The only major success of A. K. Antony's ministry was the deal to buy transport aircrafts, C 17 and C 130J, after signing the U.S. (real-time & real-world) end-user monitoring (EUM) agreement. India had fined Lockheed Martin for not fulfilling its offset obligations work related to C-130J aircraft. The Himalayan terrain is wet, and the soil there is soft as there is heavy rain (clouds are forced to get concentrated due to the Himalayas); and hence vehicles cannot move easily and road-building is a near impossibility. Logistics is the lifeblood in cannon and rocket wars, along with the power of robust precision targeting and integrated air defence. Hence, air transportation by both fixed-wing transport aircrafts and helicopters becomes critical for mobility. Both C-17 and the C-130J contracts included, the ToT to India for the construction of specially configured and temperature-controlled hangars, a base repair depot, spares supply warehouse, and all the necessary training aids and ground maintenance. “The need of the hour is a 25-year vision for the armed forces – spelling out India’s role in the global world order and cascading it down to conventional and non-conventional capabilities, on land, sea, air and outer space,” said Amber Dubey, head of aerospace and defense practice in India at KPMG. From main battle tanks to combat jets and from ships to submarines, over 60% of weapons and platforms across the three services in India are still of Soviet origin. But availability of spares and consequently quality of maintenance and servicing has been rather erratic of late, leading to bitterness amongst old friends. The inability of the original manufacturers from Russia to meet Indian requirements and the declining quality of service, had led to the Indian military to look for other military suppliers from the US, Israel and France. This means that on any given day, just over 350 of the approximately 700 combat aircraft in the air force’s inventory are in a state to fly and undertake operations. There is also a shortage of 2.17 lakh boots (high ankle), 4.47 lakh balaclavas and 65,978 durries (thick cotton quilts), all basic requirements in high-altitude areas. Besides, there’s a shortage of 13.09 lakh canvas shoes and mosquito nets. Indigenous means self-reliance, from resins used in composites, electronics, tooling etc, even when the item is not the lowest bidder. Let's not confuse indigenous with saving tax money. Indian military's typical process of general staff qualitative requirements (GSQRs) and global Request for Information (RfI) : all available literature on the equipment is gathered and its multiple characteristics collated. The idea is to include as many features as possible to demonstrate how exhaustively the task has been performed. Thereafter, as the draft travels up the chain of command, it gathers additional parameters, as each officer feels compelled to suggest more improvements. What is all the more surprising is that such QRs are formulated after extensive discussion, not only by the division concerned but finally approved by the Army’s Deputy Chief (Planning & Systems), who is responsible for acquisitions. His office, as are those involved in formulating the requests and the subsequent proposals, or tenders, is purportedly staffed by competent scientific and technical advisers. For instance, in 2004, the Army issued a tender for 168 light utility helicopters to replace the obsolete fleet of Cheetahs and Chetaks inducted into service in the mid-60s. The proposal required the chopper to hover uninterruptedly for 30 minutes, a capability no helicopter in the world possessed at the time. The maximum hover time then available, with a U.S. helicopter, was seven minutes. The Army was forced to withdraw the tender soon after. In 2013, the request sent to at least 5 overseas vendors to replace the Army’s obsolete Bofors 40mm L-70 and Soviet ZU-23mm 2B air defence guns had to be scrapped. All 5 vendors declared the requirements to be unreasonable, as they demanded a firing rate of 500 rounds per minute, a capability no gun in the world possessed. https://theprint.in/opinion/why-the-army-alh-mk-4-rudra-crash-at-pathankot-needs-a-thorough-investigation/720405/
India still imports all its (electric) target drones for simulated air threats training. 