrete bridges have been built, with another 40 more to go.
The UPA government signed off on the border infrastructure boost in 2006 with its ‘China Study Group’ headed by the NSA, setting ambitious targets to complete 61 Indo-China Border Roads (ICBR) across the various Indian states facing the LAC by 2012. The Border Road Organisation (BRO), however, was unable to deliver. BRO had been given the task to build 61 of the 73 strategic Indo-China Border Roads (ICBRs) having a total length of 3,409 kilometers. Apart from the 231 roads being constructed/upgraded, 133 completed roads are exclusively entrusted to Border Roads Organisation in J&K for maintenance. A CAG report tabled in Parliament in 2017 noted that only 15 of the planned 61 roads had been completed. The projects had incurred massive cost overruns, 98% of the Rs 4,644 crore estimate had been swallowed in building just 22 roads. Only seven of the remaining 46 roads were complete by March 2016, with the deadline for the remaining ones extended to 2021.
There were various reasons for this, chief among them being the peculiar structure and diffused accountability of the BRO. Created in 1960, it built roads for the military but was under the Ministry of Road Transport & Highways (MoRTH). Its in-house General Reserve Engineer Force (GREF) cadre sparred with IA engineers who manned the BRO. An agency created with a unique character lost its uniqueness and envisaged efficiency, it had dual controls, it was under the administrative control of the MoD but the MoRTH released its funds. Add to that the natural obstacles of building roads along the world’s highest mountain range. Based on the Indian Army’s strategic requirement, 231 roads of a total length of 7122.47 km in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) have been included in the long-term roll-on works plan (LTRoWP) for construction/upgrading out of which 157 roads are planned for completion up to 2020 and the remaining 73 or 74 roads after 2020. All 60 existing bailey-bridges in Ladakh need to be converted into bridges built of concrete. Only 20 concrete bridges have been built, with another 40 more to go.
| |
"It seems we score a breakthrough at the Skunk Works every decade, so if you invite me back in 10 years, I'll be able to tell you what we are doing [now]. I can tell you about a contract we just received a few weeks ago. We have been assigned the task of getting E.T. back home."
| |
Third "disruptive technologies" revolution in warfare (AI & EW could come as a nasty surprise on the battlefield): You can do everything right but do Electronic Warfare (EW) & mountain artillery gun wrong, and still lose. US DoD is juggling more than 685 AI projects, out of which at least 232 projects are being handled by the Army. AI-enabled machines can aid target recognition and be expected to perform tasks and change tactics at speeds that human operators cannot. However, AI is currently nowhere close to out-thinking or outflanking humans. China is investing significant amounts of capital into new disruptive technologies, that can act as problem solvers and be force multipliers, for existing military warfare systems (including Psychological warfare). China envisions further improving joint operations and towards application of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. It can shrink the time radius of OODA loops: observe, orient, decide, and act. Indian leadership may not be able to handle cognitive overload and confusing narratives, which will adversely affect at strategic level. Military dictatorships are immune to this, but democracies are highly susceptible to this type of warfare. At this level, the troops may win the battle, but the war is lost.
PLA believes cyber deterrence and reconnaissance should make up a single integrated effort, to achieving information (AI) superiority. In Chinese military, this is as important as space and nuclear deterrence. China is focusing on attrition warfare, not using troops, but using AI-based, all-domain 全域作战, mobile, warfare tech, to disaggregate adversary's ISR capabilities and affect its adversary's ability to make decisions & take critical actions in the early stages of conflict. All domains can be contested for control of resources or degrade the position of the adversary. PLA-SSF's Network Systems Department (NSD) is responsible for signals intelligence and information warfare, with the critical mission of operationalizing PLA's integrated network, cyber, EW operations, and psychological warfare. NSD also helms the PLA-SSF's corps leader training facility, called Information Engineering University. Technical Reconnaissance & Electronic countermeasures focused, General Staff Department (GSD) Third Department (also called GSD's 3PLA) constitutes the backbone of the NSD. The GSD's 4PLA deals with Information warfare.
China is planning to enhance its offensive (ground-based & space-based) networked capabilities (for example to control Loitering drones) within the Army's traditional manoeuvre warfare. Indian-made air-defence pressurized missile containers are not easily transportable across hilly areas due to heavy weight (lighter version is dangerous to use as it has high risk of pressure leakage). Drones can change their flight-profiles, can duck and pop-up with ease, which increases the time for anti-air defence's fire-control to react. It can be used to change the strategic balance of force by revolutionize our doctrine of war as much as nuclear weapons have done. However, UAV do not engage in terrain-masking, as that will lead to loss of data-link control. China’s strategy is to directly link commercial and defense developments. They are looking at land-attack missile jamming EW attack support (DRFM tech) and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) missiles to hit airbases.
China’s 13th Five-Year Plan calls for accelerating research on “majorly influential disruptive technologies”. China's is more wealthy than India and have invested in building war capacity for the kinetic/non-kinetic battles in psychological, cyber, space, AI etc with a superpower by 2029. Presently, PLA is decades behind the US due to the absence of AI-enabled hardware, especially the 4-nanometre microchips required for such hardware. China’s semiconductor industry has been able to produce only 14-nanometre microchips. PLAN is self-reliant while supplying Pakistan and is patrolling the India Ocean and along Bhutan border. India cannot separately invest in all three military service (plus cyber & space warfare) and keep adapting quickly to the changes. The situation can easily turn dire as Indian military will have shortages of imported spares and equipment during a war. Conversely, any nation that is slow to adapt to generational change opens itself to catastrophic defeat. Smart systems allow for both outwitting enemy defenses is more valued than having numerical advantage. And the possibilities are endless. PLA is the world's largest active military, with 1.483 million troops, excluding its missiles' division.
In 2017, China designated Alibaba, Baidu, iFlytek, and Tencent as the country’s official “AI Champions,” with SenseTime joining in 2018. In 2019, China added 10 new companies, including Huawei, Hikvision, Megvii, and Yitu, to the champions list. China seeks to lead the shift to “intelligentized warfare” such as cloud computing, big data analytics, quantum information, and unmanned systems, for military applications, through its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Development Strategy and by reforming both its research and development (R&D) as well as strategy and doctrine organizations. AI-ready sensors linked to fiber-optic C2 networks can aid decision-making like autonomous vulnerability analysis of man-made activity big-data to find of exploitable intelligence and plan during war. The Pentagon report on China confirmed Indian intelligence reports that PLA had laid optical fibre cables along the contested 1597 km Ladakh LAC for faster war deployment and decision-making. China's ability to leverage big data will depend upon its ability to obtain large quantities of quality data from foreign nations. Due to information sharing requirements with the PRC’s security services as required by PRC laws, worldwide expansion of 5G networks by PRC companies will challenge the security and resiliency of other countries’ networks.
While a war is being conducted on the battlefield, in the cognitive domain, a narrative is concurrently created to control the perception of the war. Large social media platforms have become the ‘main battleground for cognitive games and the main channel to influence people’s cognition.’ On these platforms, various short videos have become the ‘first scene’ for the public to understand various major events like a conflict or war. If one is technologically able to disrupt the adversary’s ability to communicate, it is possible to effectively suppress an adversary’s narrative. Military operations have a key supporting role to live updates on social media and allow for targeted disruption of the adversary. In fast-changing conditions, an ad hoc approach don't work. This requires a shift of gears from strategy as planning to strategy as learning. Embedding this adaptive capability is the only route to a sustainable advantage. Use the whole of government, both offensively and defensively. AI can be used as a force multiplier. One that helps us to make decisions faster and more rigorously, to integrate across all domains. Indian leadership may not be able to handle cognitive overload and confusing narratives. If there's anything that the first two waves of the digital revolution have taught us, it's that long-term U.S. leadership in technology is not assured. The first wave of the digital revolution emphasized democracy and human rights, but gave way to a second wave that allows authoritarian governments to infringe on those rights. It is critical to understand how to incorporate democratic order and values into our system while respecting privacy, civil liberties and rights.
PLA believes cyber deterrence and reconnaissance should make up a single integrated effort, to achieving information (AI) superiority. In Chinese military, this is as important as space and nuclear deterrence. China is focusing on attrition warfare, not using troops, but using AI-based, all-domain 全域作战, mobile, warfare tech, to disaggregate adversary's ISR capabilities and affect its adversary's ability to make decisions & take critical actions in the early stages of conflict. All domains can be contested for control of resources or degrade the position of the adversary. PLA-SSF's Network Systems Department (NSD) is responsible for signals intelligence and information warfare, with the critical mission of operationalizing PLA's integrated network, cyber, EW operations, and psychological warfare. NSD also helms the PLA-SSF's corps leader training facility, called Information Engineering University. Technical Reconnaissance & Electronic countermeasures focused, General Staff Department (GSD) Third Department (also called GSD's 3PLA) constitutes the backbone of the NSD. The GSD's 4PLA deals with Information warfare.
China is planning to enhance its offensive (ground-based & space-based) networked capabilities (for example to control Loitering drones) within the Army's traditional manoeuvre warfare. Indian-made air-defence pressurized missile containers are not easily transportable across hilly areas due to heavy weight (lighter version is dangerous to use as it has high risk of pressure leakage). Drones can change their flight-profiles, can duck and pop-up with ease, which increases the time for anti-air defence's fire-control to react. It can be used to change the strategic balance of force by revolutionize our doctrine of war as much as nuclear weapons have done. However, UAV do not engage in terrain-masking, as that will lead to loss of data-link control. China’s strategy is to directly link commercial and defense developments. They are looking at land-attack missile jamming EW attack support (DRFM tech) and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) missiles to hit airbases.
China’s 13th Five-Year Plan calls for accelerating research on “majorly influential disruptive technologies”. China's is more wealthy than India and have invested in building war capacity for the kinetic/non-kinetic battles in psychological, cyber, space, AI etc with a superpower by 2029. Presently, PLA is decades behind the US due to the absence of AI-enabled hardware, especially the 4-nanometre microchips required for such hardware. China’s semiconductor industry has been able to produce only 14-nanometre microchips. PLAN is self-reliant while supplying Pakistan and is patrolling the India Ocean and along Bhutan border. India cannot separately invest in all three military service (plus cyber & space warfare) and keep adapting quickly to the changes. The situation can easily turn dire as Indian military will have shortages of imported spares and equipment during a war. Conversely, any nation that is slow to adapt to generational change opens itself to catastrophic defeat. Smart systems allow for both outwitting enemy defenses is more valued than having numerical advantage. And the possibilities are endless. PLA is the world's largest active military, with 1.483 million troops, excluding its missiles' division.
In 2017, China designated Alibaba, Baidu, iFlytek, and Tencent as the country’s official “AI Champions,” with SenseTime joining in 2018. In 2019, China added 10 new companies, including Huawei, Hikvision, Megvii, and Yitu, to the champions list. China seeks to lead the shift to “intelligentized warfare” such as cloud computing, big data analytics, quantum information, and unmanned systems, for military applications, through its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Development Strategy and by reforming both its research and development (R&D) as well as strategy and doctrine organizations. AI-ready sensors linked to fiber-optic C2 networks can aid decision-making like autonomous vulnerability analysis of man-made activity big-data to find of exploitable intelligence and plan during war. The Pentagon report on China confirmed Indian intelligence reports that PLA had laid optical fibre cables along the contested 1597 km Ladakh LAC for faster war deployment and decision-making. China's ability to leverage big data will depend upon its ability to obtain large quantities of quality data from foreign nations. Due to information sharing requirements with the PRC’s security services as required by PRC laws, worldwide expansion of 5G networks by PRC companies will challenge the security and resiliency of other countries’ networks.
While a war is being conducted on the battlefield, in the cognitive domain, a narrative is concurrently created to control the perception of the war. Large social media platforms have become the ‘main battleground for cognitive games and the main channel to influence people’s cognition.’ On these platforms, various short videos have become the ‘first scene’ for the public to understand various major events like a conflict or war. If one is technologically able to disrupt the adversary’s ability to communicate, it is possible to effectively suppress an adversary’s narrative. Military operations have a key supporting role to live updates on social media and allow for targeted disruption of the adversary. In fast-changing conditions, an ad hoc approach don't work. This requires a shift of gears from strategy as planning to strategy as learning. Embedding this adaptive capability is the only route to a sustainable advantage. Use the whole of government, both offensively and defensively. AI can be used as a force multiplier. One that helps us to make decisions faster and more rigorously, to integrate across all domains. Indian leadership may not be able to handle cognitive overload and confusing narratives. If there's anything that the first two waves of the digital revolution have taught us, it's that long-term U.S. leadership in technology is not assured. The first wave of the digital revolution emphasized democracy and human rights, but gave way to a second wave that allows authoritarian governments to infringe on those rights. It is critical to understand how to incorporate democratic order and values into our system while respecting privacy, civil liberties and rights.
There is a popular Chinese folklore about how a hero was able to totally incapacitated his enemy, by suddenly attacking with a new weapon, instead of fighting according to "the rules".
It is the PLARF’s amphibious assault forces that are tasked to be the first to attack and occupy “big island” targets, with the PLA Marines being tasked to invade and occupy the smaller shoals and reefs, deployed from vessels like Type 071 landing platform docks (LPD) and Zubr high-speed hover-crafts (and Z-8 helicopters for Air-Assault and Special Ops mobile raids against coastal defences).
This would be followed by landing Tri-Combined-Arms Amphibious Brigades that are tasked to defend their gains. From here, China plans to use its hypersonic glide missiles against U.S. vessels. In addition, on Hainan Island, the PLA Rocket Forces has DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles with EMP warheads, to deny American carrier battle group their network-centric war-waging capabilities.
“We maintain, on the contrary, that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase ‘with the addition of other means’ because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. In essentials, that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs.” Carl von Clausewitz
This would be followed by landing Tri-Combined-Arms Amphibious Brigades that are tasked to defend their gains. From here, China plans to use its hypersonic glide missiles against U.S. vessels. In addition, on Hainan Island, the PLA Rocket Forces has DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles with EMP warheads, to deny American carrier battle group their network-centric war-waging capabilities.
“We maintain, on the contrary, that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase ‘with the addition of other means’ because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. In essentials, that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs.” Carl von Clausewitz
Intra-theater connectors provide the air and surface means to move forces and supplies over operational distances. These connectors are defined by their ability to deliver high volumes of cargo over strategic distance.
Building organizational structures within the Army is vital for doctrinal innovation. The US entered WW-II with the Army’s horse-bound 26th Cavalry Regiment engaging Japanese tanks during the Philippines campaign. By the end of the war, the Army had evolved into a competent and robust mechanized force. When the US entered the war, planners concluded that the U.S. would need over 200 infantry divisions and about 280 air combat groups to ultimately defeat the Axis powers. However, U.S. leadership knew that if they built so many infantry divisions, the manpower they would need to work the arsenal of democracy wouldn’t be there. They therefore made a conscious decision to hold the number of infantry divisions to no more than 90 while keeping the 280 air combat groups. The thinking was that a “heavy fisted air arm” would help make up for the lack of infantry parity with the Axis powers. The “90-division gamble” turned out to be a winner. As a result, throughout the Cold War, the U.S. never tried to match the Soviet Union tank for tank, plane for plane, or soldier for soldier. It instead sought ways to “offset” the potential adversary's advantages.
The US military evolved over time to meet new and disruptive challenges. The large WW2 battle network was the British home air defense network had a sustainment & regeneration, inter-connected radar grid and C3I grid; that allowed the British to continue fighting and restore combat losses. In contrast, the French War college doctrine became overly fixated with well-balanced static defense and lessons learned from WW-1. There were voices inside the French Army who advocated for a different approach. The system potentially allowed for the creation of incubators, yet no one was in a position to extract their ideas. Charles de Gaulle, for instance, pushed for the adoption of a professional Army organized into mechanized formations. Marshal Philippe Pétain, on the other hand, wanted a large military composed largely of light infantry designed to fight in a defense-in-depth. Both De Gaulle’s and Pétain’s proposals were ignored, largely since they would have put key industrial locations of France, centered on the Franco-German border, directly into the conflict zone. The French Army was stuck maintaining a “business as usual” approach. If the French High Command introduced too radical a change to the Army’s doctrine, the reserve units responsible for fleshing out standing divisions might arrive with a range of different training levels.-warontherocks
An offset strategy is some means of asymmetrically compensating for a disadvantage, particularly in a military competition. Atomic weapons could confidently take on and defeat a larger armed force. The use of two nuclear weapons in the closing stages of WW2 announced to the world that the US was a nuclear power (in fact, the only nuclear power for a while). In the 1950s, Eisenhower knew that having a “peacetime” standing army of that "90-division" was neither politically nor fiscally sustainable. Eisenhower’s New Look policy (or first offset doctrine or 1OS) relied on the US strategic nuclear triad arsenal for security. During the 1970s, the situation stagnated when the Soviets achieved nuclear parity with the U.S. and then, quickly surpassed the US arsenal numerically and qualitatively. Soviet armored units in Europe significantly outnumbered those of NATO, and the Soviets could no longer be deterred from an invasion of Central Europe. The US and its NATO allies spent decades developing technologies and operational concepts, like Follow-on-Force-Attack (FOFA) within integrated battle, that leveraged Soviet weaknesses in mobilizing forces and projecting power across Europe. Army planners realized that they would only succeed if, once a breach was achieved, they could disrupt the enemy’s rear areas.
Fast-forward twenty years. The operational concept that emerged in the 1970s and the 1980s, was the second offset (Air-Land battle) doctrine, also called the "holding strategy" by Robert O. Work. This really caught the Soviets’ attention, and the Soviets concluded the game results were accurate. They realized a conventional attack was not likely to succeed because NATO would be able to defeat their forces before they reached their planned penetration point. Soviet military theorists called a “military-technical revolution.” The second offset battle network had all the same characteristics of the British home air defense network in WW2, but it focused on the Air-Land battle. The digital microprocessor age had arrived, and the application of this technology to weapons proved to be decisive in the US maintaining a global edge. It was a high-tech period when the U.S. invested heavily to increase battlefield awareness (outfitting long-range sensor-shooter network like stealth & surveillance aircrafts with over the horizon technologies) and long-range strike capability (precision guided munitions, but it could be used only at line-of-sight ranges) deep behind enemy lines against Warsaw Pact first, second and third echelon forces (while reducing friendly-fire). The concept sought to disrupt the ability of the adversary to mobilize forces that would exploit breakthroughs along NATO’s defensive perimeter. There were lots of realistic force-on-force trainings. The key strategic mainstay of US strategy is to deter aggression, and if this fails, then to deny the adversarial objectives by ultimately defeating the enemy, however with China, America is interested in managing risks.
The US military underwent a dramatic transformation since the Vietnam War in the 1960s. Soviets actually understood the implication of the second offset (Air-Land battle) doctrine long before most American strategists did. The Gulf War proved that the US military’s integration of emerging technologies into its platforms had been worthwhile. PLA has been studying the US military since at least 1989, figuring out its weak points and how to defeat it. PLA capabilities have made it too hard to fight them conventionally. China took note of when in Gulf war, US demonstrated that the side without constant air-superiority (and skilled coordination using secured satcoms), the commanders can quickly lose their initiative and land operations pay dearly. They also noted the success of the US in integrating operations in land, sea, and air domains, while PLA leaders sought to derive specific lessons learned regarding electronic warfare, air defense, troop mobility, and air and sea coordination in the First Gulf War. China has invested heavily to neutralize US military' precision strike capabilities and to attack key vulnerabilities, especially US reliance on open seas and large ships. They also studied airpower lessons learned from US operations in the late 1990s and 2000s during the Kosovo War.
The importance of cruise missile became crystallised when the American Tomahawk cruise missiles crippled Iraq’s command and communication centres, leaving its armed forces exposed to air attacks. Just a few hundred cruise missiles were able to isolate 1.2 million strong Iraqi military in the space of few hours. The air-power destroyed Iraqi tanks with missiles and within 4 hours of fighting, the Marines destroyed 75 Iraqi armored vehicles. Similarly, with two helicopter gunships, an outnumbered group of Marine Reserve were able to destroy 50 vehicles. By contrast, the Soviets lost that initiative in Afghanistan when lethal Stinger MANPADS were introduced. China appears to have surpassed Russia in the MANPADS department and is closing in on the Stinger. China "three attacks" means countering US stealth aircrafts, cruise missiles, and armed ASW helicopters.
