There is no country that beats America in high-end cutting-edge radar, propulsion, R&D pharmaceuticals and IT (information technology). China has its own cash, but what China needs is technology. China has established talent programs to find people outside of China who have special skills and knowledge that could boost the country’s economy, including its military. However, if there's anything that the first two waves of the digital revolution have taught us, it's that long-term U.S. leadership in technology is not assured. The first wave of the digital revolution emphasized democracy and human rights, but gave way to a second wave that allows authoritarian governments to infringe on those rights. It is critical to understand how to incorporate democratic order and values into our system while respecting privacy, civil liberties and rights. One thing the U.S. uniquely offers is expertise from Silicon Valley and Wall Street. However, China leads in chemicals, machinery, basic & fabricated metals, electrical equipment, and electronics. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/07/us/politics/china-iran-arrests-export-controls.html https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2024/jan/31/inside-ring-cia-doubles-spending-to-meet-china-thr/ https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/27/us/politics/china-cia-spy-mss.html https://www.wired.com/story/ex-apple-employee-accused-of-stealing-self-driving-car-tech/ https://www.theverge.com/2022/8/22/23317502/xiaolang-zhang-pleads-guilty-trade-secret-theft-xpeng-self-driving-car Philippines will launch a new “Cyber Security Command” to work to mitigate the alarming rise of cyber assaults on government agencies. "Instead of recruiting soldiers for infantry battalions, this time we will recruit cyber warriors." Internal and external espionage (Xuān Chuán: disseminate propaganda) is one of the main reasons the Chinese government took an interest in the Internet, back in the 1990s. Since April 1997, a 100-member elite corps group was set up by the CMC to ideate ways of hacking into American and European computer systems. The Chinese Defense Ministry established the "NET Force." This was initially a research organization, which was to measure China's vulnerability to attacks via the Internet. Soon this led to examining the vulnerability of other countries, especially the United States, Japan, and South Korea. In 1999, NET Force spontaneously organized an irregular civilian militia, the "Red Hackers Union" (RHU), in response to US bombs accidentally hitting the Chinese embassy in Serbia in 1999), but the Chinese government gradually assumed indirect control over it. Key capabilities such as armour, artillery, and engineers cannot be replaced by cyber, space, or any other information-related capabilities. The future is about integration. The Chinese have been stealing data on military jet engines, missile turbojet engine, and aircraft but have been careful not to try exporting it. In October 2018 the US indicted nine Chinese citizens for Internet-based espionage that took place between 2010 and 2015 as part of an effort to steal technical data on high-performance jet engines. The jet engine data theft effort was centred around a French company operating in Jiangsu Province as a joint venture with a Chinese firm to enable China to manufacture more advanced large engines for airliners. The indictment detailed how China had established a large Internet hacking operation in Jiangsu Province where the local MSS (Ministry of State Security) provided cover for the organization that became known in Internet security circles as the JSSD (Jiangsu branch of the MSS). The Chinese military also has a growing number of formal Cyber War units. China has launched Cyber War type hacking attacks on American companies involved with collecting and analyzing Mentor satellite data. If the Chinese have reached the Mentor database, it has made Chinese electronics much less likely to encounter unpleasant surprises in wartime. The Chinese hackers of Unit 61398 are using malware to steal information by using Ice Bag, Hidden Lynx and APT and also different types of Trojan Malware, a professional advanced persistent threat [APT] programme. It was not surprising when, in 2015, after years of denying any involvement in Cyber War espionage or having organized units (like JSSD) for that sort of thing, China suddenly admitted that it was all true. This was all laid out in the March 2015 issue of a Chinese military publication (The Science of Military Strategy). While Chinese Cyber War operations in this area get a lot of publicity, the more conventional spying brings in a lot of stuff. The Chinese are also employing the traditional methods, using people with diplomatic immunity to recruit spies and offering cash. Collecting information, both military and commercial, often means breaking laws and striking (or hacking) back at the suspected attackers will involve even more felonies. The Internet-based operations, however, are only one part of China’s espionage efforts. The FBI investigation documented the use of the Chinese Confucius Institute's cultural centres at American universities and how these programs were actually part of a widespread intelligence operation that employed visa fraud for Chinese visiting scholars who were actually MSS operatives. This program recruited Chinese-born businessmen, academics and others, often naturalized American citizens, to participate in IP (Intellectual property) theft. Further encouragement was that some of these operatives could sometimes profit from it personally. Not all these recruits knew they were participating in espionage, but the Chinese could effectively pressure their citizens to cooperate. As successful as this espionage effort was, most of the Chinese-Americans approached by recruiters were not interested and politely declined. It was known that China had a state-sponsored program to make it easy for foreign-educated Chinese to return home and apply what they had learned in the West to start their own companies. Many of the technologies involved are dual-use; for commercial and military applications. China offered billions of dollars in venture capital for this program. This made it easier for Chinese moving back to China from the West to establish their own companies using what they learned in the West. This program helped create thousands of new firms. Many of these firms were using stolen trade secrets and patents that were being laundered. That is, changed sufficiently to make it difficult for the owners of the stolen intellectual property to easily prove theft. Many of these FBI investigations begin when American companies provided the FBI with documentation showing how the Chinese obtained and applied the trade secrets. What the American firms usually lack is information about who was getting the information, often including detailed manufacturing techniques, to the Chinese. It’s not just the United States that is being hit but most nations with anything worth stealing. ASML says China employee stole data. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-64658843 Finally, China energetically uses the "thousand grains of sand" approach to espionage. This involves China trying to get all Chinese going overseas, and those of Chinese ancestry living outside the motherland, to spy for China, if only a tiny bit. Supporting it all is an intelligence bureaucracy of China, with nearly 100,000 people working just to keep track of the many Chinese overseas. There are over 700,000 Chinese students attending foreign universities. Even more Chinese go abroad as tourists or on business. Chinese firms are boldly using their stolen technology, daring foreign firms to try and use Chinese courts to get justice. Because China is still a communist dictatorship, the courts do as they are told, and they are rarely told to honour foreign patent claims when stolen tech is discovered in China by its foreign owners. https://www.wired.com/story/microsoft-cloud-attack-china-hackers/ https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/29/us/politics/china-malware-us-military-bases-taiwan.html https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/24/us/politics/china-guam-malware-cyber-microsoft.html https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-110/Article/Article/3447271/quantum-computing-a-new-competitive-factor-with-china/ https://www.wgbh.org/news/local/2021-01-14/mit-professor-arrested-and-charged-with-hiding-chinese-funding https://www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/congress-focuses-china-risk-us-colleges-universities-2024-01-08/
