In the radical jihadist view, secular countries — both democratic and republic — are following the governance system of "Dajjal" (The Anti-Christ). They believe that Liberal democracy, is a fake and deceptive substitute for the Khilafah (Islamic rule of governance). This awareness of jihadist threat to liberal democrats is essential to counter violent extremism. It bears striking similarity to Wahhabism, the state religion of Saudi Arabia which once led the global jihad against the non-Muslims in general and particularly the moderate Muslims of the world who adhered to democracy and liberal Islamic values. They equally abhor the Western and European Muslims who play the role of their citizenship by voting in their elections, or contesting their elections through a democratic or republican party or pledging their allegiance to the elected president or prime minister.
"It was exactly one week ago at 3:15pm Baghdad time, when a beaming Paul Bremer made that now-famous announcement: "Ladies and gentlemen, we got him!"
Libya’s decent into lawlessness since the toppling of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi in 2011 has spawned a terrible enterprise: smuggling people from Africa and the Middle East across the Mediterranean to Europe.
Heroin, made possible by a late 19th century German chemical process enables locals to convert opium (laboriously obtained from poppy plants) into much more valuable (and portable) heroin.The chaos of the 1980s fighting against the Russians allowed the opium trade to spread from Pakistan to Afghanistan. Currently, Afghan produces about 80% of the illegal heroin in the world. While a few Afghans benefit financially (some spectacularly) from the heroin trade nearly half the population in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran suffer the consequences of addiction, crime and social breakdown. The Taliban want to create a heroin producing Islamic terrorist and gangster sanctuary in Central Asia. If you want to know how that works, look at Chechnya in the late 1990s and Somalia during the last decade. In the east (Nangarhar province) various Islamic terrorist groups and local militias are fighting each other over who controls what portions of this border area. This has long been a hideout for bandits, smugglers and Islamic terrorists.
One of the unique problems is opposition from some Islamic conservatives. This is made worse because many Arabs believe what al-Qaeda preaches, that the world should be ruled by an Islamic religious dictatorship, and that this must be achieved by any means necessary (including force against non-Moslems and Moslems who don’t agree.) This sort of thinking has been popular with Islamic conservatives since Islam first appeared in the sixth century. Since then, it has periodically flared up into major outbreaks of religious inspired violence. But that’s not the only problem. Arabs, in particular, sustain these outbursts with their fondness for paranoid fantasies and an exaggerated sense of persecution and entitlement. U.S. troops in Iraq were amazed at the number of fantastical beliefs that were accepted as reality there.
As a result of this opinion polls in Moslem countries have shown a growing approval of democracy, at least in theory. This was especially true in 2011 after the Arab Spring uprisings. But since 2011 that approval of democracy has dimmed a bit as Moslems unaccustomed to running a democracy found that doing so was not easy. They can see that democracy creates superior results where is has been established, but the process of getting democracy to work reliably is a lot harder and more difficult than many Moslems originally believed. What they all have in common is a lack of "civil society" (rule of, and respect for, law), and lots of corruption. The two sort of go together.
Another common problem in failed states is a large number of ethnic groups. Europe, and much of Asia, have managed to get past tribalism, although that has not always resulted in a civil society. Tribalism has kept most African and many Arab nations from making much economic progress. There's a similar problem in the Middle East. For example, three current hot spots, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, have long been torn apart by tribal and religious animosities. Same with the Balkans and parts of India and Pakistan. No one has come up with a quick, or easy, solution for failed states. It's all a matter of effective local leadership, and that frequently fails to show up. There has been some success in helping good leaders develop, by assisting with installing a democracy. But just letting the people vote often leads to someone, who looked like a good guy, turning into a dictatorial "president for life." One exemplary leader can make a difference. Examples abound. Kemal Ataturk, more than any of his close followers and advisors, turned Turkey from a medieval monarchy into a functioning democracy.
Arab leaders are victims of their own success. Their rule is based on corruption and police state tactics. Think East Europe before 1989. Big difference is that, although the populations of East Europe then, and the Arab world now, were both fed up with their leaders and governments, the Arabs were not willing to make as painless a switch as the East Europeans did in the 1990s. That's because the East Europeans had two choices; communism or democracy. The Arabs have four; despotism, democracy, tribal factionalism or Islamic dictatorship. In Iraq we see how the Islamic radicals react to democracy. They call it un-Islamic and kill those who disagree with them. In Iraq, the Sunni Arab minority believe it is their right (or responsibility) to run the country. One minority believes they are rulers by right, and that democracy is an abomination and un-Islamic (or at least inconvenient for the ruling minority). This is the pattern in nearly every Arab country.