During Operation Desert Storm: 42 F-117A had 1271 attack missions, 84 F-111 had 4000 missions, 75 CH-53 helicopters had 2045 missions, 84 F/A-18 had 5047 missions, 120 F-15 had 2200 missions, 120 CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters had 1601 missions, 144 A-10 had 8100 missions and 249 F-16 had 13,500 missions. The B-52G Stratofortresses flew 1,624 missions, dropped 72,000 weapons, delivered 25,700 tons of munitions on area targets, and had a mission-capable rate of 81%--2 % higher than its peacetime rate. The B-52Gs dropped 29% of all US bombs and 38% of all USAF bombs during the war.
"I know the one thing we will get wrong is we will mispredict the next major conflict. That's the only thing I know. I believe with the Chinese threat, the way to approach that is a very subtle and indirect approach … irregular warfare. My belief is that authoritarian, totalitarian governments fear one thing: Popular discontent and popular uprising… The thing that they fear most is not fleets of aircraft carriers, tanks, or expeditionary logistics. They fear information. And that’s one of the key components of irregular warfare. It will work through it. Let’s go ahead and use a little more … information, economics and diplomacy, and let’s go ahead and back off on the military for a little while, because we have time. If we’re wrong, we can spin things up. If you’re a business person, and you’re in an unpredictable business climate, what do you do? You hedge. We can’t go all in on any one thing. We need to have a wide range of capabilities." Miller said during an April 4 talk with the CATO Institute. “We cannot fight in that case in protracted war because we don’t have sufficient supply of munitions.” Wargames demonstrate that the United States could deplete its entire arsenal of LRASMs within one single week of fighting with China. “Some of the machining tools that are needed to open up new production lines are just very large, complex machines themselves that take time to fabricate and time to install”.
The US military evolved over time to meet new and disruptive challenges. The large WW2 battle network was the British home air defense network had a sustainment & regeneration, inter-connected radar grid and C3I grid; that allowed the British to continue fighting and restore combat losses. In contrast, the French War college doctrine became overly fixated with well-balanced static defense and lessons learned from WW-1. There were voices inside the French Army who advocated for a different approach. The system potentially allowed for the creation of incubators, yet no one was in a position to extract their ideas. Charles de Gaulle, for instance, pushed for the adoption of a professional Army organized into mechanized formations. Marshal Philippe Pétain, on the other hand, wanted a large military composed largely of light infantry designed to fight in a defense-in-depth. Both De Gaulle’s and Pétain’s proposals were ignored, largely since they would have put key industrial locations of France, centered on the Franco-German border, directly into the conflict zone. The French Army was stuck maintaining a “business as usual” approach. If the French High Command introduced too radical a change to the Army’s doctrine, the reserve units responsible for fleshing out standing divisions might arrive with a range of different training levels.-warontherocks
An offset strategy is some means of asymmetrically compensating for a disadvantage, particularly in a military competition. Atomic weapons could confidently take on and defeat a larger armed force. The use of two nuclear weapons in the closing stages of WW2 announced to the world that the US was a nuclear power (in fact, the only nuclear power for a while). In the 1950s, Eisenhower knew that having a “peacetime” standing army of that "90-division" was neither politically nor fiscally sustainable. Eisenhower’s New Look policy (or first offset doctrine or 1OS) relied on the US strategic nuclear triad arsenal for security. During the 1970s, the situation stagnated when the Soviets achieved nuclear parity with the U.S. and then, quickly surpassed the US arsenal numerically and qualitatively. Soviet armored units in Europe significantly outnumbered those of NATO, and the Soviets could no longer be deterred from an invasion of Central Europe. The US and its NATO allies spent decades developing technologies and operational concepts, like Follow-on-Force-Attack (FOFA) within integrated battle, that leveraged Soviet weaknesses in mobilizing forces and projecting power across Europe. Army planners realized that they would only succeed if, once a breach was achieved, they could disrupt the enemy’s rear areas.
Fast-forward twenty years. The operational concept that emerged in the 1970s and the 1980s, was the second offset (Air-Land battle) doctrine, also called the "holding strategy" by Robert O. Work. This really caught the Soviets’ attention, and the Soviets concluded the game results were accurate. They realized a conventional attack was not likely to succeed because NATO would be able to defeat their forces before they reached their planned penetration point. Soviet military theorists called a “military-technical revolution.” The second offset battle network had all the same characteristics of the British home air defense network in WW2, but it focused on the Air-Land battle. The digital microprocessor age had arrived, and the application of this technology to weapons proved to be decisive in the US maintaining a global edge. It was a high-tech period when the U.S. invested heavily to increase battlefield awareness (outfitting long-range sensor-shooter network like stealth & surveillance aircrafts with over the horizon technologies) and long-range strike capability (precision guided munitions, but it could be used only at line-of-sight ranges) deep behind enemy lines against Warsaw Pact first, second and third echelon forces (while reducing friendly-fire). The concept sought to disrupt the ability of the adversary to mobilize forces that would exploit breakthroughs along NATO’s defensive perimeter. There were lots of realistic force-on-force trainings. The key strategic mainstay of US strategy is to deter aggression, and if this fails, then to deny the adversarial objectives by ultimately defeating the enemy, however with China, America is interested in managing risks.
The US military underwent a dramatic transformation since the Vietnam War in the 1960s. Soviets actually understood the implication of the second offset (Air-Land battle) doctrine long before most American strategists did. The Gulf War proved that the US military’s integration of emerging technologies into its platforms had been worthwhile. PLA has been studying the US military since at least 1989, figuring out its weak points and how to defeat it. PLA capabilities have made it too hard to fight them conventionally. China took note of when in Gulf war, US demonstrated that the side without constant air-superiority (and skilled coordination using secured satcoms), the commanders can quickly lose their initiative and land operations pay dearly. They also noted the success of the US in integrating operations in land, sea, and air domains, while PLA leaders sought to derive specific lessons learned regarding electronic warfare, air defense, troop mobility, and air and sea coordination in the First Gulf War. China has invested heavily to neutralize US military' precision strike capabilities and to attack key vulnerabilities, especially US reliance on open seas and large ships. They also studied airpower lessons learned from US operations in the late 1990s and 2000s during the Kosovo War.
The importance of cruise missile became crystallised when the American Tomahawk cruise missiles crippled Iraq’s command and communication centres, leaving its armed forces exposed to air attacks. Just a few hundred cruise missiles were able to isolate 1.2 million strong Iraqi military in the space of few hours. The air-power destroyed Iraqi tanks with missiles and within 4 hours of fighting, the Marines destroyed 75 Iraqi armored vehicles. Similarly, with two helicopter gunships, an outnumbered group of Marine Reserve were able to destroy 50 vehicles. By contrast, the Soviets lost that initiative in Afghanistan when lethal Stinger MANPADS were introduced. China appears to have surpassed Russia in the MANPADS department and is closing in on the Stinger. China "three attacks" means countering US stealth aircrafts, cruise missiles, and armed ASW helicopters.
During Operation Desert Storm: 42 F-117A had 1271 attack missions, 84 F-111 had 4000 missions, 75 CH-53 helicopters had 2045 missions, 84 F/A-18 had 5047 missions, 120 F-15 had 2200 missions, 120 CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters had 1601 missions, 144 A-10 had 8100 missions and 249 F-16 had 13,500 missions. The B-52G Stratofortresses flew 1,624 missions, dropped 72,000 weapons, delivered 25,700 tons of munitions on area targets, and had a mission-capable rate of 81%--2 % higher than its peacetime rate. The B-52Gs dropped 29% of all US bombs and 38% of all USAF bombs during the war.
"I know the one thing we will get wrong is we will mispredict the next major conflict. That's the only thing I know. I believe with the Chinese threat, the way to approach that is a very subtle and indirect approach … irregular warfare. My belief is that authoritarian, totalitarian governments fear one thing: Popular discontent and popular uprising… The thing that they fear most is not fleets of aircraft carriers, tanks, or expeditionary logistics. They fear information. And that’s one of the key components of irregular warfare. It will work through it. Let’s go ahead and use a little more … information, economics and diplomacy, and let’s go ahead and back off on the military for a little while, because we have time. If we’re wrong, we can spin things up. If you’re a business person, and you’re in an unpredictable business climate, what do you do? You hedge. We can’t go all in on any one thing. We need to have a wide range of capabilities." Miller said during an April 4 talk with the CATO Institute. “We cannot fight in that case in protracted war because we don’t have sufficient supply of munitions.” Wargames demonstrate that the United States could deplete its entire arsenal of LRASMs within one single week of fighting with China. “Some of the machining tools that are needed to open up new production lines are just very large, complex machines themselves that take time to fabricate and time to install”.
When the opponent has better position or some other factor, that is to his advantage, then a direct frontal attack on his position will certainly cost us dearly. In this situation, we must find a way to retreat from the opponent's advantageous formation, and at the same time try to induce the opponent to play within our field of advantage. China plans to Lure the Tiger Out of the Mountains: China plans to organise and equip its forces for offensive and defensive action on the island bases in the Pacific Ocean.
US enjoys unrivaled structural power, due both to its reserve currency and because it maintains the world’s most powerful military. US is a mecca for money-laundering from abroad. US wants to constructively engage the China for one very pragmatic reason: all the money made by the China (by keeping the value of their Yuan currency artificially low over the past 2 decades has led to the China having an enormous balance of trade surplus with Western powers like US, Canada and EU) MUST be recovered back one way or another, and what better way than to address the trade imbalances and make China contribute more funds to the IMF and World Bank. Don't ever accept that China's trillion dollar forex reserves are for permanent keeps. The Chinese have decided to use the trillion dollar forex reserves to do major investments in infrastructure, both domestic and foreign. Thus, Chinese are acquiring markets, resources and influence.
The US remains home to the world's largest market as well as leading technology developers and companies and the global leader in technological innovation. America's leadership with partnerships of nations are invaluable in a global crisis, as seen by the international policy response after the financial crisis. In fact, future policies are unlikely to be effective without such international coordination. The increasing use of hybrid warfare and gray-zone tactics by China reflects their aim to strategically challenge the international structure through coercive means, while also pursuing asymmetric approaches, to compete below and beyond the level of traditional direct conventional military interaction.
Lure the Tiger Out of the Mountains: When the opponent has better position or some other factor, that is to his advantage, then a direct frontal attack on his position will certainly cost us dearly. In this situation, we must find a way to retreat from the opponent's advantageous formation, and at the same time try to induce the opponent to play within our field of advantage. Industries that rely on permanent magnets are particularly vulnerable to disruptions in the supply chain. These magnets are also necessary in key parts of the U.S. security industry, including missile-guidance systems and drone technology. Rare earth metals (REE), a group of 17 elements used in the manufacture of semiconductors, batteries, cameras, electro-optics, glass strengthening, aircraft engines, smart weapons, nuclear weapons and advanced medical systems, have taken center stage in the U.S.-China trade war. Many have properties that make them ideal for producing high quality magnets. China produces more than 80% of global output, and this dominance of the market puts it in a powerful bargaining position with the United States and other developed economies. China only has an estimated 30% of global reserves of rare earths. These elements, which are not actually that rare, can be mined through various methods.
China largely controls prices, keeping them low and making it difficult to compete. Chinese industrial policy in fact mirrored the U.S. approach in the 1950s and 1960s, when the Ames Laboratory and Rare-earth Information Center (RIC) used state investment to bolster the efforts of the private sector. While state support has declined rapidly in the United States (RIC was gone by 2002), Chinese institutions have maintained investment in human capital, price controls, and industrial policy. After China allegedly cut off rare earth exports to Japan in the midst of a territorial dispute in 2010, the Japanese state and private sectors aggressively moved to lessen their dependence on China, but the U.S. did not. However, in a surprising turn, China has agreed to buy two types of rare earth metals from the US as part of an initial trade deal with signed in U.S. by Chinese Vice Premier Liu He and US President Donald Trump, that gives China two years to ramp up purchases of hundreds of U.S. products, including scandium and yttrium, two of the 17 rare earths commonly used in computer electronics. China is expected to become a net importer of Rare earth metals (REE) by 2025 that can only be satisfied by the continuous and accelerated development of new mines in Africa.
A single mining and processing facility costs around one billion dollars. One major reason China dominates rare earth production is because the CCP has a weak environmental regulation regime. Because rare earth production, especially during refinement, poses significant dangers to the environment, the U.S. government stringently regulates it. Though a company may meet all federal regulations, it still typically needs to wait at least ten years to receive a permit. Litigation can add several more years to the permitting process. So long as China maintains a monopoly on rare earth production, there will never be innovation to make production cleaner.
The US remains home to the world's largest market as well as leading technology developers and companies and the global leader in technological innovation. America's leadership with partnerships of nations are invaluable in a global crisis, as seen by the international policy response after the financial crisis. In fact, future policies are unlikely to be effective without such international coordination. The increasing use of hybrid warfare and gray-zone tactics by China reflects their aim to strategically challenge the international structure through coercive means, while also pursuing asymmetric approaches, to compete below and beyond the level of traditional direct conventional military interaction.
Lure the Tiger Out of the Mountains: When the opponent has better position or some other factor, that is to his advantage, then a direct frontal attack on his position will certainly cost us dearly. In this situation, we must find a way to retreat from the opponent's advantageous formation, and at the same time try to induce the opponent to play within our field of advantage. Industries that rely on permanent magnets are particularly vulnerable to disruptions in the supply chain. These magnets are also necessary in key parts of the U.S. security industry, including missile-guidance systems and drone technology. Rare earth metals (REE), a group of 17 elements used in the manufacture of semiconductors, batteries, cameras, electro-optics, glass strengthening, aircraft engines, smart weapons, nuclear weapons and advanced medical systems, have taken center stage in the U.S.-China trade war. Many have properties that make them ideal for producing high quality magnets. China produces more than 80% of global output, and this dominance of the market puts it in a powerful bargaining position with the United States and other developed economies. China only has an estimated 30% of global reserves of rare earths. These elements, which are not actually that rare, can be mined through various methods.
China largely controls prices, keeping them low and making it difficult to compete. Chinese industrial policy in fact mirrored the U.S. approach in the 1950s and 1960s, when the Ames Laboratory and Rare-earth Information Center (RIC) used state investment to bolster the efforts of the private sector. While state support has declined rapidly in the United States (RIC was gone by 2002), Chinese institutions have maintained investment in human capital, price controls, and industrial policy. After China allegedly cut off rare earth exports to Japan in the midst of a territorial dispute in 2010, the Japanese state and private sectors aggressively moved to lessen their dependence on China, but the U.S. did not. However, in a surprising turn, China has agreed to buy two types of rare earth metals from the US as part of an initial trade deal with signed in U.S. by Chinese Vice Premier Liu He and US President Donald Trump, that gives China two years to ramp up purchases of hundreds of U.S. products, including scandium and yttrium, two of the 17 rare earths commonly used in computer electronics. China is expected to become a net importer of Rare earth metals (REE) by 2025 that can only be satisfied by the continuous and accelerated development of new mines in Africa.
A single mining and processing facility costs around one billion dollars. One major reason China dominates rare earth production is because the CCP has a weak environmental regulation regime. Because rare earth production, especially during refinement, poses significant dangers to the environment, the U.S. government stringently regulates it. Though a company may meet all federal regulations, it still typically needs to wait at least ten years to receive a permit. Litigation can add several more years to the permitting process. So long as China maintains a monopoly on rare earth production, there will never be innovation to make production cleaner.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-china-came-to-dominate-the-worlds-largest-nickel-source-for-electric-cars-4c081a12?mod=hp_lead_pos4
BRI previously known as OBOR is being used for Beidou positioning and navigation system, a rival to the American Global Positioning System (GPS). Currently, 30% of the Malacca traffic (especially large tankers or container ships) pay a large canal transit fee (over $100,000 for a large vessel). A new proposed canal would shorten voyages by 2,200 kms (two days at sea). China is again proposing to fund (under One Belt, One Road) the construction of a 135 kms canal in Thailand to connect the Gulf of Thailand with the Andaman Sea.
In 2013 China had only 14 of 35 Beidou satellites in service. This was sufficient to provide GPS type service for all of China. Beidu also has a special (more accurate and allows messaging) military mode that is only available to the Chinese and Pakistani military. In 2008 China decided to expand its original Beidou 1 regional satnav system to cover the entire planet and compete with GPS, Galileo and Glonass. China has used the experience from this earlier Beidou 1 network to build the world-wide "Beidou 2" system.
Beidou finally became fully operational, providing worldwide coverage, in January 2020 when the last two of its Beidou satellites were put into 21,800 kilometer high circular orbits, joining 22 others in similar obits covering the entire planet, plus six more in 36,000 kilometer high geosynchronous (stationary) orbits. The European Galileo becomes operational worldwide in 2020. The American GPS has been operational since 1978 while the Russian GLONASS achieved that status in 1996. The success of the original GPS satnav system has generated all this competition.
https://www.military.com/daily-news/2023/01/12/attacks-satellites-may-trigger-military-response-us-and-japanese-officials-say.html
At any given time, “there’s as much as 95% excess volume of airspace that isn’t used”. That’s essentially an opportunity cost. I really wish I could fire that long-range missile that’s going to go right though someone else’s lane. If I could validate in real time… that missile corridor is going to be free of any aircraft it might collide with, then that’s an opportunity I’ve created for myself.
Operational environment includes geographical obstacles to military movement & objectives.
Intelligentized warfare utilizes emerging technologies such as AI, 5G networks and quantum computing to disrupt an adversary by attacking their ability to understand and perceive Chinese actions. China has carefully designed its confrontational strategy (sow confusion and chaos by employing deception) to counter America’s traditional way of war. Strategic cognitive overmatch (military-civil grey-zone multi-domain war) and tactical anti-satellite (space) warfare. Indian leadership may not be able to handle cognitive overload and confusing narratives, which will adversely affect at strategic level. Military dictatorships are immune to this, but democracies are highly susceptible to this type of warfare. At this level, the troops may win the battle, but the war is lost. "The enemy diversion you are ignoring is the main attack." Information superiority aims at reducing one’s own observation to action loop (OODA) while elongating the enemy’s loop. The US has a highly capable war-fighting ability, largely descended from a strategy of technical superiority in platforms. The technological advantage the US has maintained over adversaries is slowly decreasing because high-tech systems and components, are now commercially available. Given the shrinking technological advantage, the historically long timeline and high-cost associated with developing new, large, complex weapon capabilities and platforms are no longer adequate.
The current tools available to US field commanders are insufficient to enable them to develop and plan creative operations against changing enemy tactics. Electronic equipments and data storages are getting outdated every 6 months, which is a challenging and expensive process. In the future, you can require every new but simpler things you build to be compatible (on-the-fly) with commercially easily-available (or low-cost, rapid-made) systems-of-systems-enhanced re-useable assets; then create an electronic network and a task force structure optimized to the specific mission. The idea is to replace laborious manual coding with machine-learning C2 algorithms (battle decision aids), so you can connect whatever you need too quickly. That lets you move away, from a fixed and limited list of options, so that you can connect to many pieces that fit together, to form a war-fighting force; where you type in what you want and see the data immediately. However, with this comes inefficiency because of possible duplication of effort.
You automate away the button pushing, so the human operator can function on a more cognitive level. Unmanned expendable systems (with adaptive radar/communications algorithms) are sent together to a battlefield grid (could be in any domain), and they pass the coordinates back, which are then relayed to a non-line-of-sight strike system in the rear, which in turn launches its munitions and takes out the emerging enemy target sets. The cost per defensive shot must be significantly lower than the cost per offensive shot. The goal is for smaller elements to fight as a network (coordinated), to create real kill-chains (complete OODA loops) of non-linear overwhelming effects, to deter and defeat adversaries. These aspects can create thousands upon thousands of simultaneous decision dilemmas for an adversary to prepare for. It doesn’t matter what the enemy does, such attacks would be very difficult to counter (i.e. asymmetry to exploit asymmetries). And if you can blind, deceive, or burn out the enemy’s sensors, it doesn’t matter how many missiles he launches or how smart they are. They will miss.