Since everything in China is a civilian-military fusion, Google was effectively working with the Chinese military. Google to work with the US defence department, there are extensive debates over ethics that is slowing the US down. By contrast, Chinese companies are obliged to work with Beijing, and were making “massive investment” into AI without regard to ethics. “While we wasted time in bureaucracy, our adversaries moved further ahead.” In a totalitarian society, you have no qualms about getting data on everybody, in every way possible. One of the weird problems with 20 years of intellectual-property theft, and where IP doesn't really have as much value as it used to, is that you learn not to invest in things like that. China owns, co-owns, or operates some 96 foreign ports globally, with its portfolio constantly expanding—most recently in Hamburg, Germany, and the Solomon Islands. Western Internet security researchers discovered how some countries can use Huawei phone software to monitor and censor journalists of the government via a commonly used router accessory called middle-box hardware. If a government allowed Huawei phones to be imported and sold, Huawei would, depending on the government, point to middle-box capabilities in Huawei phones that enabled the local government to easily censor Huawei phone users as well as let the government know who the offenders were. Less well known was that all data collected by Huawei middle-box systems was also sent back to China “for quality control purposes.” By the end of 2019 America, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Taiwan banned use of Huawei phones on mobile phone networks. PLA believes cyber deterrence and reconnaissance should make up a single integrated effort, to achieving information (AI) superiority. In Chinese military, this is as important as space and nuclear deterrence. China believes cyber deterrence and reconnaissance should make up a single integrated effort, to achieving information (AI) superiority. Their ability to disaggregate adversary's ISR capabilities (anti-satellite or space warfare) is as important as space and nuclear deterrence. China is focusing on asymmetric and hybrid attrition warfare, not using PLA troops, but by blending Chinese confrontation with cooperation, called 'Unrestricted Warfare' (using AI-based, all-effects multi-domain military-civil power & mobile military technologies), that affect adversary's ability to make decisions and take critical actions in the early stages of conflict i.e. strategic cognitive overmatch. AI-enabled machines can gather intelligence, identifying intent, and monitoring operations. However, AI is currently nowhere close to out-thinking or outflanking humans. AI tools cannot yet do deliberative or critically thinking and evaluating. Cognitive agility is the intersection point of effect that brings knowledge to capability and provides decision advantage. While the character of war — its technical dimension changes; the nature of war as the “art of war” does not. The character and nature of war are imperfect; together, they reinforce the chaos in wars. To prevail in any strategic competition, we must quickly secure technological advantage, as well as the cognitive agility to employ it effectively. PLA-SSF's Network Systems Department (NSD) is responsible for signals intelligence and information warfare, with the critical mission of operationalizing PLA's integrated network, cyber, EW operations, and psychological warfare. NSD also helms the PLA-SSF's corps leader training facility, called Information Engineering University. Technical Reconnaissance & Electronic countermeasures focused, General Staff Department (GSD) Third Department (also called GSD's 3PLA) constitutes the backbone of the NSD. The GSD's 4PLA deals with Information warfare. PLA have also distinguished that the roles of military diplomacy differ in times of peace and war. The Strategic guidelines direct the PLA to win in “Informatized Local Wars,” when the dominant mode of warfare is confrontation between “information-based systems-of-systems”. Information superiority aims at reducing one’s own observation to action loop (Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action) while elongating the enemy’s loop. China's war objective is specifically to preserve their power sources, by fighting better armed enemies in small conflicts. All domains can be contested for control of resources or degrade the position of the adversary. China's bases near Indian northern border, possess sustain robust battle-space information awareness capabilities that are often dismissed by Indian Army and AirForce who believe the bases will be easily neutralized in a conflict. Indian Army's firepower and maneuver are certainly important, but equally important is the ability to preserve information for one's own weapon systems while simultaneously starving battlespace information to one's adversary critical operational systems. Chinese are not "ten feet tall" but Indian Army should not take such PLA information capabilities dominance for granted. China's integrated communications network capabilities include redundant ISR & EW drones, fiber-optic cable, multi-band satellite communications, high-frequency broadband arrays, tropospheric-scatter communications, frequency-diverse radar systems, electronic intelligence systems, and half a dozen microwave over-the-horizon radars, relocatable ESM and cell-phone communications towers. The suggestion that the Chinese outposts are vulnerable because of a lack of survivable, redundant systems misses the point. The Chinese bases collectively present a big "quality is quantity" threat. Chinese bases primarily act as "information hard-points," harbouring and enabling significant communications and reconnaissance capabilities, as well as counters to adversary information control. AI can gather intelligence, identifying intent, and monitoring operations. They can aid target recognition and be expected to perform tasks and change tactics at speeds that human operators cannot. However, AI is currently nowhere close to out-thinking or outflanking humans. China's information warfare and military diplomacy are mutually reinforcing and symbiotic activities. "It seems we score a breakthrough at the Skunk Works every decade, so if you invite me back in 10 years, I'll be able to tell you what we are doing [now]. I can tell you about a contract we just received a few weeks ago. We have been assigned the task of getting E.T. back home." US DoD is juggling more than 685 AI projects, out of which at least 232 projects are being handled by the Army. Tactical Scalable Mobile network is not intended to extend from battalion to brigade. The integrated tactical network-equipped units are not able to maintain their such equipment. Moreover, the leader radio and Manpack are vulnerable in an electromagnetic spectrum-contested environment. Integrated Warfare Systems's Rear Admiral Doug Small said, “we’ve been very deliberate about keeping a low profile and not a huge internet presence (about U.S. crown jewel Project Overmatch's battlefield decision-superiority (reducing latency to support OPs) and streamline C2 enterprise network architectures capability in order to seamlessly network 'three existing sensor grids together to any manned or unmanned shooter'). Our competitors steal everything, and frankly, they’re not ashamed of it.” Adversaries "can exploit the information that’s put out there and then figure out ways to stymie that development because this is about accelerating war-fighting decisions by providing access to information in disparate places, running AI." The "real secret sauce," the chief of staff added, is the ability to quickly corral available data, make sense of it and forward it "to the appropriate shooter or effects mechanisms." And that well-situated force could be wielding keyboards, jammers, rifles or long-range precision fires. The U.S. military is trying to protect its “secret sauce” from adversary eyes. This is the network side of war fighting, which you don’t want to reveal because the next war, the first parts of it will not be kinetic, they will be non-kinetic. To ensure the U.S. military outwits, outmaneuvers and