https://www.amazon.com/Blood-Telegram-Kissinger-Forgotten-Genocide/dp/0307744620Toward the end of the 19th century, battered by the great rebellion of 1857, Imperial Britain set about laying social foundations for a loyal native military. The tool it chose for this social engineering was a system of new irrigation canals running across then-arid Punjab, creating what were called ‘Canal Colonies.’ In 1912, 10 per cent of colonised land in British-ruled India was reserved for the military. The British Empire provided patronage to clan chieftains in British-ruled India through the grant of lands and military contracts. These Indian elites, in turn, ensured order and raised soldiers. Economist Shahid Alam called the feudalisation, “proceeded via alliances of marriage and acquisition of agricultural lands, with or without quid pro quo.” Entire Indian villages that refused to enlist to serve in the WW-1, historian Tahir Mahmood has recorded, were evicted from their lands, and women were separated from husbands and sons until the men fell in line. For soldiers who agreed to serve the British Empire, good pay, pension and land were on offer.Praveen Swami After Partition, this system consolidated in Pakistan under the army general and second President of Pakistan, Ayub Khan. Social scientist Raymond Moore, writing in 1967, recorded that "over 300,000 acres of [taxpayer-funded] land have been made available in the Sind [Sindh], plus rich acreage along the Indian frontier." The Pakistani military rests on a system of patronage. This system of land accumulation does not exist independently of Pakistani politics. The Generals are just the leaders of the largest organised political force, exercising their influence to ensure their privileges will be protected. From 1965 to 2003, the military handed out a staggering 2,303,706.5 acres of irrigated land to its personnel. During Partition, a large number of Hindus and Sikhs from Rawalpindi and Sialkot started arriving since March 1947, bringing "harrowing stories of Muslim atrocities in West Punjab". In response, an estimated 20,000–100,000 Muslims were massacred and others driven away to West Punjab. Meanwhile, many Hindus and Sikhs refugees from Jhelum, on and after 25 November 1947 gathered in Mirpur for shelter and protection were killed by the Pakistani troops and tribesmen. "A 'greatly shocked' Sardar Ibrahim, the then president of Azad Kashmir, painfully confirmed that Hindus were 'disposed of' in Mirpur in November 1947. The raiders killed 10,000 of the captives along the way and abducted 5,000 women. The death toll was estimated to be over 20,000. Many Hindus and Sikhs from Muzaffarabad and Mirpur that survived the raids became displaced within the former princely state. During the WW-II, over 60,000 Muslims from the Poonch and Mirpur districts enrolled in the British Indian Army. Punjab was held by the Unionists, and the NWFP by Indian National Congress. Undeterred, the Muslim League decided to bring down both the governments, with the help of its militia. 500 hostile tribesmen in green and khaki uniforms entered Poonch, and they were joined by 200–300 Sattis from Kahuta and Murree. Their purpose appeared to be to loot the Hindu and Sikh minorities in the district. These efforts exacerbated Hindu-Sikh-Muslim communal tensions in the two provinces. The trauma was especially acute in the Hazara district, a Muslim League stronghold, which directly bordered the Poonch and Muzaffarabad districts. Communal fires were set ablaze in Multan, Rawalpindi, Amritsar and Lahore, spreading to Campbellpur, Murree, Taxila and Attock in Punjab. The rigorous restriction on the movement of goods and men between Pakistan and Poonch also generated shortages, causing prices to skyrocket. The State troops in Poonch ran out of rations and demanded the local populace to provide their supplies. When the populace eventually declared their inability to do so, the Revenue Minister of the State came down to Poonch to collect the tax arrears. Rebellious militias gathered in the Palandri–Nowshera–Anantnag area, attacking the state troops and their supply trucks. The state troops were at this time thinly spread escorting refugees between India and Pakistan. About 10,000 Poonchies gathered mainly to air grievances regarding high prices, and wanted to pass through the town of Bagh. The local officials at Bagh barred them from entering the town. Then the protesters surrounded the town. The army opened fire on the crowds. Reinforcements of State troops were sent from Srinagar, which dispersed the protesters. A local zamindar (landlord), is said to have led an attack on a police-cum-military post in Dhirkot and captured it. The event then led the Maharaja to unleash the full force of his Dogra troops on the population. Kashmiri identity, actually, included both Muslims and the Hindus who were forced from the valley. In 1211 when Delhi was under Muslim rulers, Kashmir was Hindu. Around 1372 or 1383, Turk Islamic preacher Sharaf-ud-Din Abdul Rehman Bulbul Shah and Persian Sufi poet Mir Sayyid (Second-)Ali Hamdani brought Islam & various Iranian crafts & textiles to Kashmir. After 1320 till 1753, Kashmir was ruled by other Mughal-Afghan dynasties. During that time Kashmir converted to Islam. By the mid 16th century, Hindu influence in the courts and role of the Hindu priests had declined as Muslim missionaries immigrated into Kashmir from Central Asia and Persia, and Persian replaced Sanskrit as the official language. In the 19th century, it was ruled by Sikhs and later the British. What is unique for J&K state is that even though it is a Muslim majority state, its population numbering 93 lakh is mainly concentrated in Kashmir valley in an area which is just 32% of the entire area of J&K. The balance 60 lakh population comprising Hindus and Buddhists are in Jammu and Ladakh regions respectively in the remaining 68% area. “Kashmir can claim the distinction of being the only region of India which possesses an uninterrupted series of written records of its history, reaching back beyond the period of the Mohammedan conquest and deserving the name of real chronicles.” Walter W. Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir, 1895. Why has Indian leadership not been able to change the behaviour of Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi General Headquarters (GHQ)? Indian and Pakistan's politicians and bureaucrats (civilian leadership) have not realized that Pakistan Army's strategic use of state-sponsored proxies, started in Pakistan's inception in 1947 in J&K, and it only turned worse after the Indo-Pak War of 1971. Pakistan already occupies Gilgit-Baltistan (and Muzaffarabad, Bag, Poonch, Sudhnutti, Kotli, Mirpur, Bhimber), however if India lost the rest of Kashmir, it would not only clear the strategic positions for future invasions from the North but turn Pakistan as the most dominant power in the region due to its strategic location. Pakistan Army's strategic use of state-sponsored proxies means Indian Army has to focus on COIN-OPS which has slowly weakened the capabilities of Indian Army operation environment level by loss of brave Indian Army officers and generating intense interests in COIN-OPS. Moreover, the 3- and 4-star Indian Army Generals during peacetime, have better chance to rise in COIN-OPS, than strengthening the Indian Army's Air-Land Battle capabilities in operation environment level for future wars that they may never command. A letter written to Jinnah by his secretary, Khursheed Husain, from Srinagar in 1945 made this crystal clear, for in it, he advised Jinnah not to accept the J&K Muslim Conference’s offer to join the Muslim League because the Kashmiris practiced ‘a strange form of Islam, worshiping saints and relics, that drove a coach and