10 Lakshya target drones were decommissioned in 2016 and replaced by imported 243 Banshee target drones. The Banshee NG aerial target drone by QinetiQ Target Systems https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gPpaLFeb_iE The scientist Manas Bihari Verma (Padma Shri awarded in 2018) who was deeply involved in LCA-Tejas phase-1 project died after suffering a heart attack in 2021. Air Commodore (retired) Parvez Hamilton Khokhar (70), who served as Chief Test Pilot on the LCA Tejas programme and as Air Attache at the Indian High Commission in Islamabad, was found murdered in Bengaluru on November 24, 2014. Khokhar was ‘A’ çategory flying instructor and an Air Attache at the Indian High Commission in Islamabad. He also knew details of the bridges and ammunition storehouses in Pakistan, he was given the additional responsibility of being the test pilot during the war, though he was the Tejas project director. Police learnt that Khokhar’s murder was essentially a robbery gone awry. The suspected mastermind of the robbery, R Srinivas, had worked in the club of the gated community for more than 6 years before finding a job as a cab driver. He knew the security system and where the CCTV cameras were located. Khokhar is the third test pilot to meet an unnatural death. HAL's Chief Test Pilot Squadron Leader (Rtd) Baldev Singh hanged himself from a tree at Nandi Hills on October 11, 2011. Group Captain Motilal Neluri (62), a resident of 1st Block, Jal Vayu Towers, NGEF Layout in Sadananad Nagar, accidentally slipped from the elevator on the fifth floor of his apartment and died following multiple head injuries on March 6, 2011. AN/AQS-22 ALFS has been selected by the Indian Navy over DRDO's Mihir helicopter sonar. India wants US technology to produce the Ottawa Protocol compliant landmines that are used only on military vehicles and not used to target humans. BHEL only licence-assembles OTO Melara 76/62 naval gun from knocked-down parts. Modern warships use towed hydroacoustic stations with low-frequency vibration emitters. There is no way to hide when caught under illumination; the only question is how well the target boat "returns" the signal. The double-hull Sindhughosh Class (877EKM) is much more noticeable when illuminated than a single-hull submarine, and low noise will not help here. The problem is unfixable. Advanced towed array sonar (ATAS) systems from Germany's Atlas Elektronik after India's Nagan active/passive ultra-LF towed-array sonar program failed. As the Indian navy wants standardized sonar across all its warships, this will involve building the ATAS in Bharat Electronic Ltd (BEL), under ToT from German Atlas Elektronik, intended for the navy’s 3 Kolkata-class destroyers; 3 Shivalik-class frigates, and 3 Teg-class Russian-origin frigates. Indian Navy's Rs 2,000 crore proposal to procure 9 active towed array sonar (ATAS) systems for warships to be able to detect enemy submarines. ATAS is considered an indispensable anti-submarine capability for warships operating in Indian waters, where a particularly sharp temperature gradient bends sonar waves through refraction, with the returning signal often getting lost. ATAS overcomes the temperature gradient, since it is towed by a cable that extends deep below the surface, into the cooler layers where submarines lurk. With the sensors themselves in the colder water layers, there is no “temperature differential”. Even the faintest return signal from a submarine is detected. Electrically-propelled (quieter) Heavy torpedoes The threat from diesel-electric and later air-independent propulsion submarines in the demanding littoral warfare arena, enhanced by increased sonar performance, is casting fresh light on the need for new generation heavy-weight torpedoes or upgrade kits for in-service weapons. Required are speeds of around 50 knots, ranges superior to 50 km and sophisticated acoustic guidance. European torpedo tubes use compressed air to eject the HWT, while Russian tubes allow the water to flood the tube & then the HWT propellers are activated for the HWT to swim out of the tube, while US torpedo tubes use a rammer to forcibly eject the HWT out of the tube. Russia lacks full remote control of a torpedo (via cable) of torpedoes which is necessary, for example, in order to "guide" a torpedo past false targets to a real enemy submarine. This is why there are restrictions on the speed of the torpedo, which makes it difficult to attack. You need a coil that remains in the torpedo tube and discharges the fiber optic cable behind the torpedo. One problem with competitive torpedoes that are equipped with older-generation batteries is that to achieve the energy for their missions and countermeasures, they need long batteries, which add so much to their length that they no longer fit into launchers. The torpedo must also have enough energy left once it has reached its target to attack and sink high-value targets such as aircraft carriers and frigates. This explains the importance of the primary battery as the energy source. The UK, Russia, US and Sweden have chosen thermal systems as their energy source. France specified the electric system because it is safe and silent. This system enables a totally silent attack. DCNS dual-purpose F-21 is a newer-generation HWT when compared to the WASS-built "Black Shark" heavyweight torpedoes. The F21 feature an electrical propulsion system based on the DCNS-supplied MU-90 lightweight torpedo Aluminium-Silver-Oxide technology battery, providing 50+km range and 50+ knots speed, according to DCNS. Equipped with a planar array and fully digital acoustic head, the F21 is also to comply with demanding nuclear-powered platform safety requirements, including insensitive warhead and safe detonation technology. In shallow waters there are “parasite” sounds that confuse torpedoes, which home in on targets acoustically. The F-21 treats the sound signals digitally with the same up-to-date processing as in modern warship sonars, which enables the F-21 to largely overcome this difficulty. The F-21 has also been ordered by the Brazilian Navy. India's Pipavav has teamed up with Germany's Atlas Elektronik to pitch the "SeaHake mod4 (DM2A4)" heavy torpedo with uncertainty over the French F21 heavy torpedo deal going through. 