Chinese are just going to sit in these big rooms: just labelling data, 10 to 12 hours a day, 6 days a week, because they live in an autocratic state. Machines will have to blunt an advancing attack and move to counter it, essentially in micro-seconds. In the not-so-distant future, AI-enabled tools will always be on, following every personnel to provide better recommendations. If you have large numbers of expendable platforms (even with higher failure rate or non-secure component systems), you can fight in the open. There is no single point of failure. However, we must lower-cost counters to enemy salvos. Germany’s blitzkrieg tactics in World War II as an example, where an overwhelming force of armour, motorized infantry, artillery, and air power combined to force a local breakthrough that could then be exploited to continue the advance. The US military must transform itself to a new force that can withstand destruction/disruption/failure of US systems operations and prevail in Air-Land Battles with a peer adversary. Russia said that "whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world."
PLA's approach to information warfare suffers from centralized decision-making and an overconfidence in their own data.
The current tools available to US field commanders are insufficient to enable them to develop and plan creative operations against changing enemy tactics. Electronic equipments and data storages are getting outdated every 6 months, which is a challenging and expensive process. In the future, you can require every new but simpler things you build to be compatible (on-the-fly) with commercially easily-available (or low-cost, rapid-made) systems-of-systems-enhanced re-useable assets; then create an electronic network and a task force structure optimized to the specific mission. The idea is to replace laborious manual coding with machine-learning C2 algorithms (battle decision aids), so you can connect whatever you need too quickly. That lets you move away, from a fixed and limited list of options, so that you can connect to many pieces that fit together, to form a war-fighting force; where you type in what you want and see the data immediately. However, with this comes inefficiency because of possible duplication of effort.
You automate away the button pushing, so the human operator can function on a more cognitive level. Unmanned expendable systems (with adaptive radar/communications algorithms) are sent together to a battlefield grid (could be in any domain), and they pass the coordinates back, which are then relayed to a non-line-of-sight strike system in the rear, which in turn launches its munitions and takes out the emerging enemy target sets. The cost per defensive shot must be significantly lower than the cost per offensive shot. The goal is for smaller elements to fight as a network (coordinated), to create real kill-chains (complete OODA loops) of non-linear overwhelming effects, to deter and defeat adversaries. These aspects can create thousands upon thousands of simultaneous decision dilemmas for an adversary to prepare for. It doesn’t matter what the enemy does, such attacks would be very difficult to counter (i.e. asymmetry to exploit asymmetries). And if you can blind, deceive, or burn out the enemy’s sensors, it doesn’t matter how many missiles he launches or how smart they are. They will miss.
Chinese are just going to sit in these big rooms: just labelling data, 10 to 12 hours a day, 6 days a week, because they live in an autocratic state. Machines will have to blunt an advancing attack and move to counter it, essentially in micro-seconds. In the not-so-distant future, AI-enabled tools will always be on, following every personnel to provide better recommendations. If you have large numbers of expendable platforms (even with higher failure rate or non-secure component systems), you can fight in the open. There is no single point of failure. However, we must lower-cost counters to enemy salvos. Germany’s blitzkrieg tactics in World War II as an example, where an overwhelming force of armour, motorized infantry, artillery, and air power combined to force a local breakthrough that could then be exploited to continue the advance. The US military must transform itself to a new force that can withstand destruction/disruption/failure of US systems operations and prevail in Air-Land Battles with a peer adversary. Russia said that "whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world."
PLA's approach to information warfare suffers from centralized decision-making and an overconfidence in their own data.
2009_dragons_transforming_from_a_mechanized_to_an_informatized_force__thomas_.pdf | |
File Size: | 3080 kb |
File Type: |
Highways in U.S. transformed the U.S. economy; ports in China transformed the Chinese economy. The Silk Road Economic Belt that would run across the Eurasian landmass may provide alternatives that offset some of China’s vulnerabilities along major sea lanes. China would carve out a continental sphere of influence from which it could compete against the United States and other seapowers. Railways, roads, and pipelines, along with PLA bases and logistics facili-ties for landward purposes, would provide secure access to markets across Eurasia. It may be a kind of insurance policy to hedge against resistance, instability, or war at sea. But it is unlikely to supplant the Maritime Silk Road as the dominant mode for China’s future development. This study thus assesses that China cannot profitably go global via a continental strategy without incurring heavy costs or without compromising its returns on investment overseas.
China has tried to use the initiatives of Maritime Silk Road, One belt One Road to establish a more integrated relationship with its neighbours by building transportation facilities. Smaller countries in the region like Sri Lanka, Nepal could not have asked for a more benevolent partner like China who helps in their reconstruction activities and adequately rewards them for the strategic advantages they offer without raising issues such as human rights or democracy. Liberalized market economy and globalization by China does not necessarily promote liberty, human rights and political freedom (that makes leaders more accountable to the citizen) in authoritarian regimes. Debt Trap Diplomacy (DTD) and has been a favorite Chinese tactic for centuries. Nations that currently have large Chinese debts are Sri Lanka, Djibouti, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, the Maldives, Mongolia, Montenegro, Pakistan, Venezuela and Tajikistan.
Case in point is the tactic of loaning poor countries large amounts of money for huge development projects (like ports, roads and railroads). The loans are on terms that look attractive, but eventually much be repaid. When the debtor nation runs into trouble making payments, China offers to reduce the load in return for control (if not majority ownership) of the ports, railroad, airport or whatever. Despite India’s displeasure, a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine is docked at the Colombo port. It is connotative of China trying to establish its military presence in South Asia. China's defense planners recognize that a large-scale effort is required to construct dual-use facilities along key sea lanes. They want overseas ports to refuel, repair and resupply passing Chinese combat ships and submarines; but without having to build full-fledged military-grade bases like the US.
China has been seeking full membership of SAARC arguing that it has a common border with five SAARC member countries. In the southwest, it has been eyeing Gan Base in the Maldives hungrily, although so far without success. In the east, in the Bay of Bengal, it has a sophisticated listening post on the Great Coco Islands, which can monitor all Indian Shipping from Port Blair, Vishakhapatnam, Kolkata, Paradip, etc. (China has another listening post at Hainji island.) It has bases (as well as potential bases, since the PLA Navy (PLAN) enjoys right of usage) at the Myanmar ports of Akyab, Cheduba and Bassein, all of which it is helping to develop into naval ports with facilities for handling ships considerably larger and more sophisticated than what the Myanmar Navy currently possesses or is likely to possess in the near future. Similarly, in the Andaman Sea it has access to Tenassirim, which is most strategically located, fairly close to the Malacca Strait. All these bases or ports where Chinese Naval ships are permitted to dock and refuel, etc, can be used most effectively to block shipping to and from Indian ports.
The Modi government has renamed the “Look East” policy as “Act East”, in an attempt to build a deeper engagement with East Asia and Southeast Asia. India and Vietnam are cooperating in oil and gas exploration in the disputed waters of the South China Sea. The sheer willingness of India to play an active role in the South China Sea, where China has overlapping territorial claims with several countries, has spooked them. China has been wary of India-Japan increasing strategic relationship. China had raised eyebrows when India invited Japan along with the USA to participate in the annual Exercise Malabar in the Western Pacific.
China has put $46 billion in infrastructural investment on the table for its long-time ally Pakistan, is set to build a network of roads, railroads, and port facilities which are part of the New Silk Road connecting China to Europe through Central Asia. Setting up the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has a clear commercial logic, but equally a military one. The Port of Gwadar, being developed by PRC engineers since 2013, would be the terminus of the long overland line from Xinjiang in China’s remote and landlocked West. Yet Gwadar, once ruled by Oman but sold to Pakistan in the 1950’s, is quite close to the Persian Gulf and Straits of Hormuz sea-lanes through which over forty percent of the world’s petroleum flows.
Many nations including Djibouti, Tonga, the Maldives, the Republic of Congo, Kyrgyzstan, Cambodia, Niger, Laos, Zambia, Samoa, Vanuatu, and Mongolia now have debts to China at more than 20% of their GDP. As a result, many of these nations have had to hand over ownership of several investments, and swathes of sovereign territory to the Chinese government.
China has tried to use the initiatives of Maritime Silk Road, One belt One Road to establish a more integrated relationship with its neighbours by building transportation facilities. Smaller countries in the region like Sri Lanka, Nepal could not have asked for a more benevolent partner like China who helps in their reconstruction activities and adequately rewards them for the strategic advantages they offer without raising issues such as human rights or democracy. Liberalized market economy and globalization by China does not necessarily promote liberty, human rights and political freedom (that makes leaders more accountable to the citizen) in authoritarian regimes. Debt Trap Diplomacy (DTD) and has been a favorite Chinese tactic for centuries. Nations that currently have large Chinese debts are Sri Lanka, Djibouti, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, the Maldives, Mongolia, Montenegro, Pakistan, Venezuela and Tajikistan.
Case in point is the tactic of loaning poor countries large amounts of money for huge development projects (like ports, roads and railroads). The loans are on terms that look attractive, but eventually much be repaid. When the debtor nation runs into trouble making payments, China offers to reduce the load in return for control (if not majority ownership) of the ports, railroad, airport or whatever. Despite India’s displeasure, a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine is docked at the Colombo port. It is connotative of China trying to establish its military presence in South Asia. China's defense planners recognize that a large-scale effort is required to construct dual-use facilities along key sea lanes. They want overseas ports to refuel, repair and resupply passing Chinese combat ships and submarines; but without having to build full-fledged military-grade bases like the US.
China has been seeking full membership of SAARC arguing that it has a common border with five SAARC member countries. In the southwest, it has been eyeing Gan Base in the Maldives hungrily, although so far without success. In the east, in the Bay of Bengal, it has a sophisticated listening post on the Great Coco Islands, which can monitor all Indian Shipping from Port Blair, Vishakhapatnam, Kolkata, Paradip, etc. (China has another listening post at Hainji island.) It has bases (as well as potential bases, since the PLA Navy (PLAN) enjoys right of usage) at the Myanmar ports of Akyab, Cheduba and Bassein, all of which it is helping to develop into naval ports with facilities for handling ships considerably larger and more sophisticated than what the Myanmar Navy currently possesses or is likely to possess in the near future. Similarly, in the Andaman Sea it has access to Tenassirim, which is most strategically located, fairly close to the Malacca Strait. All these bases or ports where Chinese Naval ships are permitted to dock and refuel, etc, can be used most effectively to block shipping to and from Indian ports.
The Modi government has renamed the “Look East” policy as “Act East”, in an attempt to build a deeper engagement with East Asia and Southeast Asia. India and Vietnam are cooperating in oil and gas exploration in the disputed waters of the South China Sea. The sheer willingness of India to play an active role in the South China Sea, where China has overlapping territorial claims with several countries, has spooked them. China has been wary of India-Japan increasing strategic relationship. China had raised eyebrows when India invited Japan along with the USA to participate in the annual Exercise Malabar in the Western Pacific.
China has put $46 billion in infrastructural investment on the table for its long-time ally Pakistan, is set to build a network of roads, railroads, and port facilities which are part of the New Silk Road connecting China to Europe through Central Asia. Setting up the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has a clear commercial logic, but equally a military one. The Port of Gwadar, being developed by PRC engineers since 2013, would be the terminus of the long overland line from Xinjiang in China’s remote and landlocked West. Yet Gwadar, once ruled by Oman but sold to Pakistan in the 1950’s, is quite close to the Persian Gulf and Straits of Hormuz sea-lanes through which over forty percent of the world’s petroleum flows.
Many nations including Djibouti, Tonga, the Maldives, the Republic of Congo, Kyrgyzstan, Cambodia, Niger, Laos, Zambia, Samoa, Vanuatu, and Mongolia now have debts to China at more than 20% of their GDP. As a result, many of these nations have had to hand over ownership of several investments, and swathes of sovereign territory to the Chinese government.
| US Navy/Marine Long range Maritime Strikes During Large Scale Exercise (LSE) 21 |
Cognitive Reactive Electronic Warfare (also offensive jammers): It targets electronic emissions of all types, but EW system's effectiveness depends on surprise. Turkey stated early on that militants are good at defending a specific area, but they don't conduct electronic warfare operations. Electronic warfare proved decisive in Vietnam, when USAF B-52 and F-4 carried jammer pods to minimise losses from SA-2 SAMs. US Army can become survivable within enemy territory with Modular Electromagnetic Spectrum Deception Suite (MEDS) to deal with Radar/communications (radio fingerprints), HF/VHF/UHF jamming interference and weaken enemy's heavy defenses. This surprise element is important when it comes to electronic gear in general, which is much more effective if the other side does not know much about how it works. India still doesn't have a dedicated Electronic Warfare planning Agency. |
US Marine Corps roles and basic structure are codified in 10 U.S.C. § 5063 that prescribes a Marine Corps primarily focused on “seizure or defence of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign” and structured as “forces of combined arms”. A war-fighting philosophy that counsels us to “orient on the enemy,” uncover their “surfaces and gaps,” to disrupt their decision-making cycle, gain dominance in operational tempo, and ultimately “penetrate the system, tear it apart, and … destroy the isolated components.” Shaping all phases of the fight. Counter-reconnaissance tasks in the contact and blunt layers will be useful to naval and joint commanders. Establishing a pace that the enemy cannot maintain, forcing the enemy not just problems, but a no-win dilemma. Striking at unexpected time and place, while holding the flank and denying area.
Adversaries will seek to degrade communications and data flows, so forces must be able to plan for this congested battlespace. “It really comes down to where do you have to have the data, where do you need to have compute and storage so that when you are operating in that degraded environment, you’re able to still conduct operations,” he said. “If we just do everything in the cloud, if a unit was to get cut off and not have conductivity back to the cloud, wherever it is, then obviously they become mission ineffective. We’ve got to find that right balance that allows us to really take the power of the cloud and the capabilities that will be resident there and apply them at the point of need.” CAC2S was the heart and soul of taking all this stuff that has been collecting and entering into a process, a system, that would then eventually kick out a Link 16 link to supporting assets, whether that's an F-35 or a destroyer, or providing the ability to link back into a fleet headquarters, into that maritime ops center, and having our locations show up in a command post.
In environments where the robots cannot communicate widely due to needing to stay covert, clutter leading to radios not working for long distance communications, or to preserve battery or bandwidth for more important messages, the robots will need a method to coordinate with as few communications as possible. The technique, called α-shape, provides an efficient method for resolving goal conflicts between multiple robots that may want to visit the same area during missions including unmanned reconnaissance, perimeter surveillance and robotic detection of radiation and underwater concentration of lifeforms. What specifically makes this research unique includes:
In environments where the robots cannot communicate widely due to needing to stay covert, clutter leading to radios not working for long distance communications, or to preserve battery or bandwidth for more important messages, the robots will need a method to coordinate with as few communications as possible. The technique, called α-shape, provides an efficient method for resolving goal conflicts between multiple robots that may want to visit the same area during missions including unmanned reconnaissance, perimeter surveillance and robotic detection of radiation and underwater concentration of lifeforms. What specifically makes this research unique includes:
- Providing an efficient method (fast and with few messages) for resolving goal conflicts between multiple robots that is robust to intermittent communications loss and robots joining or leaving local sets of robots that are in communications with each other
- Performing as good as querying every robot in the communications range while saving radio bandwidth for more important communications
- Performing better than each robot operating fully on its own without communications
On the modern battlefield, you want to give your opponent maximum doubt. Then apply disposable technology that you don't mind losing. China has anti-satellite weapon but lacks low-earth orbit (LEO) satellites for overhead close recce IRS in any weather (carrying synthetic aperture radar sensors), capable of being driven in atmosphere (an altitude up to 2,000 km from earth's surface). China is trying to develop a range of the rockets from low-earth orbit (LEO) and sun-synchronous orbit (SSO) to reach medium-earth orbit (MEO) and geostationary transfer orbit (GTO). US knows very well that even 5 or 6 of these overhead recce satellites cannot ensure persistent ISR. Chinese can track adversary units, but their systems are lacking, so they cannot target and engage them. South China Sea surveillance needs a constellation of around 10 remote sensing satellites so that it is under constant surveillance. Satellites must either orbit around the earth or hold a geo-synchronous position above it, and as such China's spy satellites and balloons cannot be everywhere, seeing everything at once—at least not yet.
China's Gaofen (gao fen means high-resolution) and Yaogan satellites (remote sensing satellites with better multispectral imaging sensors) will orbit at 500 or 700 km above Earth and are capable of taking HD photographs with a medium resolution of about three to one meter, the radar covers an area 40x40 kilometers. It combines multispectral cameras with laser altimetry to provide detailed 3D images of structures and land forms. China put two clusters of Yaogan satellites in orbit moving in formation (each cluster has three remote sensing satellites with better multispectral imaging sensors) at an altitude of 600 kilometres across the Pacific ocean. Equipped with either SAR radar or digital cameras, these can be used for surveillance of ocean and tracking ships. These satellites with support of ground-based DF-21 ballistic missiles’ have the ability to hit warships at sea. While Chinese drones are great for scanning huge swathes of area to look for potential targets of interest during 10 hours of flight time. China also rely entirely on satellite data-links (in addition to a line-of-sight radio link) that could be degraded during a time of war.
Peer adversaries do not adhere to neatly drawn Combatant Command boundaries. The US can no longer consider the ‘global commons’ uncontested from fort to port to foxhole. There is no alternative to the dynamic presence of formations in contested theatres. Ground forces will decisively shape the first battle. Decades of war in the middle-east have really made US complacent about what the casualties will be like. They will have to survive the deadly damage the enemy dishes out by digging in and hiding out. Resiliency for land forces that has low-signature forward capabilities will combine high-mobility, cover, concealment, and deception. Deception will present false targets for China through a combination of EW spoofing and physical decoys specifically developing to "complicate" the Chinese space-ground targetting system. Chinese targeting and engagement are not good if the adversary is dispersed. Chinese strike systems have to go offline while redeploying. That foothold disrupts the enemy’s area-denial scheme, creating an opening in the foe’s defences into which US reinforcements can flow. Winning the hider-finder contest will be critical.
The Carrier Strike Group remains the premier fighting unit of the US Navy. US Navy really knows how to power projection in two forms, 44 strike naval fighters coming off a carrier and all those devils dogs coming out the back of an amphibious ship, throwing large number of cruise missiles or bombs. China navy's "three attacks" means countering stealthy naval aircrafts/UAVs, cruise missiles, and armed ASW helicopters. China will have 360 battle force ships at the end of 2020, compared with the US Navy has a steady count of 297 warships in active duty service fleet, despite promises from the Donald Trump administration to increase that to at least 355, a number many analysts agree is the minimum needed. In 2022, then CNO Gilday announced that the requirement is actually much higher, in excess of 500 battle force ships. Multiple other experts' analyses confirm those higher numbers. The US Navy already has the required number of destroyers, but has already retired all of its guided-missile frigates. A reduction in the number of aircraft carriers from 11 to 9 would have repercussions.
Defence Department has plans for 400 to 500 ships Navy by 2030 including 150 upto 240 unmanned ships, 66 to 70 9th-gen nuclear attack submarines and large payload submarines, 12 Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines, 80 to 96 large combatants like destroyers, 82 to 90 logistics & auxiliary ships, 56 to 70 littoral frigates, 60 Marines striker ships & 6 (or 9) to 18 lighter amphibious assault (mini-carriers), a considerable jump and 12 CVN aircraft carrier (nuclear propulsion). Instead of 2 brigades on 38 traditional amphibious ships; now, the deployed units will be supplemented by 31 to 35 commercial looking and sounding Landing Ship Medium vessel (earlier, called light amphibious vessels, each carrying about 75 Marines and their gear and heavy firepower for a limited period of time at 14 knots and could beach itself for shore-to-shore operations). 10 Landing Ship Medium vessel being large-deck. Until the Landing Ship Medium program delivers, the stern landing vessel will act as a surrogate. These would enable the three Marine Littoral Regiments in the Pacific to move immediately to strategic choke-points and strategic locations throughout the battlespace before the action begins, in order to conduct sea denial as part of distributed maritime operations. Building up 56 to 70 littoral frigates will restore balance to what’s become a top-heavy fleet.