four through all the tenets that orthodox Muslims considered most sacred’. Kashmiris, he concluded, would need ‘a long period of re-education’ before they became fit to be included in the ranks of true Muslims. It is the re-education that a shepherd voted when he misguided Pakistani infiltrators who entered Kashmir in 1965, and cycled all the way to Srinagar to warn the police. It was the reason why Sheikh Abbdullah fully supported the Maharaja’s accession to India. In 2009, a Chatham House survey of the 4 most districts of the valley showed that while 75% said they wanted independence but only 2% said they wanted to secede to Pakistan. A majority of Pakistan-administered (Azad) Kashmiris see the current political and constitutional status of the area as a joke. Pakistan denied to the people of POK the same fundamental right to determine their future, which they appeared to champion for the people of J&K. The original Jammu and Kashmir geographical area, which was controlled by the last Maharaja, Hari Singh, at the time of his accession to India, was much bigger than what India is holding now. It had PoK in addition to Shaksgam Valley and Aksai Chin. Pakistan teaches that Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, decided to sign Treaty of Accession with India because Indian Army went in Kashmir. Implying that the Indian Army took Kashmir by force, which is completely baseless. Hari Singh, the last Maharaja of Kashmir had decided to remain independent. On 12th August 1947 he sent a telegram to the heads of India and Pakistan asking for the existing arrangements between the Kashmir state and British India (now India and Pakistan) to continue. Pakistan had planned the tribal invasion known as Operation Gulmarg, a major event in the modern history of J&K as it changed the course of the region's history. Pakistan claims that the Muslim population revolted against the Maharaja and the tribal groups went to help their endangered Muslim brethren. Indian Army was called by Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, to come into Kashmir save him from the tribal invasion. India had conditioned that if Indian blood was only going to be spent to defend India so if Maharaja of Kashmir wants Indian Army to defend Kashmir than he needed to sign the Treaty of Accession with India. India also claims that on the basis of this document, Kashmir became an integral part of the Indian Union. Mohammad Ali Jinnah's rejected the UN-supervised plebiscite proposed by Louis Mountbatten on November 2, 1947. Why did Pakistan repeatedly reject a Kashmiri plebiscite? The invading tribals sponsored by Pakistan looted, killed, and raped Hindus and Muslims alike in Kashmir. It was unlikely that the outcome of a vote would have favoured Pakistan. In April 1950, Pakistan's government sacked Sardar Ibrahim Khan, POK's first president. This triggered the Sudhan revolt by his tribesmen. The Pakistani army had to resort to military operations to quell the rebellion. It mentioned mass arrests, detention and rape of women by security forces. Pakistan could hardly afford a plebiscite. Jinnah & Bhuttos rejection of a UN-supervised plebiscite stands in contradiction to the fake narrative developed by Pakistan. After the 13th amendment in 2018, Pakistan assumed direct legislative and executive authority over Pakistan-administered Kashmir. A majority of Pakistan-administered (Azad) Kashmiris see the current political and constitutional status of the area as a joke. In 2019, Indian parliament revoked Article 35A, the autonomous status of Indian-administered Kashmir, just like Pakistan had done in 1949, when it brought the Northern Areas (now renamed as Gilgit-Baltistan) under its direct administration. The Gilgit-Baltistan area account for 85% of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. India and Pakistan were very poor nations during Independence. After Partition, of India & Pakistan, all things were divided in 82.5:17.5 (or 4:1) ratio between India and Pakistan. Things that could not be divided were to be paid in money. When Pakistan demanded the money. India was unhappy and took the case to a tribunal. The tribunal, ordered India to initially meet all the liabilities and pay Rs. 75 crores (which was 10 times India's total external debt) to Pakistan, and that Pakistan would then pay back its share of the debt of Rs 300 crore to India. It was mutally agreed that both nations would pay in installments. India gave first installment of 20 crore, but Pakistan used that money in tribal invasion known as Operation Gulmarg, a major event in the modern history of J&K as it changed the course of the region's history. After which India refused to pay the rest of the installments untile Pakistan accepted that Kashmir is part of India. However, Mahatma Gandhi insisted India pays the remaining 55 crores to Pakistan and hoped that Pakistan would oneday payback its share of the debt of Rs 300 crore to India. This was one of the reason given as why Mahatma Gandhi was assasinated in India. Neither Pakistan nor India paid their debt to each other. India also took the responsibility of paying Pakistan's foreign debt. Currently, India still owes it a little over Rs 55 crores to Pakistan, while Pakistan owes debt of Rs 300 crore to India. India has not added interest to this amount since its entry in the books. "Imagine, between 1947 and 2018, a period of 71 years, we took on debt amounting to Rs 30,000 and then in a matter of about four years we took on an additional Rs 21,000 billion" Pakistani economist Farrukh Saleem. by Shams Rehman: Pakistan, on the other hand, has primarily built its case on the ‘Two Nation Theory’ and UN resolutions. The Two Nation Theory was a term coined to mean the partition of the British India on the basis of Muslim majority areas becoming part of Pakistan. Since this principle was applicable solely and exclusively to the British India of which Kashmir was not a part in any sense of the word, the Pakistani claims on Kashmir on these bases have no legal status. The first resolution by the UN Commission on 13th August 1948 recognised the unfettered right of Kashmiri citizens (the state subjects) to self-determination, including and with the right to independence. The UN resolution, passed on 13th August 1948, asks Pakistan to take all of her civilians and military personnel and non-resident Pakistanis out of Kashmir before India was to withdraw a bulk of her armies, after which Kashmiris will decide the future of the state through a plebiscite. This plebiscite never happened. Pakistan claims that India did not withdraw her armies, whilst India argues that withdrawal of her armies was to follow the withdrawal of Pakistan’s armies, which never happened. However, gradually the Indian argument changed into a claim that after the accession by the Kashmiri Maharaja Hari Singh in 1947 and its ratification by the Kashmir Assembly, headed by the National Conference in 1949, Kashmir became an integral and inseparable part of India. Why then did India take the Kashmir case to the UN and accept to withdraw its armies and hold a plebiscite for Kashmiris to decide the future of Kashmir? It can be argued that India took the case to UN in 1948 before the affirmation of accession by the Kashmir assembly, however, the question remains why India sat through and accepted so many resolutions discussed and passed after 1949. Some BJP activists dismiss the entire UN exercise as a blunder by the socialist Nehru. The Majority of the people supporting the National Conference, on the one side, and the Muslim Conference, on the other – at least in the Indian occupied Valley and the Pakistani-occupied ‘Azad’ (Free) Kashmir – waited with great optimism for the International community to make Indian and Pakistani