War and change in world politics was rooted in competitions among the great powers, which struggled for security, wellbeing, and leadership. He contended that the great commercial seafaring states in particular would play a leading role in world politics because of the wealth they generated from international trade. In 1480, Spain was a collection of little kingdoms, eager to fight each other. By 1500, Spain held title to half the globe. British control of the seas, combined with a corresponding decline in the naval strength of its major European rivals, paved the way for Great Britain's emergence as the world's dominant military, political, and economic power. At the beginning of the 19th century, as the leader of the industrial revolution, Britain became the workshop of the world. As other countries industrialized, however, they challenged Britain’s leading position in world manufactures. The passing of the era when Britain was the world’s leading industrial power also pointed to a waning of its leadership as a naval power. In 1850, Germany was little more than a no-man's land between the territory of the great powers. To check Russian power in Asia, Britain did take the extraordinary step of breaking out of its “splendid isolation” and concluding a formal alliance with Japan in 1902. This alliance, in turn, emboldened Japan to take on Russia, resulting in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. With British backing, Japan inflicted a stunning defeat on Russia. If Russian leaders had concentrated their navy, massing its naval forces rather than scattering them, or showed more offensive zeal in the war at sea, then Russia would have defeated Japan. President Theodore Roosevelt brokered an end to the fighting by hosting negotiations between Japan and Russia. In recognition of his role, Roosevelt would receive the Nobel Peace Prize.
After two warring centuries of political crises and bloodshed, Fa (translates as political norm/model/standard, and it means Legalist's/Realist's instrument/calculator) thinkers contributed greatly to the formation of China’s empire, both on the theoretical level and as political practitioners; and many of their ideas continued to be employed. Politically, the loose aristocratic entities were replaced by centralized and bureaucratized states. Iron utensils brought about urbanization and commercialization. Fa thinkers were political realists who, rejected Confucius, and sought to attain “a rich state and a strong & powerful army” and to ensure domestic stability in an age marked by intense competition. It's China's go-to statecraft, whenever its rulers feel insecure. They have now provided Chinese Communist Party with the most compelling answers on how to unite China and become the "center" of the world. The Chinese word "China" refers to the "center" of the world. It's the missionaries who translated the term as "middle" Kingdom. China has considered itself as "the sole sovereign government of the world'' since its unification in 221 BC". CCP believes that after regaining its status as a great power, it should resume its historical position as the "center/middle of the world". Chinese people have been brainwashed to believe that, lots of ancient Chinese land has been lost to bordering nations like India, which must be taken back into the fold of China. That's part of the history of CCP. Han Chinese think that India became a country after inheriting their land from Britain. Unlike China, modern India got its freedom by peaceful struggle and is made up of diverse lands and people of different backgrounds and cultures. Every few kilometers, the language and custom changes. Chinese cannot understand how there is a united Indian-ess, instead of collapse, when there is such diversity. Chinese point to Indian's being hired to run the richest US tech companies in Silicon Valley, as some proof of "a slave mindset"; however, they forget that decades of China prosperity is dependent on their workers getting slave wages in order to produce cheap goods for US markets. Power abhors a vacuum. Since the US financial crisis, "China believes in power politics and its own natural superiority. It talks about a multi-polar world, but Beijing’s vision for Asia is strictly hierarchical—with China at the top—and does not consider India an equal." Chinese scholars and policymakers know little about the neighbourhood. Old impressions about the negative impact of caste, poverty, and regionalism in India are still common in Chinese writings. China will employ every tool in its box and remind India of the asymmetry in power to outline its hierarchical superiority. The prospect of de-escalation also appears remote, with thousands of PLA troops still present and China also bolstering infrastructure close to LAC and the eastern sector. We’d like more money for more platforms and increased capacity, but what can we actually afford while we increase our deployment readiness? India must disrupt the facts that China has forced India to spend huge sum of money for a two-front War. Modi has bet selected "AatmaNirbhar Bharat" as the way. The emerging India-U.S. strategic partnership, and India’s signing of foundational military agreements with the U.S., has meant that both the Trump and Biden administrations were willing to share intelligence with and help India bolster its capabilities in the maritime arena. China wants to provoke India into ending its current close relationship with the U.S. — a relationship that is not a military alliance. The last time the two sides fought along the India-China border, the U.S. enhanced intelligence sharing with India. This time, in addition to intelligence sharing, the U.S. could fast-track supply of advanced military equipment to India. Chinese chose to flex their muscle just a month after PM Modi and President Xi met at the G-20 Summit in Bali and one week after the annual U.S.-India military exercise – “Yudh Abhyas 2022” (War Simulation or Preparation). Indian army has a new deployment strategy – with one layer of troops who patrol close to the border and a second layer of troops or Quick Reaction Team who, if need be, can be deployed to match the PLA numbers – made the Indian military reaction possible. India insists that restoration of normal relations with China is contingent on restoring peace along the border. "During the meeting, the Indian side therefore made constructive suggestions for resolving the remaining areas" but Chinese come with a "pre-determined mindset" and they are "aggressive and the outcome of the talks was already known to them". India's sole demand which China now terms as "unrealistic" is a return to the pre-April 2020 status quo and stating that China will firmly "safeguard national sovereignty" indicates that Beijing has no plans to give up the claims. Along with these signalling, the China has stepped up major provocation, just ahead of the military commander talks, with PLA incursions in Uttarakhand's Barahoti and Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh. China has been building "militarised villages" close to India. China has decided that it has created enough 'facts on the ground' to present India with a new fait accompli and sees no reason why it should give up its territorial gains and restore the pre-April 2020 status quo at the border. The Chinese government only wants to exploit what the Indian government's expectations are. It's getting harder for India to get concessions from China. The more India wishes to have peace, the more China stalls to get more concessions. India is driven by an assumption that, "China needs India's help because of China's desire for stability in its western borders to its overall national strategy." However, China pretends that any leverage that India holds, is no leverage at all. Hence, China pretends and ignore India whenever it is at a disadvantage. The current Chinese foreign minister has also asked Indian ambassador to help China succeed without bothering about particular border incidents. China knows very well that it's ridiculous to expect concessions, but the intent is to confuse, convolute and delay till China holds the advantage. Chinese will like to keep the Patrolling Point PP15 (area called Hot Spring) close to the site of the 1959 ambush, Demchok, Depsang plains (at the critical Raki Nala Y-Junction, also known as Bottleneck), unresolved till the time, the political cost of not settling it becomes higher than doing so. Chinese officials feel that India is still sleepwalking to the fact that China is more powerful, so it will do what it wants to, and India must deal with the reality on the ground. China says that Indians have an unrealistic expectation, which is not in line with their real military power. China cries foul when India matches the troops levels China has deployed in Ladakh in the name of "training" & "exercise". To date, a significant additional PLA presence still remains in Sirjap, Khurnak Fort, Nyagzu and Rutog areas putting additional pressure on India. PLA is already entrenched 18 km inside India-claimed lines and now wants the creation of a 15-20 km buffer zone or no patrol zone inside India-claimed lines as a precondition for disengagement. The infrastructure in place also means the PLA could quickly return to areas that it previously occupied. Chinese forces have remained near the Gogra border at their previous turnaround and throughout the Galwan valley and east of Kongka La. They continue to improve lines of communication to the region to maintain their presence indefinitely, should they so choose. PLAGF armour presence at Gyantse and armour elements remaining deployed near Gamba. Instead, China's hostility towards India is increasing; since China cannot tolerate even the slightest scratch to its 'reputation', having built an image of an 'invincible superpower' at home, a condition that "goes beyond patriotism and exceptionalism" and seeks to satiate the ever-growing hunger of audiences at home. Chairman Xi is keen to consolidate a third consecutive term, has several other problems on his plate, the quick collapse of Evergrande Group and the real estate market and; some Chinese social media have suggested that Chinese commanders have been 'replaced' was due to the high rate of "mountain sickness" among the officers and soldiers. Chinese media cannot accept the fact that Indian troops are in much better physical condition at freezing altitudes. After all, PLA has spent more money on cold-proof manufacturing, logistic construction, and healthcare resources. Xi has doubled down on nationalist rhetoric and action. The intense bullying of Taiwan and a more hawkish stance towards India are manifestations of that tactic. Sreemoy Talukdar
The greater India’s national strength and international status became, the more its self-esteem and self-confidence would grow, and that much louder its demands for more concessions from China would be. Therefore, it was no longer possible for China to maintain stability in its relations with India by simply continuing its “cooperative strategy” of the past or merely releasing deterrent signals. China needed to reassert its strength advantage and force India to accept Chinese superiority through committed actions. "No full-scale confrontation" does not mean "no confrontation". The key idea is to strike a new balance or equilibrium: where through "controlled" conflicts at the disputed border, a "rising and confident" India is brought under check, and China's strength and psychological advantage in bilateral ties are restored. Chinese media: "If China can resolutely destroy the arrogance of the Indians, through tactical actions at this juncture, Indians will feel that the thighs of Americans are not reliable, and they will return to their traditional non-alignment route." Xi Jinping is not only the president of China and general secretary of the China's Communist party, but also the head of the army. After the statesmanship shown by Deng Xiao Ping (who was educated in France), unquestionably China’s greatest leader, we are now witnessing significant foreign policy changes during a period of prolonged rule by Xi Jinping, who appears determined to make his name in history, by extending China’s maritime and land boundaries through the use of force. Xi's policy had fundamentally shifted to a more aggressive foreign policy because it now has the means to do so, economically, militarily, and diplomatically. China is losing its lustre globally, from the remarkably rapid economic growth it achieved, thanks to the reforms and vision of Deng Xiao Ping who supported “collective leadership” with no more “leader for life”, to create and sustain more efficient government in general that lasted until 2016. Deng Xiao Ping practised what he preached, retired when his 10-year term ended. Since he died, CCP has turned to nationalism and a build-up of conventional military power to support territorial expansion. China is the second-largest foreign investor in Myanmar after Singapore. In Singapore, the CCP has sought to influence many Singaporean elites. 'The Fractured Himalaya': So much of the present crisis with China is seeped in differences which are decades old. Why is the Line of Actual Control contested? How realistic have various Indian leaders been in assessing China and its true intentions? Is there a pattern in China's actions along the contested boundary? Are there not incredible similarities between what we saw in the late fifties and what we are seeing now? Nirupama Rao, the former Indian Foreign Secretary who also served as Ambassador to Beijing explains it all. China is still spreading lies about Galwan Valley, Modi Government & Indian Army must bring closure with formal inquiry. The term “political warfare” comes from George Kennan, and it refers to activities below the threshold of armed conflict. It includes economic coercion, human intelligence operations, and cyber operations includes information and disinformation campaigns on social media platforms. These activities are designed to preserve and expand CCP power while weakening adversaries. FBI and Homeland security do not have enough agents or intelligence analysts to deal with a growing Chinese counter-intelligence campaign—in addition to Russian, Iranian, and other counter-intelligence activity in the US. There is also substantial legal and illegal influence within Congress, corporations and universities, involving lobbyists with links to China. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) believes that only the strong has rights, i.e. "law of the jungle", so they feel the need to flex their military power to threaten their opponents with territorial disputes in order to display to their people that they are getting respect in this world. It doesn't believe in friendly-nations. They believe only in the right of the strong and powerful, taking advantage of gullible or weak nations. China's Communist regime talks about being a "force for peace" and wanting a multi-polar world, but it practices one doctrine, one leader, one party, and one Chinese Han-centric nation. For 40 years, it has declared that China has no territorial desire or "China has never taken one inch of land from other countries", while it tries to claim and 'convince' other nations that large swathes of sovereign territory in these nations belongs to China. At the same time, China has expanded its territory by creating large illegal military islands in South China Sea that are closer to other countries. When Chinese side gets controls an area, then they gaslight by saying there can be "no invasion" by China since the area now belongs to them and how can you be invader of your own land. This is indeed believing that only the strong has rights, i.e. "law of the jungle". The direct consequence is that this will endanger world peace. China's claims on India and the South China Sea are seen as illegal by international law, whom China ignores and calls irrelevant. As expected, this fiery intention has made democratic nations to draw their swords. China's exponential growth follows a hard arithmetic, ensuring that regardless of its future trajectory, in terms of scale, it will not revert to a time before the 1980. China is systematically using its economic and MIC power to replace US with its own brand of domination in Southeast Asia. CCP's territorial expansionism has no limits, unlike other economic and technological powers like US, UK, France, Japan, Germany, Australia. The US has not indulged in territorial expansionism, but the world's policeman, now appears exhausted after two decades of war, while at the same time, China has rocketed from a starving nation to a wealthy nation. In 2018, China scrapped the two-term limit on the presidency. Xi Jinping avowed aim is to create a new international structure or world order, where China is the dominating dragon in size and power, in order to resume its historical position as the "center/middle of the world". In contrast, India's policy or end goals are Not the same as those during colonial times. India sees the value in working with the imperfect world order that exist since WW2, while reforming it through treaties. China doesn't have any old treaties since their government had to flee to Taiwan. This is why China keeps talking about international treaties being unequal with China. China believes that democratic values have become obsolete and CCP's vision for the future is going to be very popular in Asia-Pacific, once they replace the US from its position. China's growth demands a concentrated effort due to the scarcity of both resources and time. The "Military-Civil Fusion" (MCF) 军民融合 is a national strategy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Govt. worldwide pick vendors based on lowest price, so getting low-interest rates help vendors to quote lower price. Every nation is averse to lending funds for big projects or technology start-ups. Lending institutions are suffering due to bad loans. However, Chinese Govt gives away lowest interest rate loans, but they will only do so if you agree to lock every transaction for your business and your supply chain ecosystem, within China's own financial platform and buy & hire only from China. Thereby de-industrialising developed nations. This is how China is fulfilling its aspirations. Faith in personal friendships and profits rather than common sense has already led many American multinational businesses to economic disasters in China. Also, if you want to do business in China, there is to be no discussion of Chinese dominion over Tibet, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Clearly, what the Chinese are doing is 'deterrence by punishment' posturing. We need to respond to it with 'deterrence by denial'. PLA have also distinguished that the roles of military diplomacy differ in times of peace and war. China employed nearly 80 different gray zone tactics across all instruments of national power. China's information warfare and military diplomacy are mutually reinforcing and symbiotic activities. In Singapore, the CCP has sought to influence many Singaporean elites. While a war is being conducted on the battlefield, in the cognitive domain, a narrative is concurrently created to control the perception of the war. Large social media platforms have become the ‘main battleground for cognitive games and the main channel to influence people’s cognition.’ On these platforms, various short videos have become the ‘first scene’ for the public to understand various major events like a conflict or war. If one is technologically able to disrupt the adversary’s ability to communicate, it is possible to effectively suppress an adversary’s narrative. Military operations have a key supporting role to live updates on social media and allow for targeted disruption of the adversary. In fast-changing conditions, an ad hoc approach don't work. This requires a shift of gears from strategy as planning to strategy as learning. Embedding this adaptive capability is the only route to a sustainable advantage. Use the whole of government, both offensively and defensively. Intelligentized warfare utilizes emerging technologies such as AI, 5G networks and quantum computing to disrupt an adversary by attacking their ability to understand and perceive Chinese actions. Strategic cognitive overmatch (military-civil grey-zone multi-domain war) and tactical anti-satellite (space) warfare. Indian leadership may not be able to handle cognitive overload and confusing narratives, which will adversely affect at strategic level. Military dictatorships are immune to this, but democracies are highly susceptible to this type of warfare. At this level, the troops may win the battle, but the war is lost. "The enemy diversion you are ignoring is the main attack." CCP has increasingly become the greatest challenge and greatest threat to post-war international stability. International engagement and economic development have failed to soften the political character of the CCP regime. While using "Military-Civil Fusion" (MCF) 军民融合 to acquire foreign ports, China is selling an idealised-version of authoritarian governance (while in reality it's mass black bagging its citizens into remote internment camps without proper trial/defence) and preaching that 'democratic system' is a western trap to keep Asia & Africa countries weak and poor. Power is a means to achieve greater security and China is doing the work. China seeks to paralyse a bigger opponent's "systems" rather than the opponent's hard or soft deterrence capabilities. China seeks to destroy opponents but arouse minimal suspicion before the new equilibrium, to China’s advantage, is established. Chinese Communist game is to make their opponents get into self-delusion, that it's beneficial to behave, in the way China what's them to. They talk peace, however, the world can now see they are full of deception. Something said today, can change tomorrow. China does not think that this is morally bad, rather a means to achieve its aims. This is their idea of peaceful rise. Xi now no longer mentions this and instead calls on “Leading” the reform on global governance and making statements like “it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia and uphold the security of Asia”. After 2015, Xi put forward in his speeches more deceptive words, such as providing the world with a 'Chinese solution'. Zhong-guo Zhong-chandang / Communist Party of China (CPC), wants to usurp the meaning of 'democracy', by calling China a democracy! China is a Communist nation governed by one-party system, however, CPC says China is a real "democracy of both process and outcome; and both procedure and substance". In their mindset, they believe they are fully consistent & rational and convinced that other nations are delusional or failing to comprehend them. To subdue your competitor without fighting is the acme of skill. This aspect stresses the importance of shaping the conditions and to being prepared in advance. "Shaping" on the ground, means to go beyond the mode of managing differences, shape bilateral relations actively and accumulate positive momentum. Confrontation and conciliation can be used together. For example, in 2006, China reclassified the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh as part of Southern Tibet and blocked lending for development projects. China renamed six places in Arunachal, but this is nothing new and has been done by all colonizers. China also introducing stapled visas for Indian citizens of J&K. China also claims new 10% of Bhutanese land, which has no border with China. The Chinese intent is to create areas of disputes, not to go to war. China's "two steps forward, one step back" incursion to change the status-quo on the ground. Even amid its aggression, China has had no hesitation in raking up the Jammu and Kashmir issue at the UN's Security Council. Negotiation and dialogue kept the relationship from going out of control. Negotiation, as proximity and fluctuating advantage, can encourage diplomacy. As a Chinese saying goes, "Respect the strong, blackmail the weak". “We maintain, on the contrary, that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase ‘with the addition of other means’ because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. In essentials, that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs.” Carl von Clausewitz "China seems to be most perturbed by, what it perceives as, the convergence of interest between the US and India in reorganising/realigning global supply chains. Chinese observers note how China had originally planned to use the interdependence between the Chinese and American economy to carry out the transformation/ upgradation of its manufacturing industry. While on the other hand, it simultaneously sought to exploit the vast Indian market under its Belt and Road plans to develop and industrialise (low-end industries from China’s industrially advanced provinces) its lagging inland provinces, thereby ensuring China’s economic rise to be more balanced, long-term, self-sustaining, and unbeatable. However, the script went awry midway, as the US refused to let China carry out its industrial upgradation process smoothly, and initiated “the trade and technology war”; on the other hand, India refused to cooperate and integrate the Indian economy with that of China under the BRI, RCEP or other China-led economic initiatives." "Xi Jinping thought" still reveres the teachings of Mao and Karl Marx, but it also links Mr. Xi to even older Chinese traditions. Mr. Xi regularly quotes ancient sages, stressing their teachings on obedience and order. China's Mo-Di, one of China’s first philosophers, judged all creative job's (like art, storytelling/theatre and music) as a negative utilitarianism. In ancient China, music was a trinity of arts which would be performed not simply as part of ceremonial rites, to worship ancestors and divinities, but also for entertainment at banquets to honour the powerful. In Mo-Di's view, the entire process involved in performing arts and composing music were useless, and it deprived social production of time and energy. He did not hate creative and aesthetic works, but rather saw no use for it in society, and therefore believed that people’s tax money should not go into artistic programs. He believed if someone listened to music daily, it means that they were slacking. There are only 3 things he believed that people worried about - food, clothes and rest. Xi called Karl Marx "the greatest thinker in human history." “Some people think that communism can be aspired to but never reached, or even think that it cannot be hoped for, cannot be envisioned, and is a complete illusion. . . . Facts have repeatedly told us that Marx and Engels’s analysis of the basic contradiction of capitalist society is not outdated. . . . Western anti-China forces conspire to overthrow the CCP, so the party must stamp out “false ideological trends,” including constitutional democracy, the notion that Western values are Universal, the concept of Civil Society, journalistic independence, challenges to the party’s version of history. We must not let down our guard.” He emphasized that the party's ideology and social system are fundamentally incompatible with the West. Xi said in his speech published in April 2021 the current historical period as one of great risk and opportunity. The Soviet collapse haunts CCP leadership. "The process of China's realization of the great undertaking of national rejuvenation must ultimately follow from testing and struggle against the system of American hegemony." Xi required party leaders at all levels to watch a six-part documentary titled "A 20-Year Memorial for the Soviet Loss of Party and Country." US-China conflict could be either in Pakistan or South China Sea. China has placed their bets on their alternative to Strait of Malacca, the Gwadar-Xinjiang Pipeline, as part of China's CPEC which claims to connect 30% of World's GDP to China via Pakistan's transshipment deep-sea port by 2030. However, the challenging topography of the Himalayan region and high transit costs make such investment unprofitable. Gilgit-Baltistan region, earlier known as Northern Areas, shares contiguous borders with China, Afghanistan and Kargil district of Ladakh. The Chinese-constructed Karakoram highway runs through the region. Iran’s threats to close the other major world choke point, the Strait of Hormuz, show that whatever its actions, China remains vulnerable to a Persian Gulf blockade. However, Iran would like Chinese investment and military tech. Meanwhile, Russia will continue to prove its importance through arms sales. Also, China illegally copies Russian military equipments and then cuts out Russian sales by selling it at a lower price. Russians are depended on Russia-China trade and oil sales since China's GDP is 10 time bigger than India. However, the China's per capita income is nearly one seventh that of the US. https://indusscrolls.com/during-1958-chinese-famine-people-ate-people-parents-their-kids Back in 1981, some 85% of the Chinese population was living in extreme poverty, while today it's less than 1%. (India, in contrast, still has 68% of its population living in extreme poverty.) This was because Nixon warmed up to China and gave India the cold shoulder, during the Cold War era. Deng Xiao Ping's positive attitude toward the US engagement policy was due to the fact that China's economy was at the edge of collapse at the end of the Cultural Revolution. Henry Kissinger, Alexander Haig, Prescott Bush etc persuaded American corporations to commit billions of dollars to China because they thought their connections would provide them secure deals in China. No responsible person should have advised American businessmen to commit millions of dollars to China during this period. It simply helped legitimize a repressive communist regime. If China were to achieve per capita gross national income comparable to South Korea by mid-century with a population three times larger than that of the US, then China could "become so powerful that the US will not be able to contain it and prevent it from dominating Asia." Even if China were to fall short economically, China would still likely have accumulated enough power to attempt a shot at global hegemony. There is good reason to expect that China and its armed forces will overcome the obstacles to going global. The Chinese military will need to develop a network of basing and logistical arrangements to sustain expeditionary operations. In the Indo-Pacific theater, some 40 naval bases and foreign ports support the US fleet. China's defence planners recognize that a large-scale effort is required to construct dual-use facilities along key sea lanes. They want overseas ports to refuel, repair and resupply passing Chinese combat ships and submarines; but without having to build full-fledged military-grade bases like the US. China’s strategy is evident: to confine Indian strategic attention to the Sino-Indian border, preventing New Delhi from looking beyond at Tibet and Xinjiang, China’s most sensitive pressure points. China has flooded Xinjiang and Tibet with black-suited armed militias, whose members now carry portable fire extinguishers to douse Tibetans who are attempting self-immolation. But there remains widespread resentment at Beijing’s increasingly colonial presence in these areas. In contrast, India’s border population along the LAC remains heart-warming Indian. In Ladakh, Himachal, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, despite New Delhi’s inexplicable neglect, pro-India sentiment is high and China is regarded with distrust and suspicion that is constantly reinforced from across the border. So far, India’s military, bureaucracy and political elite have fallen for China’s game, directing their energies into placating China in the hope of a border settlement. Since the West holds all the trump-cards, India has no other choice but to deepen economic and industrial ties with the West. While Russia had promised India that if India placed greater emphasis on the Russia-India-China (RIC) grouping, then China will be persuaded to considerably reduce its aggressive stance against India. Overall, Russia is balancing its interests between China and India and does not want to take a clear sides. However, if China is defeated in the US-China competition, Russia fear it may be US's next target. AUKUS was devised and formed as an idea of enhancing the military component when QUAD was missing a military component to deter China. The axis began with a vibrant new economic superpower (Germany then, China now) looking for more respect, territory and a "place in the sun." The 20th century axis also had a declining empire (Austria-Hungary) playing the part of the hapless sidekick during World War I, while Italy assumed that role in World War II. These days the loser sidekick is Russia, an empire no more but still eager to recapture past glories at any cost.