98 Whitehead Alenia Sistemi Subacquei (WASS) Black Shark heavyweight torpedoes for the IN’s six Scorpene SSKs. The first 20 Black Sharks will be delivered directly by WASS, while the MoD-owned Bharat Dynamics Ltd will licence-assemble the rest from WASS-supplied completely knocked-down kits. Poseidon (Status-6) is an 80-foot-long nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicle that is essentially an underwater ICBM designed to travel autonomously across thousands of kilometres and detonate outside an enemy aircraft carrier. Enhanced Combat Helmet ECH for USMC has helped soldier survive a direct hit from a 7.62x54mm Russian round (at a distance of about 20 feet) to the back of the head with minimal injuries. Integrated Head Protection System or IHPS weighs almost 1.3 kgs less than the previous version but offers 15% more protection and 100% more “blunt impact protection”. It now allows users to add a visor, mandible and the option for an extra 1.13 kgs “applique” layer for more head protection. ECH costs $600 each, twice as much as the ACH Gen-1. They are testing a boltless Universal Helmet Mount or UHM that will allow any device to be mounted to helmets different thicknesses (since buying different mounts for each type of helmet is not cheap). This is part of U.S. Army's Soldier Protection System or SPS modular scalable integrated system. Ballistic Helmets inclusive of trauma protection pads (with integrated communication headsets for 'commanders'). The Kevlar helmet reduces the deaths by at least half and reduces many wounds to the status of bumps, sprains, and headaches. The Indian Army has been demanding light-weight ballistic helmets for almost two decades now because the existing ones are not only 2.5 kg heavy and bulky, but also provide protection from only splinters and rocks. Over a decade ago, only Indian Army’s elite para special forces were given Israeli OR-201 helmets made with glass reinforced plastic. After two decades, a contract for 1,58,279 light-weight ballistic helmets, worth around Rs 170 crore is to be inked. These are ‘Mukut’ Reduced Blunt Trauma helmets with 13 mm Behind Armour protection, manufactured by NATO-supplier MKU (a subsidiary of India's GKG group); which will be nearly 1 kilo lesser than the old ones and will be bolts-less. These have been certified by HP White Laboratories, USA. In early 2010, the Indian Army reported it was short of 3,90,000 ballistic helmets. After 2005, troops had a helmet that stopped most sniper bullets and nearly everything else. This was a tremendous boost to morale, especially because there were more and more incidents of soldiers shot in the head and surviving. The new helmets have increased protection (often against high speed rifle bullets favoured by snipers) while becoming more comfortable to wear, more accommodating of accessories (especially personal radios and night vision gear) without becoming heavier. Combat helmets were long considered low-tech, but that has changed since the 1980s. The appearance of new materials plus advances in the design and construction of helmets have been accelerating, especially since 2001. The 1.5 kg Kevlar PASGT (Personnel Armor System for Ground Troops) design was a third generation combat helmet, nicknamed the "Fritz" after its resemblance to the German helmets used in both World Wars. That German World War I design, which was based on an analysis of where troops were being hit by fragments and bullets in combat, was the most successful combat helmet in both world wars. This basic design was finally adopted by most other nations after the American PASGT helmet appeared in the 1980s. The fourth generation helmets, currently in service, use better synthetic materials and more comfortable design. The ACH, like MICH/FAST are smaller and lighter (they weigh about the same). ACH was developed from the earlier MICH (Modular Integrated Communications Helmet) which the U.S. Army Special Forces (Special Operations Command) pioneered and was so successful that the rest of the army began buying them. With many nations now using the ACH design and modifying it, along with civilian firms who make ACH-like helmets for police and firefighters, the technology continues to advance. Formerly called the Gallet, after the designer, and eventually known as the FAST ballistic helmet, the manufacturer has long been known for designing helmets for fire, police, and rescue personnel. When first issued to troops in 2004 the MICH was 14 percent lighter (at 1.36 kg/3 pounds) and more