outshoots a powerful adversary such as China or Russia, the Pentagon has pursued a strategy known as Combined Joint All-Domain Command, Control, Communications (and Battle Management System applications), linking sensor to shooter in every domain. The focus is on "deception" includes creating "chaos and confusion in the spectrum [radio frequency as well as] targeting adversary situational awareness, command and control, and decision-making processes to enable friendly force freedom of maneuver. Any capability that contributes "to blinding, seeing, or targeting the adversary by degrading their ability to utilize the electromagnetic spectrum and their ability to share information over tactical edge networks." https://www.theepochtimes.com/investigative-report-china-theft-incorporated_1737917.html https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/how-lockheed-martins-kill-chain-stopped-securid-attack/d/d-id/1139125 China is content with using ageing chips while its semiconductor industry catches up, and has already bought every last used piece of chip manufacturing equipment from Japan. At any given time, “there’s as much as 95% excess volume of airspace that isn’t used”. That’s essentially an opportunity cost. I really wish I could fire that long-range missile that’s going to go right though someone else’s lane. If I could validate in real time… that missile corridor is going to be free of any aircraft it might collide with, then that’s an opportunity I’ve created for myself. U.S. obtained some high-tech Russian aircraft simply by offering asylum and large cash as rewards. B-29 was a complex piece of U.S. technology and Russians put their B-29 copy, the Tu-4 into service in 1949 but by that time it was introduced it was already made obsolete by the air defense system. Copying old tech takes the same amount of time as developing new tech. U.S. already had the B-36 and B-47 in service, while the B-52 was 3 years from its first flight and 6 from entering service. In 1965, Glenn Snyder first proposed & later Robert Jervis explained, the existence of a "stability-instability paradox" to explain strategic stability at the nuclear level could actually encourage or enable conflict at lower levels of the spectrum, especially through information warfare & the use of surrogates or proxies. It is unclear if these same rules for strategic stability apply in today’s environment. Today’s security environment is characterized by complex asymmetries, multi-domain conflict, and nine nuclear-armed states with widely divergent intentions. In this more fragmented competitive environment, emerging technologies, especially in the digital information space, can level the playing field, providing smaller states virtual expeditionary forces with global reach. Both Russia and China, on the other hand, have felt compelled to challenge institutional structures and avoid direct traditional military competition, while pursuing asymmetric approaches to competition “below and beyond” traditional one-upmanship in the conventional military domain. These states hope to advance their interests through coercive influence and digital proxies without clear attribution or risk of escalation. National Security Agency had led more than 61,000 hacking operations all over the world to snoop on oil and energy firms, including a continent-wide surveillance programme in Latin America. US citizens were inadvertently snooped on too. PLA agents of Unit 61398 captured National Security Agency hacking attack on their own computers and repurposed them in 2016 to attack American allies and private companies in at least 5 countries or territories: Belgium, Luxembourg, Vietnam, the Philippines and Hong Kong. They were later dumped on the internet by a still-unidentified group and used by Russia and North Korea in devastating global attacks. North Korean and Russian hackers used them for attacks that crippled the British health care system by cutting short the shipping of critical supplies of a vaccine. Russian attacks paralyzed critical Ukrainian services. This forced the National Security Agency to turn over its arsenal of software hacking vulnerabilities to Microsoft for patching. National Security Agency used sophisticated malware to destroy Iran’s nuclear centrifuges — and then saw the same code proliferate around the world, doing damage to random targets, including American business giants like Chevron. Although there is no direct link to China, Internet-security engineers have been finding bits of code identical to Chinese commercial software. U.S officials should have factored in the real likelihood that their own tools boomeranging back on American targets or allies. Chinese simply seem to have spotted an American cyberintrusion and snatched the code, often developed at huge expense to American taxpayers. US spy agencies had a "black budget" for secret operations of almost $53bn in 2013. Similar to Stuxnet and Duqu (both created by a joint U.S.-Israeli effort for use against Iran), the new spyware was called Gauss, and it was used to monitor Hezbollah (an Iran backed Lebanese terrorist group) financial activity. In late 2014 another high grade Cyber War weapon has been found. This one is called Regin and it joined illustrious predecessors like Stuxnet, Duqu, Flame and several others that have been discovered since 2009. Regin, like its predecessors, was extensive, apparently built by skilled and well organized professionals and designed to stay hidden. This it apparently did for over six years. Regin has numerous modules and the ability to do a lot of spying on its own without much, if any, human intervention. Malware like this is royalty of hacker software, built with care and abundant resources by top talent. The 2015 version is called Duqu 2.0 and it is much improved over the 2011 original. Duqu 2.0 uses a new communications system making it very difficult (and often impossible) to determine where it is sending data and getting orders from. Duqu 2.0 also hides itself much more efficiently, making it more difficult to detect and remove. Duqu 2.0 uses more powerful encryption, making it more difficult to even examine portions of it that are captured. Duqu 2.0 uses all of this, especially the stealth, to compromise entire networks, including routers and “smart” devices (like printers) attached to the network. This makes it much more difficult to remove because parts of Duqu 2.0 are all over an infected network and well hidden. Clean out one server and surviving Duqu 2.0 components will note this and quietly re-infect the “cleaned” computer or server. Internet security companies continue to study older major league Cyber War weapons like Stuxnet and keep finding new angles to these powerful weapons. It was that kind of research that led to the discovery of Regin and similar (like Duqu 2.0) high end hacking tools. Stuxnet was different in that it was developed specifically to damage Iran’s uranium enrichment equipment. All high-end cyber weapons like Stuxnet are designed to keep their activities hidden, and some have done so for up to a decade, or more. Apparently a beta version of Stuxnet was at work as early as 2005. After the 2005 beta version, there were several more improved versions released. Whoever created Stuxnet probably knows the extent of the damage because Stuxnet also had a "call home" capability even though it was designed to operate in systems without Internet access (by travelling via memory sticks or DVDs). The so-called Vault 7 Wikileaks revealed how the CIA hacked Apple and Android smartphones in overseas spying operations and efforts to turn internet-connected televisions into listening devices. Prior to his arrest without bail, Joshua Schulte, a 33-year-old former CIA software engineer, helped create the hacking tools. There are probably more than three of these stealthy Cyber War applications in use and most of us will never hear about it until, and if, other such programs are discovered and their presence made public. Few other details were released, although many more rumors have since circulated. The U.S. and Israel were long suspected of being responsible for these "weapons grade" computer worms. Both nations had the motive to use, means to build, and opportunity to unleash these powerful Cyber War weapons. This stuff doesn't get reported much in the general media, partly because it's so geeky and because there are no