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-11-16/dalio-warns-of-consequences-of-more-intense-china-us-friction Consumption by rich middle-class (who feel safe in their social security fund) led growth is the final stage in any sustainable economy. China knows its economic model is unsustainable. Wang Qishan, Xi’s vice president, once revealed that the sickness in China’s system was like a giant game of musical chairs and that state-owned enterprises couldn’t thrive in the long term. It currently has an incompatible dual-track ownership system between the market and the state. Due to rising labour costs, the industries that exports of cheap goods have moved on to Vietnam and Bangladesh. "A decade ago, the annual number of university graduates rose from 1.4 million in 2002 to 3.4 million 2005 and 6.3 million in 2010. A decade ago, the unemployment rate of university graduates was over 10%. Currently, about 54% of 18-22-year-old China's youth will obtain university degrees, and a growing percentage of them cannot find jobs that justify the effort and expense that went into obtaining a diploma. Job-seekers are cheated and exploited by corrupt employers and officials on a regular basis. Despite the booming economy, it’s still hard for many college grads to get a job." Chinese banks have huge debt due to mortgages linked to its speculative housing market. There are less infrastructure opportunities that can provide risk-free quick returns on Chinese investments. China’s energy security concerns are also about its ability to compete with other players. Despite the abundance of oil and gas in the market, the geography of China result in the possibility of “when there is competition for scarce goods… a struggle for power will ensue.” China has a high levels of national debt and an increasing social disparity between rich and poor. A potential solution to dependence on crude oil imports from the Persian Gulf would be to develop the renewable energy. Today's Chinese leadership actions are directly designed to secure the shortest sea routes to move goods to Asian markets. Although 69% of China’s energy consumption comes from coal, its oil requirements are substantial. China became the world’s largest oil importer in 2017 and 80% has to pass through the Strait of Malacca, but because of the US Navy’s heavy presence near Singapore, the Strait of Malacca would remain significantly vulnerable to a China-focused blockade. This is in stark contrast to China’s position as a net exporter in the 1970s. Chinese strategists exhibit long-standing and strong paranoia about encirclement or under siege and being cut off at sea. They view Gwadar Port in Pakistan as an “ideal anchorage” and Djibouti as an observation station and a defensive site. Given that Pakistan is currently designated a major non-NATO ally and possesses nuclear weapons, US and allies would be hard-pressed to undertake actions that directly threaten Pakistani prerogatives. Chinese authorities have also been exploring the possibility of using the Northern Sea Route (NSR) to diversify trade routes, mainly with Europe and Russia. Yet, as a result of shipping restrictions associated with the ice cover, it still cannot be an alternative. Russia aims to use its neutral position to increase its leverage over China and India, as well as Indo-Pacific affairs in general. Russia wants to formally make India part of the Eurasian Customs Union and begin laying oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia, through Aksai Chin, to India. The Chinese have been consistently and persistently moving the goalposts. China has said that they do not recognise the LAC of 1993 Jiang Zemin-Narasimha Rao agreement. The Chinese government-controlled media states that if India wants peace, India should uphold the LAC of 1959 which gives the terrain advantages to PLA and makes Indian Army's defences untenable. However, they now say that the 1959 claim line itself will only grant temporary peace and claims the entire Indian territory of Ladakh in-between Tibet and Pakistan-occupied Gilgit-baltistan. Like India, China wants to secure all land-based threats to its CPEC. China is not ready to accept that a Dalai Lama could be born outside China. China has gone further westwards with their claims made in 1962 version or those claims that were made in 1969 version. China now sees the territory of Ladakh as vital for protecting the Chinese control over Tibet and Xinjiang (Uttarakuru). Anybody thinking that a permanent solution to the China-India border issue is close at hand is being foolhardy. "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Mao Zedong |
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China has steadily advance towards its declared objective of gobble-up the whole of Ladakh in due course of time. Chinese military action has been to physically hold on to new positions on the first ridge-line next to the Kugrang River near Gogra to attempt to position the PLA on dominating heights to add more depth to their bases, while the decision-makers of India are resorting to "perceptions" by creating a narrative about India building up strong defences after the damage has already been done, with nothing being done so far to undo the damage.
In fact, China has officially taken the position that they do not have any border with India in Kashmir and Ladakh! China objected to keeping open the old traditional route via Demchok in Ladakh because China consider Ladakh as its territory, far more than the 26 disputed areas near LAC. They do not accept Ladakh becoming a union Indian territory when India revoke Article 370 in J&K. However, it is important to point out as these differing "perceptions" of the LAC, do NOT exist along the Galwan River (China seems to have secured the heights in the north and south of the Galwan river).
There are 12 disputed pockets along the LAC where opinion differs in Ladakh, however, Galwan is not one of the disputed areas. We are very clear about the alignment of the LAC, as we have cremated or buried our people who were killed in action in 1962. All talk about a thick pen being used to draw lines denoting frontiers that represent an ambivalence of about 6 km is only for maps showing the McMahon Line & the Tibet-Sikkim IB, and NOT in any map showing our LAC patrolling limits. It would be a shame if we now agree to Chinese coercion and give up those areas without firing a shot, using the fig leaf of different "perceptions".
Hence, according to China's state-media, India has been forcibly building in the Chinese side. On the Chinese side, its highway G-219 can be used for a quick build-up. The terrain in Tibetan Plateau is dry, and the soil there is hard as there is no rain (due to clouds being obstructed by the Himalayan mountain range); and hence vehicles can move easily. Exactly the opposite holds true for India where, the clouds are forced to get concentrated due to the Himalayas and consequently road-building is a near impossibility. The mutual pull-back agreement by Indian Army and China's PLA, effectively shifted the LAC in Galwan Valley by 1 km in favour of the Chinese. After the Gogra disengagement, there remains the thorny issue of negotiating a troop disengagement at Depsang, where the Chinese are 15 kms inside Indian territory and have shown no inclination to discuss withdrawal. An entire Indian strike corps, along with at least two infantry divisions, have been redeployed to the LAC as a deterrent to China.
https://www.npr.org/2019/12/14/787220664/life-along-pakistans-mountain-highway-where-china-is-investing-billions-of-dolla
It is impossible to keep the existing Karakoram Highway (KKH-1) functional for 5 months a year at best because of adverse weather. A landslide and flooding (from Attabad Lake) in 2010 blocked the KKH-1 for more than one year. Eventually, a new route comprises 5 tunnels and several bridges, along the southeastern side of the Attabad Lake was added in 2015. Another all-weather alternative transportation route, Karakoram Highway (KKH-2) (and a high-speed railway line) will enter the highest mountains in PoK from the Pamir Plateau inside Xinjiang via the Mintaka Pass and then proceed into Hunza. This road will be expensive, estimated by Pakistan to cost more than US$11 billion. Hotan is an important military HQ of the PLA. The Hotan-Golmud Highway links Xinjiang and reduces the distance between Gilgit and Golmud to almost half. China has also built feeder roads eastward through the Shaksgam Valley (part of the Trans-Karakoram Tract) linking Gilgit with Hotan.
The M41 Highway that passes through the desolate Pamir Mountains is an important route along the Silk Road. This route was turned highway by the Soviets between 1931 and 1934 as a means to transport troops into Afghanistan. China has been able to legally built their second "anti-terrorist" military base in the Pamir Mountains next to the small 75-km strip called Wakhan Corridor (very near another base in Taxkorgan or Tashkurgan), after Tajikistan was unable to pay back their loans from China. Now China's is interested in the shia territory around Upper Hunza Valley (near Gilgit) to Rustam valley in Mardan (Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) near India-controlled Kashmir. Pakistani Sunni terrorists are trying to change the demographics in that region. Currently, China and Pakistan are connected only by the Karakoram Highway, completed in 1978, via a single crossing in the Khunjerab Pass. China and Pakistan has built the nearly 3,000-km-long economic corridor linking Pakistan’s Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea through the Khunjerab Pass to west Uttarakuru (now Xinjiang) to improve connectivity between the two countries. The Indian Army believed that it was an "impossible" task to build a highway through the northernmost portion of Siachen, the Shaksgam valley, due to the tough terrain of this very narrow gorge. The satellite images have confirmed the presence of the road and military posts constructed by China using the compressed earth technique.
China never even consulted India about CPEC which passes through Pakistan-occupied Indian territory. This action is an act of war against India. China's National highway and high-speed railway is being build from Xinjiang, cutting through the Taklamakan Desert and reaching Gartok in TAR. As the defined role of the PLA is to fight in self-defence, therefore any India retaliation strike to Pakistan military in Pakistani soil that harms China's CPEC infrastructure can give China the chance to directly threaten key Indian military capabilities. However, even if the corridor to Gwadar could be developed and security issues resolved, there’s only the Karakoram Highway, an inhospitable, two-lane route through the treacherous mountains separating China and Pakistan. Contrary to the promise made by China to India in late 1962, it has been building 20 km long road in the no-man’s land since 1998. China doesn't believe in "buffer zones". During OP Vijay in the Kargil war, China used the opportunity to build in record time, a 5-km-long motorable track from finger-4 to finger-8 along the Panggong Tso lake to step up their patrolling. In 2020 skirmish have started taking place somewhere between Finger 3 and Finger 4, where the road isn't black-topped.
On June 17, 2002, both sides met again and maps of the Western sector were seen by both sides for about 20 minutes, during the meeting itself the maps were withdrawn since it was felt that they represented maximalist positions for both sides. In 2010, the denial of a visa to Lt Gen Baljit Singh Jaswal who headed the Northern Command looking after J&K, (including Ladakh) was another sign. This move was followed by China referring to J&K as a “disputed territory”. China’s true intentions would soon become clearer. The PLA was intent on establishing a foothold in PoK to control the region. China started to describe J&K as “India-controlled Kashmir”. Immediately after India repudiated Article 370, China said that India had changed the status quo in Kashmir, while adding a caveat that will not change China’s exercise of territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction beyond the 26 disputed area (near LAC) in Ladakh. China has always refused to exchange maps or inform India of its LAC perceptions. It is the Chinese claim of both the IB & LAC, that has been changing since 1950. Also, uranium deposits have been known to have been found in Ladakh in 2007.
India's Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) the world’s highest airstrip at 16,700 feet which was constructed and in 2008. Daulat Beg Oldi is located more than 12 km south of Karakoram Pass, the north is close to China and east is Askai Chin. It's all-weather and can also facilitate an alternative west route to Siachen. If a war were to break out between India and China, Daulat Beg Oldi would be the first frontline airstrip vulnerable to Chinese artillery fire, so that IAF cannot launch air strikes against the Chinese. However, China knows that Daulat Beg Oldi is a strategic asset for India near Siachen during peace time. Hence, China seems to have secured the heights in the north and south of the Galwan river that overlook India's Daulat Beg Oldi road, with 2 battalions with 1 held as reserve at the LAC. This neutralises Daulat Beg Oldi is a strategic asset for India as China can destroy the road from those heights. Due to military storage facilities along excellent roads on the Chinese side, the PLA "Northern" rapid-force army can respond quickly. The PLA "western" army facing India in Ladakh, consist of all part-time soldiers (mainly, peasants) & are unpredictable as they have no military discipline or any knowledge about de-escalation concepts. Even back in 1962 all the PLA fighting forces in Ladakh came from Xinjiang (north) and not from Tibet (west). Interestingly, an unintended consequence of China's one-child policy has resulted in discouraging people from being in these high-risk jobs.