comfortable than the PASGT. MICH was most appreciated because it can be worn for long periods without becoming uncomfortable. In 2011 an improved version, ECH showed up. The ECH made use of a new thermoplastic material (UHMWP or Ultra-High Molecular Weight Polyethylene), which is also used in the current FAST helmet. UHMWP is lighter and stronger than the Kevlar used in the ACH and earlier PASGT and, it turned out, provided much better protection as well. ECH was not 100% bullet proof but it was 40% resistant to projectiles and 70% stronger than the previous ACH helmet. India is also looking for air-conditioned jackets for special force soldiers who operate for long hours in hot areas. The US Army is already using jackets, worn underneath body armour, which provide cooling to soldiers. A small battery that fits inside the armour powers the system. Self-ageing, weldable Al-Zn-Mg alloy The use of Chinese-made armour-piercing steel-core bullets by militants from Pakistan have increased since 2017. Intermittently, militants have been stuffing their AK-47 magazines with four to five such bullets along with the normal bullets. We have seen their use in multiple attacks now, and it has brought home the threat from armour-piercing steel-core bullets. Body armour can only prevent bullets from penetrating the Front and Rear, when fired from a certain range (say 10 meters or more). It doesn't "dissipate" enough energy, so its user will still suffer the blow of a bullet. Bullet-proof jackets The Army's existing bulky bullet-proof vests - with poor protection - are near the end of their operational life. The Indian Army desperately needs 3,53,765 new bullet-proof vests that protects up to 10 metres against a 7.62 mm bullet and 5 metres against a 9 mm bullet. The delay in the induction of bullet-proof jackets have been blamed on "convoluted procurement procedures". In early 2010, the Army reported it was short of 1,80,000 lightweight bullet-proof jackets. The Indian Army's programme to acquire 1.86 lakh bullet-proof jackets for Rs 900 crore, to bridge the gap in its requirement of 3.53 lakh jackets, has been pending since 2009. Each jacket costs between Rs 50,000-60,000 and protects up to 10 metres against a 7.62 mm bullet and 5 metres against a 9 mm bullet. It will be ultra light and easier to wear during combat situations, that will also provide protection to the neck, chest, and groins. In 2016, after waiting for 10 years, 50,000 bulletproof jackets was procured for Rs 140 crores from Tata Advanced Materials Limited, under "emergency" procurement. The delivery of the jackets will start from August 2016 and must be completed by January 2017. An earlier tender for the "capital procurement" of 1.86 lakh modular jackets was scrapped in October 2015 because the samples offered by 6 vendors "failed" to clear GSQRs (technical parameters or general staff qualitative requirements) field trials. However, as all the samples failed to meet requirements, the Army vice-chief's existing financial powers were "relaxed as a one-time exception" to ensure the fast-track purchase of 50,000 jackets based on older technical specifications. Several parliamentary committees have taken a dim view of the "critical shortage" of bullet-proof jackets, slamming the government for "playing with the lives" of soldiers. The shortages in the bullet-proof jackets have been termed "critical". Bullet-proof jackets currently being tested for the Indian Army to be produced by Gujarat Forensic Science Limited Larsen and Toubro has already built the hull for India's first indigenous submarine and received orders for a further two. The Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) has now come up with a prototype bullet-proof jacket, as per the newer technical specifications, using different "state-of-the-art ballistic materials". This under-development prototype aims to protect against AK-47s and self-loading rifle bullets. 12 Indian companies have been issued industrial licenses for the manufacture of bullet-proof jackets. 1,86,138 bullet-proof jackets are being planned to be procured. Out of 5,000 bullet-proof vests that Maharashtra Police purchased, only around 3,000 passed the test and 1,430 jackets were rejected. Mishaps
In Limbo
Corruption
Long-ranged vectors: |
the_radio_proximity_fuse.pdf | |
File Size: | 9548 kb |
File Type: |
vt__proximity__fuse_op-1480.pdf | |
File Size: | 9631 kb |
File Type: |
ECIL and BEL supply the fuzes imported from Israel or from REUTECH, a subsidiary of South Africa's Denel Group, had supplied 15,000 1989-1990 vintage fuzes in Nov 1999 from the stockpiles of the South African Army to Indian Army for OP Vijay. The technical offer from the REUTECH team had indicated that the M-8513 fuzes have a min shelf-life of 10 years. Although the requirement was projected in June 1999, the contract was concluded only in January 2000, with the deliveries commencing only in May 2000. Since OP Vijay was over by August 1999, 95% of the contracted amount for these fuzes was paid Rs. 17.27 crore by India.