rulers fulfil their promise to give Kashmiris the right to determine their future. However, after clashes between the aspirations of Kashmiris for independence, and of the Indian and Pakistani rulers for accession, optimism began to give way to scepticism and resentment as early as 1953 when the Indian government deposed the head of Kashmiri Government in IOK (Sheikh Abdullah) and the Pakistani government did the same in POK (Sardar Ibrahim). While Pakistan imprisoned and tortured Bhatt and his comrades, and India executed him on 11th February 1984, the world remained almost indifferent to this largely peaceful resistance, with the Ganga Hijacking and killing of an Indian diplomat in Birmingham as two exceptions. Both India and Pakistan are not in Kashmir to protect Kashmiris from the ‘other’ but for the resources of Kashmir – mainly water but also minerals and forests. "If one considers that India recovered after the initial setbacks and took the war to Pakistan, ending it on its terms, then India could be said to have won it. On the other hand, Pakistan treats it as an unqualified victory and celebrates it as 'Defence Day', a clever ploy to settle the argument!" Prologue Indo-Pak War of 1965: The seeds of the birth of Bangladesh were sown on December 25, 1962 when Sheikh Mujibur Rehaman had a midnight meeting with Indian diplomats at the Indian Consulate in Dacca. In 1962, the IAF created aviation history by landing 6 AMX 13 Tanks, dismantled in two parts, at Chushul (14000 feet) using AN 12 aircraft. In the 1965 war, using an old photograph of bunched up AMX-13 tanks from Chhamb-Jaurian Sector for example, Pakistan claimed it had decimated 20 Lancers; whereas in reality, the one lone squadron of light tanks had held up two regiments of the far superior Pattons. In the 1965 war, 12 Vampire fighters were launched from Pathankot to stop the Pakistani advance on Chammb in the Akhnoor sector — but they slowed down the thrust, with four of them getting shot down. The aircraft, owing to their vintage nature, Vampires were withdrawn from front line service after losses to Pakistan Air Force’s modern F-86 that they were up against, and were replaced by Mystères, Hunters and Gnats. Speaking of the Pakistan Air Force, the Pakistanis had indeed destroyed almost three times the number of Indian aircraft, but Squadron Leader Alam’s claim of having shot down nine Hunters is a bold faced lie. After more than 200 years, when the British colonizers finally made an exit following the economic devastation of second World War, the vast swath of Indian sub-continent got divided into two parts: The secular India and the Muslim-dominated Pakistan. The British official thought the transfer of power would need 5 years but due to the rising communal roits, the last viceroy, Lord Louis Mountbatten had agreed to complete the transfer of power in 4 months. The region of Kashmir, a predominant Muslim territory ruled by a Hindu provincial ruler, was left in a case of ambiguity. In a letter Shastri explained as to why India agreed to a plebiscite in Kashmir in 1948 and this is no longer an option: “The reason why, when in 1947, we first went to the Security Council with a complaint of aggression against Pakistan, we made a unilateral promise of having a plebiscite in the State of Jammu & Kashmir, was that, at that time, the State had no democracy, having been under the rule of a prince in the British days, and we were anxious ourselves to be satisfied that the people, as distinct from the ruler, genuinely favoured accession to India. Ever since the accession of the State, we have been building up democratic institutions. There have been three general elections in conditions of freedom. The results of these elections have demonstrated clearly that the people of Jammu & Kashmir have accepted their place in the Indian Union.” Shastri wrote, according to a copy of the letter released by U.S. State Department. Jinnah, before the formation of Pakistan, told the Life Magazine, stating that it was his view that Pakistan’s geo-strategic location has made it imperative for the US policy makers to forge an alliance with the country. He said that the US interest in countries along the Soviet boundaries will be considered for military aid — “since Pakistan is not very far from Russia, the US would build our Army and give us the arms to prevent Russia from walking”. After freedom, Jinnah placed Pakistan firmly in the western camp, in contrast to Jawaharlal Nehru, who took a position of nuance. The Eisenhower administration responded by flooding Pakistan with US weaponry and assistance. The hesitant, often elliptical, Indian requests for similar assistance were ignored on the grounds that Pakistan was now a “treaty ally”, which India declined to be. Pakistan, despite its obsession with Kashmir, maintained the ceasefire for over 16 years (1949 to 1965) was due to two factors: India had a strong and stable government under a towering leader and the western front, unlike the eastern border, was well fortified. Jawaharlal Nehru died in May 1964 and by the end of the year Pakistan had finalised plans to seize Kashmir by force. The defeat of the Indian Army by the Chinese in 1962 and Nehru’s death had given the Pakistanis the erroneous impression that India was vulnerable. Borders remained volatile all through out the 1950s and 60s. Much less is known of the battle of Rann of Kutch which was conceived by the Pakistani military as a “trial run” before launching a full-scale war to annexe Kashmir. In Pakistan, Iskander Mirza, the then president, abrogated the Constitution in 1958 and declared martial law only to be deposed by Gen Ayub Khan (who was almost court-martialled for cowardice during the Burma campaign under General William Slims). In early January 1965, Ayub Khan defeated Fatima Jinnah, sister of Mohd Ali Jinnah, in an unfairly conducted election. He chose the Rann of Kutch as the area for the Pakistan Army’s “trial operation” against India. He raised a claim of about 3,500 square miles of territory in this area which, according to his foreign minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was in the “adverse possession” of India. In January 1965, an Indian police patrol noticed that an 18-mile long track, running within the Indian territory and connecting Ding (in Pakistan) with Surai (in India), was being patrolled by Pakistanis border guards on the plea that it lay within the Pakistani side of the border. The Indian police expelled the Pakistani guards and destroyed the outposts they had erected to secure the area. A further incident of violation of Indian territory by Pakistani patrols took place in February 1965. When the Indian government lodged a protest, the Pakistan foreign office denied any such violation and claimed that the area in proximity to Kanjarkot had been in the continued possession of Pakistan since August 1947. On April 24, Pakistan simultaneously attacked four Indian positions — Sardar Post, Biar Bet, Vigokot and Point84 — using Patton tanks and 100-pound guns for the first time. Fierce fighting continued till April 30, when Indian Army artillery caused heavy damage to Pakistani ammunition dumps. The Pakistani attack faded away. At the end of this week-long fierce engagement, India was still in possession of Sardar Post, Vigokot and the southern tip of Biar Bet, but had lost its hold on Point-84. Pakistan then made a proposal for talks, but India insisted on the vacation of Kanjarkot by the occupying Pakistani forces before any talks could be held. Rawalpindi would not agree to the vacation of Kanjarkot and no talks were therefore held. After an immense amount of diplomatic activity, Wilson succeeded and a ceasefire became effective on July 1, 1965. As a part of this arrangement the status quo ante as on January 1, 1965, was fully restored. Paradoxically, even Ayub did not want to intensify the Rann of Kutch conflict. He had launched that operation because he wanted to give his troops and armour, the newly acquired American Patton tanks, a full dress rehearsal to prepare them for a full-scale invasion of India, first in Kashmir and immediately thereafter Punjab. He also wanted to assess the will and capability of Indian soldiers to fight a war. Pakistan (having technologically superior U.S.