China wants to maintain the struggle on the ground without triggering a war. Ambiguity helps China to slowly push the envelope. The real issue is Aksai Chin can be reached from south by Hotsprings-Gogra region (which has large permanent PLA base in Kongka-'la'/pass) and from west by Daulat Beg Oldi passing through Galwan. The Chinese construction of posts in this location clearly points to China's intention of making Galwan Valley off limits to India. Chinese continue to be in Depsang at the critical Raki Nala Y-Junction (also known as Bottleneck). While the Chinese have developed infrastructure till the tail end of their perception of LAC, they resort to violence in denying the same last mile connectivity to us to our LAC. The terrain in Tibetan Plateau is dry, and the soil there is hard as there is no rain (due to clouds being obstructed by the Himalayan mountain range); and hence vehicles can move easily. Exactly the opposite holds true for India where, the clouds are forced to get concentrated due to the Himalayas and consequently road-building is a near impossibility. Hence, air transportation by both fixed-wing transport aircrafts and helicopters becomes critical for mobility. Engine's Horse-Power loses as much as 25% power due to lighter atmosphere in high-altitude.
Our own patrols must be able to move to the designated areas, as hitherto fore, without deliberate blocking by PLA. Which is why China plan was to cross the Shyok and Galwan rivers and come across the Galwan Valley, and block the Darbuk-Shayok-Daulat-Beg-Oldie Road, thereby creating pressure on India by stopping all Indian traffic movement along that road. Solace cannot be drawn from the fact that none of these incidents have led to firing, due to immense self-control and discipline. Events have a life of their own, and even limited escalation cannot be guaranteed. The trend of events indicates that prolonged face-offs were orchestrated from the apex, maybe even the CMC. These events obviously had to be carefully planned, and it takes some time to plan these things.
The M41 Highway that passes through the desolate Pamir Mountains is an important route along the Silk Road. This route was turned highway by the Soviets between 1931 and 1934 as a means to transport troops into Afghanistan. China has been able to legally built their second "anti-terrorist" military base in the Pamir Mountains next to the small 75-km strip called Wakhan Corridor (very near another base in Taxkorgan or Tashkurgan), after Tajikistan was unable to pay back their loans from China. Now China's is interested in the shia territory around Upper Hunza Valley (near Gilgit) to Rustam valley in Mardan (Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) near India-controlled Kashmir. Pakistani Sunni terrorists are trying to change the demographics in that region. Currently, China and Pakistan are connected only by the Karakoram Highway, completed in 1978, via a single crossing in the Khunjerab Pass. China and Pakistan has built the nearly 3,000-km-long economic corridor linking Pakistan’s Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea through the Khunjerab Pass to west Uttarakuru (now Xinjiang) to improve connectivity between the two countries. The Indian Army believed that it was an "impossible" task to build a highway through the northernmost portion of Siachen, the Shaksgam valley, due to the tough terrain of this very narrow gorge. The satellite images have confirmed the presence of the road and military posts constructed by China using the compressed earth technique.
China never even consulted India about CPEC which passes through Pakistan-occupied Indian territory. This action is an act of war against India. China's National highway and high-speed railway is being build from Xinjiang, cutting through the Taklamakan Desert and reaching Gartok in TAR. As the defined role of the PLA is to fight in self-defence, therefore any India retaliation strike to Pakistan military in Pakistani soil that harms China's CPEC infrastructure can give China the chance to directly threaten key Indian military capabilities. However, even if the corridor to Gwadar could be developed and security issues resolved, there’s only the Karakoram Highway, an inhospitable, two-lane route through the treacherous mountains separating China and Pakistan. Contrary to the promise made by China to India in late 1962, it has been building 20 km long road in the no-man’s land since 1998. China doesn't believe in "buffer zones". During OP Vijay in the Kargil war, China used the opportunity to build in record time, a 5-km-long motorable track from finger-4 to finger-8 along the Panggong Tso lake to step up their patrolling. In 2020 skirmish have started taking place somewhere between Finger 3 and Finger 4, where the road isn't black-topped.
On June 17, 2002, both sides met again and maps of the Western sector were seen by both sides for about 20 minutes, during the meeting itself the maps were withdrawn since it was felt that they represented maximalist positions for both sides. In 2010, the denial of a visa to Lt Gen Baljit Singh Jaswal who headed the Northern Command looking after J&K, (including Ladakh) was another sign. This move was followed by China referring to J&K as a “disputed territory”. China’s true intentions would soon become clearer. The PLA was intent on establishing a foothold in PoK to control the region. China started to describe J&K as “India-controlled Kashmir”. Immediately after India repudiated Article 370, China said that India had changed the status quo in Kashmir, while adding a caveat that will not change China’s exercise of territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction beyond the 26 disputed area (near LAC) in Ladakh. China has always refused to exchange maps or inform India of its LAC perceptions. It is the Chinese claim of both the IB & LAC, that has been changing since 1950. Also, uranium deposits have been known to have been found in Ladakh in 2007.
India's Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) the world’s highest airstrip at 16,700 feet which was constructed and in 2008. Daulat Beg Oldi is located more than 12 km south of Karakoram Pass, the north is close to China and east is Askai Chin. It's all-weather and can also facilitate an alternative west route to Siachen. If a war were to break out between India and China, Daulat Beg Oldi would be the first frontline airstrip vulnerable to Chinese artillery fire, so that IAF cannot launch air strikes against the Chinese. However, China knows that Daulat Beg Oldi is a strategic asset for India near Siachen during peace time. Hence, China seems to have secured the heights in the north and south of the Galwan river that overlook India's Daulat Beg Oldi road, with 2 battalions with 1 held as reserve at the LAC. This neutralises Daulat Beg Oldi is a strategic asset for India as China can destroy the road from those heights. Due to military storage facilities along excellent roads on the Chinese side, the PLA "Northern" rapid-force army can respond quickly. The PLA "western" army facing India in Ladakh, consist of all part-time soldiers (mainly, peasants) & are unpredictable as they have no military discipline or any knowledge about de-escalation concepts. Even back in 1962 all the PLA fighting forces in Ladakh came from Xinjiang (north) and not from Tibet (west). Interestingly, an unintended consequence of China's one-child policy has resulted in discouraging people from being in these high-risk jobs.
China wants to maintain the struggle on the ground without triggering a war. Ambiguity helps China to slowly push the envelope. The real issue is Aksai Chin can be reached from south by Hotsprings-Gogra region (which has large permanent PLA base in Kongka-'la'/pass) and from west by Daulat Beg Oldi passing through Galwan. The Chinese construction of posts in this location clearly points to China's intention of making Galwan Valley off limits to India. Chinese continue to be in Depsang at the critical Raki Nala Y-Junction (also known as Bottleneck). While the Chinese have developed infrastructure till the tail end of their perception of LAC, they resort to violence in denying the same last mile connectivity to us to our LAC. The terrain in Tibetan Plateau is dry, and the soil there is hard as there is no rain (due to clouds being obstructed by the Himalayan mountain range); and hence vehicles can move easily. Exactly the opposite holds true for India where, the clouds are forced to get concentrated due to the Himalayas and consequently road-building is a near impossibility. Hence, air transportation by both fixed-wing transport aircrafts and helicopters becomes critical for mobility. Engine's Horse-Power loses as much as 25% power due to lighter atmosphere in high-altitude.
Our own patrols must be able to move to the designated areas, as hitherto fore, without deliberate blocking by PLA. Which is why China plan was to cross the Shyok and Galwan rivers and come across the Galwan Valley, and block the Darbuk-Shayok-Daulat-Beg-Oldie Road, thereby creating pressure on India by stopping all Indian traffic movement along that road. Solace cannot be drawn from the fact that none of these incidents have led to firing, due to immense self-control and discipline. Events have a life of their own, and even limited escalation cannot be guaranteed. The trend of events indicates that prolonged face-offs were orchestrated from the apex, maybe even the CMC. These events obviously had to be carefully planned, and it takes some time to plan these things.
Cognitive reactive EW sensors integrates Artificial-Intelligence algorithms (without pre-programming) for quick, Adaptive communications, signal detecting, (radio fingerprints), processing and disrupting (ARC) for real-time analytics; alongside Joint multi-domains like cyber & space-based navigation networks. The electronic equipments and data storages can get outdated every 6 months, which is a challenging and expensive process. The tools available to field US commanders are insufficient to enable them to develop and plan creative operations against changing enemy EW tactics. In the not-so-distant future, AI-enabled tools will always be on, following every personnel to provide better recommendations. Russia said that "whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world."
“China is an ambitious country which envisions being unchallenged in Asia. China has managed to dominate Asia through a clever mix of diplomacy & coercion.”
Intelligentized warfare utilizes emerging technologies such as AI, 5G networks and quantum computing for fast acts to disrupt an adversary by attacking their ability to understand and perceive Chinese actions. "The future of warfare is expanding in the domains of information and intelligence. Conventional standard munitions can no longer meet the needs of warfare. Observation and perception of the battlefield situation are crucial."
"The enemy diversion you are ignoring is the main attack." While the character of war — its technical dimension changes; the nature of war as the “art of war” does not. The character and nature of war are imperfect; together, they reinforce the chaos in wars. To prevail in any strategic competition, we must quickly secure technological advantage, as well as the cognitive agility to employ it effectively.
Theater Information Advantage Detachment/Element in South China Sea, owned by US Army Cyber Command, consisting of 65 people, is specifically focused on information activities in "competition" with near-peer adversaries, or below the threshold of armed conflict. Nuclear powers can engage their competitors’ core strategic interests directly, intrusively, and coercively (and perhaps unintentionally), well below traditional forms of armed conflict, especially through cyber, economic, and media-based attacks. As states drive to compete and win at the sub-conventional level — in the "gray zone" — the risk of strategic crisis may increase. What if, by undermining and manipulating independent institutions of government and democratically-elected political leaders, during a crisis or conflict, non-democratic states can use "gray-zone" tactics to divide the public from their leaders and institutions, foment internal conflict, and impede senior decision-making.
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China views gray zone activities as a natural extension of how countries exercise power. Grey Zone operations do not clearly violate international law, but put pressure on the adversary and test their resolve. The kill mechanism (the weapon) and the platform (the delivery system), the military's objective is either to enhance our position or degrade the position of the adversary. China employed nearly 80 different gray zone tactics across all instruments of national power. Chinese aggression and hostility towards India is in no way going to help them achieve their global aspirations. China hopes to advance its interests through coercive influence and debt-trapped proxies without clear attribution or risk of escalation. That is only helping to make their nation stand out of place and out of time. China is only upsetting its future rise by picking fights with India.
Of course, China is not stranger to information warfare and deception, or even using proxies as tools of strategic competition (nor is the US). All domains can be contested for control of resources. Over time China has coerced the Philippines, clashed with Vietnam, forced Japan to scramble its combat jets, threatened Taiwan, and found ways to alter Indian actions as well. Cold War history is littered with such cases. By promoting false narratives with conflicting data points, manipulating international institutions, and instigating targeted social unrest, potential adversaries can break confidence in the US and its allies, increase distrust and confusion, and coerce desirable outcomes at lower levels of conflict.
Of course, China is not stranger to information warfare and deception, or even using proxies as tools of strategic competition (nor is the US). All domains can be contested for control of resources. Over time China has coerced the Philippines, clashed with Vietnam, forced Japan to scramble its combat jets, threatened Taiwan, and found ways to alter Indian actions as well. Cold War history is littered with such cases. By promoting false narratives with conflicting data points, manipulating international institutions, and instigating targeted social unrest, potential adversaries can break confidence in the US and its allies, increase distrust and confusion, and coerce desirable outcomes at lower levels of conflict.