India's search for a 155-millimetre howitzer to replace its ageing arsenal of Swedish-made FH-77B Bofors guns helps demonstrate multiple factors that have contributed to the making of the mess. First, the Army sought weapons with characteristics that are now widely acknowledged to have been unrealistic: tenders were issued, withdrawn, and reissued after multiple rounds of tests.
Then, in March, the government blacklisted leading contenders Singapore Technologies Kinetics and Rheinmetall Air Defence, for their alleged role in a 2009 corruption scandal at the government-run Ordnance Factory Board.
The Delhi High Court, meanwhile, blocked plans to spend $647 million on purchasing 145 M777 155-mm howitzers manufactured by the United Kingdom's BAE Systems, and laser pointing systems built by Selex.
The end result has been the Army's artillery wing being degraded to a point of near-helplessness. Less than half of the 400-odd Bofors howitzers purchased in the 1980s are now in use. The 180 Soviet Union-made 130mm M-46 field guns used by India's artillery regiments were upgraded in the hope of giving them characteristics similar to 155mm howitzers, but insiders say their performance is far from satisfactory. For the most part, India's regiments are dependent on unmodified M-46 guns, D-30 122mm guns, and 105mm field guns — all designs dating back decades.
The Bofor’s bogey continues to haunt the modernisation plans of the Indian artillery especially the acquisition of 155mm howitzers for almost a quarter of century. The modernisation process continues to stagnate for various reasons, some beyond the control of the army. This is largely attributable to different scandals continuing to stymie the long delayed acquisition of the 155mm howitzers, despite the lessons learnt during the Kargil conflict of 1999, where artillery fire power had undeniably paved the way for victory. The last major acquisition of guns was that of 400 places of 155mm/39 calibre FH 77B, howitzers from Bofors of Sweden with a range of 30 km in the mid-eighties.
Today, most of the guns held in the inventory of artillery are either obsolescent or reaching obsolescence. While the Russian origin 122mm D30 towed howitzer mainly deployed in the plains is already obsolete, the 105mm Indian field gun (1FG), the mainstay of the artillery and in service for the last three decades is nearing obsolescence. Furthermore its limited range of 17 km is almost irrelevant in a future battlefield environment where guns with 30-40 km range would be the need of the hour. Most of the armies in the world are today even looking at Mortars with enhanced ranges of 12-14 km. The FH 77B (Bofors) guns bought in 1986 are almost down to approximately half the numbers due to non-availability of spares and cannabalisation.
If one were to take a purely transaction-oriented approach to the Bofors deal, one will wonder what the fuss is all about. Even Sten Lindstrom, the Swedish police office who blew the Rs 64 crore payoff cover-up, says the 155 mm field gun was good. The howitzers proved their worth during the Kargil war with their shoot and scoot capability. Chitra Subramaniam-Duella, the journalist who investigated the story, says the price that India paid - $1.3 billion - for the 415 guns was competitive. India was not sold a lemon. Our soldiers did not come to harm. National security was not compromised. Should we worry about the payoff?
That depends on how you view it. If you call it a bribe you will get agitated. The presumption then is that the payoff was an imposition on the Indian taxpayer and if it were not paid we would have got a discount on the deal. But what if came from Bofors' profits? If we regard it as a commission, as a payment to ensure that a good deal is not scuttled, will it smell odious? We should then worry not so much about the payoff, as the defence procurement process that allows a deal to be held up despite passing the tests. Of course someone at the top was paid. Yes there was a cover-up. Certainly middlemen should not have been employed (as the rules barred them). It is the kind of piety that it inserted into government contracts without thought.