The new number is the result of a U.S. study called Battle Force 2045. U.S. Navy's aversion to real testing of new revolutionary programs comes from not accepting any risk from Congress oversight to terminate Navy's programs if any defects are found out before production. US shipyards firms have poor capacity to provide maintenance and repair of Navy warships fleet, which is causing poor readiness and inability to perform missions. US has 50 attack submarines, but 18 of those are in maintenance. Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) is a four-star admiral and his deputy is the chief of naval operations (CNO) have failed to help upgrade the capacity of private shipyards. Chinese Navy could still numerically build the world’s largest fleet with more than 420 warships (including submarines) by 2030, however, China's Navy only has 20% of its manpower from voluntary force while the remaining 80% are conscripts on short-service commission.
Each brigade required 17 ships, for a total of 34. Ten percent more were needed to account for ships in long-term maintenance and, hence, unavailable. That set a total requirement of 38. The Marine Corps grudgingly accepted a fiscally constrained goal of 34. The Marine Corps has provided a calculation for their goal of 35 Landing ships Medium (nine for each of the three Marine Littoral Regiments and eight more for maintenance and other unavailability). The secretary of the Navy committed to meeting the 31-ship goal but was vague about how or when. However, the weakness of the argument is that the Marine Corps wants to build extremely capable and expensive platforms that it has already argued are vulnerable in wartime. If the main requirement is peacetime employment, then different and much cheaper platforms would suffice.
China's Gaofen (gao fen means high-resolution) and Yaogan satellites (remote sensing satellites with better multispectral imaging sensors) will orbit at 500 or 700 km above Earth and are capable of taking HD photographs with a medium resolution of about three to one meter, the radar covers an area 40x40 kilometers. It combines multispectral cameras with laser altimetry to provide detailed 3D images of structures and land forms. China put two clusters of Yaogan satellites in orbit moving in formation (each cluster has three remote sensing satellites with better multispectral imaging sensors) at an altitude of 600 kilometres across the Pacific ocean. Equipped with either SAR radar or digital cameras, these can be used for surveillance of ocean and tracking ships. These satellites with support of ground-based DF-21 ballistic missiles’ have the ability to hit warships at sea. While Chinese drones are great for scanning huge swathes of area to look for potential targets of interest during 10 hours of flight time. China also rely entirely on satellite data-links (in addition to a line-of-sight radio link) that could be degraded during a time of war.
Peer adversaries do not adhere to neatly drawn Combatant Command boundaries. The US can no longer consider the ‘global commons’ uncontested from fort to port to foxhole. There is no alternative to the dynamic presence of formations in contested theatres. Ground forces will decisively shape the first battle. Decades of war in the middle-east have really made US complacent about what the casualties will be like. They will have to survive the deadly damage the enemy dishes out by digging in and hiding out. Resiliency for land forces that has low-signature forward capabilities will combine high-mobility, cover, concealment, and deception. Deception will present false targets for China through a combination of EW spoofing and physical decoys specifically developing to "complicate" the Chinese space-ground targetting system. Chinese targeting and engagement are not good if the adversary is dispersed. Chinese strike systems have to go offline while redeploying. That foothold disrupts the enemy’s area-denial scheme, creating an opening in the foe’s defences into which US reinforcements can flow. Winning the hider-finder contest will be critical.
The Carrier Strike Group remains the premier fighting unit of the US Navy. US Navy really knows how to power projection in two forms, 44 strike naval fighters coming off a carrier and all those devils dogs coming out the back of an amphibious ship, throwing large number of cruise missiles or bombs. China navy's "three attacks" means countering stealthy naval aircrafts/UAVs, cruise missiles, and armed ASW helicopters. China will have 360 battle force ships at the end of 2020, compared with the US Navy has a steady count of 297 warships in active duty service fleet, despite promises from the Donald Trump administration to increase that to at least 355, a number many analysts agree is the minimum needed. In 2022, then CNO Gilday announced that the requirement is actually much higher, in excess of 500 battle force ships. Multiple other experts' analyses confirm those higher numbers. The US Navy already has the required number of destroyers, but has already retired all of its guided-missile frigates. A reduction in the number of aircraft carriers from 11 to 9 would have repercussions.
Defence Department has plans for 400 to 500 ships Navy by 2030 including 150 upto 240 unmanned ships, 66 to 70 9th-gen nuclear attack submarines and large payload submarines, 12 Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines, 80 to 96 large combatants like destroyers, 82 to 90 logistics & auxiliary ships, 56 to 70 littoral frigates, 60 Marines striker ships & 6 (or 9) to 18 lighter amphibious assault (mini-carriers), a considerable jump and 12 CVN aircraft carrier (nuclear propulsion). Instead of 2 brigades on 38 traditional amphibious ships; now, the deployed units will be supplemented by 31 to 35 commercial looking and sounding Landing Ship Medium vessel (earlier, called light amphibious vessels, each carrying about 75 Marines and their gear and heavy firepower for a limited period of time at 14 knots and could beach itself for shore-to-shore operations). 10 Landing Ship Medium vessel being large-deck. Until the Landing Ship Medium program delivers, the stern landing vessel will act as a surrogate. These would enable the three Marine Littoral Regiments in the Pacific to move immediately to strategic choke-points and strategic locations throughout the battlespace before the action begins, in order to conduct sea denial as part of distributed maritime operations. Building up 56 to 70 littoral frigates will restore balance to what’s become a top-heavy fleet.
The new number is the result of a U.S. study called Battle Force 2045. U.S. Navy's aversion to real testing of new revolutionary programs comes from not accepting any risk from Congress oversight to terminate Navy's programs if any defects are found out before production. US shipyards firms have poor capacity to provide maintenance and repair of Navy warships fleet, which is causing poor readiness and inability to perform missions. US has 50 attack submarines, but 18 of those are in maintenance. Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) is a four-star admiral and his deputy is the chief of naval operations (CNO) have failed to help upgrade the capacity of private shipyards. Chinese Navy could still numerically build the world’s largest fleet with more than 420 warships (including submarines) by 2030, however, China's Navy only has 20% of its manpower from voluntary force while the remaining 80% are conscripts on short-service commission.
Each brigade required 17 ships, for a total of 34. Ten percent more were needed to account for ships in long-term maintenance and, hence, unavailable. That set a total requirement of 38. The Marine Corps grudgingly accepted a fiscally constrained goal of 34. The Marine Corps has provided a calculation for their goal of 35 Landing ships Medium (nine for each of the three Marine Littoral Regiments and eight more for maintenance and other unavailability). The secretary of the Navy committed to meeting the 31-ship goal but was vague about how or when. However, the weakness of the argument is that the Marine Corps wants to build extremely capable and expensive platforms that it has already argued are vulnerable in wartime. If the main requirement is peacetime employment, then different and much cheaper platforms would suffice.
The US may not be able to dominate the airspace, choke points or waterways. Marines “littoral force” may head to the battle only to be given its specific task right before entering the fight. The service also wants to make some of their capabilities and assets lighter, so Marines can move quickly and carry what they need on their backs while moving around islands and shorelines. Headquarters is also pushing indications, warnings and cueing down to the forward-sensing forces. That includes the full sense and make sense. If the Marines would give up on the missile-shooting and convert to simple surveillance, then the Campaign of Learning would have been worth the effort and the Marines would have a worthwhile, if exceedingly small, mission. The new "scout platoons" will consist of 26 Marines.
After years of the war on terror, the time is ripe for the USMC to refresh technology and its tactics to fight a peer nation. The largest sustained ground conflicts the Marine Forces has fought against a nation state adversary have all been in the Pacific. Marines littoral regiment will need to be able to be highly survivable inside this complex contested maritime environment and rapidly mobilize forces controlling tight waterways, small islands or locations with mobile truck-based platforms to direct attacks on enemy positions. USMC primary job here is sea denial to help control of the maritime space. Counter-reconnaissance or RXR capabilities will be key on the battlefield to frustrate enemy scouting. It hardly matters how precise new weapons are if you lack the ISR reach to find targets. Instead of 2 brigades on 38 amphibious ships; now, the deployed units will be supplemented by 35 commercial-looking and sounding Landing Ship Medium vessel (earlier, called light amphibious vessels, each carrying about 75 Marines and their gear and heavy firepower for a limited period of time at 14 knots and could beach itself for shore-to-shore operations). Until the Landing Ship Medium program delivers, stern landing vessel will act as a surrogate.
After years of the war on terror, the time is ripe for the USMC to refresh technology and its tactics to fight a peer nation. The largest sustained ground conflicts the Marine Forces has fought against a nation state adversary have all been in the Pacific. Marines littoral regiment will need to be able to be highly survivable inside this complex contested maritime environment and rapidly mobilize forces controlling tight waterways, small islands or locations with mobile truck-based platforms to direct attacks on enemy positions. USMC primary job here is sea denial to help control of the maritime space. Counter-reconnaissance or RXR capabilities will be key on the battlefield to frustrate enemy scouting. It hardly matters how precise new weapons are if you lack the ISR reach to find targets. Instead of 2 brigades on 38 amphibious ships; now, the deployed units will be supplemented by 35 commercial-looking and sounding Landing Ship Medium vessel (earlier, called light amphibious vessels, each carrying about 75 Marines and their gear and heavy firepower for a limited period of time at 14 knots and could beach itself for shore-to-shore operations). Until the Landing Ship Medium program delivers, stern landing vessel will act as a surrogate.
In his book, "First to Fight", Marine Corps lieutenant general Victor H. Krulak declared that the U.S. landing craft of 1937 "had not advanced far beyond" what they were "during the Revolutionary War."
US Navy's aversion to real testing of new revolutionary programs comes from not accepting any risk from Congress oversight to terminate Navy's programs if any defects are found out before production. US shipyards firms have poor capacity to provide maintenance and repair of Navy warships fleet, which is causing poor readiness and inability to perform missions. Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) is a four-star admiral and his deputy is the chief of naval operations (CNO) have failed to help upgrade the capacity of private shipyards
In the two decades in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Marine Corps had essentially become a second land army, despite its roots as an amphibious force. The U.S. Marine Corps is too big. It is several times larger than any other Marine force. It is bigger than the Israeli Defense Force and nearly twice the size of the entire British Army! Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, ordered the Marine Corps to downsize to 175,000 active duty Marines by 2018. The 175,000 active force level is considered a ceiling. General James Amos, warned that military pay and benefits have grown to consume 63% of the Marine Corps budget, while just 8% is devoted to modernization, which will shrink further unless manpower is cut. Before the war on terror led to ground force increases, USMC end-strength was 173,321. Force Design 2030 is 174,600. In fact, the current USMC constitutes 27.4 percent of the US ground forces, whereas it constituted 26.6 percent in 2001. USMC still have a full-force of 21 infantry battalions (and 6 infantry battalions as reserve), but 4000 fewer marines. For comparison, the US Army’s infantry battalions are sized at 729 personnel. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c6AC7NSyo4Y Charles Krulak said, "Thinking that the Marines sitting on these islands are going to threaten the Chinese enough to stop them in their tracks, that’s just wishful thinking." Commandant Berger has chosen secrecy over stakeholders, testing in a closed loop, leapfrogging instead of iterating, and losing control of the narrative. Getting an organization to buy into requires salesmanship, a painful lesson Berger is learning into the life of FD2030.
While the Goldwater-Nichols Act improved cooperation and interoperability across most of the Joint Force, the same cannot be said for the maritime Services. In fact, the act’s forced separation of Navy and Marine Corps Service components had a profound impact on the employment of Marine Corps forces, catalysing the gradual erosion of the Corps’ traditional relationship with the Navy. The act also drove a wedge between the maritime Services, allowing the Navy and Marine Corps to focus on their roles in providing separate and distinct contributions to Joint operations. While the Navy focused on leveraging technology to enhance its naval warfare capacity, the Marine Corps reinforced the allure of its maneuver warfare philosophy through operational successes ashore. The division and subsequent isolation of Navy and Marine Corps forces into separate Service components, each resourced by their own funding streams, led the Services to develop “a tendency to view their operational responsibilities as separate and distinct, rather than intertwined.” While the Marine Corps gained much from cultivating the warfighting experience of a generation of Marines in combat operations ashore, it also paid a penalty in straining its relationship with the Navy and stunting the growth of its own maritime culture.
For a long time, the US Navy Department has had 2 components; the Navy fleet and the marines, which is now a separate service that is still closely intertwined with the navy. The 1st Marine infantry Division is the oldest two division-sized unit of the USMC, and when it started bore the designation of 2nd Advanced Base Regiment. It was primarily employed in wars in the Caribbean. Once the US entered WW-2 the marines formed their first division size units and ended the war with 6 divisions, organized into 2 corps. Only 4 of those divisions survived the after WW-2 and one of them is now a reserve division. In 2006, the USMC basically lost 2 of their 4 Force Recon companies (one being a reserve unit) in order to build Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC). The marines consider themselves specialists, while the US Army are generalists who carry out more amphibious operations than the marines. Some USMC has found a home in SOCOM, since marine leaders want to shrink the Corps so that they become small enough to handle anticipated navy amphibious operations and not large enough to have troops available for large-scale support of army operations. Most marine commanders see their future as, even more elite and better equipped force that can harass, the heavily fortified islands of Chinese garrisons throughout the region.
If the Marine Corps is unable to halt ever rising operating costs, manpower will go lower. The Marines needed to shed equipment, headquarters, and base structure. Now the new USMC will be expected to have 3 Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs) that act with nothing more than commander's intent and operate beyond the range of support in the Pacific Ocean. USMC primary job here is sea denial to control of the maritime space. The littoral regiment will be made up of roughly 2,000 Marines and contain 3 elements: the littoral combat team, the littoral anti-air battalion and the littoral logistics battalion. The 3 Marine Littoral Regiment alone cannot fight a peer war with China. Even the old USMC Regiments just doesn't have that kind of capacity for power projection. https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/00_CAL_MAR_A2013_FINAL.pdf The USMC cannot take the lead and do forcible entry (China) in the Pacific, as it has done in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it can provide maritime security for the Navy to carry out its combat operations. If the Marine Corps is unwilling to adapt, Congress will direct changes.
The Marine squad now contains peacetime 13 Marines, instead of the wartime configured 15 Marines. Removal of the assistant squad leader and one rifleman from each squad. Each of the 3 rifle companies will contain signal, logistics, EW and medical. Hence, the Marine Corps is eliminating its entire fleet of tanks, mini-UAVs and reducing most of its 16 M777 artillery battalions by 2030 (every artillery regiment has an unneeded 365-man regimental headquarters battery with its own Napoleonic staff section), in order to raise increase new type of Landing Ship Medium vessel (earlier, called light amphibious vessels, each carrying about 75 Marines and their gear and heavy firepower for a limited period of time at 14 knots and could beach itself for shore-to-shore operations), 14 new rocket-artillery battery battalions, long-range anti-ship batteries and launcher on light vehicles, long-ranged UAVs with just 2 sensors and counter-drone specialists. 10 Landing Ship Medium vessel being large-deck. Until the Landing Ship Medium program delivers, stern landing vessel will act as a surrogate.
In its experiments, it seeks to add a Navy corps-man to each squad, added electronic warfare capabilities, water purification and organic electrical power generation as well as work on unmanned tactical resupply. Added medical training and personnel for improved casualty care in austere locations where medical evacuation may not be available. Hence, USMC is eliminating 3 of the current 17 medium tilt-rotor squadrons, 3 out of its 8 heavy-lift helicopter squadrons, and 2 of the 7 light-attack helicopter squadrons, which are “unsuitable” for a peer war with China. The best way to kill a ship was no longer a ship—just as a tank is not necessarily the best way to kill a tank any longer. However, many retired Combatant commanders and Generals, who are experienced with wargaming (to find new ideas), do not think Marine Corps Force design can be validated by doing wargames unless backed up by real world exercises (for more than two years).
In a peer-to-peer fight in the Pacific Ocean, USMC is supporting the Navy or Airforce to disrupt Chinese long-range reconnaissance-strike capabilities; and the Army being the main ground force. Hence, USMC is reducing its frontline combat strength by decreasing its infantry battalions by 200 troops and elimination of only 3 infantry battalions (and 2 reserve-component infantry battalions). Reorganized rifle company elements into a weapons platoon, manned with machine gunners, mortarmen, anti-tank missile gunners and organic precision-fire personnel. Smaller task forces more than compensates for a loss of rotating one fewer FAST platoon. Congress and the American people expect a lean, mean, and ready Marine Corps. Let's remember, that the whole idea is distributed maritime operations for mass effects and not mass forces. Marine Corps are trying to “get to decision-making at machine speed”. In its experiments, it is seeking to reduce the cognitive load or demands (e.g., attention and memory) of combat operations for company non-commissioned officers.
While the Goldwater-Nichols Act improved cooperation and interoperability across most of the Joint Force, the same cannot be said for the maritime Services. In fact, the act’s forced separation of Navy and Marine Corps Service components had a profound impact on the employment of Marine Corps forces, catalysing the gradual erosion of the Corps’ traditional relationship with the Navy. The act also drove a wedge between the maritime Services, allowing the Navy and Marine Corps to focus on their roles in providing separate and distinct contributions to Joint operations. While the Navy focused on leveraging technology to enhance its naval warfare capacity, the Marine Corps reinforced the allure of its maneuver warfare philosophy through operational successes ashore. The division and subsequent isolation of Navy and Marine Corps forces into separate Service components, each resourced by their own funding streams, led the Services to develop “a tendency to view their operational responsibilities as separate and distinct, rather than intertwined.” While the Marine Corps gained much from cultivating the warfighting experience of a generation of Marines in combat operations ashore, it also paid a penalty in straining its relationship with the Navy and stunting the growth of its own maritime culture.
For a long time, the US Navy Department has had 2 components; the Navy fleet and the marines, which is now a separate service that is still closely intertwined with the navy. The 1st Marine infantry Division is the oldest two division-sized unit of the USMC, and when it started bore the designation of 2nd Advanced Base Regiment. It was primarily employed in wars in the Caribbean. Once the US entered WW-2 the marines formed their first division size units and ended the war with 6 divisions, organized into 2 corps. Only 4 of those divisions survived the after WW-2 and one of them is now a reserve division. In 2006, the USMC basically lost 2 of their 4 Force Recon companies (one being a reserve unit) in order to build Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC). The marines consider themselves specialists, while the US Army are generalists who carry out more amphibious operations than the marines. Some USMC has found a home in SOCOM, since marine leaders want to shrink the Corps so that they become small enough to handle anticipated navy amphibious operations and not large enough to have troops available for large-scale support of army operations. Most marine commanders see their future as, even more elite and better equipped force that can harass, the heavily fortified islands of Chinese garrisons throughout the region.
If the Marine Corps is unable to halt ever rising operating costs, manpower will go lower. The Marines needed to shed equipment, headquarters, and base structure. Now the new USMC will be expected to have 3 Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs) that act with nothing more than commander's intent and operate beyond the range of support in the Pacific Ocean. USMC primary job here is sea denial to control of the maritime space. The littoral regiment will be made up of roughly 2,000 Marines and contain 3 elements: the littoral combat team, the littoral anti-air battalion and the littoral logistics battalion. The 3 Marine Littoral Regiment alone cannot fight a peer war with China. Even the old USMC Regiments just doesn't have that kind of capacity for power projection. https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/00_CAL_MAR_A2013_FINAL.pdf The USMC cannot take the lead and do forcible entry (China) in the Pacific, as it has done in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it can provide maritime security for the Navy to carry out its combat operations. If the Marine Corps is unwilling to adapt, Congress will direct changes.