visuals. https://in.mashable.com/tech/9661/your-smartphone-is-probably-being-tracked-and-its-not-hard-to-figure-out-who-you-are Defence Ministry of India has cleared a decade-long proposal to create 3 new military institutions involving the Army, Navy and Air Force for special tasks: (1) The Armed Forces Special Operations Division; (2) The Defence Cyber-Warfare Agency; (3) The Defence Space Agency. However, the creation of Defence Cyber-Warfare Centre and Defence Space Centre to be headed by a Navy and Air Force officer, falls short of 'Cyber Command' and 'Space Command' as recommended by the Naresh Chandra Committee in 2011. A 72-page expert committee report in 2020 has recommended that India needs a new data regulator to oversee the sharing, monetization and privacy of information collected online. India already has a bill for governing the use of personal data, and this latest report recommends adding the non-personal data regulator via legislation as well. The proposals in the report govern collection, analysis, sharing, distribution of gains, as well as the destruction of data. The committee recommended creating a new classification of “data business” for health, e-commerce, internet and technology services companies that collect, process, store, or otherwise manage data. “Just like the economic rights to natural resources arising from a community are considered to primarily belong to it, the value of social resources of Community Non-Personal Data should primarily accrue to it (instead of the current default whereby data firms can take up the entire value of such data)” Information superiority aims at reducing one’s own observation to action loop (Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action) while elongating the enemy’s loop. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/china-tough-target-us-spies-rcna73725 The Russians have been quicker to turn their cyberattacks for political purposes. A 2007 cyberattack on Estonia, a former Soviet republic that had joined NATO, sent a message that Russia could paralyze the country without invading it. The next year, cyberattacks were used during Russia’s war with Georgia. For years, the Russians stayed largely out of the headlines, thanks to the Chinese — who took bigger risks, and often got caught. In 2014 and 2015, a Russian hacking group began systematically targeting the State Department, the White House and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “Each time, they eventually met with some form of success,” Michael Sulmeyer, a former cyber-expert for the secretary of defense, and Ben Buchanan, now both of the Harvard Cyber Security Project, wrote recently in a soon-to-be published paper for the Carnegie Endowment. The Russians grew stealthier and stealthier, tricking government computers into sending out data while disguising the electronic “command and control” messages that set off alarms for anyone looking for malicious actions. The State Department was so crippled that it repeatedly closed its systems to throw out the intruders. At one point, officials travelling to Vienna with Secretary of State John Kerry for the Iran nuclear negotiations had to set up commercial Gmail accounts just to communicate with one another and with reporters travelling with them. A low-cost, high-impact weapon that Russia had test-fired in elections from Ukraine to Europe was trained on the United States, with devastating effectiveness. For Russia, with an enfeebled economy and a nuclear arsenal it cannot use short of all-out war, cyber-power proved the perfect weapon: cheap, hard to see coming, hard to trace. Reality at the information level is more and more difficult to verify and easier to manipulate because of cyberspace. What is also important is the fact that in this information environment, it is very easy to reach people who propagate disinformation. There are two primary kinds of cyber attacks:
Chinese military planners have determined the greatest weakness the United States military has is its reliance on computer and satellite systems. It has developed strategies to take advantage of these systems. Hackers in the PLA have worked out plan aimed disabling an aircraft carrier battle group. A “virtual guidebook fr electronic warfare and jamming: was developed by the PLA after carefully studying American and NATO military manuals. Since 2007, the PLA has sponsored more than 2,500 military scientists and engineers to study abroad and has developed relationships with researchers and institutions across the globe. In order to make ‘honey’ at home, the PLA is picking ‘flowers’ abroad. Chinese Confucius Institute's cultural centers program at American universities like Harvard recruited Chinese-born businessmen, academics and others, often naturalized American citizens, to participate in IP (Intellectual property) theft. China offered billions of dollars in venture capital for this program. This made it easier for Chinese moving back to China from the West to establish their own companies using what they learned in the West. This program helped create thousands of new firms. The Chinese knew Chinese-Americans who alerted the FBI posed a risk but considered it an acceptable risk is given the amount of intellectual property that was being stolen and put to work back in China. In effect, each of these is an "Espionage Department" at these universities, where, each year, about 300 carefully selected applicants are accepted, to be trained as spies and intelligence operatives. The college trained operatives expect to make a career out of stealing Western technology. A Texas businessman, Peter Zuccarelli conspired with a Pakistani agent middleman to smuggle export restricted components of radiation-hardened integrated microchips (used for deep-space exploration and ICBM guidance) to China and Russia. China has found that espionage is an enormously profitable way to steal military and commercial secrets. While Chinese Cyber War operations in this area get a lot of publicity, the more conventional spying brings in a lot of stuff that is not reachable on the Internet. One indicator of this effort is the fact that American counter-intelligence efforts are snagging more Chinese spies. But this is largely due to increased spying efforts by China, rather than more success by the FBI and CIA. This use of industrial espionage has played a large part in turning China into the mightiest industrial and military power on the planet. For over two decades China has been attempting to do what the Soviet Union never accomplished: steal Western technology, then use it to move ahead of the West. Russian government eventually found out that China hired Russia scientists for seemingly innocent commercial projects but then paid the new employees bonuses to work on military tech-related projects. Currently, the Americans are starting to sound like the Russians in the 1990s, but the Americans have more legal and economic clout. The Soviets lacked the many essential supporting industries found in the West (most founded and run by entrepreneurs) and was never able to get all the many pieces needed to match Western technical accomplishments. Soviet copies of American computers, for example, were crude, less reliable, and less powerful. It was the same with their jet fighters, tanks, and warships. China gets around this by making it profitable for Western firms to set up factories in China, where Chinese managers and workers can be taught how to make things right. In 1992, China agreed to buy 40 MD-90 commercial aircraft from McDonnell Douglas, a unit of the Boeing Company, if US also allowed a set of 13 pieces of specialist machining tools (that shape and bend aircraft parts) to be sold to the China state-owned aerospace company CATIC. China diverted these tools to a facility known to manufacture military aircraft and cruise missile components as well as civilian products. At the same time China allows thousands of their best students to go to the United States to study. While most of these students will stay in America, where there are better jobs and more opportunities, some will come back to China and bring American business and technical skills with them. The final ingredient is a shadowy venture capital operation, sometimes called Project 863, that offers money for Chinese entrepreneurs who will turn the stolen technology into something real. Finally, China energetically uses the "thousand grains of sand" approach to espionage. This involves