The only silver lining in this dismal gun acquisition saga is the successful upgrade of 180 pieces of 130 mm/39 calibre M46 Russian guns to 155mm/45 calibre with the ordinance and kits supplied by Soltam of Israel. Despite its initial teething problems, this has been a successful venture giving an enhanced range of 39 km from its original 26 km.Army has a mix of 155mm/39 calibre, 155mm/45 calibre and 155mm/52 calibre gun system.
Then, in March, the government blacklisted leading contenders Singapore Technologies Kinetics and Rheinmetall Air Defence, for their alleged role in a 2009 corruption scandal at the government-run Ordnance Factory Board.
The Delhi High Court, meanwhile, blocked plans to spend $647 million on purchasing 145 M777 155-mm howitzers manufactured by the United Kingdom's BAE Systems, and laser pointing systems built by Selex.
The end result has been the Army's artillery wing being degraded to a point of near-helplessness. Less than half of the 400-odd Bofors howitzers purchased in the 1980s are now in use. The 180 Soviet Union-made 130mm M-46 field guns used by India's artillery regiments were upgraded in the hope of giving them characteristics similar to 155mm howitzers, but insiders say their performance is far from satisfactory. For the most part, India's regiments are dependent on unmodified M-46 guns, D-30 122mm guns, and 105mm field guns — all designs dating back decades.
The Bofor’s bogey continues to haunt the modernisation plans of the Indian artillery especially the acquisition of 155mm howitzers for almost a quarter of century. The modernisation process continues to stagnate for various reasons, some beyond the control of the army. This is largely attributable to different scandals continuing to stymie the long delayed acquisition of the 155mm howitzers, despite the lessons learnt during the Kargil conflict of 1999, where artillery fire power had undeniably paved the way for victory. The last major acquisition of guns was that of 400 places of 155mm/39 calibre FH 77B, howitzers from Bofors of Sweden with a range of 30 km in the mid-eighties.
Today, most of the guns held in the inventory of artillery are either obsolescent or reaching obsolescence. While the Russian origin 122mm D30 towed howitzer mainly deployed in the plains is already obsolete, the 105mm Indian field gun (1FG), the mainstay of the artillery and in service for the last three decades is nearing obsolescence. Furthermore its limited range of 17 km is almost irrelevant in a future battlefield environment where guns with 30-40 km range would be the need of the hour. Most of the armies in the world are today even looking at Mortars with enhanced ranges of 12-14 km. The FH 77B (Bofors) guns bought in 1986 are almost down to approximately half the numbers due to non-availability of spares and cannabalisation.
If one were to take a purely transaction-oriented approach to the Bofors deal, one will wonder what the fuss is all about. Even Sten Lindstrom, the Swedish police office who blew the Rs 64 crore payoff cover-up, says the 155 mm field gun was good. The howitzers proved their worth during the Kargil war with their shoot and scoot capability. Chitra Subramaniam-Duella, the journalist who investigated the story, says the price that India paid - $1.3 billion - for the 415 guns was competitive. India was not sold a lemon. Our soldiers did not come to harm. National security was not compromised. Should we worry about the payoff?
That depends on how you view it. If you call it a bribe you will get agitated. The presumption then is that the payoff was an imposition on the Indian taxpayer and if it were not paid we would have got a discount on the deal. But what if came from Bofors' profits? If we regard it as a commission, as a payment to ensure that a good deal is not scuttled, will it smell odious? We should then worry not so much about the payoff, as the defence procurement process that allows a deal to be held up despite passing the tests. Of course someone at the top was paid. Yes there was a cover-up. Certainly middlemen should not have been employed (as the rules barred them). It is the kind of piety that it inserted into government contracts without thought.
The only silver lining in this dismal gun acquisition saga is the successful upgrade of 180 pieces of 130 mm/39 calibre M46 Russian guns to 155mm/45 calibre with the ordinance and kits supplied by Soltam of Israel. Despite its initial teething problems, this has been a successful venture giving an enhanced range of 39 km from its original 26 km.Army has a mix of 155mm/39 calibre, 155mm/45 calibre and 155mm/52 calibre gun system.
"A lot of hand-holding has been done by the Army, both for Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS) and Dhanush. I had a detailed discussion last week with the OFB (Ordnance Factory Board) and ARDE (Armament Research and Development Establishment of DRDO)," said the Director-General of Artillery, Lieutenant General Tarun Kumar Chawla (AVSM).