-made fighters) became confident that IAF will not be used in the war as happened in the 1962 India-China War, since with IAF involvement, the conflict will escalate to a full-fledged war. By the end of May 1965, the Pakistanis seemed to have completed their “trial run” to their apparent satisfaction. Military historian Russel Brines writes, “Ayub and the Pakistani military top brass drew self-comforting and encouraging conclusions from the Rann of Kutch conflict.” Emboldened by his Army’s adventure, Ayub Khan authorised a covert invasion of Kashmir that would escalate into a full-scale war with far-reaching consequences for India-Pakistan relations. In 1965, Pakistan under the leadership of General Ayub Khan launched an aggressive attack on India. The war began on August 5 following the initiation of Operation Gibraltar, a strategically planned infiltration in Kashmir valley by Pakistan troops. More than 50,000 armed Pakistani soldiers entered in Kashmir disguised as locals. The rationale behind the move was to create a scenario of insurgency within the valley and cut-it-off from the rest of India. Pakistani troops were successful in making in-roads in various sectors of Kashmir owing to the heavy artillery they were equipped by United States and United Kingdom, in the Cold War era. On the other hand, India was yet recovering with the devastation suffered in Indo-Sino War (1962). However, General J N Chowdhary made a strategically wise decision to attack Pakistan on the western frontier. Punjab’s battles are restricted by the river corridors. Pakistan had the option to swing south from Khem Karan or go east into uncontested territory but the presence of the River Sutlej forced it to advance along the grain towards the Beas Bridge. Despite, maintaining a strong grip in Kashmir, Islamabad was forced to divert its resources towards its southern frontiers. As Pakistan was fast running out of ammunition, US feared that any delay in ceasefire would put Pakistan at a disadvantage position and could be very well run over by a strong Indian Army, which was moving fast inside the Pakistan side of Punjab. PM Lal Bahadur Shastri surprised many with his wartime leadership that saw Indian troops cross into Pakistani territory, bringing to naught Pakistan’s second attempt to snatch Kashmir by force. US President Lyndon Johnson, who chaired a special meeting the following day on the subject, gave instructions to “sit it out”. One of the reasons for United State’s coyness to act against Pakistan was described, in the declassified cables revealed was because of the U2 spy plane base in Peshawar, Pakistan. The air force station run by the CIA remained at that time the only authentic source of spy-in-the-sky information on Soviet and Chinese missile plans, even after U2 planes were shot down in 1960. Spy satellites had not been fully developed as yet. With increased Soviet pressure, Pakistan formally terminated the Peshawar facilities in 1968. The turning point of the battle was the capture of Haji Pir Pass by the Indian troops on August 28. As a result, Pakistani troops stationed in Kargil and other important junctions were cut-off from the supplies sent to them. In a desperate mode, Pakistan launched ‘Operation Grand Slam’ to occupy the Akhnoor sector in Jammu. However, Indian army curtailed their ambitious mission in a relatively easy manner. In the next couple of days, the Pakistani troops were eliminated from Poonch, Phillora, Barki and Dograi. Intelligence and maps was very poor. India failed to pick up the fact that the Pakistanis had surreptitiously raised an additional armoured division and the IAF could not locate the PAF aircraft in East Pakistan. There was no joint planning, leave alone coordination, between the Air Force and the Army. This led to the Lahore fiasco when Pakistani air strikes disrupted the Indian offensive on September 6. The IAF was unprepared for the strike on September 6 when the Pakistan air force (PAF) destroyed 13 aircrafts in a raid on Pathankot, including two new MiG-21s. Similar raids found the IAF station Kalaikunda in the east unawares leading to the destruction of eight aircraft on the ground. MiG-21s had recently been inducted and were not yet night capable for interception. Night flying of Gnat aircraft was limited due to poor cockpit lighting. The night fighter Vampires were already obsolete. If there is anything this war proved, was that 1965 war was show of mutual incompetence. This applies to Pakistan in Chhamb-Jaurian so early on in the war, then in Khem Karan, and to India in the Lahore and Sialkot sectors, where initial surprise and local superiority did not translate into decisive gains. On September 6, XI Corps launched a surprise attack at 4am, led to the crossing of the Ichhogil canal and the capture of the Bata shoe factory on the outskirts of Lahore by 11am. Despite capturing some 140 sq mi of land, and crippling Pakistan’s 1st armoured division at Khem Karan, XI Corps performance, Singh says it was “a sickening repetition of command failures leading the sacrifice of a series of cheap victories.” Senior commanders ordered a withdrawal to the east bank of the canal. I Corps captured 200 sq mi of territory and destroyed a great deal of Pakistani armour. The month-long battle finally came to a halt with intervention from United Nation Security Council. Both sides claim to have won the war, but international defence experts found India in a stronger position. On September 22 , UN passed a resolution demanding an unconditional ceasefire from both sides. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri wanted to know from Army chief JN Chaudhuri whether India could gain any great victory if it continued to fight. The general declared that India had run out of ammunition and it would be okay to accept the ceasefire. In 1965 war, Indian Army had captured the strategic Haji Pir Pass. Soviet Union was placed in charge to hold mediation talks between the warring neighbours. During the Tashkent talks between Indian and Pakistan, held through the good offices of Soviet Union, India agreed to return Haji Pir Pass, Pt 13620 which dominated Kargil town and many other tactically important areas. Had this pass been held by us, the distance from Jammu to Srinagar through Poonch and Uri would have been reduced by over 200 Kms. Also, later on when Pak commenced its infiltration into J & K in 1965 through the Uri – Poonch Bulge which continues even today. To add mystery to the whole process, Prime Minister Shastri died on 10th January, 1966 after signing the Tashkent Declaration with President Ayub Khan of Pakistan. He was denounced by all and sundry for caving in to the Russian pressure. But in hindsight, India was remiss in not capturing Haji Pir Pass in 1971 war. It was the only worthwhile objective on the Western Front. A fortnight into the war, both were tired in body and mind, short of ammunition or tactical ideas. This has been documented on both sides by honourable soldiers who fought each other. Both sides started building up for the next, more “decisive” war. As a result, India turned to the Soviet Union, which replaced Britain and France as our main weapons supplier. Disillusioned with US, Pakistan turned firmly into the Chinese camp. India and Pakistan continue to commemorate the 1965 war on both sides of the border in September, claiming success over the other. Pakistan Army lost its last chance to force a military solution on the Indians." This was the first war that saw, what is now a familiar pattern, of Pakistani leaders rushing off to China to seek succour after getting into trouble with India. India had learnt a harsh lesson that neither NAM, nor the Afro-Asian group would come to its aid. Near the end of 1948, Władysław (Józef Marian) Turowicz and 45 airforce veterans of World War II from Poland, opted to relocate to a country that was a rather new entry on the world map: Pakistan. Initially, they established technical institutes in Karachi. Turowicz later helped restructure the nascent (ex-Royal) PAF Academy as an Instructor and Chief Scientist. His colleagues assisted him in imparting specialized technical training to PAF technicians. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUN02gUnyxc By November 1971, almost 10 million refugees from East Pakistan had fled their homes and streamed into India in the wake of mass killings perpetrated on the Bengali population by the Pakistan military under the ‘Butcher of Bangladesh’, Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan. Indira Gandhi's secretary, P.N. Dhar had reminded D.P. Dhar of Napoleon’s advice: "never interrupt an enemy when it’s making a mistake." The Pakistani attack came as good news to India, too. Indian decision-makers had been expecting an attack on the western front by Pakistan. D.P. Dhar was on the PM’s aircraft travelling with her from Calcutta when the pilot informed them of the Pakistani air strikes. "The fool has done exactly what one had expected". The Indian Government's directive given to the Eastern Command focused on capture of maximum territory, including the major towns and the port cities of Chittagong and Khulna, but declared that Dhaka was an “objective too far”. But the brilliant commanders and staff officers never lost sight of why Dhaka had to be the critical operational objective. The aim was to dismember Pakistan and create the new nation state of Bangladesh. The victory had to be absolute, leaving the international community with no option but to recognise the new state. This “default strategy” ended up being adopted by the Army Headquarters midway through the war. In manoeuvre style of warfare, selected positions are attacked to force logistic breakthrough corridors and these ‘gaps’ created are exploited to reach the critical vulnerability. Then an all-out effort with high firepower is made to capture or destroy the critical vulnerability of the enemy. Once the critical vulnerability is captured, the enemy forces, regardless of their strength, are rendered ineffective.
Pakistan consisted of East Pakistan & West Pakistan flanking India on both sides and China (which till today has border disputes with India's northern boundaries) had declared its full support. Even the U.S. fully supported the relatively small Muslim nation Pakistan and saw it as an ally against Soviets. The Soviets on the other hand had fought with China and so India had became its natural ally. The Soviet made it clear that it would block any move to prematurely summon the UN Security Council. It is important to state that while some Bengali East voices were challenging the unity of Pakistan, most were still in favour of a united, democratic, federal Pakistan, despite the growing realisation in the eastern wing that East Pakistan had by now become a mere colony of West Pakistan. As the Bengali East was treated like second class citizens and their common religion could not make them feel any less alienated by distance, customs and temperament. They were appalled at the response of the Pakistani administration in dealing with the devastating cyclone in November 1970 in Bangladesh, which claimed the lives of close to 200,000 people. And the Pakistani generals were not willing to honour the 1970 election results, and a major crisis was at hand. Pakistani establishment began to crack down with unprecedented cruelty. Ten million refugees fled to India. While the real toll of the brutal crackdown could not be ascertained as yet, speculation is that it took millions of human lives. Indira Gandhi wrote to Nixon about the 'carnage in East Bengal' and the flood of refugees burdening India. When US Secretary of State Will Rogers received this 'miserable' cable, he informed President Nixon that the 'Dacca consulate is in open rebellion.' This did not change Nixon's opinion: 'The people who bitch about Vietnam bitch about it because we intervened in what they say is a civil war. Now some of the same bastards...want us to intervene here -- both civil wars.' In an interview with Jeffrey Goldberg, the Editor-in-Chief of “The Atlantic”, Kissinger reported that after the opening of China via Pakistan, America engaged in increasingly urging Pakistan to grant autonomy/ independence for Bangladesh. The Indian Prime minister decided to tour Western capitals to explain the Indian stand. But it did not cut much ice. India failed to elicit support from the US, which mattered the most. During the following months, the situation deteriorated, and many more refugees came to India. As the much more powerful Pakistan army pushed the ill-equipped Bengali regular units back towards the Indian borders. The CIA had reported that 'India would foster and support Bengali insurgency and contribute to the likelihood that an independent Bangladesh would emerge from the developing conflict.' India helped East Pakistan become Bangladesh in the last few months of 1971, but was not responsible for the conditions between 1947 and 1970 which led to the breakup of Pakistan. India remained steadfast in its support and resolve to facilitate the formation of an independent Bangladesh. Radical nationalist Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was no Nehru or Mahatma. An increasingly assertive Indian government wanted to make full use of Bengali discontent, as a riposte to Pakistan’s, decades long, meddling in J&K. In her patriotism, she used India's secret intelligence agency (that's modelled on Israel's external intelligence agency) to run a proxy war (since in July, General Manekshaw told Indira that the army would not be ready till December) by equipping & training the West Pakistan rebels (Mukti Bahini) during a time when the West Pakistan was using its own army to crush the mass agitations taking place in East Pakistan (India accepted one of the largest number of refugees) and the brutality made Bangladeshis bring intelligence to the Indian side without Indian planning to do so (it is said that the Indian officials thought of it as dream situation that presented itself and had to be taken advantage of). Nixon's administration kept arming Pakistan despite having imposed an embargo on providing both Islamabad and New Delhi military hardware and support. Who initiated the war hardly mattered to the world, since if the "Responsibility to Protect" argument was put forward rather effectively by India. Pakistan retaliated by attacking in the West frontier. The Pakistani attack came as good news to India, too. The Indian Army had not yet made any major attacks in the western sector, but a CIA mole in Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s cabinet had leaked her plan to bomb Pakistani military capability into the Stone Age. Nixon – who was working to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough in China, with Pakistan acting as the middleman – asked Beijing to mobilise troops on the Indian border. But as Moscow had moved its crack army divisions to the Chinese border, and due to the snowy winter season, China decided it was not going to sacrifice itself at Nixon’s