The Marine squad now contains peacetime 13 Marines, instead of the wartime configured 15 Marines. Removal of the assistant squad leader and one rifleman from each squad. Each of the 3 rifle companies will contain signal, logistics, EW and medical. Hence, the Marine Corps is eliminating its entire fleet of tanks, mini-UAVs and reducing most of its 16 M777 artillery battalions by 2030 (every artillery regiment has an unneeded 365-man regimental headquarters battery with its own Napoleonic staff section), in order to raise increase new type of Landing Ship Medium vessel (earlier, called light amphibious vessels, each carrying about 75 Marines and their gear and heavy firepower for a limited period of time at 14 knots and could beach itself for shore-to-shore operations), 14 new rocket-artillery battery battalions, long-range anti-ship batteries and launcher on light vehicles, long-ranged UAVs with just 2 sensors and counter-drone specialists. 10 Landing Ship Medium vessel being large-deck. Until the Landing Ship Medium program delivers, stern landing vessel will act as a surrogate.
In its experiments, it seeks to add a Navy corps-man to each squad, added electronic warfare capabilities, water purification and organic electrical power generation as well as work on unmanned tactical resupply. Added medical training and personnel for improved casualty care in austere locations where medical evacuation may not be available. Hence, USMC is eliminating 3 of the current 17 medium tilt-rotor squadrons, 3 out of its 8 heavy-lift helicopter squadrons, and 2 of the 7 light-attack helicopter squadrons, which are “unsuitable” for a peer war with China. The best way to kill a ship was no longer a ship—just as a tank is not necessarily the best way to kill a tank any longer. However, many retired Combatant commanders and Generals, who are experienced with wargaming (to find new ideas), do not think Marine Corps Force design can be validated by doing wargames unless backed up by real world exercises (for more than two years).
In a peer-to-peer fight in the Pacific Ocean, USMC is supporting the Navy or Airforce to disrupt Chinese long-range reconnaissance-strike capabilities; and the Army being the main ground force. Hence, USMC is reducing its frontline combat strength by decreasing its infantry battalions by 200 troops and elimination of only 3 infantry battalions (and 2 reserve-component infantry battalions). Reorganized rifle company elements into a weapons platoon, manned with machine gunners, mortarmen, anti-tank missile gunners and organic precision-fire personnel. Smaller task forces more than compensates for a loss of rotating one fewer FAST platoon. Congress and the American people expect a lean, mean, and ready Marine Corps. Let's remember, that the whole idea is distributed maritime operations for mass effects and not mass forces. Marine Corps are trying to “get to decision-making at machine speed”. In its experiments, it is seeking to reduce the cognitive load or demands (e.g., attention and memory) of combat operations for company non-commissioned officers.
USMC helps the combined/joint forces in any operation; and counter-reconnaissance, disrupt or defeat the enemy sensors & signal networks (for long-range reconnaissance-strike capabilities) and targetting tasks from the ground, behind enemy lines, in the contact and blunt layers which will be useful to naval and joint commanders. Its mantra is to be the only service that prepares to Embrace (rectify itself fast), Adapt and Overcome the constant uncertainty and tailor itself to the speed of the changes in any type of complex warfare. Unlike US Army, USMC are short-term or stand-in commando (either entry shock-troops or they amphibious reinforced infantry integrated to provide brown-water maritime security for Navy to carry out its combat operations) educated institutionally in seeking/exploiting gaps (using CI teams within degraded satcom) under fog (the enemy observing you has only limited visibility. It doesn't mean you are "not there") and trained in surprise manoeuvre at sea (magtf) using low-signature long-range high-end fire. USMC being relatively smaller numbers expeditionary force on the ground (with its own airpower with >150 km range BVR & anti-ship missiles) can transform from avoiding logistics build-up (& embrace CI), and when in hostile area, quickly increase the tempo of combat power (excel in reorienting back into heavy armour by beg-borrow-steal-duplicitous advantages from other services logistics) like in Asia–Pacific theatre during WW2.
I personally believe that we have witnessed the end of the effectiveness of "towed" artillery. We continue to look at wheeled and (lighter) robotic solutions to artillery that is "towed". US Army Futures Command head said during US Army symposium 2024. Militaries will need to focus on either neutralizing anti-artillery weapons or on developing howitzers that are highly mobile artillery systems. Towed artillery, 10 to 15 minute displacement times displacement time is not going to work against a good enemy. Russian and Chinese push waves of infantry into selected locations on the front lines, concentrating their armour and artillery forces to saturate the enemy's defences. Attrition warfare emerges when neither side can achieve a clear asymmetric advantage. So we still need to modernize our fires, but we need to continue to look at robotic solutions to artillery. The US Army is trying to automate the resupply of its self-propelled artillery that would cut crews by half and double the rate and volume of fire.
How will Marines “littoral force” be able to surprise manoeuvre at sea (magtf) carrying long-range high-end fire but without supporting units like artillery smoke shells? How does the Force design compensate USMC protective firepower, with few missiles, when all the tanks in the Marine Corps are being elimination, even from the reserves? How does USMC "littoral" troops, without getting specific integration and training, reorienting itself to using tanks and artillery when it's needed in battle, even if they are able to beg-borrow-steal from Army's logistics? However, tanks aren’t disappearing from the fight. Tanks (heavy armour) and artillery will continue to be provided by the regular US army. USMC can't out-armor the Army. It can't out-artillery the Army. Heavy armoured has become less useful, unless there is available firepower-support within minutes (from sets of autonomous light vehicles) for pacific island battlefield, due to the wide proliferation of portable anti-armour missiles. Tanks are also getting too heavy, due to added protections, to move quickly to cut across enemy lines, due to all the addition protection for survivability. Russian armoured vehicles have had trouble surviving against the threat of Turkish precision strike with long-range reconnaissance drone in Syria. Same with UAE-supplied Chinese precision strike with drone in Libya. Even tanks camouflaged by buildings and bushes were no match for thermal imaging sensors watching from the skies. The problem has exacerbated by modern Chinese anti-tank systems. MCSC might consider returning equipment to the Primary Inventory Control Activity, a Department of Defense inventory system. They could also transfer equipment to sister services such as the Army—a task they have undertaken with tanks, the ABV and bridging capabilities. This allows the Army to retain and expand its capabilities at a reduced cost by eliminating the need to buy additional items. The Marine Corps could also send equipment to Marine Corps Logistics Bases in Barstow, California, or Albany, Georgia, for repositioning analyses or long-term storage as needed.
The best way to deter such Chinese militia maritime activities in and around the islands of the Philippines, is by having US Marine personnel (with patrol boats, anti-submarine warfare helicopters, UAVs carrying anti-submarine warfare pods, autonomous underwater vessels, anti-surface missile batteries) at the scene of action to support local allies and partners in a manner proportionate to the malign activities. Infantry Marines are to become well-versed in multiple weapons systems -- less specialized and more "commando-like." "Specialization is for insects."Robert A. Heinlein. Gen. David Berger's deputies said it will be tough to fully understand the battlefield quickly or to find targets, while remaining unseen by the enemy. They will be forced into situations that required them to make the most of what little they have, but will be given autonomy to do whatever to achieve their objectives. However, during peace time USMC will be broadly seen and will often be targetable, but they will remain resilient to attack through a series of measures, tactics and techniques (that are not available in warships). The adversary will know the location, but not disposition.
EABO is whack-a-mole to spread out the risks in and around thousands of islands, which forces the enemy to spend more resources with a low return on investment. Submarines pose a significant threat to EABs because they have the potential to close, undetected, to ranges that limit the time for implementing countermeasures. From a defender’s standpoint, compared to close artillery exchanges, the beauty of a precision strike is that it is precise. In simplest terms, if a PGM is launched against a EAB, moving hundreds of meters can be enough to avoid the munition’s effect. If the PGM is capable of in-flight update or has an advanced organic seeker, then additional stand-off measures are required. The commandant of the Marine Corp, Gen. David Berger said, "We have to be distributed. We have to empower lower unit leaders, we have to plan for logistics in a contested environment that's very distributed, very spread out. You have to have enough mobility that you can relocate your unit pretty often."
I personally believe that we have witnessed the end of the effectiveness of "towed" artillery. We continue to look at wheeled and (lighter) robotic solutions to artillery that is "towed". US Army Futures Command head said during US Army symposium 2024. Militaries will need to focus on either neutralizing anti-artillery weapons or on developing howitzers that are highly mobile artillery systems. Towed artillery, 10 to 15 minute displacement times displacement time is not going to work against a good enemy. Russian and Chinese push waves of infantry into selected locations on the front lines, concentrating their armour and artillery forces to saturate the enemy's defences. Attrition warfare emerges when neither side can achieve a clear asymmetric advantage. So we still need to modernize our fires, but we need to continue to look at robotic solutions to artillery. The US Army is trying to automate the resupply of its self-propelled artillery that would cut crews by half and double the rate and volume of fire.
How will Marines “littoral force” be able to surprise manoeuvre at sea (magtf) carrying long-range high-end fire but without supporting units like artillery smoke shells? How does the Force design compensate USMC protective firepower, with few missiles, when all the tanks in the Marine Corps are being elimination, even from the reserves? How does USMC "littoral" troops, without getting specific integration and training, reorienting itself to using tanks and artillery when it's needed in battle, even if they are able to beg-borrow-steal from Army's logistics? However, tanks aren’t disappearing from the fight. Tanks (heavy armour) and artillery will continue to be provided by the regular US army. USMC can't out-armor the Army. It can't out-artillery the Army. Heavy armoured has become less useful, unless there is available firepower-support within minutes (from sets of autonomous light vehicles) for pacific island battlefield, due to the wide proliferation of portable anti-armour missiles. Tanks are also getting too heavy, due to added protections, to move quickly to cut across enemy lines, due to all the addition protection for survivability. Russian armoured vehicles have had trouble surviving against the threat of Turkish precision strike with long-range reconnaissance drone in Syria. Same with UAE-supplied Chinese precision strike with drone in Libya. Even tanks camouflaged by buildings and bushes were no match for thermal imaging sensors watching from the skies. The problem has exacerbated by modern Chinese anti-tank systems. MCSC might consider returning equipment to the Primary Inventory Control Activity, a Department of Defense inventory system. They could also transfer equipment to sister services such as the Army—a task they have undertaken with tanks, the ABV and bridging capabilities. This allows the Army to retain and expand its capabilities at a reduced cost by eliminating the need to buy additional items. The Marine Corps could also send equipment to Marine Corps Logistics Bases in Barstow, California, or Albany, Georgia, for repositioning analyses or long-term storage as needed.
The best way to deter such Chinese militia maritime activities in and around the islands of the Philippines, is by having US Marine personnel (with patrol boats, anti-submarine warfare helicopters, UAVs carrying anti-submarine warfare pods, autonomous underwater vessels, anti-surface missile batteries) at the scene of action to support local allies and partners in a manner proportionate to the malign activities. Infantry Marines are to become well-versed in multiple weapons systems -- less specialized and more "commando-like." "Specialization is for insects."Robert A. Heinlein. Gen. David Berger's deputies said it will be tough to fully understand the battlefield quickly or to find targets, while remaining unseen by the enemy. They will be forced into situations that required them to make the most of what little they have, but will be given autonomy to do whatever to achieve their objectives. However, during peace time USMC will be broadly seen and will often be targetable, but they will remain resilient to attack through a series of measures, tactics and techniques (that are not available in warships). The adversary will know the location, but not disposition.
EABO is whack-a-mole to spread out the risks in and around thousands of islands, which forces the enemy to spend more resources with a low return on investment. Submarines pose a significant threat to EABs because they have the potential to close, undetected, to ranges that limit the time for implementing countermeasures. From a defender’s standpoint, compared to close artillery exchanges, the beauty of a precision strike is that it is precise. In simplest terms, if a PGM is launched against a EAB, moving hundreds of meters can be enough to avoid the munition’s effect. If the PGM is capable of in-flight update or has an advanced organic seeker, then additional stand-off measures are required. The commandant of the Marine Corp, Gen. David Berger said, "We have to be distributed. We have to empower lower unit leaders, we have to plan for logistics in a contested environment that's very distributed, very spread out. You have to have enough mobility that you can relocate your unit pretty often."
Marine Corps is considering merging the machinist and welder into a single "fabricator" military occupational specialty.
USMC says the approach to logistics is, that "it can't be a chain; it has to be a web" in and around the islands. This ‘web’ also provides cover for the US Navy as it manoeuvres. Marine units plan to use their own anti-ship missiles, long-range “asymmetric” capabilities, and a very complex air-defence; to easily turn nearby seas (and skies) into their own version of China’s “anti access/area denial” no-go areas.
Phase 1 of IBX held 13 live-force experiments in environments ranging from Appalachian Mountain winters to Okinawan jungle summers, demonstrated that a battalion of 735 Marines, the initial planning size, was not “operationally suitable.” We found the far-left lateral limit. The battalion number has been re-adjusted to 811 Marines. Phase 2 of IBX “the decisive phase of this experimentation”, will be focused on a single unit, the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, or 3/4.
The future is in a variety of manned and unmanned teamed systems. Relying on commanders of various regiments to “think together about what’s the right way to use the intelligent robotics and autonomous systems” using trained human specialists. “What we don’t want is to have a whole bunch of disparate systems out there that everyone in their own lane figures out.” The Corps is “fielding things,” experimenting, iterating and “failing as fast as we can”. The Corps has also learned what they don’t need to change.
EW and organic ISR are "essential on the modern battlefield." USMC is looking at loitering munitions, and tools that allow each squad to manage their electronic signature. Tactical Scalable Mobile network is not intended to extend from battalion to brigade. The integrated tactical network-equipped units are not able to maintain their such equipment. Moreover, the leader radio and Manpack are vulnerable in an electromagnetic spectrum-contested environment. Radio frequency detection is one of the most effective systems for detecting and tracking forces, bypassing traditional methods of camouflage.
To ensure the U.S. military outwits, outmaneuvers and outshoots a powerful adversary such as China or Russia, the Pentagon has pursued a strategy known as Combined Joint All-Domain Command, Control, Communications (and Battle Management System applications), linking sensor to shooter in every domain. The focus is on "deception" includes creating "chaos and confusion in the spectrum [radio frequency as well as] targeting adversary situational awareness, command and control, and decision-making processes to enable friendly force freedom of maneuver. Any capability that contributes "to blinding, seeing, or targeting the adversary by degrading their ability to utilize the electromagnetic spectrum and their ability to share information over tactical edge networks."
Integrated Warfare Systems's Rear Admiral Doug Small said, “we’ve been very deliberate about keeping a low profile and not a huge internet presence (about U.S. crown jewel Project Overmatch's battlefield decision-superiority (reducing latency to support OPs) and streamline C2 enterprise network architectures capability in order to seamlessly network 'three existing sensor grids together to any manned or unmanned shooter'). Our competitors steal everything, and frankly, they’re not ashamed of it.”
Adversaries "can exploit the information that’s put out there and then figure out ways to stymie that development because this is about accelerating war-fighting decisions by providing access to information in disparate places, running AI." The "real secret sauce," the chief of staff added, is the ability to quickly corral available data, make sense of it and forward it "to the appropriate shooter or effects mechanisms." And that well-situated force could be wielding keyboards, jammers, rifles or long-range precision fires. The U.S. military is trying to protect its “secret sauce” from adversary eyes. This is the network side of war fighting, which you don’t want to reveal because the next war, the first parts of it will not be kinetic, they will be non-kinetic.
Jamming systems operate at a particular frequency or waveform, making it difficult for adversaries to jam every single communication network at the same time. The idea of that is that you would want to have as many [communication systems] available to you as possible, so that you can shift from one that’s jammed into one that’s not jammed. And with the software-defined networking, that happens a lot more seamlessly. Like the other services, the Navy has a variety of communication systems that are not necessarily interoperable. The aim of Project Overmatch is to "create a more interoperable force, allowing more pieces of the Navy — more ships, more aircraft, more unmanned systems later on — to be able to connect with one another and talk to one another".
“What Project Overmatch is designed to do is” use software to translate “automatically between different communication systems”. The radio is able to handle the different waveforms of the different communication systems, and then software inside the radio translates the message from one format into the other format. It’s joint, it’s all-domain, but it comes down to command and control. No matter the system, introducing new capabilities across the entire service is one of the hardest things to do. To enable the Navy’s software-defined network management system, the service will need to install additional processing power on ships and aircraft. Small drones platforms simply won’t have the space. So, they’re going to basically be dumb nodes at the end of the chain.
One, unmanned systems should also help in the transition of units and equipment from ships to the shoreline. Why put a human there if a machine can do just the same? How much of that do you need to fly ashore, and does it need to be a [CH-53K helicopter] only, or can we use unmanned rotary wing aircraft to move supplies and equipment? Otherwise, the Marine Corps would be “stuck” with manned connectors “cycling back and forth, back and forth, back and forth”. How can you triple … the volume of equipment and the space that you can do it in, using unmanned? And two, you can generate a lot more tempo, cover a lot more territory if you’re combined unmanned and manned.
The cost per defensive shot must be significantly lower than the cost per offensive shot. “Have any of you ever seen a propulsion plant that can operate for 45 days without a person touching it on a ship? There are some land-based systems and power plants and things that have been running [unmanned] for years, but a ship is a completely different environment. We don’t have to jump to unmanned right away. A bridge to getting to unmanned could be ... the integration of autonomy onto manned platforms. Just have it run in the background, have it start to generate data and be assessed and basically — not trying to replace anyone — but basically aid an overwhelmed bridge”.
The cost per defensive shot must be significantly lower than the cost per offensive shot. “Have any of you ever seen a propulsion plant that can operate for 45 days without a person touching it on a ship? There are some land-based systems and power plants and things that have been running [unmanned] for years, but a ship is a completely different environment. We don’t have to jump to unmanned right away. A bridge to getting to unmanned could be ... the integration of autonomy onto manned platforms. Just have it run in the background, have it start to generate data and be assessed and basically — not trying to replace anyone — but basically aid an overwhelmed bridge”.
On the modern battlefield, you want to give your opponent maximum doubt. Then apply disposable technology that you don't mind losing. The cost per defensive shot must be significantly lower than the cost per offensive shot. China has anti-satellite weapon but lacks overhead close recce IRS satellites, capable of being driven in atmosphere (an altitude up to 2,000 km from earth's surface), carrying search & rescue (SAR) sensors. However, China's Gaofen (gao fen means high-resolution) and Yaogan satellites will orbit at 500 or 700 km above Earth and are capable of taking HD photographs with a medium resolution of about one meter. It combines multispectral cameras with laser altimetry to provide detailed 3D images of structures and land forms. US knows very well that even 5 or 6 of these overhead recce satellites cannot ensure persistent ISR. While Chinese drones are great for scanning huge swathes of area to look for potential targets of interest during 10 hours of flight time. China also relies entirely on satellite data-links that could be degraded during a time of war.
https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/suspicious-activity-what-are-german-fighter-pilots-doing-in-china-a-25ac852d-887d-454b-8d73-02a595c83c32
https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/suspicious-activity-what-are-german-fighter-pilots-doing-in-china-a-25ac852d-887d-454b-8d73-02a595c83c32
Chinese military's "three defenses" are precision strikes, jamming, and ISR. Air-Land Battle requires an interconnected battle network with a sensor grid to "look deep and shoot deep." Two of the most important elements in combat ops are to get: real-time Intel and SatCom, to the correct HQ Command. However, if China can’t locate the Marines in and around the 7,000 islands of the Philippines, they can't hit them. This type of fog of war can become useful. Marine units plan to conform geography to its advantage and fight from a strategic defensive, moving from key first-island chain and confined archipelagoes and using their own anti-ship missiles, long-range “asymmetric” capabilities, and a very complex air-defence; can easily turn nearby seas (and skies) into their own version of China’s “anti access/area denial” no-go areas. This ‘web’ also provides cover for the US Navy as it manoeuvres. Marines will also require more and different types of ships – smaller and faster – to keep the detachments mobile and supplied. This is easier said than done.
What separates a C4ISR network, from a C4ISRT network is targeting (the 'T') —the ability to use sensor data from a variety of systems to accurately direct long-range fires. China navy's "three attacks" means countering stealthy naval aircrafts/UAVs, cruise missiles, and armed ASW helicopters. US Navy is first in sea power, but it is less dominant in the littoral waters in anti-access places like the South China, the Baltic and Black Seas as well as the Persian Gulf. Salinity and temperature vary greatly in different shallow-water environments of the world. They have different layers, with currents in one direction on the surface, and 3 meters down, there’s a totally different direction of the current. You don’t have much time to think about things – you have to react and react the right way to stay alive.