Design defects on the Dhanush have jeopardised an army order for 114 guns.
the_corps_artillery_in_the_airland_battle_1988.pdf | |
File Size: | 2713 kb |
File Type: |
It hardly matters how precise new weapons are if the Army lacks the ISR reach to find targets. What separates a C4ISR network, from a C4ISRT network is targeting (the 'T') —the ability to use sensor data from a variety of systems to accurately direct long-range fires. The US's DoD is moving away from airborne ISR assets (vulnerable to longer ranged air-to-air missiles), and moving into using unclassified data-links to control ISR satellite constellation which tracks moving targets in real-time, for better resiliency and sustainability. A basic operational idea of Air-Land Battle requires an interconnected battle network with a sensor grid to "look deep and shoot deep."
Deep Attacks by themselves, without integration, are ineffective. The proper use of tanks is in fast-moving, massed operations overwhelmingly supported by precision fires by infantry, longest range artillery, aviation and air defence. Key capabilities such as armour, artillery, and engineers cannot be replaced (by cyber, space, or any other information-related capabilities). Presently, APS are not capable of defeating top-attack. One does not need the best anti-tank missiles, but rather larger numbers of cheaper yet adequate ones. At best, the APS can only defeat projectiles that are in-coming horizontally. They need to be modified to tackle top-attack munitions. You need slat cages on top of ERA panels, to protect it from multiple top-attacks. No amount of APS is worth not having an infantry screen. Drones help artillery locate targets. "When an enemy can hit a tank 90 kms away with long-range fire, I can't move them on time to be in a position to do something that I need them to do. It's not that they're bad, it's that I can't afford to use them in my current mission."
Manoeuvre contact battles require communication of high-quality targetting data amongst different units. Larger uavs should be networked with helicopters, armoured vehicles and AI-enabled C2 systems. Even if some can master the tenets of fire/shoot and move, the last building block, "communicate," often remains elusive, mainly due to lack of support, user errors and overly complicated architectures. Tactical bandwidth requirements continue to outpace system capabilities, with different warfighting functions demanding alternate networks. The typical IBG will pipe several levels of data networks, tactical radio, and satellite-based tracking systems simultaneously, saturating the signals' environment. The lapses when moving forward HQs leaves ample room for shutdown and startup errors. The Indian Army should seek to condense as many of these tactical data streams and functions as possible. Indian Army, currently, still relies on 'fire-n-manoeuvre' principles, instead of 'manoeuvre fires'.
Deep Attacks by themselves, without integration, are ineffective. The proper use of tanks is in fast-moving, massed operations overwhelmingly supported by precision fires by infantry, longest range artillery, aviation and air defence. Key capabilities such as armour, artillery, and engineers cannot be replaced (by cyber, space, or any other information-related capabilities). Presently, APS are not capable of defeating top-attack. One does not need the best anti-tank missiles, but rather larger numbers of cheaper yet adequate ones. At best, the APS can only defeat projectiles that are in-coming horizontally. They need to be modified to tackle top-attack munitions. You need slat cages on top of ERA panels, to protect it from multiple top-attacks. No amount of APS is worth not having an infantry screen. Drones help artillery locate targets. "When an enemy can hit a tank 90 kms away with long-range fire, I can't move them on time to be in a position to do something that I need them to do. It's not that they're bad, it's that I can't afford to use them in my current mission."
Manoeuvre contact battles require communication of high-quality targetting data amongst different units. Larger uavs should be networked with helicopters, armoured vehicles and AI-enabled C2 systems. Even if some can master the tenets of fire/shoot and move, the last building block, "communicate," often remains elusive, mainly due to lack of support, user errors and overly complicated architectures. Tactical bandwidth requirements continue to outpace system capabilities, with different warfighting functions demanding alternate networks. The typical IBG will pipe several levels of data networks, tactical radio, and satellite-based tracking systems simultaneously, saturating the signals' environment. The lapses when moving forward HQs leaves ample room for shutdown and startup errors. The Indian Army should seek to condense as many of these tactical data streams and functions as possible. Indian Army, currently, still relies on 'fire-n-manoeuvre' principles, instead of 'manoeuvre fires'.
deep_maneuver_ops_book_12nov21_lsco.pdf | |
File Size: | 6585 kb |
File Type: |
0 Comments
Your comment will be posted after it is approved.