Grey-zone actions don’t just happen. They are a measured movement towards the objectives (rather than seeking decisive results within a specified time) in a carefully designed campaign plan controlled by the CCP high-level leadership and strategic-level military commanders. Grey-zone actions are not those of tactical commanders freelancing. Instead, they are carefully scripted brinkmanship. By acting to remain below key escalatory thresholds so as to avoid war, the grey zone involves the use of all the instruments of national power, particularly non-military and non-kinetic tools.
https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/server-attack-delhi-aiims-chinese-fir-2309052-2022-12-14
https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/aiims-server-hack-delhi-police-cbi-interpol-help-ip-address-details-8331538/
https://thewire.in/world/india-china-hackers-border-tension-power-grid-malware-recorded-future
https://www.forbesindia.com/article/take-one-big-story-of-the-day/cyberattacks-you-could-be-the-next-target/84223/1
https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/server-attack-delhi-aiims-chinese-fir-2309052-2022-12-14
https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/aiims-server-hack-delhi-police-cbi-interpol-help-ip-address-details-8331538/
https://thewire.in/world/india-china-hackers-border-tension-power-grid-malware-recorded-future
https://www.forbesindia.com/article/take-one-big-story-of-the-day/cyberattacks-you-could-be-the-next-target/84223/1
China is still a communist police state and India is still in coalition with other big democratic nations who have powerful economies. China has contempt for such democracies. Chinese communist leadership believe that all democracies are natural competitors for them and Indian democracy is inferior to Chinese Communist Party rule. China incorrectly believes the US has done a poor job as the policeman in keeping global Order. China willing to offer India to be a junior "partner" on the world stage and not a competitor, much in the way that the US is doing. There is a “new Cold War” with the US and Chinese officials believe it is not just prepared, but well-positioned to prevail. China hubristic assessment of its own position is encouraging even bolder acts of adventurism. There's a tendency to overestimate Chinese military capabilities. The Chinese have a long history of overestimating their capabilities in the opening stages of a war. That worked better when it was Chinese versus Chinese. There are many examples in history where militaries prepare for one kind of conflict and then had to fight a different kind of conflict because the enemy also gets a vote. Governments in the US, India, and Japan have attempted to play down their differences with China, but to no avail. China is displaying imperiousness, opportunism, reactiveness, and insecurity all at once.
The Chinese assessment is that the institutional structure in India is too process-centred to enable disruptive-innovative policies, needed to sustain decades long growth. And the political class in India does not have enough interest in taking on the challenges of the governance mechanism to cogitate solutions for the 21st century. Chinese experts agree that there is a price to pay, especially on the economic front, however, their general impression is that China can afford serious and long-term damage on its relations with India. Despite what the outsiders might see as China’s mistake, China is unlikely to change its current strategic assessment. Chinese experts agree that there is a price to pay, especially on the economic front, however, their general impression is that China can afford the damage. China is set on its new trajectory, thinking that it will pay off in the end. However, CCP also has repeatedly shown that it has the pragmatic capacity to correct course.
Indian leadership is at fault too, as it has been content with managing its diplomatic-military security issues with China, rather than address them. India has been content with ‘talk and discuss’ the boundary question and not ‘negotiate’ in any meaningful manner. Indian diplomats are stationed far away from the India-China high-altitude border. Which means no diplomat, from the Indian side, can be brought quickly, without many weeks of acclamation. The longer the talks go on, it only helps China to consolidate its hold on the land grabs, including by building fortifications and installing optic fiber cables. Indian security policy apparatus is totally devoid of any formal military representation. One-off comments are no substitute for the participative process of security policy formulation. Shivshankar Menon says that "The world is much more realistic. The world measures your material power, hard power, your economy, your military strength, and your ability to run your own affairs well."
One could argue that China has opened too many “fronts” diplomatically, but militarily, China has always been careful to avoid a two-front confrontation with America in the east and India in the west. The more China takes up its hard maximalist line vis-à-vis Indian core security interests (& territorial integrity), it's only logical that, the reaction would be that India sheds its neutral position on China and will no longer be able to justify the compartmentalization of Chinese threats to itself and have to make the difficult choice of sharing its Indian military locations and sensitive data by accepting strategic alliance with America (and will depend exclusively on US, instead of Russia, for its critical military spare-parts). Unlike Russians, US defence hardware "systems" has several strictly-controlled crypo-keys (essential for full combat operation) that can on/off by US even after it's exported/assembled by international partners. Another problem is the long time it takes to certify non-U.S. weapons for use.
The US always has its own interests in mind, which is American dominance in every region (and their maritime trade routes), and has been pushing in this direction for years. In the guise of shared India-US networks, can compromise India's missile command and control system. By being connected to the American network-centric “systems”, the effectiveness of Indian own defence can be jeopardised. After all, India has no control over American satellites or networks. One can say the entire US military power rests on its network-centric "systems" and failure to protect it puts partner nations at risk. Chinese actions on India's border has left India with no other choice but to join hands with the world's sole superpower. India will have no choice but to act as a subordinate US partner (similar to Australia & Japan) and accept that China doesn't care, if there is going to be any real peace between the two large neighbours of Asian.
China's obsession with faulty and outdated ideas carry real-world repercussions for neighbouring countries like India. For example: Chinese Han (ethnic Chinese) legendary commander Xiang Yu (of late Qin / early Han Dynasty) famously said "fawn upon one's superior and bully one's subordinates". Hard as China may try to seem like an idealised communist governance, they need to realise they are not superior to everyone, destined to become the next Huangdi Temu-jin/Genghis's empire, that stretched from Eastern and Central Europe to the Sea of Japan. Mao said that "in everything under the heaven, there is great disorder", which makes the situation excellent for the purpose of ultimately achieving a "great order under the heaven". The Chinese characters for the word 'turmoil' would translate more properly to 'chaos.'
The highest ethics for communist leadership in China is following Chinese Utilitarianism, even though they cover it up with globally acceptable diplomatic speak. China economy is many times bigger, due to the 20 times US investment every year, compared to India. However, with this economic robustness is the very basis of China’s potential as a challenger to US unipolarity. China's comprehensive national power (CNP) based on land mass, national economy and military power is second only to US. They believe a higher GDP proves that their system is ultimately superior to democracy. Hence, culturally-speaking, the Chinese Communists vision of, a "New Era" for the global community of nations, is not a "greater future for mankind" at all, but rather for China to be a strong commanding hand blessing nations that bow in respect and beats the unruly nations if they don't.
The Chinese assessment is that the institutional structure in India is too process-centred to enable disruptive-innovative policies, needed to sustain decades long growth. And the political class in India does not have enough interest in taking on the challenges of the governance mechanism to cogitate solutions for the 21st century. Chinese experts agree that there is a price to pay, especially on the economic front, however, their general impression is that China can afford serious and long-term damage on its relations with India. Despite what the outsiders might see as China’s mistake, China is unlikely to change its current strategic assessment. Chinese experts agree that there is a price to pay, especially on the economic front, however, their general impression is that China can afford the damage. China is set on its new trajectory, thinking that it will pay off in the end. However, CCP also has repeatedly shown that it has the pragmatic capacity to correct course.
Indian leadership is at fault too, as it has been content with managing its diplomatic-military security issues with China, rather than address them. India has been content with ‘talk and discuss’ the boundary question and not ‘negotiate’ in any meaningful manner. Indian diplomats are stationed far away from the India-China high-altitude border. Which means no diplomat, from the Indian side, can be brought quickly, without many weeks of acclamation. The longer the talks go on, it only helps China to consolidate its hold on the land grabs, including by building fortifications and installing optic fiber cables. Indian security policy apparatus is totally devoid of any formal military representation. One-off comments are no substitute for the participative process of security policy formulation. Shivshankar Menon says that "The world is much more realistic. The world measures your material power, hard power, your economy, your military strength, and your ability to run your own affairs well."
One could argue that China has opened too many “fronts” diplomatically, but militarily, China has always been careful to avoid a two-front confrontation with America in the east and India in the west. The more China takes up its hard maximalist line vis-à-vis Indian core security interests (& territorial integrity), it's only logical that, the reaction would be that India sheds its neutral position on China and will no longer be able to justify the compartmentalization of Chinese threats to itself and have to make the difficult choice of sharing its Indian military locations and sensitive data by accepting strategic alliance with America (and will depend exclusively on US, instead of Russia, for its critical military spare-parts). Unlike Russians, US defence hardware "systems" has several strictly-controlled crypo-keys (essential for full combat operation) that can on/off by US even after it's exported/assembled by international partners. Another problem is the long time it takes to certify non-U.S. weapons for use.
The US always has its own interests in mind, which is American dominance in every region (and their maritime trade routes), and has been pushing in this direction for years. In the guise of shared India-US networks, can compromise India's missile command and control system. By being connected to the American network-centric “systems”, the effectiveness of Indian own defence can be jeopardised. After all, India has no control over American satellites or networks. One can say the entire US military power rests on its network-centric "systems" and failure to protect it puts partner nations at risk. Chinese actions on India's border has left India with no other choice but to join hands with the world's sole superpower. India will have no choice but to act as a subordinate US partner (similar to Australia & Japan) and accept that China doesn't care, if there is going to be any real peace between the two large neighbours of Asian.
China's obsession with faulty and outdated ideas carry real-world repercussions for neighbouring countries like India. For example: Chinese Han (ethnic Chinese) legendary commander Xiang Yu (of late Qin / early Han Dynasty) famously said "fawn upon one's superior and bully one's subordinates". Hard as China may try to seem like an idealised communist governance, they need to realise they are not superior to everyone, destined to become the next Huangdi Temu-jin/Genghis's empire, that stretched from Eastern and Central Europe to the Sea of Japan. Mao said that "in everything under the heaven, there is great disorder", which makes the situation excellent for the purpose of ultimately achieving a "great order under the heaven". The Chinese characters for the word 'turmoil' would translate more properly to 'chaos.'
The highest ethics for communist leadership in China is following Chinese Utilitarianism, even though they cover it up with globally acceptable diplomatic speak. China economy is many times bigger, due to the 20 times US investment every year, compared to India. However, with this economic robustness is the very basis of China’s potential as a challenger to US unipolarity. China's comprehensive national power (CNP) based on land mass, national economy and military power is second only to US. They believe a higher GDP proves that their system is ultimately superior to democracy. Hence, culturally-speaking, the Chinese Communists vision of, a "New Era" for the global community of nations, is not a "greater future for mankind" at all, but rather for China to be a strong commanding hand blessing nations that bow in respect and beats the unruly nations if they don't.
China countered the US's lethal 'network information system-of-system' capabilities with Sunzi-style asymmetric and hybrid approach that blended confrontation with cooperation, called 'Unrestricted Warfare', which used all-effects all-domain national power. US doctrine does not recognize hybrid warfare by unarmed actors with respect to impactful information effects. This causal chain also spawns unintended consequences. It led the US to adopt the Multi-Domain Operations approach and China is attempting to counteract with Multi-Domain Precision Warfare focusing on operation of space assets for combat. CCP is focusing on exploiting what their enemies expectations are.
Only conducting large-scale deterrence operations to will not be sufficient to deter adversaries shaping activities to change the global order. Sensemaking and feedback are critical components of operational art. China sees a larger, competitive battlefield. The Joint Concept for Competing urges us to adopt a similar view, with a much larger understanding of “competitive space” and critical “sub-areas” of competition. This calls for a reimagining the application of operational art, by the US Army, below the threshold of armed conflict, supporting strategic objectives. Therefore, operational art must evolve to prioritize changes to the global system and generating strategic advantage for the US within the competition space.
China is determined to create a "new normal" by "shaping the ground" for a future global order in which their wishes are respected. The act of showing "Respect" is also peculiar for CCP, as it's a euphemism. Chinese traditionally believe that the right way to become highly admired is by practising the concept of Tai-Chi (perfectly, balancing any dynamic opposites) which has "Qi" (awareness or mindfulness of the type of force released or breath by opposites); & (more importantly in this context) "Li" (principle or rational model of interactions between opposites in civilized manner) i.e. the proper internalized behaviour code for juniors is to give propriety and respect to seniors, it primarily entails “core” foreign courts sending "tribute" to China in order to control the “peripheries” through economic and trade interactions.
Strategic cognitive overmatch (military-civil grey-zone multi-domain war) and tactical anti-satellite (space) warfare. A derivative of natural order, Li retains a cosmic role in its enchantment of human experience by harmonizing it with nature. It is this concept that is both celebrated throughout the early Chinese classical literature. Chinese ‘magnanimity’ actually made the Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan acquiesce to territorial concession to China in the 1990s. The last border settlement was with Tajikistan in 2011, when China claimed 28,000 sq. km but ‘settled’ for 1,158 sq. km of land east of the Sarekole Mountains. Chinese long-term strategies are aimed at making their belief of superiority become such an objective fact so that all nations have to accept it one by one.
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The US Army is trying to automate the resupply of its self-propelled artillery that would cut crews by half and double the rate & volume of fire. It hardly matters how precise new weapons are if the Army lacks the ISR reach to find targets.