China trying to get all Chinese going overseas, and those of Chinese ancestry living outside the motherland, to spy for China, if only a very very tiny bit. An electrical engineering teacher, Yi-Chi Shih, conspired to unlawfully transfer to China, tech microchip designs for MMIC devices used for military equipment like missiles, aircraft electronics and electronic warfare gear. A computer ‘Keylogger’ spyware (virus) has infected the cockpits of America’s Predator and Reaper drones, logging every keystroke pilots were doing while remotely flying their missions over Afghanistan and other warzones. NSA, whose lawful mission is foreign intelligence, is reaching deep inside the machinery of American companies that host hundreds of millions of American-held accounts on American soil. PRISM is an heir, in one sense, to a history of intelligence alliances with as many as 100 trusted U.S. companies since the 1970s. The NSA calls these Special Source Operations, and PRISM falls under that rubric. The Silicon Valley operation works alongside a parallel program, code-named BLARNEY, that gathers up “metadata” — technical information about communications traffic and network devices — as it streams past choke points along the backbone of the Internet. BLARNEY’s top-secret program summary, set down in the slides alongside a cartoon insignia of a shamrock and a leprechaun hat, describes it as “an ongoing collection program that leverages IC [intelligence community] and commercial partnerships to gain access and exploit foreign intelligence obtained from global networks.” President George W. Bush’s secret program of warrant-less domestic surveillance in 2007, after news media disclosures, lawsuits and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court led to Congress passing the Protect America Act in 2007 and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, which immunized private companies that cooperated voluntarily with U.S. intelligence collection. The program, code-named PRISM, has not been made public until now. It may be the first of its kind. The NSA prides itself on stealing secrets and breaking codes, and it is accustomed to corporate partnerships that help it divert data traffic or sidestep barriers. Its first partner, Microsoft, and began six years of rapidly growing data collection beneath the surface of a roiling national debate on surveillance and privacy. But there has never been a Google or Facebook before, and it is unlikely that there are richer troves of valuable intelligence than the ones in Silicon Valley. When a clandestine intelligence program meets a highly regulated industry, said a lawyer with experience in bridging the gaps, neither side wants to risk a public fight. The engineering problems are so immense, in systems of such complexity and frequent change, that the FBI and NSA would be hard pressed to build in back doors without active help from each company. "Basically, the NSA asks companies to subtly change their products in undetectable ways: making the random number generator less random, leaking the key somehow, adding a common exponent to a public-key exchange protocol, and so on," cryptographer Bruce Schneier notes in a story by the Guardian. "If the backdoor is discovered, it's explained away as a mistake. And as we now know, the NSA has enjoyed enormous success from this program." The court-approved program is focused on foreign communications traffic, which often flows through U.S. servers even when sent from one overseas location to another. Between 2004 and 2007, Bush administration lawyers persuaded federal FISA judges to issue surveillance orders in a fundamentally new form. Until then the government had to show probable cause that a particular “target” and “facility” were both connected to terrorism or espionage. In four new orders, which remain classified, the court defined massive data sets as “facilities” and agreed to certify periodically that the government had reasonable procedures in place to minimize collection of “U.S. persons” data without a warrant. Jameel Jaffer, deputy legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union, said: “I would just push back on the idea that the court has signed off on it, so why worry? This is a court that meets in secret, allows only the government to appear before it, and publishes almost none of its opinions. It has never been an effective check on government.” “We have never heard of PRISM,” said Steve Dowling, a spokesman for Apple. “We do not provide any government agency with direct access to our servers, and any government agency requesting customer data must get a court order.” It is possible that the conflict between the PRISM slides and the company spokesmen is the result of imprecision on the part of the NSA author. In another classified report obtained by The Post, the arrangement is described as allowing “collection managers [to send] content tasking instructions directly to equipment installed at company-controlled locations,” rather than directly to company servers. And it is true that the PRISM program is not a dragnet, exactly. From inside a company’s data stream the NSA is capable of pulling out anything it likes, but under current rules the agency does not try to collect it all. Analysts who use the system from a Web portal at Fort Meade, Md., key in “selectors,” or search terms, that are designed to produce at least 51 percent confidence in a target’s “foreignness.” That is not a very stringent test. Training materials obtained by The Post instruct new analysts to make quarterly reports of any accidental collection of U.S. content, but add that “it’s nothing to worry about.” Even when the system works just as advertised, with no American singled out for targeting, the NSA routinely collects a great deal of American content. That is described as “incidental,” and it is inherent in contact chaining, one of the basic tools of the trade. To collect on a suspected spy or foreign terrorist means, at minimum, that everyone in the suspect’s inbox or outbox is swept in. Intelligence analysts are typically taught to chain through contacts two “hops” out from their target, which increases “incidental collection” exponentially. The same math explains the aphorism, from the John Guare play, that no one is more than “six degrees of separation” from any other person. Firsthand experience with these systems, and horror at their capabilities, is what drove a career intelligence officer to provide PowerPoint slides about PRISM and supporting materials to The Washington Post in order to expose what he believes to be a gross intrusion on privacy. “They quite literally can watch your ideas form as you type,” the officer said. The U.S. and Israel have been successful with "software attacks" in the past. This stuff doesn't get reported much in the general media, partly because it's so geeky and because there are no visuals. Despite all the secrecy, this stuff is very real and the pros are impressed by Stuxnet-type systems, even if the rest of us have not got much of a clue. The demonstrated capabilities of these Cyber War weapons usher in a new age in Internet based warfare. High-end or weapon-grade malware began showing up (or was first discovered) in 2009. In 2012 American and Israeli officials admitted that the industrial grade Cyber War weapons (like Stuxnet and several others) used against Iran recently were indeed joint U.S.-Israel operation. Subsequent efforts like Regin were also believed to be more Israeli-American collaborations. In 2012 Internet security researchers accused Israel of a similar stunt when new spyware was found throughout the Middle East. Similar to Stuxnet and Duqu (both created by a joint U.S.