You have to get people studying about what we can expect 30 years from now. It’s very important there is a place with skilled people that can do war gaming in the littoral environment, and who are adding the right inputs to a game like that. You can do gaming anywhere, but if you don’t have skilled people with knowledge of that kind of environment, the result would be useless. It would be useful to influence the development of new war fighting tactics and techniques; to evaluate what we are doing; to be able to game on it; and then have something brought back again, so we can be better and better all the time and adjust to new differences.
"Part of that is because they play by a different set of rules. They're blurring the lines between police forces and coast guard and military and politics - they are blurring that intentionally. We have very clear lanes that we stay in, and we haven't moved off of that, we have not adjusted. We have to." US Navy-Marine Corps integrated force are developing concepts for conducting nested Distributed, Littoral and Expeditionary operations to achieve sea control, sea denial and power projection in order to compete with China from 2023 to 2030 in the grey zone competition. In "2023, we have to have a capability we can provide a combatant commander that provides deterrence."
The Navy and Marine Corps Team must be ready to compete, fight, and win whenever and wherever needed. To reduce the time our platforms are offline for maintenance and repairs, we will invest in sustainment, critical readiness infrastructure, and the industrial workforce, while adopting the best practices of private industry to increase overall efficiency and reduce preventable mishaps.
Artillery is considered a "big war" weapon that is less important in the Corps' new peacetime focus on faster and smaller units of deployment. It has a big logistical tail and is difficult to move ashore with its fleet of trucks. USMC is looking for new mobile strike firepower tech and tactics that is highly survivable within the reach of precision fires greater than 500 km, allowing support for thin expeditionary maritime manoeuvre, while creating dilemmas for the near-peer enemy and consume enemy ISR resources. Thin expeditionary formations (with real-time ISR drones with just 2 long-range sensors & light air-defence) will have to manoeuvre in littoral environment and (converge from dispersed locations to integrating fires with the Navy) "shoot-n-scoot" between little islands around choke points. A sobering reality is that the US will suffer significant losses. However, "The evidence-based possibility that if we were able to change, we probably wouldn't have to fight."
Defensive and offensive jammers and radars systems are important. The forgotten element is detailed integration. This is the culmination of simultaneous de-confliction, coordination, and synchronization of airborne resources to support the ground scheme of manoeuvre (getting the enemy to move into a disadvantageous position using combat power). Marines are also taking lessons learned from the UK’s Royal Commandos on advances they have made in small boats “for logistics, maneuver and fires.” The real challenges exist in transporting water and fuel for forces on the move. Logistics “allows us mobility,” but “it also has to be easy to maintain” so Marines come quickly from spot to spot and not carry long trains of spare parts.
Targetting moving naval targets beyond the radar horizon is impossible for the China navy. Only the US Navy's LRASM can receive and act upon re-targetting updates sent in real-time. "Right now, about 75 to 85% of how we enable and understand long-range precision fires is through a SIGINT picture". China has made its space programme a top priority recently as it aims to become a major space power by 2030. Presently, there is a blurring of lines between war and peace as hybrid conflicts take centre-stage. US knows very well that even 5 or 6 overhead recce satellites cannot ensure persistent ISR.
While Chinese drones are great for scanning huge swathes of area to look for potential targets of interest during 10 hours of flight time. They also rely entirely on satellite data-links that could be degraded during a time of war. Once the missile launchers are set up under some camo nets, it's pretty much invisible (unless there is narrow and close ISR with side radars). This is part of the amphibious deception capability that will complement the Navy and Air Force's heavy punchers. They will become an unpredictable force that's never static, that keeps the enemy from sleeping well at night.
What separates a C4ISR network, from a C4ISRT network is targeting (the 'T') —the ability to use sensor data from a variety of systems to accurately direct long-range fires. China navy's "three attacks" means countering stealthy naval aircrafts/UAVs, cruise missiles, and armed ASW helicopters. US Navy is first in sea power, but it is less dominant in the littoral waters in anti-access places like the South China, the Baltic and Black Seas as well as the Persian Gulf. Salinity and temperature vary greatly in different shallow-water environments of the world. They have different layers, with currents in one direction on the surface, and 3 meters down, there’s a totally different direction of the current. You don’t have much time to think about things – you have to react and react the right way to stay alive.
You have to get people studying about what we can expect 30 years from now. It’s very important there is a place with skilled people that can do war gaming in the littoral environment, and who are adding the right inputs to a game like that. You can do gaming anywhere, but if you don’t have skilled people with knowledge of that kind of environment, the result would be useless. It would be useful to influence the development of new war fighting tactics and techniques; to evaluate what we are doing; to be able to game on it; and then have something brought back again, so we can be better and better all the time and adjust to new differences.
"Part of that is because they play by a different set of rules. They're blurring the lines between police forces and coast guard and military and politics - they are blurring that intentionally. We have very clear lanes that we stay in, and we haven't moved off of that, we have not adjusted. We have to." US Navy-Marine Corps integrated force are developing concepts for conducting nested Distributed, Littoral and Expeditionary operations to achieve sea control, sea denial and power projection in order to compete with China from 2023 to 2030 in the grey zone competition. In "2023, we have to have a capability we can provide a combatant commander that provides deterrence."
The Navy and Marine Corps Team must be ready to compete, fight, and win whenever and wherever needed. To reduce the time our platforms are offline for maintenance and repairs, we will invest in sustainment, critical readiness infrastructure, and the industrial workforce, while adopting the best practices of private industry to increase overall efficiency and reduce preventable mishaps.
Artillery is considered a "big war" weapon that is less important in the Corps' new peacetime focus on faster and smaller units of deployment. It has a big logistical tail and is difficult to move ashore with its fleet of trucks. USMC is looking for new mobile strike firepower tech and tactics that is highly survivable within the reach of precision fires greater than 500 km, allowing support for thin expeditionary maritime manoeuvre, while creating dilemmas for the near-peer enemy and consume enemy ISR resources. Thin expeditionary formations (with real-time ISR drones with just 2 long-range sensors & light air-defence) will have to manoeuvre in littoral environment and (converge from dispersed locations to integrating fires with the Navy) "shoot-n-scoot" between little islands around choke points. A sobering reality is that the US will suffer significant losses. However, "The evidence-based possibility that if we were able to change, we probably wouldn't have to fight."
Defensive and offensive jammers and radars systems are important. The forgotten element is detailed integration. This is the culmination of simultaneous de-confliction, coordination, and synchronization of airborne resources to support the ground scheme of manoeuvre (getting the enemy to move into a disadvantageous position using combat power). Marines are also taking lessons learned from the UK’s Royal Commandos on advances they have made in small boats “for logistics, maneuver and fires.” The real challenges exist in transporting water and fuel for forces on the move. Logistics “allows us mobility,” but “it also has to be easy to maintain” so Marines come quickly from spot to spot and not carry long trains of spare parts.
Targetting moving naval targets beyond the radar horizon is impossible for the China navy. Only the US Navy's LRASM can receive and act upon re-targetting updates sent in real-time. "Right now, about 75 to 85% of how we enable and understand long-range precision fires is through a SIGINT picture". China has made its space programme a top priority recently as it aims to become a major space power by 2030. Presently, there is a blurring of lines between war and peace as hybrid conflicts take centre-stage. US knows very well that even 5 or 6 overhead recce satellites cannot ensure persistent ISR.
While Chinese drones are great for scanning huge swathes of area to look for potential targets of interest during 10 hours of flight time. They also rely entirely on satellite data-links that could be degraded during a time of war. Once the missile launchers are set up under some camo nets, it's pretty much invisible (unless there is narrow and close ISR with side radars). This is part of the amphibious deception capability that will complement the Navy and Air Force's heavy punchers. They will become an unpredictable force that's never static, that keeps the enemy from sleeping well at night.
multi_domain_battle_new_doctrine_of.pdf | |
File Size: | 168 kb |
File Type: |
| Raytheon High-Energy Laser Mission Scenarios | |
The Marine Littoral Regiment's presence in the local partners or allies will be completely known, and be selectively exposed to the peer enemy satellites (these capabilities are not available in warships). US Marines will not be sitting and waiting, in some uninhabited Pacific islands. The enemy will also not know their disposition. They will not be mechanized but will have patrol boats and helicopters, drones and unmanned underwater vessels for maritime maneuvers. "Getting fuel, getting power, getting electricity to keep these things flying or operating is a challenge for us." USMC says the approach to logistics is, that "it can't be a chain; it has to be a web" in and around the islands. Marine units plan to conform geography to its advantage and fight from a strategic defensive, moving from key first-island chain and confined archipelagoes and using their own anti-ship missiles, long-range “asymmetric” capabilities, and a very complex air-defence; can easily turn nearby seas (and skies) into their own version of China’s “anti access/area denial” no-go areas. When tasked with a purpose, USMC units will need high initiative and high-speed, to switch to offence or defensive force, at the correct time. It will neither be purely offensive nor purely defensive in nature.
Stop saying bang (shoot and kill). It's fairly easy for anyone to be lethal by simply pressing the trigger. The need is to understand immediately what’s going to happen. It starts by being adaptable and forward-thinking. Long periods of radio silence could also include during risk-informed decision-making under stressful scenarios. Using a variety of coordinated EW and ISR from different sources will leave the enemy vessels frustrated and exposed. USMC will need to create deception and dilemma at decisive points, to create opportunities to press its advantage. Dispersal and surprise maneuver will be the way to survive. Precision missiles will be reserved for the knockout strike, if the enemy escalates from China's grey-zone ("intelligentized") hostilities. These batteries will remain resilient to attack through a series of measures, tactics and techniques.
Stop saying bang (shoot and kill). It's fairly easy for anyone to be lethal by simply pressing the trigger. The need is to understand immediately what’s going to happen. It starts by being adaptable and forward-thinking. Long periods of radio silence could also include during risk-informed decision-making under stressful scenarios. Using a variety of coordinated EW and ISR from different sources will leave the enemy vessels frustrated and exposed. USMC will need to create deception and dilemma at decisive points, to create opportunities to press its advantage. Dispersal and surprise maneuver will be the way to survive. Precision missiles will be reserved for the knockout strike, if the enemy escalates from China's grey-zone ("intelligentized") hostilities. These batteries will remain resilient to attack through a series of measures, tactics and techniques.
installations_and_logistics_2030.pdf | |
File Size: | 431 kb |
File Type: |
USAF would be responsible for air-dropping guidance packages for troops on the ground. Officials believe they are closer to finding an optimal mix of long-range and highly survivable capabilities for the littoral contested environment. The impending challenge is significant and cannot be met by merely refining current methods and capabilities. China is "iterating so rapidly, and I think that forces us to change. If we can change, we can win." In the end, US and its partners in the Pacific Ocean will be successful in overcoming certain fiscal and technological challenges. However, it's critical for the US to be able to pre-position food, fuel, weapons and equipment needed to run an airfield from which it plans to operate. The US have been "spoiled by two decades of conducting strategic and operational logistics in a permissive environment."
USAF doesn't have the power projection capacity with peer nations. USAF is exploring new clear concepts and approach to employ large groups of relatively low-cost, reusable, and ultimately disposable or expendable — long-ranged UAVs with just 2 sensors, dropped from next-gen cargo aircrafts, to perform a variety of tasks in support of joint campaigns. US have also realised that regular development takes too long and gets outdated quickly. Many of its key technologies and features have never been shown in planning or development. This independent closed system will have a high degree of redundancy and even a high failure rate of individuals will not result in an overall failure. The implications of applying pure saturation grids would force the enemy to exhaust its inventory of interceptors & missiles and increase the resiliency of forward-based forces. Its effectiveness during the opening days of a conflict could be profound.
During a high-intensity war with a near peer, adversary like China, around 100 aircraft could be lost in a single day of combat. The US Air Force is eying a fleet of 1,000 drone wingmen in its airpower — without breaking the bank. MQ-X drone are reusable, but are cheap enough that they can be shot down in battle without incurring massive financial losses. It could be used for strike, communications and electronic attack missions in a contested environment. The US's Replicator hedging strategy aims to churn out many thousands of low-cost unmanned systems, for different domains, that are meant to help overcome masses of ships, missiles, and people. You have to balance the tradeoff of size, weight, power and cost. A drone could be put by special forces, sleeping until it's ready for use. It could come out to provide precision and navigation when needed. It could fly a life vest down to a downed pilot or a radio to a downed pilot. It could actually fly down and survey the runway which you're about to land on. It could serve as a decoy or jammer. What to look for on Replicator is "small, smart, cheap and many" existing systems that could potentially "move the needle" in the Indo-Pacific which allows you to do it again and again and again, and break down systemic barriers along the way.
Meanwhile, the US Army’s number one modernization priority, and critical to winning in a fight against a peer adversary, is the Precision Strike Missile (upgraded multi-mode seeker) will extend the firing range of the ATACMS, by more than 500 kms. The missile is called "Spiral" and is designed to hunt moving targets on land and sea. The U.S. Army is working on combined-arms tactics to build kill zones to a time and place of choosing, with different zones being serviceable by different types of weapons — air, indirect fire, direct fire, etc. "Obviously the Army is a terrestrial, land-centric force. However, we recognize that, with the focus on INDOPACOM".
"We're going to fight an enemy that can pretty much see the whole battlefield space [and electromagnetic signals] and has a magazine depth and range to hit anything. There's no place you can relax, rest or let your guard down. That means ground commanders will have to factor in scenarios in which some supplies will be unavailable." The service is building in the wiring harness so that all new vehicles are ready to go for leader-follower robotic vehicle convoy operations when that technology is approved for Army-wide implementation. The future Bradley, Paladin howitzer and Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle will all use the same power train, meaning the same parts and same mechanical know-how can be used on all three major systems and their variants.
USAF doesn't have the power projection capacity with peer nations. USAF is exploring new clear concepts and approach to employ large groups of relatively low-cost, reusable, and ultimately disposable or expendable — long-ranged UAVs with just 2 sensors, dropped from next-gen cargo aircrafts, to perform a variety of tasks in support of joint campaigns. US have also realised that regular development takes too long and gets outdated quickly. Many of its key technologies and features have never been shown in planning or development. This independent closed system will have a high degree of redundancy and even a high failure rate of individuals will not result in an overall failure. The implications of applying pure saturation grids would force the enemy to exhaust its inventory of interceptors & missiles and increase the resiliency of forward-based forces. Its effectiveness during the opening days of a conflict could be profound.
During a high-intensity war with a near peer, adversary like China, around 100 aircraft could be lost in a single day of combat. The US Air Force is eying a fleet of 1,000 drone wingmen in its airpower — without breaking the bank. MQ-X drone are reusable, but are cheap enough that they can be shot down in battle without incurring massive financial losses. It could be used for strike, communications and electronic attack missions in a contested environment. The US's Replicator hedging strategy aims to churn out many thousands of low-cost unmanned systems, for different domains, that are meant to help overcome masses of ships, missiles, and people. You have to balance the tradeoff of size, weight, power and cost. A drone could be put by special forces, sleeping until it's ready for use. It could come out to provide precision and navigation when needed. It could fly a life vest down to a downed pilot or a radio to a downed pilot. It could actually fly down and survey the runway which you're about to land on. It could serve as a decoy or jammer. What to look for on Replicator is "small, smart, cheap and many" existing systems that could potentially "move the needle" in the Indo-Pacific which allows you to do it again and again and again, and break down systemic barriers along the way.
Meanwhile, the US Army’s number one modernization priority, and critical to winning in a fight against a peer adversary, is the Precision Strike Missile (upgraded multi-mode seeker) will extend the firing range of the ATACMS, by more than 500 kms. The missile is called "Spiral" and is designed to hunt moving targets on land and sea. The U.S. Army is working on combined-arms tactics to build kill zones to a time and place of choosing, with different zones being serviceable by different types of weapons — air, indirect fire, direct fire, etc. "Obviously the Army is a terrestrial, land-centric force. However, we recognize that, with the focus on INDOPACOM".
"We're going to fight an enemy that can pretty much see the whole battlefield space [and electromagnetic signals] and has a magazine depth and range to hit anything. There's no place you can relax, rest or let your guard down. That means ground commanders will have to factor in scenarios in which some supplies will be unavailable." The service is building in the wiring harness so that all new vehicles are ready to go for leader-follower robotic vehicle convoy operations when that technology is approved for Army-wide implementation. The future Bradley, Paladin howitzer and Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle will all use the same power train, meaning the same parts and same mechanical know-how can be used on all three major systems and their variants.
“Be audacious & cunning in your plans, firm and persevering in their execution, determined to find a glorious end.” Carl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz
Early arriving forces are light and lack supplies needed for prolonged defensive engagements. Tossing them in front of enemy armored spearheads is foolish. A counteroffensive is a better strategy in such cases, since the further enemy forces rapidly advance, the more vulnerable they become. In such cases, light units equipped and trained for rearguard actions are best. Of course, politics comes into play, as enemy objectives may be deemed essential to defend. Western military thought emphasizes the offense, despite the historical success of counteroffensives. The Korean war stalemate during 1952 and 1953, US forces turned back many Chinese offensives with heavy firepower and blocking movements, leading to a stalemate. If the US had lured the Chinese into a false sense of accomplishment by withdrawing in the face of an attack, much of the PLA Army could have been trapped and strangled.
In 1942, as powerful German armored forces bypassed Stalingrad, the Russians realized that a counterstroke into the lengthy German flank would be more effective than moving forces far to the southeast to defend against German armor. This resulted in the complete encirclement and surrender of the German 6th Army, while powerful German tanks were abandoned far to the east from a lack of fuel and supplies. By 1943, the Germans lacked the resources to mount offensives. They found it easier to wait for the Russians to expose themselves with offensive thrusts, avoid their armored spearheads, then counterattack into their exposed flanks to maul Russian rear area troops and roll up their spearheads from behind.
Early arriving forces are light and lack supplies needed for prolonged defensive engagements. Tossing them in front of enemy armored spearheads is foolish. A counteroffensive is a better strategy in such cases, since the further enemy forces rapidly advance, the more vulnerable they become. In such cases, light units equipped and trained for rearguard actions are best. Of course, politics comes into play, as enemy objectives may be deemed essential to defend. Western military thought emphasizes the offense, despite the historical success of counteroffensives. The Korean war stalemate during 1952 and 1953, US forces turned back many Chinese offensives with heavy firepower and blocking movements, leading to a stalemate. If the US had lured the Chinese into a false sense of accomplishment by withdrawing in the face of an attack, much of the PLA Army could have been trapped and strangled.
In 1942, as powerful German armored forces bypassed Stalingrad, the Russians realized that a counterstroke into the lengthy German flank would be more effective than moving forces far to the southeast to defend against German armor. This resulted in the complete encirclement and surrender of the German 6th Army, while powerful German tanks were abandoned far to the east from a lack of fuel and supplies. By 1943, the Germans lacked the resources to mount offensives. They found it easier to wait for the Russians to expose themselves with offensive thrusts, avoid their armored spearheads, then counterattack into their exposed flanks to maul Russian rear area troops and roll up their spearheads from behind.
|
The Navy and the current Marine Corps senior leadership is heavily invested in FD 2030. The Marine Corps has divested billions of the assets that made the Corps a balanced, combined arms team to buy anti-ship capabilities primarily devoted to deterring or fighting a war with China. A new “Great Game” for influence is going on in the Indo-Pacific. The US has strengthened its ties with Japan, India, and Australia, while China has made inroads into places such as the Solomon Islands. The current Marine Corps approach is based on a Chinese break-out from the First Island Chain in the East and South China Seas, like the Japanese naval blitzkrieg of 1941-42.
https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/05/24/us-micronesia-security-deal/
The US strategic plan for the Pacific involved securing several island chains to support operations against Japan and the Philippines. The first major island chain to be secured was the Marshalls; however, a small garrison and airbase on the island of Betio in the Gilberts stood in the way. Tarawa was an essential WWII stepping-stone across the Pacific. In what one combat correspondent called “the toughest battle in Marine Corps history,” U.S. Marines wrestled it away at a cost of more than 1,009 men.