China's Rocket Force is designed to attack forward airfields and US warships. Chinese airpower could deliver about 1,400 precision land-attack and anti-ship missile shots per day. In 2021, China allegedly moved more than 250 dual-payload-capable tactical ballistic missiles (to knock out at least 4 IAF airbase near Ladakh) and new 8-10 SAM sites (including S-400 SAM imported from Russia), to protect PLA from IAF's air-power. Chinese first limit access, and then they deny the area. India has 7 Army & IAF commands facing China (out of a total of 17 single-service commands), whereas China has a unified Western Theater Command facing India.
China can surprise target us in Leh, from Hotan (in Xinjiang) by using 370 km range version of their rockets while also remain hidden in their air-base which has integrated air-defence. If they use 300-mm rockets (range 130-160 km) variant, they have to come onto their G-219 highway, and their entry & exit will be visible for miles. Hence, China is building an alternative route (national highway and high-speed railway) much further to the east starting from Xinjiang, cutting through the Taklamakan Desert & reaching Gartok in TAR. So what we need to do first is keep them under surveillance, then hunt them down with our special forces or trans-border patrols. We need to have dedicated surveillance capability. This means our sensor-to-shooter links have to be of a very high order, including communications and procedures, which we don't have now.
The new generation missiles and bombs, do not have very long shelf lives and require months to produce (most of which are imported, or critical parts are imported). This means that supply lines must always be open. India needs to make 200 (or a minimum of 60) Pralay missiles per year for a decade, to match China.
In modern warfare, it is very important to select the right algorithm, to increase the effectiveness of your sensor/weapon-target. This problem can be considered as a weapon target-assignment (WTA) optimization problem in mathematics. China’s doesn't have access to better algorithms. They’re just going to sit in these big rooms (operational network): just labelling data (for their kill-chain), 10 to 12 hours a day, 6 days a week, because they live in an autocratic state.
In modern warfare, it is very important to select the right algorithm, to increase the effectiveness of your sensor/weapon-target. This problem can be considered as a weapon target-assignment (WTA) optimization problem in mathematics. China’s doesn't have access to better algorithms. They’re just going to sit in these big rooms (operational network): just labelling data (for their kill-chain), 10 to 12 hours a day, 6 days a week, because they live in an autocratic state.
By mid-2020, the total mechanised force of the PLA against the Indian Army was about 4 light tank regiments and 2 Light rapid-action motorised infantry regiments, with heavy-armour reinforcements in its rear. Currently, the light tank regiments have gone down from 4 to 3, while the light highly-mobile infantry regiments have gone up from 2 to 3. Also, the mechanised force has been transformed into Tri-Combined Divisions (Direct-Fire, Air-defence, Support & Engineer), while the sub-units are being transformed into from motorised to medium mechanised Infantry brigades.
There are 10 motorized vehicles and 9 mobile 81 mm mortars or 120 mm caliber gun vehicles, in every PLA's tri-combined arms battalion called Group Army (mix of artillery battalion, medium-light armour and mechanised infantry sub-units at unit level). There are 28 medium-light armoured tanks in two heavy tri-combined arms battalion of PLA. PLA are protected by FM-90, HQ-17, FL-2000 air-defence. Mobility and shoot-and-scoot tactics has become synonymous with survival. China has over 6,000 tanks, with 2,500 of them modern designs. The rest of them are based on the Russian T-54/55 license as the Type 59.
There are 10 motorized vehicles and 9 mobile 81 mm mortars or 120 mm caliber gun vehicles, in every PLA's tri-combined arms battalion called Group Army (mix of artillery battalion, medium-light armour and mechanised infantry sub-units at unit level). There are 28 medium-light armoured tanks in two heavy tri-combined arms battalion of PLA. PLA are protected by FM-90, HQ-17, FL-2000 air-defence. Mobility and shoot-and-scoot tactics has become synonymous with survival. China has over 6,000 tanks, with 2,500 of them modern designs. The rest of them are based on the Russian T-54/55 license as the Type 59.
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China's Central Base Depot, which stores warheads, is strategically located inside Mt. Taibai among the Qin Mountains in Central China.
China has approx. 350 nuclear warheads, at least 90 to 240 ICBMs, out of which 66 to 78 are land-based and 24 to 48 are submarine-based (12 JL-2 missiles per boat).
India has only ten 3,500 km Agni-III nuclear missile launchers capable of hitting the entire Chinese strategic areas of its mainland and 8 to 10 medium-range Agni-II nuclear missile launchers capable of reaching central China. India also has less than 12 Agni-V nuclear missiles. Indian retaliation doctrine dictates the dispersal of the arsenal, the secrecy of its locations and strong second-strike capabilities.
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The C4ISR-T joint battle networks of the future should be dynamically reconfigurable mesh networks that are better capable of adapting to threats and disruptions. These networks can split into tactical sub-networks as necessary, reroute data through different systems and alternative pathways in unpredictable ways, and reconnect into larger networks as opportunities emerge. The communications element is the essential component that makes this higher level of interoperability and resilience possible, but the other elements of the battle network must also be adapted to pass data seamlessly across multiple levels of security using compatible data standards and protocols.
Russians secure military comms are not working after the 4G telecom towers in Ukraine were destroyed. During peacetime exercises, outdated battlefield communications were not a major problem. Russian soldiers have resorted to using commercially-available, unsecured radios. Russia command posts are struggling to keep its communications secure, while Ukrainians have been getting "excellent (signals) intelligence". Ukrainian reports suggest that Russian communications across the static forces are vulnerable to intercepts and pinpointing location. It's not totally clear exactly how, but Ukrainian artillery and MLRs have been blowing up a lot of Russian command posts routinely. Ukrainian forces also appear to be targeting anyone "standing near a bunch of antennas".
Unlike US, the Russians have very poor and limited air-ground equipments for Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) to bust Ukrainian ATGM ambushes, since it require expensive electronics. Meanwhile, Ukraine's military command & control, communications and weapon guidance systems are largely intact. Space Exploration Technologies Corp's (SpaceX) Starlink, a constellation of US satellites for high-speed internet, was able to resist Russian jamming of their satellite network by software update. SpaceX pointed out that it could put additional Starlink satellites into orbit faster and more cheaply than anyone else could destroy them. Ukrainian forces are contesting them from the front, flanks and in between. Ukraine has focused on ambushing Russian supply chains and avoided big, open, battles and conflicts. Ukrainians have been heavily-armed with anti-armour weapons, loitering drones, superior American ISR and are operating with much shorter interior lines with more coordination. Russia has employed drones and electronic warfare to find, fix, and attack important Ukrainian artillery systems, particularly HIMARS and counter-battery radars.
China's military budget now is an estimated $250 billion to $300 billion a year on its armed forces. China spends the highest amount of money on data-driven war-gamed realistic precision-strike combat training, since many PLA officers are known to be unable to deal with unexpected situations. The PLA has had difficulty addressing the shortage of officers who can make decisions by themselves (when they are cut-off from their chain of command) and have a deep knowledge of joint combat operations. China's aims at developing an in-depth precision strike munitions system backed by integrated persistent surveillance and reconnaissance, and C2 capabilities to operate in Taiwan and Tibet. China saw the Sino-Vietnamese border conflict of 1979 to 1990 as a way to evolve the PLA by testing new doctrines and equipment on its border. China's war objective is specifically to preserve their power sources, by fighting better armed enemies in small conflicts.
"The PLA ground forces now stand at some 975,000, a very small number for a country that has 13,743 miles of borders with 14 countries — including extreme high-mountain borders where internal combustion engines lose power, jungle-covered borders where remote observation is spoiled by foliage, Russian-river borders with endemic smuggling, and the border with India’s Ladakh where an accumulation of unresolved Chinese intrusions have forced each side to deploy substantial ground forces, with at least 80,000 on the Chinese side. China did in fact have a substantial dedicated border force, but it was abolished for the same reason that the PLA ground army is so small: a crippling shortage of physically fit Chinese men willing to serve in these regions. Cities and towns, by contrast, do not seem afflicted by such severe manpower shortages, leading to the weird phenomenon on Nepal’s main border crossing to Tibet where, according to an acquaintance, a group of freezing Cantonese city policemen were checking travellers and “guarding the border”. (They said they had been “volunteered” for two months.) These days air and naval forces need high skill levels across the board, and that is the PLA’s Achilles’ heel: bright young Chinese are possibly the planet’s most civilian-minded population, least inclined to serve under the command of a military hierarchy. Turkic, Manchurian and Mongol populations preferred to serve as soldiers rather than farmers, while with the Han Chinese it was the other way round. More money would only help to induce them to volunteer if there were a concurrent economic downturn. There is one right now, as it happens, with very high youth unemployment numbers declared to be around 20%."Edward Luttwak
Russians secure military comms are not working after the 4G telecom towers in Ukraine were destroyed. During peacetime exercises, outdated battlefield communications were not a major problem. Russian soldiers have resorted to using commercially-available, unsecured radios. Russia command posts are struggling to keep its communications secure, while Ukrainians have been getting "excellent (signals) intelligence". Ukrainian reports suggest that Russian communications across the static forces are vulnerable to intercepts and pinpointing location. It's not totally clear exactly how, but Ukrainian artillery and MLRs have been blowing up a lot of Russian command posts routinely. Ukrainian forces also appear to be targeting anyone "standing near a bunch of antennas".
Unlike US, the Russians have very poor and limited air-ground equipments for Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) to bust Ukrainian ATGM ambushes, since it require expensive electronics. Meanwhile, Ukraine's military command & control, communications and weapon guidance systems are largely intact. Space Exploration Technologies Corp's (SpaceX) Starlink, a constellation of US satellites for high-speed internet, was able to resist Russian jamming of their satellite network by software update. SpaceX pointed out that it could put additional Starlink satellites into orbit faster and more cheaply than anyone else could destroy them. Ukrainian forces are contesting them from the front, flanks and in between. Ukraine has focused on ambushing Russian supply chains and avoided big, open, battles and conflicts. Ukrainians have been heavily-armed with anti-armour weapons, loitering drones, superior American ISR and are operating with much shorter interior lines with more coordination. Russia has employed drones and electronic warfare to find, fix, and attack important Ukrainian artillery systems, particularly HIMARS and counter-battery radars.
China's military budget now is an estimated $250 billion to $300 billion a year on its armed forces. China spends the highest amount of money on data-driven war-gamed realistic precision-strike combat training, since many PLA officers are known to be unable to deal with unexpected situations. The PLA has had difficulty addressing the shortage of officers who can make decisions by themselves (when they are cut-off from their chain of command) and have a deep knowledge of joint combat operations. China's aims at developing an in-depth precision strike munitions system backed by integrated persistent surveillance and reconnaissance, and C2 capabilities to operate in Taiwan and Tibet. China saw the Sino-Vietnamese border conflict of 1979 to 1990 as a way to evolve the PLA by testing new doctrines and equipment on its border. China's war objective is specifically to preserve their power sources, by fighting better armed enemies in small conflicts.