bidding. The US had mobilized their 7th Fleet to the Bay of Bengal, ostensibly to evacuate US nationals, is public knowledge. But the declassified papers show Washington had planned to use US Navy’s Task Group 74 of Seventh Fleet for a joint attack by the US and the UK against the Indian Army. The Indian AirForce having wiped out the Pakistani AirForce within the first week of the war, was on alert to fend off any possible intervention by aircrafts from U.S.S Enterprise (was with Task Group 74) of US Navy’s Seventh Fleet. The Soviets dispatched a powerful nuclear-armed Flotilla, the 10th Operative Battle Group of Red Banner Pacific Fleet from its headquarters in Vladivostok in the Far East, under the Command of Admiral Vladimir Kruglyakov. Soviets deployed two task groups; 2 cruisers, 2 destroyers, 6 submarines, and support vessels. However, since the Soviet missiles were of limited range (300 km) so, the Soviets commanders had to take the risk to be within range of Seventh Fleet of United States Navy. The Chief Commander order to surface the nuclear submarines when near the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet. It was done to demonstrate, that the Red Banner Pacific Fleet were in the Indian Ocean, with their nuclear submarines. Soviets intercepted the American communication. The commander of the British fleet, Admiral Gordon, told the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet Commander: 'Sir, we are too late. There are the Russian atomic submarines here, and a big collection of battleships'. This last supposed signal had no confirmation from the American side. Since the U.S. was already locked in a bitter fight in Vietnam, it too didn't want to get involved. "The Soviet Union has a treaty with India; we have one with Pakistan." Pakistan was the broker between the United States and People's Republic of China. The regional situation was already complex, the two superpowers, Soviet Union and USA were supporting India and Pakistan respectively. The war ended with Pakistan's defeat at the hand of India's now well-equipped armed forces in the familiar terrain of Punjab and with the creation of Bangladesh in the East. Indira is credited to have given a land known for hundreds of years as suffers from invasion (most recently by the Chinese) got the taste of victory and gave the nation and its armed forces a sense of pride. Within 13 days, the Indian army routed Pakistan in one of the swiftest campaigns of the 20th century. A Charismatic brass, led by the legendary Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, made sure that the Armed Forces decimated Pakistan’s resistance and forced them to an unconditional surrender. A thousand paratroopers of the 50 Independent Parachute Brigade of the 2 Para Battalion were airdropped in broad daylight by 50 aircrafts of the Indian Air Force. The result was that the Pakistanis were caught completely by surprise and an entire Pakistani Brigade was decimated at Tangail between 11 and 13 December. History remembers Capt TK Ghosh who spent ten days hiding behind enemy lines to prepare the DZ (dropping Zone) for what was to become the largest airborne operation since the Second World War. Commander Vijai Prakash Kapil, Vir Chakra (retired) and Petty Officer Chiman Singh, Maha Vir Chakra (retired) were part of the secret Naval Intelligence unit had trained Mukti Bahini naval commandos for one of the largest covert maritime warfare operations since the Second World War. Despite the fact that West Pakistanis were told as late as Dec 14 and 15 that they were winning the war, on Dec 16, 1971, Gen A.A.K. 'Tiger' Niazi, GOC, surrendered to the Indian troops led by Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora in Dhaka. India took approximately 90,000 prisoners of war, including Pakistani soldiers and their East Pakistani civilian supporters. 79,676 prisoners were uniformed personnel, of which 55,692 were Army, 16,354 Paramilitary, 5,296 Police, 1,000 Navy and 800 PAF. The remaining prisoners were civilians – either family members of the military personnel or collaborators. A total of 1,313 Indian soldiers won gallantry awards in the 1971 war. These included 959 from the Army, 171 from the Navy and 183 Air Force personnel. Four of these were Param Vir Chakra winners - three going to the Army and one to the Indian Air Force (IAF). However, Assam is dealing with the consequences and thought tactically the creation of Bangladesh has been good for the nation (because now the politicians could return to social development... which resulted in the ugly "Emergency" where Indira virtually turned into the World's first female dictator) remains to be seen. Can the paranoid Pakistan ever forget their defeat and, ironically, Bangladesh has not become a stable nation and is crippled by extreme challenges of poverty, over population, etc making it a safe heaven for some of India's north-eastern insurgencies. In a dogfight, anything can happen, depending upon the tactics used by the two sides. For example, who can forget the IAF hero Sqn Ldr AK Devayya who during the 1965 Indo-Pak war shot down an F-104 Starfighter deep inside Pakistan over Peshawar before being fatally downed by another PAF jet. The Chinese knew that the control of Chushul and surrounding areas would give them unhindered access to Ladakh roads and valleys leading to Leh. Chushul is located in southeastern Ladakh, south of the famous Pangong Lake. Chushul airfield is important because the lack of road connectivity to Ladakh necessitated the movement of supplies to the area by air. Low operating pressure and ratified air created problems in the cooling systems of the tanks and the freezing temperature affected the efficiency of their engines. Muhammad Ali Jinnah had assured all the atypical sects that Pakistan will be a non-sectarian modern Muslim nation. Pakistan’s constitution was first approved in 1956, under Prime Minister Muhammad Ali, but stood abrogated in 1958 after a military coup d’état. The country’s second constitution, under General Ayub Khan, was approved in 1962. The revised document institutionalised the intervention of the military in domestic politics, for example, the president or his defence minister of Pakistan must be from Pakistani army. The 1962 constitution was suspended in 1969 when Gen Yahya Khan was appointed as the chief martial law administrator. The 1969 constitution was abrogated in 1972. The 1973 constitution was the first in Pakistan to be framed by elected representatives under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. In 1977, a military coup d’état was conducted by Chief of Army Staff General Zia-ul-Haq, which deposed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and imposed martial law. Zia’s emphasis on Islam, in an already conservative society, encouraged Islamic zealotry in the army. The Shia-Sunni conflict emerged in the wake of Gen Zia ul-Haq (Sunni) capturing power in Pakistan, the Ayatollahs in Iran (Shia) and Saudi Arabia (Sunni) challenging the Iranian bid to capture the leadership of the Muslim world. What followed was sectarian radicalisation of Shias and Sunnis. Zia’s second major contribution was the revival of covert warfare using irregulars. Then again, in 1999, General Pervez Musharraf arrested Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and imposed martial law till the time he appointed himself as the president of Pakistan. Amid this continued struggle for power, violence has been a stark reality in the politics of Pakistan. The country’s first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was shot dead, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was hanged, his daughter Benazir was shot dead, Zia-ul-Haq died under mysterious circumstances, and General Pervez Musharraf survived