Japanese Rear Admiral, Meichi Shibasaki, said “a million Americans” wouldn’t be able to take Tarawa in “100 years.” Americans took Tarawa in 76 hours. The U.S. delivery of coordinated land, sea and air power brought a U.S. force of over 30,000 men, a 10-1 advantage over the Japanese. The complete collapse of Japanese command, control, and communications prevented any concerted attack. All but 17 of the 3,500 dug-in Japanese defenders were killed. Few military battles have matched the concentrated ferocity of the three-day fight between U.S. and Japanese forces in November 1943 for a sandy sliver of land halfway between Pearl Harbor and the Philippines.
| |
During WW-2, Guadalcanal saved the Pacific, and the Coastwatchers saved Guadalcanal. The US-controlled islands initially served as a second line of defence against communist countries in East Asia during the Cold War. In 2015 Micronesia introduced a resolution to end the exclusive partnership with the US as early as 2018. Micronesia, with a population of about 110,000, has received a large amount of aid and investment from China since 2003. Tulagi, is a small island near Guadalcanal that provides access to major shipping lanes to Australia and New Zealand from Hawaii and the mainland United States. Tulagi can extends China’s political influence. Access to Tulagi will provide Beijing with a base for commercial or military activity. Cementing Chinese operations there could give China far greater reach in Solomon Islands and the Southwest Pacific. Leasing an island may become financially very attractive to Pacific island elites. Possession of portions of the Second Island Chain would give China a “springboard against foreign force projection”.
| |
Shortly after WW-1, the Australian Naval Staff instituted a system of Australian civilian "coast watchers" early warning organisation, whose duty it was to report any matters of naval intelligence. These were strategically dotted with approx. 800 middle-aged missionaries, shopkeepers, fishermen, plantation and cattle ranch workers. Between WW-1 and WW-2, it was extended to Papua, New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. Australians gained control over the Solomons after World War I. Initially, a number of British 'Special Operations Executive' officers who had escaped from Singapore along with their Australian counterparts formed the nucleus of the Inter Allied Services Department (IASD). In 1941, 100 out of the 800 Coastwatchers, were placed under the control of the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) spies. The coastwatchers could not have existed without the support of the natives. In 1942, specialist Training Schools were built all around Australia, the most well known being 'Camp Z' Experimental Station ("The House on the Hill") and also the highly secretive 'Services Reconnaissance Department'. About 400 Melanesians served with the coastwatchers, another 680 with the Solomon Islands Protectorate Defense Force, and about 3,200 served as labourers. They also picked up survivors of sinking ships and western refugees. The network was codenamed “Ferdinand,” after the Walt Disney cartoon bull character that preferred smelling flowers to fighting.
From the base at Rabaul, Japanese forces moved on to the Australian-administered islands of Buka and Bougainville, and then along the double chain of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate, reaching Tulagi in May 1942, where they began building a naval base to complement the excellent anchorage. The Japanese had to be stopped. Any further advance and their warships and planes would threaten the sea lane between the United States and Australia, where a build-up of American forces and material had begun. On August 7, 1942, a regiment of the inadequately trained 1st Marine Division landed on Tulagi. The force called it Operation Shoestring because they had only a fraction of the supplies and equipment their leaders thought necessary. The Coastwatcher's early warning network was vital to the Marine's success holding Guadalcanal's Henderson Field airstrip. An important factor in the Guadalcanal Campaign was when Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) coast watchers spies who were sent out to operate secret radio stations behind enemy lines and report on Japanese troop, plane and ship movements. AIB agents located at the key points of Buin and Buka Passage were ideally situated for observation purposes. “Our small band of devoted allies who have contributed so vastly in proportion to their numbers.”
There were never more than about 15 coastwatchers in the Solomons, plus a few American assistants; several watchers on the northern island of Bougainville were killed. The Japanese on Bougainville, aware there were “spies” on the island, decided to flush them out. Japanese pressure forced the coast watchers on Bougainville to withdraw by submarines. Japanese killed hundreds of natives. Even when cruelty was not involved, there was friction between natives and the Japanese. The Japanese troops kept going farther into the jungle-covered mountains until the Japanese gave up and returned to their base, whereupon he returned to Buin. The native scouts let the "coast watchers" know that the Japanese soldiers had given up following them, and they returned to their observation post at Buka Passage.
Sixty Japanese ships and barges had assembled within sight of Paul Mason at Buin. They were waiting for the troop transports when the Coast Watchers had reported off northern Bougainville. American planes and ships attacked the convoy, and the Japanese lost some 6,000 reinforcements intended for Guadalcanal. Japan had lost the initiative. With the Bougainville objective attained, the work of coast watchers in this region ended. They were rewarded with medals and went back to their plantations, trade stores, coastal trading ships, and careers as government officials. The total number of Coastwatchers to die was 36. When the Marines left Guadalcanal, 75% had malaria. The Solomons Coastwatchers were the model for other such intelligence operations and guerilla activity across the Pacific Theater. They were important in the preparation for the liberation of the Philippines as well as other Pacific Theater locations. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/USMC-M-Guadalcanal/USMC-M-Guadalcanal-3.html
From the base at Rabaul, Japanese forces moved on to the Australian-administered islands of Buka and Bougainville, and then along the double chain of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate, reaching Tulagi in May 1942, where they began building a naval base to complement the excellent anchorage. The Japanese had to be stopped. Any further advance and their warships and planes would threaten the sea lane between the United States and Australia, where a build-up of American forces and material had begun. On August 7, 1942, a regiment of the inadequately trained 1st Marine Division landed on Tulagi. The force called it Operation Shoestring because they had only a fraction of the supplies and equipment their leaders thought necessary. The Coastwatcher's early warning network was vital to the Marine's success holding Guadalcanal's Henderson Field airstrip. An important factor in the Guadalcanal Campaign was when Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) coast watchers spies who were sent out to operate secret radio stations behind enemy lines and report on Japanese troop, plane and ship movements. AIB agents located at the key points of Buin and Buka Passage were ideally situated for observation purposes. “Our small band of devoted allies who have contributed so vastly in proportion to their numbers.”
There were never more than about 15 coastwatchers in the Solomons, plus a few American assistants; several watchers on the northern island of Bougainville were killed. The Japanese on Bougainville, aware there were “spies” on the island, decided to flush them out. Japanese pressure forced the coast watchers on Bougainville to withdraw by submarines. Japanese killed hundreds of natives. Even when cruelty was not involved, there was friction between natives and the Japanese. The Japanese troops kept going farther into the jungle-covered mountains until the Japanese gave up and returned to their base, whereupon he returned to Buin. The native scouts let the "coast watchers" know that the Japanese soldiers had given up following them, and they returned to their observation post at Buka Passage.
Sixty Japanese ships and barges had assembled within sight of Paul Mason at Buin. They were waiting for the troop transports when the Coast Watchers had reported off northern Bougainville. American planes and ships attacked the convoy, and the Japanese lost some 6,000 reinforcements intended for Guadalcanal. Japan had lost the initiative. With the Bougainville objective attained, the work of coast watchers in this region ended. They were rewarded with medals and went back to their plantations, trade stores, coastal trading ships, and careers as government officials. The total number of Coastwatchers to die was 36. When the Marines left Guadalcanal, 75% had malaria. The Solomons Coastwatchers were the model for other such intelligence operations and guerilla activity across the Pacific Theater. They were important in the preparation for the liberation of the Philippines as well as other Pacific Theater locations. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/USMC-M-Guadalcanal/USMC-M-Guadalcanal-3.html
The critical Japanese strongholds in the eastern Solomons were Tulagi, which had a natural harbor. In 1942, the Japanese began constructing an airfield on Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands. At the time, the islands were occupied by indigenous inhabitants (mostly working in fishing and subsistence agriculture, or on a few large plantations owned and operated by the colonial authority) and a few European overseers. Japan needed the airbase it was building on Guadalcanal, and every new pair of American boots that landed on the island was a direct threat to the empire. The move threatened the ocean supply corridor between the US and Australia, and the Americans prepared to counter the move by capturing Guadalcanal. The Battle of Savo Island, was arguably worse than any 37 minutes of any other U.S. Navy defeat, including Pearl Harbor. Japan sank three American ships and killed over 1,000 U.S. sailors, in addition to dooming an Australian ship and killing 84 Australian sailors while suffering 129 Japanese troops. However, the US submarine S-38, managed to bring down the Japanese Kako with a torpedo.
Although the Americans had precariously secured a beachhead and taken control of the airfield, which they renamed Henderson Field, the Japanese controlled the rest of the island. The Japanese desperately sought to reinforce the island and to drive the Americans back into the sea. By October 1942, Japan and the United States had worn each other down in the South Pacific. Both armies were devastated by malaria and supply shortages. At sea, the picture was equally grim. Japan had just lost 74 planes at Santa Cruz, but the United States had lost the aircraft carrier Hornet, and her sole remaining flattop, Enterprise, was badly damaged. American planes ruled “The Slot” and Ironbottom Sound off Guadalcanal by day, but Japanese ships dominated them by night. Both sides were stalemated, gasping for breath.
Despite being outgunned and mismatched, the American ships unleashed a maelstrom of fire on the Japanese. Early on the morning of November 12th 1942, the Americans won the race to reinforce Guadalcanal when 8 U.S. transports steamed into Ironbottom Sound. The Japanese hit back at once. Their land-based 11th Air Fleet flew down The Slot and into a wild battle. The sky was filled with color–yellow flame, black smoke and white spray–as Japanese planes pressed home their attacks. In 8 minutes of action, the Japanese lost 11 bombers & 1 fighter. The Americans lost 3 fighters, took a hit on the destroyer Buchanan and another hit on the heavy cruiser San Francisco. With the situation on Guadalcanal becoming dire, on Nov. 30 the Japanese made plans to reinvigorate the Tokyo Express in a last ditch effort to hold onto the island. Though the Americans had paid a high price, their efforts began to convince the Japanese to abandon Guadalcanal. The Guadalcanal Campaign, more so even than the Battle of Midway, tore the heart out of Japanese naval airpower. On land, Japanese forces suffered some 30,000 casualties against 15,000 for the Americans.
https://unwritten-record.blogs.archives.gov/2017/08/03/operation-watchtower-the-guadalcanal-campaign/
US Marines Coast Defensers with anti-air guns, at Midway Island fended off a Japanese aerial attack, which contributed to the victory of the naval battle hundreds of miles away. The 1st Marine Defense Battalion and civilian contractors stood the Japanese off at Wake Island. There were only 80 infantrymen in the mobile reserve. The Marines held out for 16 days. Japanese Rear Admiral Shigematsu Sakaibara ordered the execution of the 98 captive American civilian workers. They were blindfolded and executed with a machine gun. On 7 August, the 3rd Defense Battalion went ashore with the infantry to Guadalcanal and defended the island (and others in the Solomon Islands) against Japanese counter-attacks during the Battle of Guadalcanal. In early 1944, the Marshall Islands became the next target in the Pacific, and the Marine defenders moved in. Short on rifles, but had a few machine guns. By summer, they landed in the Mariana Islands, including Saipan, and Guam. While the 2nd, 5th, 8th, and 16th Marines Coast Defensers did not participate in the Battle of Iwo Jima, they did land on Okinawa in April 1945. The actions of some units are well documented: for example, the 1st Defense Battalion on Wake Island in 1941; the 6th at Midway in 1942; and the 9th in the Central Solomons during 1943.
EVERYONE Has A Plan Until They Get PUNCHED IN THE MOUTH
https://taskandpurpose.com/news/abbey-gate-bombing-afghanistan-investigation/
William Lind in a recent article {https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1985/07/28/the-marines-brass-is-winning-the-battle-but-losing-the-corps/7e1d1c1e-c8d7-42fe-a0d1-52b14b670e3d/} that laid out the proposition that after four defeats - Lebanon, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan - America’s military officer corps is intellectually stagnant. This is utter nonsense. Still coming from William Lind, the “self-professed” inventor, or re-inventor, of the concept of maneuver warfare it cannot be lightly disregarded.
It is first worth taken note of some of the historical pointers Lind employs as examples of when armies “crapped in their own mess kits” and then went on to get it right. His first example deals with how Scharnhorst reinvented the German Army, after its embarrassment at the hands of Napoleon in 1806. Not a bad example, as far as it goes. For the Germans did create an incredibly proficient army at the tactical and operational levels of wars. In the hands of a strategic genius - Bismarck – it was potent force, in support of German (Prussian) policy objectives. In the hands of a strategic idiot though, that army started and was crushed in history’s two most destructive wars.
His next example is the French after 1870. This is an odd choice indeed. For the French answer to their 1870 defeat was adoption of the “Spirit of the Offense,” which led to horrendous losses in the first weeks of World War I, and almost cost France the war. Remarkably the French persisted with these asinine methods until the rank and file mutinied in 1917. The final example is Japan after 1945. As remaking our entire society and forgoing warfare for all time is not currently a viable option, I believe it safe to discount this example. In fact, all of his examples are pretty horrendous given the point he is trying to make. That is the problem with historical analogies, in most cases; one only has to probe an inch below the surface to demonstrate their utter worthlessness. Much can, of course, be learned, from history, but not when it is sloppily applied, as it is here.
But let’s examine why Lind believes the officer corps is intellectually sterile. His first reason is that “officers live in a bubble” where they are constantly fed “swill” about how great they are, and get angry if they hear anything else. If that is truly the impression Lind has of today’s officer corps then, one may argue, that he is the one in a bubble. One wonders if he has ever visited Small Wars Journal, or any of the other sites where military officers are continuously arguing about the points Lind states are being ignored. Moreover, the truth is that most military officers are developed in an environment of almost constant competition, where through a variety of means they are critiqued, often brutally, on everything they do. One has only to witness an after action review at one of our training centers to see how leadership and unit foibles are exposed to all the world before those involved are sent off to fix them.
But, my guess is that Lind’s real problem is with our military repeatedly telling itself that it is unmatched fighting force. For, as Lind is the first to state, our military is clearly is not as good as it thinks it is. His argument is ridiculous on two levels. Even if our military was not an unmatchable force it believes itself to be, of what benefit is it to ever admit such a thing. Can anyone picture a football coach telling his team the day before the big game, that their chances would be much better if only they were as good as their opponent? Similarly, what would the troops think of a military commander who constantly reminded them that they were not as good as their foes? That would do wonders for morale.
The second is even more telling, once it is fully considered. Arguably, the US military has not lost a tactical fight in over 70 years (Task Force Smith in Korea), and has not lost an operational level fight in 150 years (and that depends on what side you were on during the Civil War). For decades, the US military has been absolutely unbeatable on the battlefield. Even in those fights where we were most hard-pressed (Ia Drang, Somalia, Wanat) our Soldiers and Marines delivered at least an order of magnitude more casualties than they took. The simple truth is that by every empirical measure known the US military is the best in the world and remains capable of overmatching any foe on the near-time horizon.
Lind then calls attention to the senior officer bubbles, which are maintained by ”vast, sycophantic staffs that rival Xerxes’ court.” As an historian of the Greco-Persian Wars, I would bet that Lind has little conception of what Xerxes court was like. Hint: it was most assuredly not as he imagines it. But, I assume that he true meaning is that our 4-star commanders are kept in the dark by well-meaning staff officers who have to tell them how great things are to avoid terrible and unspeakable fates. Lind even states that he knows this for a fact, from having personally told these “god-kings” the truth and suffered for it. One must ask two questions; what “courtier” allowed him to penetrate the bubble, and how has Lind suffered as a result. Most would not consider his cozy think-tank position as suffering. Though one does wonder how his position in The Center for Public Transportation allows him the opportunity to access the actually state of today’s military. Possibly, his suffering revolves around at his continuing irrelevance to the crucial debates of our time. Possibly he is offended by not getting as many invites to military conferences or wargames as he used to. If that is the case, it is because he no longer has anything worthwhile to say. In fact, he was last relevant in 1985, and his contributions then were of rather paltry substance.
Lind goes on to state that our military officers are “merely craftsmen” and not professionals. His standard for this comment is that most officers do not read military history, which he proves through two anecdotes; one each from a Marine Corps and Army school, where the students supposedly read only 1 or 2 pages a night. Well, I teach at the Marine Corps War College and I assure Mr. Lind that the students are usually reading over 100 and closer to 200 pages a night. I do, however, lament that there is not more time given over to teaching military history at the various War Colleges (though there are ongoing measures to fix that). Still, at the lower course levels, students are immersed in military history, particularly those students with an aptitude for the material, who are often given a second full year of immersion into military history.
If our students are returning to the military education system not as well read as one might hope, that reflects the fact that they have been at war for over a decade. Given a choice between a bit more time learning their craft, and thereby keeping the men and women charged to their care alive, or reading Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War, which would Lind advise a young officer to do. Moreover, if there really is a professor at an Army school who believes “We are back to drawing on the cave wall,” then I submit that his comment reflects his own failings, and it is time for him to move on.
Lind does not hold the officer corps totally culpable for their own failure. Rather, he views their professional handicaps as a result of three institutional failings. First up, is Lind’s claim that there are too many officers for the organization. To prove his point he compares the leanness of a German Panzer Division in World War II to our division headquarters that he claims are the size of “cities.” Let’s overlook the hyperbole, and note that Lind is comparing apples and oranges. During the invasion of Iraq the 3rd Infantry Division went from Kuwait to Baghdad in 21 days, destroying half a dozen Iraqi divisions along the way. During that time, the division was maneuvered by Brigadier General Lloyd Austin from the back of a couple of vehicles, and he was supported by a staff of less than a dozen officers. Moreover, when I visited the 101st Airborne Division headquarters during the invasion, it was working out of two tents.
Only during the occupation did headquarters begin to grow. This was not a result of needing more officers to coordinate the combat side of the equation. Rather, division headquarters were given diplomatic responsibilities, told to establish local economies, and help establish civic government (the list is almost endless). The reason military officers handled these positions is that, for the most part, the government’s civilian agencies failed to show up in anything near the numbers required to do the job. As the amount of jobs that military was asked to undertake grew, so did the staffs responsible for them. In the event, if those same divisions were called to fight another maneuver war, let’s say in Korea, they would rapidly abandon that excess infrastructure and slim down for combat… as they always have.
According to Lind the Army is also weighed down by too many briefings that give the “illusion of content.” First, what the @*#$& is the “illusion of content.” I suppose Lind is allowed to apply meaningless buzz-phrases out of some business textbook, but, in truth, briefings are important. Why? Because that is how information is conveyed. Every officer can, of course, list any number of briefings he really did not need to attend, or relate a story about the PowerPoint presentation from hell, but one fails to see how this equates to intellectual sterility. Does Lind think that Napoleon’s staff officers, or Eisenhower’s, did not spend much of their time preparing and attending briefings?
At this point, Lind launches into a screed about our military’s personnel policies having created an “emasculated, morally deficient, ass-kissing, conformist, officer corps.” Really? It is too bad Lind, while dealing with transportation problems all day, apparently has no time to visit with serving military officers of all ranks. He would discover that his comments are far removed from reality. I recently had the opportunity to witness a 4-star general talking with a group of captains about the state of the Army. If these captains were holding anything back I could not imagine what it was. In fact, my impression was that if wanted to demonstrate “talking truth to power” she could do no better than use that meeting as an example. So, what is Lind talking about? The best I can guess is that he is rehashing many of the points he was making in the 1980s (and they were wrong then), without having any knowledge of our current military. I, for instance, am a mere professor at the Marine Corps War College. The odds that the Commandant of the Marine Corps - General Amos - knows who I am, are slim (at least until he reads this). Still, if I sent him a note, out of the blue, telling him the corps was making a terrible mistake in how it educating its future leaders (it’s not), I would bet a month’s pay I could get on his schedule. I would bet another month’s pay that after venting my feelings my job would remain secure and I would, in fact, feel no negative professional repercussions. Lind is imaging an American military that does not exist, and possibly never existed. It is sad, indeed that persons have to take the time beating down his straw men.