"The PLA ground forces now stand at some 975,000, a very small number for a country that has 13,743 miles of borders with 14 countries — including extreme high-mountain borders where internal combustion engines lose power, jungle-covered borders where remote observation is spoiled by foliage, Russian-river borders with endemic smuggling, and the border with India’s Ladakh where an accumulation of unresolved Chinese intrusions have forced each side to deploy substantial ground forces, with at least 80,000 on the Chinese side. China did in fact have a substantial dedicated border force, but it was abolished for the same reason that the PLA ground army is so small: a crippling shortage of physically fit Chinese men willing to serve in these regions. Cities and towns, by contrast, do not seem afflicted by such severe manpower shortages, leading to the weird phenomenon on Nepal’s main border crossing to Tibet where, according to an acquaintance, a group of freezing Cantonese city policemen were checking travellers and “guarding the border”. (They said they had been “volunteered” for two months.) These days air and naval forces need high skill levels across the board, and that is the PLA’s Achilles’ heel: bright young Chinese are possibly the planet’s most civilian-minded population, least inclined to serve under the command of a military hierarchy. Turkic, Manchurian and Mongol populations preferred to serve as soldiers rather than farmers, while with the Han Chinese it was the other way round. More money would only help to induce them to volunteer if there were a concurrent economic downturn. There is one right now, as it happens, with very high youth unemployment numbers declared to be around 20%."Edward Luttwak
In a short war, China will have a capability edge over India as they have integrated their ground-based & space-based multi-Sensor network grid for various target navigation (and C2). The Pentagon report on China confirmed Indian intelligence reports that PLA had laid optical fibre cables along the contested, 1597 km Ladakh LAC for faster war deployment and decision-making. China envisions further improving joint operations and towards application of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. It can shrink the time radius of OODA loops: observe, orient, decide, and act. AI-enabled machines can gather intelligence, identifying intent, and monitoring operations. It can aid target recognition and be expected to perform tasks and change tactics at speeds that human operators cannot. PLA’s theory of victory is based on using precision strikes by PLA rocket force, to permanently disrupt, misdirect or destroy India Air force and Army’s critical operational architecture essential nodes and sensors (C3, space and firepower navigation capabilities), and asymmetric information dominance to be able to manipulate the perceptions of India's top decision-makers which will affect decisions and critical actions in the early stages of conflict. Indian leadership may not be able to handle cognitive overload and confusing narratives, which will adversely affect at strategic level. Military dictatorships are immune to this, but democracies are highly susceptible to this type of warfare. At this level, the troops may win the battle, but the war is lost.
PLA believes cyber deterrence and reconnaissance should make up a single integrated effort, to achieving information (AI) superiority. In Chinese military, this is as important as space and nuclear deterrence. China is focusing on attrition warfare, not using troops, but using AI-based, all-domain 全域作战, mobile, warfare tech, to disaggregate adversary's ISR capabilities and affect its adversary's ability to make decisions & take critical actions in the early stages of conflict. All domains can be contested for control of resources or degrade the position of the adversary. PLA-SSF's Network Systems Department (NSD) is responsible for signals intelligence and information warfare, with the critical mission of operationalizing PLA's integrated network, cyber, EW operations, and psychological warfare. NSD also helms the PLA-SSF's corps leader training facility, called Information Engineering University. Technical Reconnaissance & Electronic countermeasures focused, General Staff Department (GSD) Third Department (also called GSD's 3PLA) constitutes the backbone of the NSD. The GSD's 4PLA deals with Information warfare. PLA's approach to information warfare suffers from centralized decision-making and an overconfidence in their own data.
PLA believes cyber deterrence and reconnaissance should make up a single integrated effort, to achieving information (AI) superiority. In Chinese military, this is as important as space and nuclear deterrence. China is focusing on attrition warfare, not using troops, but using AI-based, all-domain 全域作战, mobile, warfare tech, to disaggregate adversary's ISR capabilities and affect its adversary's ability to make decisions & take critical actions in the early stages of conflict. All domains can be contested for control of resources or degrade the position of the adversary. PLA-SSF's Network Systems Department (NSD) is responsible for signals intelligence and information warfare, with the critical mission of operationalizing PLA's integrated network, cyber, EW operations, and psychological warfare. NSD also helms the PLA-SSF's corps leader training facility, called Information Engineering University. Technical Reconnaissance & Electronic countermeasures focused, General Staff Department (GSD) Third Department (also called GSD's 3PLA) constitutes the backbone of the NSD. The GSD's 4PLA deals with Information warfare. PLA's approach to information warfare suffers from centralized decision-making and an overconfidence in their own data.
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All domains can be contested for control of resources or degrade the position of the adversary. Space Exploration Technologies Corp's (SpaceX) Starlink, a constellation of US satellites for high-speed internet, was able to resist Russian jamming of their satellite network by software update. US realized that EW and organic ISR are "essential on the modern battlefield." They are looking at loitering munitions, and tools that allow each squad to manage their electronic signature.
Clausewitz, a Prussian philosopher, said that military leaders must come to grips with how War is fought is changing (the character of war) within the context of the enduring nature of war (the human element: a political clash of opposing wills). Failure to distinguish between war's nature and character have significant and negative impacts on both the preparation and the conduct of war.
The Great Powers marched confidently into battle in 1914 prepared for previous wars, resulting in horrific casualties. The cognitive evolution to Competition with China must proceed through three steps: (1) acknowledging the limitations of the historical conceptualization of operational art and re-define operational art for today's strategic environment; (2) embracing the different warfare perspectives, specifically how China understand warfare; and (3) the military application, in China's "instrument of national power (DIME)", in US-China competition. In 1999, two PLA colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui wrote that, the "boundaries lying between the two worlds of war and non-war, of military and non-military, will be totally destroyed" so that even the "rules of war may need to be rewritten." PLA have also distinguished that the roles of military diplomacy differ in times of peace and war. The Strategic guidelines direct the PLA to win in “Informatized Local Wars,” when the dominant mode of warfare is confrontation between “information-based systems-of-systems”. PLA's operational system-of-systems is composed of 5 sub-systems:
the HQ Command system,
the actionable, integrated reconnaissance & intelligence system,
the target navigation & precision strike system,
the information confrontation system, and
the logistic support system.
China's bases near Indian northern border, possess sustain robust battle-space information awareness capabilities that are often dismissed by Indian Army and AirForce who believe the bases will be easily neutralized in a conflict. Indian Army's firepower and maneuver are certainly important, but equally important is the ability to preserve information for one's own weapon systems while simultaneously starving battlespace information to one's adversary critical operational systems.
China's integrated communications network capabilities include redundant ISR & EW drones, fiber-optic cable, multi-band satellite communications, high-frequency broadband arrays, tropospheric-scatter communications, frequency-diverse radar systems, electronic intelligence systems, and half a dozen microwave over-the-horizon radars, relocatable ESM and cell-phone communications towers. The suggestion that the Chinese outposts are vulnerable because of a lack of survivable, redundant systems misses the point. The Chinese bases collectively present a big "quality is quantity" threat. Chinese bases primarily act as "information hard-points," harbouring and enabling significant communications and reconnaissance capabilities, as well as counters to adversary information control. China's information warfare and military diplomacy are mutually reinforcing and symbiotic activities.
Russian and Chinese push waves of infantry into selected locations on the front lines, concentrating their armour and artillery forces to saturate the enemy's defences. How to change the equation of three-attacker-to-defender force ratio, when you don't have any non-organic indirect fire support? The solution has always been clear: Provide each squad (that has real-time ISR info and EW to locate & jam enemy tactical radio communications while protecting theirs by creating noise fog) with their own lethal weapons systems like "swarm" of loitering guided munitions to destroy in priority order: enemy light armoured vehicles, crew-served weapons, command and control locations, and then target groups of three or more combatants in trench line. US realized that EW and organic ISR are "essential on the modern battlefield." They are looking at loitering munitions, and tools that allow each squad to manage their electronic signature.
Pattern-recognition capabilities and data analytics can help navigation and target recognition, as is expected on-board US military’s Optionally-Manned platforms, as well as maintenance predictions and improved logistics. But generating the curriculum takes resources: time, data and manpower. There's been a recognition that logistics are going to be constantly contested. US Army is beginning to grow the air and missile defense force. The Army also wants to grow additional Indirect Fire Protection Capability units as well. "[tactical operations center setup] need to be able to move in minutes [not hours]. We need to be able to command and control on the move [with the efforts to reduce the ability to detect the command post]."
Attrition warfare emerges when neither side can achieve a clear asymmetric advantage. Ukraine is fighting the world’s first aerial war of attrition, based on missiles and drones, a contest between air superiority and air denial. Drones are used to find enemy threats, like mines and enemy movements.
The Russians have deployed a large number of drones and other forces to carry out 3D reconnaissance, locate the Ukrainian army's HIMARS, understand their movements, and launch fighter-bombers to execute targeted strikes. Russian cyberattacks on satellite communications can cut Ukrainian troops off from commanders; attacks that jam GPS systems blunt the effectiveness of smart artillery; and electromagnetic assaults destroy up to 5,000 small drones a month. It's claimed that Ukraine consumed around 5,000 to 10,000 drones a month.
Unfortunately, Ukraine’s endurance in the air war could run out first, particularly if Ukraine is not more selective in its air defence. For Russia’s air superiority strategy to succeed, it must attrit Ukraine’s surface-to-air missiles at a rate faster than the US and other countries can resupply them. By targeting Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, the Russians confront Ukraine with an impossible choice: attempt to save its people from a cold and dark winter, but severely deplete its surface-to-air missile stocks; or preserve strength by avoiding unfavourable engagements, but ask its people to pay a high price.
2024: The US Army is making significant investments in the force structure supporting integrated air and missile defense at the corps and division levels. New additions include:
-Four additional (Indirect Fire Protection Capability) IFPC battalions, providing a short to medium-range capability to defend against unmanned aerial systems, cruise missiles, rockets, artillery and mortars;
-Nine Counter small-UAS (C sUAS) batteries nested within (Indirect Fire Protection Capability) IFPC and division air defense battalions;
-Four additional Maneuver Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) Battalions, which counter low-altitude aerial threats, including UAS, rotary wing aircraft, and fixed wingaircraft.
The difference between China and India is that PLA has high-altitudes firing ranges, training grounds, SAM sites, underground logistics warehouses, heliports and garrison barracks. Live-fire tests supported with electronic combat data have been carried out at high altitudes for most new weapons. India still lacks enough high-altitude firing ranges and training facility, and underground logistics warehouses for Indian Army's longer-range systems and heavy mechanised units. Unless you have ranges for longer-range systems and fire them and test them, you will not know. If we don't test our rockets at high altitude, we are in trouble. Although few facilities are available, but you may have to wait for one year to test fire as there is always months long queue. There are not enough test facilities in Northern and Eastern areas in the mountains. China is focused on "three attacks" to dominate the airspace, which means countering stealthy aircrafts, cruise missiles, and armed helicopters. These all means stronger air-defence, but it can be neutralised by Indian AirForce. PLA's YJ-62, YJ-12B and HQ-12 systems are obsolete and HQ-9B system is vapourware. Hence, China has bought Russian S-400 air-defence system. These improvements, along with anti-tank capabilities, greatly enhance area coverage and counter-battery support to subordinate divisions. China's domestic military-industrial complex remains of questionable quality. However, China unlike the Russians keep their latest equipment in the rear as reserves.
China's Rocket Force is designed to attack forward airfields and US warships. China has 2,650 battlefield rocket systems and 3,800 self-propelled artillery, while India has 266 battlefield rocket systems and 235 self-propelled artillery. In eastern Ladakh, PLA has deployed approximately 6 brigade-size Tri-Combined Arms Battalion called Group Army (mix of artillery battalion, medium-light armour and mechanised infantry sub-units at unit level), that offers more flexibility and eliminates the necessity for the tank commander to reinforce each tank regiment with motorized regiment's assets. There are 10 motorized vehicles and 9 mobile 81 mm mortars or 120 mm caliber gun vehicles, in every PLA's tri-combined arms battalion. 155 mm PCL-181 (& 122 mm PCL-161) & 300 mm PHL-03 caliber self-propelled artillery or direct-fire and 370 mm MLRS to fire deep into the enemy’s rear, have increased the PLA commanders' available firepower. The division commander then has greater flexibility in the use of his artillery resources to influence the battle. China's advantage also lies in the rear, in the broader valleys on the Tibetan plateau, with heavy-armour mechanised Infantry battalions, once the battle moves into the plains of Ladakh. China produces Ukrainian 1200hp air-cooled engine for Type-96 tank (also called Type-88) but lacks additives to quick-start the engine in cold temperature. There are 28 medium-light armoured tanks in two offensive heavy tri-combined arms battalion that transformed the of PLA infantry formations from motorised to mechanised. Engine's Horse-Power loses as much as 25% power due to lighter atmosphere in high-altitude. Mobility and shoot-and-scoot tactics has become synonymous with survival.