Envisioned as a low-cost, low-risk means to stabilize Libya, the planned force became a case study in the limits of American power to shape events following the upheaval of the Arab Spring. With its small population, oil resources and proximity to Europe, there was no reason the nation should devolve into chaos. An early opponent of George W. Bush’s war there, Obama was determined to avoid another Middle Eastern quagmire. The Obama administration’s plan to help the country rebuild its military, joined by other NATO governments, instead came to symbolize the shortcomings of the West’s approach to post-revolution Libya.
This "humanitarian” intervention was based on the false pretense that Gaddafi was already slaughtering civilians, which Obama implied in his public statements. Qaddafi never translated that rhetoric into targeting civilians. France and the United States duped Russia into agreeing to a United Nations Security Council Resolution providing for a NATO "no-fly” zone over Libya—allegedly to prevent Gaddafi from killing civilians in the Libyan city of Benghazi during an Arab Spring revolt. Gaddafi was actually beating back the rebellion, and in the four major cities that he had retaken, no civilians had been massacred. Instead of just clearing the skies of Libyan aircraft, the NATO aircraft, in combination with rebel forces on the ground, destroyed Gaddafi’s security forces and overthrew him. Because Gaddafi had long been demonized, France and the United States just couldn't resist taking advantage of the Arab Spring revolt against him to get rid of him for good.
In fact in 2003, Qaddafi had voluntarily halted his nuclear and chemical weapons programs and surrendered his arsenals to the United States, and was providing the United States good intelligence on Islamist terrorists. His reward, eight years later, was a U.S.-led regime change that culminated in his violent death. It is a bad signal to aspiring nuclear nations that non-nuclear nations get no respect from the United States. North Korea released a statement from an unnamed Foreign Ministry official saying that “the Libyan crisis is teaching the international community a grave lesson” and that North Korea would not fall for the same U.S. “tactic to disarm the country.” The harm from the intervention in Libya extends well beyond the immediate neighborhood. For one thing, by helping overthrow Qaddafi, the United States undercut its own nuclear nonproliferation objectives.
By late 2010, the elder Qaddafi had sacked his more hard-line son Mutassim, a move that appeared to pave the way for Saif and his reformist agenda. Sixty-nine years old and in ill health, he was laying the groundwork for a transition to his son Saif, who for many years had been preparing a reform agenda. From 2009 to 2010, Saif persuaded his father to release nearly all of Libya’s political prisoners, creating a deradicalization program for Islamists that Western experts cited as a model. He also advocated abolishing Libya’s Information Ministry in favor of private media. He even flew in renowned American scholars—including Francis Fukuyama, Robert Putnam, and Cass Sunstein—to lecture on civil society and democracy. Saif also convinced his father that the regime should admit culpability for a notorious 1996 prison massacre and pay compensation to the families of hundreds of victims.
American airstrikes can deliver swift and decisive results on the battlefield. But without a feasible morning-after plan or dependable state institutions to support, shifting the dynamics on the battlefield often makes things worse. Humanitarian intervention should be reserved for the rare instances in which civilians are being targeted and military action can do more good than harm, such as Rwanda in 1994.
Saddam Hussein: High Value Target Number One. The Glorious Leader. The Lion of Babylon had been snared. Iraq's most wanted - the ace of spades - had become little more than an ace in the hole."
Lynching was formal, cold for Saddam Hussein, hanged in Dec 2006, in a camera of a glow in Baghdad, after a outline hearing underneath American influence. The open lynching was pell-mell as well as Muammar Gaddafi, who was captured, exhibited, trampled as well as maybe finished Thursday, Oct twenty by a horde of insubordinate fury, after being bleeding in a bombing of his procession by NATO forces. The dual dictators came out of a story during a same age (69 years) as well as in a same way: in a detonate of savagery comprehensive issue of a apprehension they had erected in form of government.
To a end, however, Muammar Gaddafi as well as Saddam Hussein were sealed in rejection about their degradation. On Syrian air wave hire Al-Rai, a initial vitupérait, there have been still a couple of days, opposite “rats” a National Transitional Council (CNT), a domestic masquerade of fighting back Jamahiriya, denying that his system of administration fell. Facing a judge, after his constraint by U.S. forces in Dec 2003, a second paraded with honour intact, as if he were still boss of Iraq feared.
Both were innate in medium circumstances: a Bedouin tent in a dried of Sirte, Gaddafi to about 1942, as well as a tillage encampment nearby Tikrit in 1937 for his change ego in Iraq. The armed forces serves as springboard for a immature Muammar whilst Saddam, flunked by a troops academy in Baghdad, rock climbing a ranks of a Baath party.