Lind finishes with this reprehensible close: “If American military officers want to know, or even care, why we keep losing, they need only look in the mirror. They seem to do that most of the time anyway, admiring their now-tattered plumage. Behind them in the glass, figures in turbans dance and laugh.”
So, let’s get a few things straight. First… and this is crucial, the American military does not lose. As I pointed out above, it has a nearly unbroken record of battlefield victories dating back into the 19th century. And, that in the final analysis, is what our military is paid to do: keep the peace, and failing that to win on the battlefield. Unfortunately, as was pointed out to Colonel Summers after Vietnam; in strategic terms, winning on the battlefield is often irrelevant. So, as our military ends over a decade in combat, it comes out with its head held-high, its valor proven, and its capacity to win any engagement unchallenged. Still, the nation again failed to achieve the strategic success it hoped for. By and large such failure cannot be laid at the feet of the military. Our forces did all that was asked of them and more. It is, therefore, hard to see how even another hundred tactical victories could have altered the strategic result. The answer to this strategic dilemma is not going to be found in telling officers to read more history. Rather, it must be found in making sure our policymakers are better prepared to understand and react to the strategic conundrums that surround them. The nation’s military instrument is as close to perfect as any in history, what it needs a statesman of Bismarckian genius to direct when and where it deploys… and to achieve what result. But, blaming the politicians has always been a step to far for Lind and his ilk, as it is much always easier to fault those who fought, bled and died then those who sent them.
In summary, Lind has diagnosed the wrong aliment and offered the wrong cure, and worse, is trying to treat a patient that does not exist. In the process, he has demonstrated that he has lost contact with the realities of our current military. In truth, the real officer corps, particularly our senior officers, are always and everywhere looking for worthwhile suggestions and help. The pity is that Lind has demonstrated that he has nothing in value to offer them. He would much rather, insult and berate, as he demands the officer corps reform itself according to his vision. What that vision consists of, besides reading more military history, remains unfathomable. It is time for Lind to return to his dark corner, and stop bothering the adults who are doing the serious work of reinvigorating the force that will defend this great nation for another generation.
Still, on the off chance Lind truly desires to contribute to the ongoing debate, and not just cast stones, may I recommend a little reading. Each of the services is busily working on their ideas for the future - Expeditionary Force 21 for the Marines, Vision 2025 for the Army, Air-Sea Battle for the Air Force and Navy. May I suggest that Lind take the time to review the documents relating to these new plans and directions, and then publish a commentary on his thoughts.. Rather than attack the military for not thinking about the future force, which is demonstrably false, Lind could make himself relevant in the current debate by carefully analyzing the pro and cons of the myriad of debates that he has somehow currently has convinced himself are no longer taking place.
William Lind in a recent article {https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1985/07/28/the-marines-brass-is-winning-the-battle-but-losing-the-corps/7e1d1c1e-c8d7-42fe-a0d1-52b14b670e3d/} that laid out the proposition that after four defeats - Lebanon, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan - America’s military officer corps is intellectually stagnant. This is utter nonsense. Still coming from William Lind, the “self-professed” inventor, or re-inventor, of the concept of maneuver warfare it cannot be lightly disregarded.
It is first worth taken note of some of the historical pointers Lind employs as examples of when armies “crapped in their own mess kits” and then went on to get it right. His first example deals with how Scharnhorst reinvented the German Army, after its embarrassment at the hands of Napoleon in 1806. Not a bad example, as far as it goes. For the Germans did create an incredibly proficient army at the tactical and operational levels of wars. In the hands of a strategic genius - Bismarck – it was potent force, in support of German (Prussian) policy objectives. In the hands of a strategic idiot though, that army started and was crushed in history’s two most destructive wars.
His next example is the French after 1870. This is an odd choice indeed. For the French answer to their 1870 defeat was adoption of the “Spirit of the Offense,” which led to horrendous losses in the first weeks of World War I, and almost cost France the war. Remarkably the French persisted with these asinine methods until the rank and file mutinied in 1917. The final example is Japan after 1945. As remaking our entire society and forgoing warfare for all time is not currently a viable option, I believe it safe to discount this example. In fact, all of his examples are pretty horrendous given the point he is trying to make. That is the problem with historical analogies, in most cases; one only has to probe an inch below the surface to demonstrate their utter worthlessness. Much can, of course, be learned, from history, but not when it is sloppily applied, as it is here.
But let’s examine why Lind believes the officer corps is intellectually sterile. His first reason is that “officers live in a bubble” where they are constantly fed “swill” about how great they are, and get angry if they hear anything else. If that is truly the impression Lind has of today’s officer corps then, one may argue, that he is the one in a bubble. One wonders if he has ever visited Small Wars Journal, or any of the other sites where military officers are continuously arguing about the points Lind states are being ignored. Moreover, the truth is that most military officers are developed in an environment of almost constant competition, where through a variety of means they are critiqued, often brutally, on everything they do. One has only to witness an after action review at one of our training centers to see how leadership and unit foibles are exposed to all the world before those involved are sent off to fix them.
But, my guess is that Lind’s real problem is with our military repeatedly telling itself that it is unmatched fighting force. For, as Lind is the first to state, our military is clearly is not as good as it thinks it is. His argument is ridiculous on two levels. Even if our military was not an unmatchable force it believes itself to be, of what benefit is it to ever admit such a thing. Can anyone picture a football coach telling his team the day before the big game, that their chances would be much better if only they were as good as their opponent? Similarly, what would the troops think of a military commander who constantly reminded them that they were not as good as their foes? That would do wonders for morale.
The second is even more telling, once it is fully considered. Arguably, the US military has not lost a tactical fight in over 70 years (Task Force Smith in Korea), and has not lost an operational level fight in 150 years (and that depends on what side you were on during the Civil War). For decades, the US military has been absolutely unbeatable on the battlefield. Even in those fights where we were most hard-pressed (Ia Drang, Somalia, Wanat) our Soldiers and Marines delivered at least an order of magnitude more casualties than they took. The simple truth is that by every empirical measure known the US military is the best in the world and remains capable of overmatching any foe on the near-time horizon.
Lind then calls attention to the senior officer bubbles, which are maintained by ”vast, sycophantic staffs that rival Xerxes’ court.” As an historian of the Greco-Persian Wars, I would bet that Lind has little conception of what Xerxes court was like. Hint: it was most assuredly not as he imagines it. But, I assume that he true meaning is that our 4-star commanders are kept in the dark by well-meaning staff officers who have to tell them how great things are to avoid terrible and unspeakable fates. Lind even states that he knows this for a fact, from having personally told these “god-kings” the truth and suffered for it. One must ask two questions; what “courtier” allowed him to penetrate the bubble, and how has Lind suffered as a result. Most would not consider his cozy think-tank position as suffering. Though one does wonder how his position in The Center for Public Transportation allows him the opportunity to access the actually state of today’s military. Possibly, his suffering revolves around at his continuing irrelevance to the crucial debates of our time. Possibly he is offended by not getting as many invites to military conferences or wargames as he used to. If that is the case, it is because he no longer has anything worthwhile to say. In fact, he was last relevant in 1985, and his contributions then were of rather paltry substance.
Lind goes on to state that our military officers are “merely craftsmen” and not professionals. His standard for this comment is that most officers do not read military history, which he proves through two anecdotes; one each from a Marine Corps and Army school, where the students supposedly read only 1 or 2 pages a night. Well, I teach at the Marine Corps War College and I assure Mr. Lind that the students are usually reading over 100 and closer to 200 pages a night. I do, however, lament that there is not more time given over to teaching military history at the various War Colleges (though there are ongoing measures to fix that). Still, at the lower course levels, students are immersed in military history, particularly those students with an aptitude for the material, who are often given a second full year of immersion into military history.
If our students are returning to the military education system not as well read as one might hope, that reflects the fact that they have been at war for over a decade. Given a choice between a bit more time learning their craft, and thereby keeping the men and women charged to their care alive, or reading Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War, which would Lind advise a young officer to do. Moreover, if there really is a professor at an Army school who believes “We are back to drawing on the cave wall,” then I submit that his comment reflects his own failings, and it is time for him to move on.
Lind does not hold the officer corps totally culpable for their own failure. Rather, he views their professional handicaps as a result of three institutional failings. First up, is Lind’s claim that there are too many officers for the organization. To prove his point he compares the leanness of a German Panzer Division in World War II to our division headquarters that he claims are the size of “cities.” Let’s overlook the hyperbole, and note that Lind is comparing apples and oranges. During the invasion of Iraq the 3rd Infantry Division went from Kuwait to Baghdad in 21 days, destroying half a dozen Iraqi divisions along the way. During that time, the division was maneuvered by Brigadier General Lloyd Austin from the back of a couple of vehicles, and he was supported by a staff of less than a dozen officers. Moreover, when I visited the 101st Airborne Division headquarters during the invasion, it was working out of two tents.
Only during the occupation did headquarters begin to grow. This was not a result of needing more officers to coordinate the combat side of the equation. Rather, division headquarters were given diplomatic responsibilities, told to establish local economies, and help establish civic government (the list is almost endless). The reason military officers handled these positions is that, for the most part, the government’s civilian agencies failed to show up in anything near the numbers required to do the job. As the amount of jobs that military was asked to undertake grew, so did the staffs responsible for them. In the event, if those same divisions were called to fight another maneuver war, let’s say in Korea, they would rapidly abandon that excess infrastructure and slim down for combat… as they always have.
According to Lind the Army is also weighed down by too many briefings that give the “illusion of content.” First, what the @*#$& is the “illusion of content.” I suppose Lind is allowed to apply meaningless buzz-phrases out of some business textbook, but, in truth, briefings are important. Why? Because that is how information is conveyed. Every officer can, of course, list any number of briefings he really did not need to attend, or relate a story about the PowerPoint presentation from hell, but one fails to see how this equates to intellectual sterility. Does Lind think that Napoleon’s staff officers, or Eisenhower’s, did not spend much of their time preparing and attending briefings?
At this point, Lind launches into a screed about our military’s personnel policies having created an “emasculated, morally deficient, ass-kissing, conformist, officer corps.” Really? It is too bad Lind, while dealing with transportation problems all day, apparently has no time to visit with serving military officers of all ranks. He would discover that his comments are far removed from reality. I recently had the opportunity to witness a 4-star general talking with a group of captains about the state of the Army. If these captains were holding anything back I could not imagine what it was. In fact, my impression was that if wanted to demonstrate “talking truth to power” she could do no better than use that meeting as an example. So, what is Lind talking about? The best I can guess is that he is rehashing many of the points he was making in the 1980s (and they were wrong then), without having any knowledge of our current military. I, for instance, am a mere professor at the Marine Corps War College. The odds that the Commandant of the Marine Corps - General Amos - knows who I am, are slim (at least until he reads this). Still, if I sent him a note, out of the blue, telling him the corps was making a terrible mistake in how it educating its future leaders (it’s not), I would bet a month’s pay I could get on his schedule. I would bet another month’s pay that after venting my feelings my job would remain secure and I would, in fact, feel no negative professional repercussions. Lind is imaging an American military that does not exist, and possibly never existed. It is sad, indeed that persons have to take the time beating down his straw men.
Lind finishes with this reprehensible close: “If American military officers want to know, or even care, why we keep losing, they need only look in the mirror. They seem to do that most of the time anyway, admiring their now-tattered plumage. Behind them in the glass, figures in turbans dance and laugh.”
So, let’s get a few things straight. First… and this is crucial, the American military does not lose. As I pointed out above, it has a nearly unbroken record of battlefield victories dating back into the 19th century. And, that in the final analysis, is what our military is paid to do: keep the peace, and failing that to win on the battlefield. Unfortunately, as was pointed out to Colonel Summers after Vietnam; in strategic terms, winning on the battlefield is often irrelevant. So, as our military ends over a decade in combat, it comes out with its head held-high, its valor proven, and its capacity to win any engagement unchallenged. Still, the nation again failed to achieve the strategic success it hoped for. By and large such failure cannot be laid at the feet of the military. Our forces did all that was asked of them and more. It is, therefore, hard to see how even another hundred tactical victories could have altered the strategic result. The answer to this strategic dilemma is not going to be found in telling officers to read more history. Rather, it must be found in making sure our policymakers are better prepared to understand and react to the strategic conundrums that surround them. The nation’s military instrument is as close to perfect as any in history, what it needs a statesman of Bismarckian genius to direct when and where it deploys… and to achieve what result. But, blaming the politicians has always been a step to far for Lind and his ilk, as it is much always easier to fault those who fought, bled and died then those who sent them.
In summary, Lind has diagnosed the wrong aliment and offered the wrong cure, and worse, is trying to treat a patient that does not exist. In the process, he has demonstrated that he has lost contact with the realities of our current military. In truth, the real officer corps, particularly our senior officers, are always and everywhere looking for worthwhile suggestions and help. The pity is that Lind has demonstrated that he has nothing in value to offer them. He would much rather, insult and berate, as he demands the officer corps reform itself according to his vision. What that vision consists of, besides reading more military history, remains unfathomable. It is time for Lind to return to his dark corner, and stop bothering the adults who are doing the serious work of reinvigorating the force that will defend this great nation for another generation.
Still, on the off chance Lind truly desires to contribute to the ongoing debate, and not just cast stones, may I recommend a little reading. Each of the services is busily working on their ideas for the future - Expeditionary Force 21 for the Marines, Vision 2025 for the Army, Air-Sea Battle for the Air Force and Navy. May I suggest that Lind take the time to review the documents relating to these new plans and directions, and then publish a commentary on his thoughts.. Rather than attack the military for not thinking about the future force, which is demonstrably false, Lind could make himself relevant in the current debate by carefully analyzing the pro and cons of the myriad of debates that he has somehow currently has convinced himself are no longer taking place.
The heart of the Marine Corps is in its Fleet Marine Force, an organic component of the United States Fleet, consisting of the amphibious assault divisions which spearheaded our Navy’s victorious westward march across the Central Pacific, and the Marine Air Arm whose primary task is the provision of close air support for the Marines who storm the beaches. The strength of that Fleet Marine organization lies in its status as an organic element of our fighting fleet—prepared at any time and on short notice to extend the will of the naval commander ashore in the seizure of objectives which are vital to the prosecution of a naval campaign or in the protection of American interests abroad. This is the demonstrated value of the Fleet Marine Force, a powerful source of ready strength to the Nation, both in war and in peace.
It is a Marine’s duty to be ready any time, and I am pleased to be able to report to you that the condition of readiness prevails within the Marine Corps today. Our field forces are fully prepared to take the field at a moment’s notice. They are well trained and are prepared to carry out their functions with their customary efficiency, spirit and morale at a time when the responsible heads of other services are complaining of disintegration of fighting power accompanied by problems of low morale and deterioration of discipline. I can assure you that these conditions are not existent in the Marine Corps. The Marines are ready, and if it came to a fight today, I do not know who could replace them.
Armies are ponderous. They organize and prepare for operations with care and deliberation and they have great staying power. While those are unquestionably admirable virtues, they still are not the characteristics which go to make up an effective mobile, amphibious fighting force, in peace or war—a force ready to act as a part of the fleet at any time. This, indeed, is the fundamental difference between the Marines and the Army and the effect of this difference has been manifest many times. There is a continuous record of instances in our national history where the Army could not move at all, or could not move soon enough to satisfy the needs of the situation—Cuba in 1906, Vera Cruz in 1914, Iceland in 1941, and Guadalcanal in 1942, are only a few typical examples which demonstrate the point I make. In each case, the Army arrived on the scene only after the objective sought by the United States had been accomplished by Marines. This is not offered in criticism of our Army, but as a factual statement of the effect of basic functional differences. These may be summarized in a simple statement—that no matter how hard it tries, a great national Army cannot be a specialist Marine Corps and still be an Army.
But our dominant position in the field of landing operations did not come about by chance. It was the logical issue of 20 years of conscientious devotion by the Navy and Marine Corps to the complexities of the amphibious subject—to the development of the detailed techniques, doctrines and equipment, which later proved of such value to the armed forces of both our own and allied nations. This success in the field of amphibious development is directly attributable to one fact and one fact only—that the Marines have always viewed the landing operation as a specialty—their specialty, and their efforts have been oriented in that single direction on a full-time, year-in-and-year-out basis.
And finally, there is the matter of duplication. The War Department is now contending that the amphibious efforts of the Marines, despite their century and a half of precedent, are an invasion of the Army’s sphere—an unjustified duplication. In that regard I wish to state that no such duplication exists. The amphibious specialty is the Marine’s sphere, and the Army is not and never has been in the amphibious field. It does not have the schools, the training facilities, the development agencies, or the continuity of experience which are essential complements to the maintenance and development of a full-time amphibious specialist force. Furthermore, those Army troops which took part in landing operations during the past war were actually applying the principles and using the techniques, methods and equipment developed by the Marine Corps and the Navy. In some cases, they were even trained by the Marine Corps. At the present time, the Marines are continuing their devotion to the study and perfection of their specialty—standing ready again to impart their knowledge, whenever needed, to any other element of the armed forces. So, if at this time the War Department undertakes to set up the mechanism to enter the amphibious field, a source of duplication will indeed exist, but the responsibility for that duplication will rest not with the Marines but with the War Department.
It is a Marine’s duty to be ready any time, and I am pleased to be able to report to you that the condition of readiness prevails within the Marine Corps today. Our field forces are fully prepared to take the field at a moment’s notice. They are well trained and are prepared to carry out their functions with their customary efficiency, spirit and morale at a time when the responsible heads of other services are complaining of disintegration of fighting power accompanied by problems of low morale and deterioration of discipline. I can assure you that these conditions are not existent in the Marine Corps. The Marines are ready, and if it came to a fight today, I do not know who could replace them.
Armies are ponderous. They organize and prepare for operations with care and deliberation and they have great staying power. While those are unquestionably admirable virtues, they still are not the characteristics which go to make up an effective mobile, amphibious fighting force, in peace or war—a force ready to act as a part of the fleet at any time. This, indeed, is the fundamental difference between the Marines and the Army and the effect of this difference has been manifest many times. There is a continuous record of instances in our national history where the Army could not move at all, or could not move soon enough to satisfy the needs of the situation—Cuba in 1906, Vera Cruz in 1914, Iceland in 1941, and Guadalcanal in 1942, are only a few typical examples which demonstrate the point I make. In each case, the Army arrived on the scene only after the objective sought by the United States had been accomplished by Marines. This is not offered in criticism of our Army, but as a factual statement of the effect of basic functional differences. These may be summarized in a simple statement—that no matter how hard it tries, a great national Army cannot be a specialist Marine Corps and still be an Army.
But our dominant position in the field of landing operations did not come about by chance. It was the logical issue of 20 years of conscientious devotion by the Navy and Marine Corps to the complexities of the amphibious subject—to the development of the detailed techniques, doctrines and equipment, which later proved of such value to the armed forces of both our own and allied nations. This success in the field of amphibious development is directly attributable to one fact and one fact only—that the Marines have always viewed the landing operation as a specialty—their specialty, and their efforts have been oriented in that single direction on a full-time, year-in-and-year-out basis.
And finally, there is the matter of duplication. The War Department is now contending that the amphibious efforts of the Marines, despite their century and a half of precedent, are an invasion of the Army’s sphere—an unjustified duplication. In that regard I wish to state that no such duplication exists. The amphibious specialty is the Marine’s sphere, and the Army is not and never has been in the amphibious field. It does not have the schools, the training facilities, the development agencies, or the continuity of experience which are essential complements to the maintenance and development of a full-time amphibious specialist force. Furthermore, those Army troops which took part in landing operations during the past war were actually applying the principles and using the techniques, methods and equipment developed by the Marine Corps and the Navy. In some cases, they were even trained by the Marine Corps. At the present time, the Marines are continuing their devotion to the study and perfection of their specialty—standing ready again to impart their knowledge, whenever needed, to any other element of the armed forces. So, if at this time the War Department undertakes to set up the mechanism to enter the amphibious field, a source of duplication will indeed exist, but the responsibility for that duplication will rest not with the Marines but with the War Department.
what-to-do-about-american-investment-in-china.pdf | |
File Size: | 250 kb |
File Type: |
When you say one thing, the clever person understands three.
1 Comment