-Israeli effort), the new spyware was called Gauss, and it was used to monitor Hezbollah (an Iran backed Lebanese terrorist group) financial activity. Gauss was apparently unleashed in 2011, and had already done its job by the time it was discovered. The 2015 version is called Duqu 2.0 and it is much improved over the 2011 original. Duqu 2.0 uses a new communications system making it very difficult (and often impossible) to determine where it is sending data and getting orders from. Duqu 2.0 also hides itself much more efficiently, making it more difficult to detect and remove. Duqu 2.0 uses more powerful encryption, making it more difficult to even examine portions of it that are captured. Duqu 2.0 uses all of this, especially the stealth, to compromise entire networks, including routers and “smart” devices (like printers) attached to the network. This makes it much more difficult to remove because parts of Duqu 2.0 are all over an infected network and well hidden. Clean out one server and surviving Duqu 2.0 components will note this and quietly re-infect the “cleaned” computer or server. Duqu 2.0 is one of a growing number of powerful malware systems showing up. In late 2014 another high grade Cyber War weapon has been found. This one is called Regin and it joined illustrious predecessors like Stuxnet, Duqu, Flame and several others that have been discovered since 2009. Regin, like its predecessors, was extensive, apparently built by skilled and well organized professionals and designed to stay hidden. This it apparently did for over six years. Malware like this is royalty of hacker software, built with care and abundant resources by top talent. Regin has numerous modules and the ability to do a lot of spying on its own without much, if any, human intervention. Security researchers are now trying to find where Regin has been, which is difficult because Regin was designed to erase all traces of itself after getting what it was sent in for. Regin apparently was not designed for long term visits, which made it more vulnerable to detection and analysis. Once researchers knew more about Regin they were able to quickly search likely systems that might have been attacked to look for clues that Regin was there once, or more, in the past. Unlike earlier software of this type, Regin was designed to intrude in a wider variety of places and look for a much longer list of items. Regin was also designed to recover deleted files and even take over the operation of an infected PC for some operations. Yet another high-end spyware system was recently discovered. This one has been called Sauron and it is very difficult to detect because it is designed that way. So far Sauron has been found in over 30 government networks in China, Rwanda, Russia, Iran and Belgium. Sauron spends most of its time monitoring the system it is in for specific types of information (like passwords, decryption keys and similar useful stuff.) Sauron can deliver its information via the Internet or by hiding in USB drives that are available. US has used sophisticated malware to destroy Iran’s nuclear centrifuges — and then saw the same code proliferate around the world, doing damage to random targets, including US business giants like Chevron. Chinese state-sponsored hackers acquired some of the US-developed hacking codes (tweaked versions of Eternal Synergy and Double Pulsar) which were later dumped on the internet by an unidentified group that calls itself the Shadow Brokers and it was repurposed by Russia and North Korea in devastating global attacks. The targets included European scientific research organizations, British health care system and critical Ukrainian public services like airports, gas stations & ATMs. It forced NSA to turn over its arsenal of software vulnerabilities to Microsoft for patching and to shut down some of the agency’s most sensitive counterterrorism operations. Chinese seem to have spotted an American cyberintrusion and snatched the code, often developed at huge expense to US taxpayers. In the future, he said, US officials will need to factor in the real likelihood that their own tools will boomerang back on US targets or allies. The decline of American espionage competence is an aftereffect of the Church Committee. This was an investigative operation sponsored by Congress in the late 1970s that sought to reform and punish the CIA. The reforms were mainly about eliminating CIA spying inside the United States, or doing stuff for the president that Congress did not approve of. The CIA interpreted all this as "no more James Bond stuff." After the 1970s, the CIA relied more on spy satellites and other electronic monitoring for their reports on what was going on in the world. The Church Committee insured that the CIA became a much less interesting place to work for practitioners of traditional (on the ground, up close and personal) espionage. But it's not just paper bullets intelligence operatives have to worry about these days. The post-9/11 world dramatically altered the way that national intelligence services do business. For one, the craft of espionage and military intelligence has become inherently more dangerous for case officers and agents in an age of terrorism and insurgency than it was during the Cold War. This is a complete turnaround from the way business was done during the Cold War in the '60s, '70s, and '80s. Many case officers on all sides, whether CIA, Mi6, or KGB, served out their entire 20 or 30 year careers as professional spies without ever having touched a firearm after their initial tradecraft courses. After all, getting into gun battles was not their job. Collecting information was. Furthermore, the case officers themselves, often operating under official diplomatic cover, didn't really have anything to fear if they were caught or their covers blown, except a ruined career and expulsion from whatever country they operated in. The ones in real danger were always the informants, or "assets", that the case officers recruited, who were liable to face execution if they were found out. Simply put, spying really wasn't that dangerous for the case officers. After the War on Terrorism began, the Cold War rules began to rapidly disappear. For one thing, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, along with most places that CIA officers operate today, are actual war zones with nothing "cold" about them. During traditional peacetime case officers don't really have to worry about their own safety, just that of their informants. Once you get involved with terrorists or an actual shooting war starts, all of that changes, and intelligence officers (whether CIA or Army Intelligence) become major high-value targets for terrorist and insurgents. This has necessitated a number of dramatic changes in the way the Americans, British, and other professional intelligence services do business where they are needed most (in war zones). For one, the spooks are getting strapped. Case officers working in places like Pakistan, Afghanistan, and even Egypt routinely carry handguns everywhere they go to defend themselves should the need arise. During the Cold War this was unnecessary and generally considered a stupid liability since being caught with a weapon would probably get you booted out of the country you operated in. Carrying a sidearm is necessary for a case officer working in a city like Karachi or Kabul, the truth remains that getting into a gunfight is still the last resort and should be avoided at all costs. Case officers know that the most effective way to avoided being a terrorist target is to avoid following the same routines every day, varying routes to and from work/meetings, never sleeping in the same safe house for too long, and generally making one's life as varied and unpredictable as possible. Experienced spies know that if you can't be found, you can't be a target. The best game plan is to be as invisible as possible. Using contractors to run your informant networks is the best cover of all. Russia is different, as the Russians always had the best spies (because of superior recruiting, training, and management). A lot of those spies were cut loose after the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, and some of them offered to talk (if the price was right). What these guys revealed was chilling for Western intel agencies, a decades long tale of successful old-school espionage operations. The KGB was so good that most of these ops were not even suspected. U.S. snooping has a history older than the republic. With the help of a code-breaker, George Washington deciphered British messages during the critical siege of Yorktown. At least three times he planted false war plans and military documents on agents in successful bids to deceive the British. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/ https://news.usni.org/2014/09/02/john-walker-spy-ring-u-s-navys-biggest-betrayal https://www.military.com/history/jonathan-pollard-was-one-of-most-damaging-spies-us-history.html https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-preparing-to-release-convicted-israeli-spy-jonathan-pollard-officials-say-1437766957 https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/25/world/middleeast/us-says-parole-of-jonathan-pollard-spy-for-israel-will-follow-law.html?ref=topics https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/10/21/israel-said-to-have-passed-us-intelligence-to-soviets/a39c073e-6de6-4d9e-bfd1-9d8b40bb1799/ https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/07/magazine/china-spying-intellectual-property.html The Change of the Landscape of the World Will be Faster and More Dramatic Than We Have Expected by Wu Sikang: In the narrow “window” that remains before China is completely blockade by the United States from importing key scientific technology, Beijing should use “unrestricted” and “supernormal” means, including “more precise, better concealed, and special ways,”. China should “turn the international cooperation on basic research into an important vehicle to break the technological blockade." "We need to seize this time window to expedite the development of new economic and business models to get an upper hand". "Strengthen cooperation with globally renowned technology transfer institutes, build up and introduce a number of international and professional technology transfer service organizations, and construct a global network of technological achievement transfer.” Despite knowing that a United States’ Navy EP-3E spy plane — that had fallen into China's hands — was carrying secret information related to India’s military and security, the US may have sought to keep the information hidden from India, says an alleged US government “Top-Secret” document, titled “EP-3E Collision: Cryptologic Damage Assessment and Incident Review”, has been leaked by the whistle-blower Edward Snowden. The alleged document says the spy-plane carried “material covering Russia, North Korea, India, and the Persian Gulf, as well as intelligence on the PRC not relevant to the mission”. Chinese government-sponsored hackers stole vast amounts of highly-sensitive data relating to America’s undersea warfare programs from a US government defence contractor who works for the Naval Undersea Warfare Centre — a military organisation headquartered in Rhode Island’s Newport city — that conducts R&D for submarines and underwater weaponry. The compromised data included signals and sensor data, information relating to cryptographic systems, and the Navy submarine development unit’s electronic warfare (EW) library. The news comes as President Donald Trump’s administration was seeking to secure China’s support in persuading North Korea to give up nuclear weapons. In 2009, a former head of security at the Estonian Defense Ministry, Herman Simm, was found to have passed over 2,000 pages of NATO and other diplomatic information to Russia’s foreign intelligence service SVR between 1995 and 2008, a case widely considered to be one of the worst spy scandals within the military bloc. https://www.newsweek.com/eugene-yu-konnech-ceo-arrested-over-alleged-data-theft-1748981 Between 2009 and 2013, Su Bin, a Chinese businessman who ran a China-based aviation company called Lode Technology, directed two China-based hackers in a year-long effort to infiltrate Boeing's internal computer networks to gain confidential access to about 32 different US defence projects including the C-17, the F-22, and the F-35. He was arrested in Canada. To avoid diplomatic and legal problems, stolen documents were sent to servers in other countries, such as South Korea and Singapore, before being moved to Hong Kong or Macao. Noshir Gowadia and others, whom the US convicted in 2010, provided China with the lock-on range for infrared-guided missiles against the B-2 and information that allowed China to develop a low-signature cruise missile exhaust system. In 2012, Pratt & Whitney Canada (PWC), a Canadian subsidiary of the Connecticut-based defense contractor United Technologies, plead guilty for exporting restricted US military software to China that was used in the development of the China's Z-10 attack helicopter, under the guise of a civilian medium helicopter program in order to secure Western assistance. Anticipating its help on China’s military attack helicopter would open the door to a far more lucrative civilian helicopter engine market in China, the importer claimed it was developing a civilian version of the helicopter in parallel with the military version. Whether this was ultimately a cover under which the dynamics for an attack helicopter could be developed or was a genuine program is unclear. Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp., told a US court that it may have violated an embargo on export of controlled technology to China. The company agreed to pay a USD 75 million fine in connection with the export violation. China denied reports that the chopper was a replica of stolen US Black Hawk technology. In 2018 Peter Zuccarelli was sentenced to 46 months in prison for conspiring to smuggle radiation hardened integrated circuits (microchips that can operate despite the increased radiation found outside the atmosphere) to China and Russia. These microchips are also needed in ICBM guidance and control systems. These microchips were falsely labeled as “touch screen components” as the activities went on from June 2015 to March 2016. There were others involved, including an unnamed Pakistani man who is a naturalized U.S. citizen and was described as the middleman for this deal and similar schemes with others. In 2019, the China's efforts included efforts to acquire dynamic random access memory, aviation, and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) technologies. In October 2019, a Chinese national was sentenced to 40 months in prison for conspiring to export military-& space-grade technology illegally to China. The PRC national worked with other individuals in China to purchase radiation-hardened power amplifiers & supervisory circuits used for military & space applications. 67-year-old Alexander Yuk Ching Ma, born in Hong Kong, a 15-year veteran of the CIA, was charged Monday with selling US secrets to China. He used his security clearance to copy or photograph classified documents related to guided missile and weapons systems, and information about the CIA’s internal organization and means of CIA communications; and passed the information to his Chinese handlers. He said he "wanted 'the motherland' to succeed". But he was not charged because he suffers from "an advanced and debilitating cognitive disease." In 2019, Jerry Chun Shing Lee, 54, pleaded guilty to conspiring with Chinese intelligence services. He gave detailed specific locations where CIA officers were, as well as the precise location and time frame of a sensitive CIA operation, which was all secret-level classified information. In 2020, Wei Sun, a naturalised US electrical engineer who worked for 10 years in Raytheon unit in Tucson, was sentence to 3 years in prision after pleading guilty for trying to illegally export to China, the technical data related to an advanced medium-range air-to-air missile's guidance system, in violation of US arms export laws and regulations. In 2021, FBI reported that Cheng Bo, a 45-year-old employee at a Singapore-based electronics distributor, allegedly helped facilitate at least 18 illegal shipments of American power amplifiers to China between 2012 and 2015. In 2021, it's reported that Honeywell was fined $13M for unauthorized sharing via DEXcenter of dozens of 71 ITAR-controlled engineering drawings relating to components of various aircraft, missiles, and tanks, including the F-35 & F-22 stealth fighters, the B-1B bomber, T55 & CTS800 engines, the Tomahawk cruise missile, and the M1A1 Abrams MBT, to China, Taiwan, Ireland, Mexico and Canada. In 2021, FBI arrested Xu Yanjun, a Chinese intelligence officer who works for Ministry of State Security (or State Security Ministry), for trying to steal GE Aviation trade secrets. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/nov/16/xu-yanjun-chinese-spy-who-targeted-ge-aviation-get/ In 2021, a renowned Estonian marine scientist, Tarmo Kõuts was sentenced to three years in prison for spying, since 2018, for China's Intelligence Bureau of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission. From 2006 to 2014, Kõuts was a member of the scientific committee of the Ministry of Defense, and from 2006 to 2012, a member of the scientific committee of NATO's Center for Maritime Research and Experimentation, previously named NATO Undersea Research Center. In 2022, Shapour Moinian, a former US Army helicopter pilot turned defense contractor, sold proprietary aviation technology information and sensitive materials related to multiple types of aircraft. In 2022, Xiang Haitao, who works for the Chinese Academy of Science's Institute of Soil Science but formerly worked as an imaging scientist for Monsanto subsidiary, The Climate Corporation, pleading guilty to conspiring to commit economic espionage in a plot to deliver nutrient-application software to China's government. The companies developed farming software intended to help farmers use data to increase productivity, according to the department. A key part of the platform was Nutrient Optimizer, a proprietary predictive algorithm meant to help farmers optimize their use of crop nutrients. In 2022, Phil Pascoe, Monica Pascoe, and Scott Tubbs, were charged with illegally sending 70 export-controlled technical drawings and information data of sensitive US military weapons parts (related to aviation, submarines, radar, tanks, mortars, missiles, infrared and thermal imaging targeting systems, and fire control systems) to China. In 2023, Wenheng Zhao who is also known as Thomas Zhao, and Jinchao Wei who is also known as Patrick Wei, were arrested and indicted in two separate cases for allegedly sending sensitive U.S military information to China's intelligence officers. For $14,866, Zhao sold operational plans for a large-scale U.S. military exercise in the Indo-Pacific region. The plans had detailed the "specific location and timing of Naval force movements, amphibious landings, maritime operations and logistics support". He also sold electrical diagrams and blueprints for a radar system located on a U.S. military base in Okinawa; and 30 technical and mechanical manuals relating to the layouts and weapons systems of several ships. In 2024, China-born naturalized U.S. citizen Thomas Zhao was sentenced to 2 years in prison for collecting nearly $15,000 in bribes in 14 different payments from a Chinese intelligence officer in exchange for sensitive information, photos and videos of involving Navy exercises, operations and facilities In 2024, China-born naturalized U.S. citizen Chenguang Gong was charged with allegedly stealing trade secrets files on a flash drive, included blueprints (methods, designs, techniques, processes, specifications, testing, and manufacture) for detection systems technology of nuclear missile launches that detect, track and then jam incoming ballistic and hypersonic missiles infrared tracking abilities, among other technologies. https://www.military.com/daily-news/2022/11/10/3-charged-sending-technical-drawings-of-us-military-weapons-parts-china.html https://www.wsj.com/articles/ex-harvard-professor-charles-lieber-avoids-prison-for-lying-about-china-funding-64852291?mod=hp_lista_pos3 https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/25/opinion/china-usa-scientists-technology.html https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/10/18/scientists-americas-top-nuclear-lab-poached-china-develop-hypersonic/ https://www.reuters.com/technology/south-korea-indicts-ex-samsung-elec-executive-alleged-data-leak-china-2023-06-12/ https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/4242663-former-soldier-indicted-china-classified-information/ When you talk to one additional person, the secrecy never remains. In fact, the surgical strikes were planned with mobile phones kept 20 metres away. Not only they were put off but kept 20 metres away so that nothing leaks. And I am very proud to say only one thing: I must have had between Uri (terror attack on Indian Army’s base) and actual (surgical) strikes something like 18-19 meetings, which includes (meetings with) Army top brass and also defence ministry’s officers, but nothing leaked out. Even probably it has not come out even now. Including flying of some of the officers to some foreign capitals to make arrangements for armaments and ammunition before the surgical strikes. We had to send officers with authority to carry out the on-spot purchase as they call it. When you work out something, your preparation has to be perfect to ensure that everything is taken care (of). In defence, many times we were not in a position to discuss any of the issues with anyone, whether it is Myanmar surgical strikes or whether it is PoK (Pakistan-administered Kashmir) surgical strikes. When you don’t tell anyone, you tend to build up stress. I virtually didn’t sleep because of the pressure. Manohar Parrikar
"The US was always interested in Japanese and Indian locations for its SOSUS stations. Initially called Project Caesar, this involved running cables out on continental shelves and connecting them to hydrophones suspended above the sea bottom at optimum signal depths. An ‘experimental station’ was established at the north-western tip of Hokkaido in 1957, with the cable extending into the Soya (La Perouse) Strait. It monitored all Soviet submarine traffic going in and out of Vladivostok and Nakhodka in the Sea of Japan. Undersea surveillance systems and associated shore-based data collection stations code-named Barrier and Bronco were installed in Japan in the 1960s."
In the 1970s, a network between Japan and the Korean Peninsula was commissioned. By 1980, three stations at Wakkanai (designated JAP-4), Tsushima (JAP-108) and the Ryukyu Islands (RYU-80) were operational in Japan, along with earlier stations built in the Tsushima Straits and the Okinawa area. By the mid-1980s the SOSUS hydrophone arrays stretched from southern Japan to The Philippines, covering the approaches to China. "Japan-financed project that calls for laying of an undersea optical fibre cable from Chennai to Port Blair; and the construction of an undersea network of seabed-based surveillance sensors stretching from the tip of Sumatra right up to Indira Point. Once completed, this network will be an integral part of the existing US-Japan ‘Fish Hook’ sound surveillance (SOSUS) network that will play a pivotal role in constantly monitoring all submarine patrols mounted by China’s PLA Navy (PLAN) in both the South China Sea and the IOR. This network will in turn be networked with the Indian Navy’s (IN) high-bandwidth National Command Control and Communications Intelligence network (NC3I), which has been set up under the IN’s National Maritime Domain Awareness (NMDA) project at a cost of Rs.1,003 crores. At the heart of the NC3I is the Gurgaon-based, Rs.453 crore Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC), whose systems integration software packages were supplied by Raytheon and CISCO." China PLAN’s seabed-based surveillance network, developed jointly by Ukraine and China since 1996, has been under installation along China's territorial waters since 2012, with work expected to be completed later this year. The seabed-based component of this network comprises arrays of hydrophones and magnetic anomaly detectors spaced along undersea cables laid at the axis of deep sound-channels roughly normal to the direction that the arrays are to listen. This capability is next paired with maritime reconnaissance/ASW aircraft assets to establish a multi-tier ASW network. China’s ambitions for undersea surveillance should not be restricted to the “near seas,”; more distant areas, such as the Bay of Bengal, may be appropriate sites for future Chinese seabed-based sonar arrays “in order to support ASW operations in those sea areas.” Prasun K. Sengupta Pattern-recognition capabilities and data analytics can help navigation and target recognition, as is expected on-board US military’s Optionally-Manned platforms, as well as maintenance predictions and improved logistics. But generating the curriculum takes resources: time, data and manpower. We believe that we can responsibly use AI as a force multiplier. One that helps us to make decisions faster and more rigorously, to integrate across all domains. If there's anything that the first two waves of the digital revolution have taught us, it's that long-term U.S. leadership in technology is not assured. The first wave of the digital revolution emphasized democracy and human rights, but gave way to a second wave that allows authoritarian governments to infringe on those rights. It is critical to understand how to incorporate democratic order and values into our system while respecting privacy, civil liberties and rights. Comments are closed.
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