two assignation attempts. However, if you establish a country for Muslims, the question of who is a true Muslim emerges, because of long sectarian animosities, should not be surprising. The “Agartala Conspiracy and Sedition” case of 1968, against Mujib and 34 others, brought out in the open, the intense craving for a separate national identity for East Bengalis. India had intervened in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) to stop the genocide perpetrated by Pakistani Army and consequently helped it to liberate from West Pakistan. An independent Khalistan would end India's land access to Kashmir to the north, another key interest of the Pakistan Army since 1947. Indian Prime minister Indira Gandhi was gunned down by her Sikh bodyguards because they believed she was responsible for the massacre at the Golden Temple. “For Pakistan, the Khalistan movement is an affordable way to bleed India, and that won’t change under Prime Minister Imran Khan. For the Khalistanis, I think the referendum (a campaign by a UK-based organisation to vote for a separate Sikh State) is a strategic blunder which will only expose how feeble the support for Khalistan is. The Khalistanis are shooting themselves in the foot by destroying their bogus claims to speak for all Sikhs. They’ll say they got low numbers because of Indian repression.” The pro-Khalistan elements believed to have reached out to illegal Sikh immigrants and offered them immigration support and money to participate in a referendum in Westminster. There was no verification if the persons arriving for the referendum were Sikhs, Pakistanis or Afghans. The offer to ferry the prospective voters on a bus was criticised by the Gurudwaras. Few Sikhs who say India's "occupation" of Indian Punjab, but they never ask Pakistan to end its occupation of the much larger Pakistani Punjab. Majority of Sikhs, the report points out, are happy with India and those who live in Indian Punjab even cheer for their regional government headed by Captain Amarinder Singh. Real Sikhs in real Pakistan still suffer from conversion and attack on Gurudwaras. This is why their population is rapidly declining in Pakistan. An ambitious Khalistani map includes many parts of India outside Punjab but does not claim a single inch of Pakistani territory. Why did it miss Lahore in Pakistani, where Guru Nanak Dev Ji was born, and Ranjit Singh ran an empire? Being a developing nation, India did not want or afford to become the hegemon or wear the mantle of "policeman". P.N. Haksar, the top adviser to former prime minister Indira Gandhi, ensured that the 1972 Simla Agreement between India and Pakistan did not repeat the errors of the Treaty of Versailles. From his study of history, Haksar had concluded that “if those who sat around the table at Versailles to conclude a peace with Germany defeated during the First World War had acted with wisdom and not imposed upon Germany humiliating terms of peace, not only the rise of Nazism would have been avoided, but also the seeds of the Second World War would not have been sown.” Haksar had, it seems, learnt the same lesson as Truman. He would convince the Indian prime minister—notes historian Srinath Raghavan—“that a punitive settlement would only prepare the ground for further conflict in South Asia”. This explains why India did not leverage a stupendous military victory and the capture of 93,000 prisoners of war to settle the Kashmir dispute once and for all in its favour. Even if India, learning from history, did not unilaterally impose the terms of the Simla Agreement, the leadership in Pakistan did not draw the lessons from the war which could lead to cessation of hostilities. In fact, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who took over power after the war, was actually interested in initiating a “1,000-year war” against India. He would commit Pakistan to the acquisition of nuclear weapons so as to prevent a repeat of the 1971 humiliation. This acquisition was supported actively by China and passively by the US. In a famous 1999 essay titled “Give War A Chance” for the Foreign Affairs journal, Edward N. Luttwak had said: “…although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace.” For all its decisive ending with the dismemberment of the state of Pakistan, the 1971 war could not bring peace. The nuclear parity that the war led to has allowed Pakistan to engage in low-cost asymmetrical warfare while keeping another full-scale war at bay—many scholars don’t treat Kargil (1999) as a full-scale war. Ayub Khan spelt out 'his plan' that revolved around the SSG (Special Services Group) boys training a group of 'mujahideen' that would comprise regular army soldiers and volunteers, which would infiltrate Kashmir and create a general uprising that would bring India to the conference table, to accept Pakistan's terms, and without provoking a full-scale war. Such an artificial freezing of conflict—to use the words of Luttwak in a somewhat different context—“[perpetuates] a state of war indefinitely by shielding the weaker side from the consequences of refusing to make concessions for peace”. "Prime Minister Nehru made an unequivocal request for US military assistance. For the tired, beaten leader, it was a humbling overture. It was an admission not only that his central belief in peaceful coexistence with the PRC was irrevocably shattered but also that his cordial relationship with the Soviet Union had proved hollow." McNamara urged that the first move be to find out what the real situation was. If we were to put our prestige and resources at risk, we must find out the score. He proposed sending a small high-level military mission immediately to India. The McNamara's delegation quickly arrived in India. After years of attempting to court the Indian leadership, who were often sympathetic but never committal, Gyalo Thondup (the second-eldest brother of the Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama) relished the moment as he sat in front of a select group of senior intelligence and military officials. By early 1971, the SFF also called Vikas Regiment or Establishment 22 (Two-Two), had grown to 64 Tibetan Companies and direct CIA contact with the SFF was almost non-existent. Taking temporary leave of his Tibetans, he was placed in charge of a guerrilla training programme for 10,000 East Pakistani — soon to be called Bangladeshi insurgents, Mukti Bahini. Despite this increase, the force had not seen any serious combat since its inception. Worse, 7 companies were being misused for traffic control in Ladakh. Protesting this abuse of an elite unit, the head lobbied to incorporate his men into contingencies against East Pakistan. Quietly, Dharamsala offered its approval. Until that point, there had been an unwritten rule that the SFF would not be used for anything other than its intended purpose against China. Some were sent to Tibet but they were betrayed by their Tibetians themselves for money and ended up rotting in chinese gulag. The SFF owes its allegiance to the Dalai Lama, the flag of Tibet and the flag of India. It was decided that the SFF would be charged with staging guerrilla raids across the Chittagong Hill tracts, known for their thick jungles, humid weather, and leech-infested marshes. The SFF used 19 canoes to shuttle across the Karnaphuli River. Coming upon an outpost that night, the Tibetans overran the position while the Pakistanis were eating. The SFF split into small teams and curled behind the Pakistanis in classic guerrilla fashion. Using both their Bulgarian AK-47 assault rifles and native knives, they smashed through the outpost. By the time all-out war was officially declared early the following month, the SFF had been inside East Pakistan for three weeks. At the time of the ceasefire, the Tibetans were within 40km of Chittagong port. A total of 23 Indians and 45 Tibetans of the SFF would be awarded for their gallantry; 580 Tibetans received cash bonuses. Their victory had had a cost, however. Forty-nine Tibetans had paid with their lives for the birth of a nation not their own. These combatants are Not part of the War memorial since they are not technically part of India’s armed forces. They are refugees given sanctuary by India, however, since most of them serving were born in India, they can be given Indian citizenship on a retrospective basis and only after this is done can they become Indian martyrs. The fallout from the Bangladeshi operation was swift. The CIA lodged a protest against RAW over the use of Tibetans in Operation Mountain Eagle. RAW chief hardly lost any sleep over the matter; with US financial and advisory support to the SFF all but evaporated. Dharamsala that was under fire, as serious protests against Operation Mountain Eagle were from within the Tibetan refugee community. The rehabilitation funds were handover to designated Tibetans in Nepal. The money was well-spent. The ex-guerrillas formally opened their Pokhara hotel, the Annapurna Guest House. Another carpet-weaving factory was operating in Kathmandu, as was a taxi and trucking company. Operating under the RAW chief, Special Group or SG (from Special Frontier Force) of Indians (not Tibetians) was created in 1981. Till then, the Army had shown little interest in raising a specialised anti-terrorist force. In 1982, the directorate launched Project Sunray. It tasked a colonel of the Army's 10th Para Forces to set up an Indian unit of 250 officers and men. Officers just had to ask for equipment and it would be given. A request for over 100 bulletproof vests and tactical helmets was met almost overnight and the gear flown in from Israel. Special Group was prepared for Operation Sundown which was aborted. Two officers were at the Golden Temple during Bluestar. Following Indira's assassination, Special Group men protected Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and his family until the government raised the Special Protection Group (SPG) in 1985. Soon after, nearly 200 Special Group (SG) personnel were deputed to a new anti-terrorist force under the Union home ministry, the National Security Guard (NSG). The Special Group remains RAW's military unit for clandestine intelligence missions, the equivalent of CIA's Special Activities Division. Written by Sandeep Unnithan: The daylight murder of dig A.S. Atwal inside the Golden Temple in April 1983 had paralysed Punjab Police into inaction. Major General Shabeg Singh was a war hero who had trained Bangladeshi insurgents called Mukti Bahini fighters in 1971 but was stripped of his rank and court-martialled on charges of corruption just before he was to retire in 1976. Now, as the military adviser of Bhindranwale, he oversaw conversion of the five-storeyed Akal Takht into a fortress. He knew Indian Army weakness was that it was never trained for fights in built-up areas within a city. Operation Bluestar inflamed Sikh sentiments and triggered a mutiny in certain Indian Army units. It also led to the death of Mrs Gandhi: Her two Sikh bodyguards gunned her down on October 31 that year. The communal holocaust in which over 8,000 Sikhs were murdered by mobs around the country-including 3,000 in Delhi-fanned another decade of insurgency in Punjab.
In 2014, United Kingdom was shocked by declassified letters dating to February 1984 that revealed that Margaret Thatcher's government had helped India on "a plan to remove Sikh extremists". This plan, according to a top-secret letter from the principal private secretary of then British foreign secretary Geoffrey Howe to the then home secretary Leon Brittan, was drawn up by an officer of the Special Air Services (SAS), UK's elite commando force. The letter, written four months before Indira Gandhi ordered the Army to flush militants out of the temple. The SAS assistance was not for Bluestar, but for Operation Sundown, which was aborted. Some of the commandos had trained to spearheaded a near-suicidal frontal assault on the heavily fortified Akal Takht. Special Group was prepared for Operation Sundown. Some commandos had stayed around the temple and rehearsed. Some of them still sported the beards they had grown for their undercover work as volunteers in the Golden Temple's langar. When the plan was called off, they returned to their base in Sarsawa. Mark Tully and Satish Jacob wrote in their 1985 book Amritsar: Mrs Gandhi's Last Battle, "Mrs Gandhi was not a decisive woman, she was very reluctant to act, and she only fought back when she was firmly pinned against the ropes." The Army was her last resort. She green-lit Operation Bluestar. Dhawan says two "extra-constitutional authorities" in Rajiv Gandhi's inner circle, who would later become key figures in his Cabinet, were responsible for her change of mind. "They told her the military option was the only solution" he says. The mantle fell on the Western Army commander, the flamboyant Lt-Gen Krishnaswamy Sundarji. He had briefly considered a plan to starve out the defenders but junked it fearing an uprising in the countryside. "There must be no damage to the Akal Takht". The three battalions that Lt-Gen Brar's 9th Infantry Division sent into the Golden Temple that night were trained to fight a conventional combat on the plains of Punjab and in the deserts of Rajasthan. Two Special Group officers were also at the Golden Temple during Bluestar. 83 armymen and 492 civilians died in Operation Bluestar, the single bloodiest confrontation in independent India's history of civil strife. The Army had clearly underestimated the defences. As soon as they entered the temple, a sniper shot the unit's radio operator clean through his helmet. The rest took cover in the long gallery of pillars that led to the Akal Takht. Light machine guns and carbines crackled from behind impregnable walls of the temple, their multiple gun flashes blinding the commandos' night-vision devices, forcing them to take them off. An armoured personnel carrier bringing in troops was immobilised by a rocket-propelled grenade. The area between the Akal Takht and the Darshani Deori that led to the Golden Temple had turned into a killing zone, covered by Shabeg's light machine guns. Attempts by the para-commandos to storm the defences were repeatedly beaten back. Indian Army would overwhelm the enemy by sheer force of numbers. Around 7.30 a.m. on June 5th 1984, three Vickers-Vijayanta tanks were deployed. They fired 105 mm shells and knocked down the walls of the Akal Takht. The temple premises resembled a medieval battlefield. Machine guns, light artillery, rockets and, eventually, battle tanks were used to overwhelm Bhindranwale and his mini army and the Akal Takht, the highest seat of temporal authority of the Sikhs, was reduced to a smoking ruin. The Army recovered 51 light machine guns (normally, 51 light machine guns are given to Army unit with 800 soldiers). The operation was a success, he said, but there were heavy casualties-both armymen and civilians. Mrs Gandhi's first reaction was anguish. "Oh my God,? she told Dhawan. "They told me there would be no casualties." It took the Army 2 more days to clear Bhindranwale's men from the temple's labyrinthine corridors. The commanding officer of the Special Group (SG) contingent, a lieutenant-colonel, was seriously wounded by a sniper as he escorted the President around the temple. Following Indira's assassination, Special Group men protected Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and his family until the government raised the Special Protection Group (SPG) in 1985.
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