China's Rocket Force is designed to attack forward airfields and US warships. China has 2,650 battlefield rocket systems and 3,800 self-propelled artillery, while India has 266 battlefield rocket systems and 235 self-propelled artillery. In eastern Ladakh, PLA has deployed approximately 6 brigade-size Tri-Combined Arms Battalion called Group Army (mix of artillery battalion, medium-light armour and mechanised infantry sub-units at unit level), that offers more flexibility and eliminates the necessity for the tank commander to reinforce each tank regiment with motorized regiment's assets. There are 10 motorized vehicles and 9 mobile 81 mm mortars or 120 mm caliber gun vehicles, in every PLA's tri-combined arms battalion. 155 mm PCL-181 (& 122 mm PCL-161) & 300 mm PHL-03 caliber self-propelled artillery or direct-fire and 370 mm MLRS to fire deep into the enemy’s rear, have increased the PLA commanders' available firepower. The division commander then has greater flexibility in the use of his artillery resources to influence the battle. China's advantage also lies in the rear, in the broader valleys on the Tibetan plateau, with heavy-armour mechanised Infantry battalions, once the battle moves into the plains of Ladakh. China produces Ukrainian 1200hp air-cooled engine for Type-96 tank (also called Type-88) but lacks additives to quick-start the engine in cold temperature. There are 28 medium-light armoured tanks in two offensive heavy tri-combined arms battalion that transformed the of PLA infantry formations from motorised to mechanised. Engine's Horse-Power loses as much as 25% power due to lighter atmosphere in high-altitude. Mobility and shoot-and-scoot tactics has become synonymous with survival.
High-intensity warfare often dictates that the industrial capabilities of warring states must be re-purposed to support the war effort in order to offset surging demand for replacement equipment or precision-guided munitions, once imported critical parts are expended. Developing nations are having to increase defence budgets to restore pre-war stockpiles, while even the US defence industry is having to re-assess its supply chain capacity to sustain wartime levels of production across an expansive range of weapons systems and platforms.
The issue with the US defence industry is that the majority of R&D and manufacturing capabilities had been tailored to supply equipment for low-intensity warfare and counterinsurgency operations. European defence firms (France, Germany and the UK) have the expertise, but they face great difficulty in producing equipment at scale, with the slower tempo of European defence procurement having severely undermined the industry’s ability to ramp-up production to meet wartime needs.
The principal war-waging deficiencies of India are not about the availability or non-availability of arms and ammunition, but about institutional deficiencies like the standalone war-waging postures of the three armed services. "It is hard enough to be joint, the difficulties in interoperability will be many times greater," said Indian Army Chief Gen MM Naravane in 2021. India is set to get its Integrated Battle Groups (IBG) with 5,000 soldiers (larger than a brigade which have 3,000 soldiers, however they will be smaller than divisions, which consist of around 12,000 soldiers). The 17 single-service commands that currently exist would be reorganization into just four theater commands, each with elements from all three services: The first command will be the “western theatre command” looking at Pakistan; while the second command will be "northern theatre command" focused on the entire border in China. A third, navy-heavy theatre, called the “maritime command” will be responsible for the security of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and Andaman & Nicobar Command (ANC) island air-defense command, would project power into the eastern Indian Ocean. A differing mix of elements such as infantry, tanks, artillery, air defence, signals and engineers; will be permanently deployed together. The IGBs meant for deployment on the border with Pakistan will have tanks and heavy artillery because these formations will focus on the flat terrain in Punjab and Rajasthan.
The IGBs to be deployed on the border with China will instead focus on infantry and light artillery due to the mountainous nature of the terrain. The terrain is wet, and the soil there is soft as there is heavy rain (clouds are forced to get concentrated due to the Himalayas); and hence vehicles cannot move easily and road-building is a near impossibility. Hence, air transportation by both fixed-wing transport aircrafts and helicopters becomes critical for mobility. Indian also needs 25 more transport helicopters. All Indian military exercises involving heliborne (vertical envelopment) operations are only conducted by the Indian Army. To give promote joint-ness and synergy amongst the 3 armed services, India needs to start training officers together from junior command courses onwards, and to combine the 3 higher command courses into a single curriculum, under an integrated Joint Training Command under which all training establishments function. Combined arms is the employment of two or more arms together in complementary ways. This allows each arm to exploit the strengths and protect the weaknesses of the others with which it is combined.
Since China has both bigger budget and military industrial base, the three Indian armed services must agree to adopt integrated operations plan for contingency scenarios. Since 2017, China has been sending 16 to 19 PLAN warships (along with axillary ships), for 3 months per year, into the Indian Ocean. Indian Navy has the capacity of monitoring around 17 to 18 warships in the Indian Ocean. By 2025 and 2035, China is looking to have 32 and 52 PLAN warships force respectively, in the Indian Ocean, that can restrict the Indian Navy at will. Air power is the primary tool to achieve tactical gains in modern warfare. The importance of Indian Army is greater, only when one needs boots on the ground. At the same time, IAF must transfer its light helicopters to Indian Army Aviation Corps (AAC) and focus on creating combat search-n-rescue (CSAR) capabilities. In the past, the Indian Army took the lead in any land battle with air-support, however, unlike China (which lacks modern fighter jet engines to carry out high-altitude, offensive ops), India's Air power arm is the most ready to play a decisive role in any offensive & defensive 'integrated' future conflict with China. The best defense is to destroy the launch vehicle before it can fire. Similar tactics can be used against artillery and missiles units. The forgotten element is detailed integration, which is difficult to execute in any scenario by any country.
Air support must be carefully planned and briefed prior to the mission to prevent tragedy. The Air Force advocates for centralized control through a single air component, whereas the Army attaches its aviation units to the brigade or division being supported. These force must have “bake in” integration and train “like they fight, fight like they train.” This is the culmination of simultaneous de-confliction, coordination, and synchronization of airborne resources (army attack helicopters) to support sudden ground manoeuvre to seek gaps (forcing the enemy with a dilemma to move into a disadvantageous position). Striking at unexpected time and place, while holding the flank and denying area. However, all this is something that is easier said than done. The Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) of the Indian Army can spend very little time and resources on any synchronised joint services multidimensional war-fighting battle doctrines and tactics. Consequently, formations like Integrated Battle Groups (IBG) can be raised only on paper. For the CDS to focus exclusively on doctrines and theaterisation, CDS will need Vice-CDS and a range of Deputy CDSs, with one Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff responsible for capital procurement projects.
The IGBs to be deployed on the border with China will instead focus on infantry and light artillery due to the mountainous nature of the terrain. The terrain is wet, and the soil there is soft as there is heavy rain (clouds are forced to get concentrated due to the Himalayas); and hence vehicles cannot move easily and road-building is a near impossibility. Hence, air transportation by both fixed-wing transport aircrafts and helicopters becomes critical for mobility. Indian also needs 25 more transport helicopters. All Indian military exercises involving heliborne (vertical envelopment) operations are only conducted by the Indian Army. To give promote joint-ness and synergy amongst the 3 armed services, India needs to start training officers together from junior command courses onwards, and to combine the 3 higher command courses into a single curriculum, under an integrated Joint Training Command under which all training establishments function. Combined arms is the employment of two or more arms together in complementary ways. This allows each arm to exploit the strengths and protect the weaknesses of the others with which it is combined.
Since China has both bigger budget and military industrial base, the three Indian armed services must agree to adopt integrated operations plan for contingency scenarios. Since 2017, China has been sending 16 to 19 PLAN warships (along with axillary ships), for 3 months per year, into the Indian Ocean. Indian Navy has the capacity of monitoring around 17 to 18 warships in the Indian Ocean. By 2025 and 2035, China is looking to have 32 and 52 PLAN warships force respectively, in the Indian Ocean, that can restrict the Indian Navy at will. Air power is the primary tool to achieve tactical gains in modern warfare. The importance of Indian Army is greater, only when one needs boots on the ground. At the same time, IAF must transfer its light helicopters to Indian Army Aviation Corps (AAC) and focus on creating combat search-n-rescue (CSAR) capabilities. In the past, the Indian Army took the lead in any land battle with air-support, however, unlike China (which lacks modern fighter jet engines to carry out high-altitude, offensive ops), India's Air power arm is the most ready to play a decisive role in any offensive & defensive 'integrated' future conflict with China. The best defense is to destroy the launch vehicle before it can fire. Similar tactics can be used against artillery and missiles units. The forgotten element is detailed integration, which is difficult to execute in any scenario by any country.
Air support must be carefully planned and briefed prior to the mission to prevent tragedy. The Air Force advocates for centralized control through a single air component, whereas the Army attaches its aviation units to the brigade or division being supported. These force must have “bake in” integration and train “like they fight, fight like they train.” This is the culmination of simultaneous de-confliction, coordination, and synchronization of airborne resources (army attack helicopters) to support sudden ground manoeuvre to seek gaps (forcing the enemy with a dilemma to move into a disadvantageous position). Striking at unexpected time and place, while holding the flank and denying area. However, all this is something that is easier said than done. The Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) of the Indian Army can spend very little time and resources on any synchronised joint services multidimensional war-fighting battle doctrines and tactics. Consequently, formations like Integrated Battle Groups (IBG) can be raised only on paper. For the CDS to focus exclusively on doctrines and theaterisation, CDS will need Vice-CDS and a range of Deputy CDSs, with one Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff responsible for capital procurement projects.
Indian industry cannot be engaged for developing innovative, cost-effective solutions since there is no clarity from the Indian DoD given the war history of Indian Army battle plans remain classified. Indian Army has no faith in DRDO's Combat Vehicles Research & Development Establishment (CVRDE) ability to develop combat vehicles for future battlefields, which is highly demoralising for CVRDE and the Indian industries as a whole. Unlike India, Russia does not suffer from the intellectual brain-drain is because, even with a much smaller GDP, Russia is decades ahead of India in education and R&D on weapons. Thus, Indian Army is dependent on imports. India has a large inventory of Russian heavy armour. T-72m1-cia is India's light tank that has replaced the ageing T-55 tanks. India has managed to produce T-72's engine (780hp). India has created additives to quick-start the engine in cold temperature. However, India still imports T-90 engine, gearbox, power-packs, gun and stabilisation from Russia. Since Indian Army lacks 155 mm/52 calibre artillery Gun mounted on high mobility truck, so the Army also uses these T-90 tanks to work as artillery mounted on truck.
The thermal sights on Indian tanks are French, but assembled by India's BEL. India only license-makes invar ATGM and Indian tanks will be teeth-less, if it runs out of imported 125 mm APFSDS. India's OFB have not been able to make APFSDS. Russian armoured vehicles are among the best, but they have had trouble surviving against the threat of Turkish precision strike with long-range reconnaissance drone in Syria. Same with UAE-supplied Chinese precision strike with drones in Libya. However, China also relies entirely on satellite data-links, that could be countered by Electronic warfare (jamming), which means high failure will result in an overall failure. It hardly matters how precise your weapons are if you lack the ISR reach to find targets. China is trying hard to quickly catch up with the US and UK as it plans to develop 3 low-Earth orbit constellations. This means defensive and offensive jammers and radars systems are increasingly important elements. Counter-reconnaissance capabilities will be key on the battlefield to frustrate Chinese scouting. Deception will present false targets to the adversary through a combination of electronic spoofing and physical decoys.
The higher you go, the more you see. While Aerostats are not able to sustain deployments in high-altitude areas due to strong winds. High altitude UAVs equipped with side-looking SAR sensors provides more actionable intelligence rather than overhead satellites. The precision afforded by high-altitude UAV comes with top-end technology, can be expensive. However, Chinese drones are great for scanning huge swathes of area to look for potential targets of interest during 10 hours of flight time. They are part of ISR and gathering of reconnaissance. But once the conflict starts, these drones can become susceptible. You can’t win a war by sending arms drones into well-defended enemy air-space. Therefore, China makes the most of ISR drones when there is no war, no peace at its border. Presently, there is a blurring of lines between war and peace as hybrid conflicts take centre-stage. Chinese AirForce's key strength is in round the clock SIGINT for protection of its Army from IAF fighters carrying stand-off air-launched precision-guided munitions. Air-Land Battle requires an interconnected battle network with a sensor grid to "look deep and shoot deep." General-purpose and attack helicopter units and UAVs, provide combined armed units and engineers regiment with a highly-manoeuvrable and versatile platform for reconnaissance, command and control, and fire support.
Starting in 2011, the PLAAF began deploying KJ-500 AEW and BZK-05 UAVs (also fighters for protection) to various airfields, including Lhasa Gonggar and Shigatse Peace Airport, which is about 250 miles west of Lhasa, for a short-term rotational basis, usually from July to September, but some might be there all year. Both airfields are dual-use, so civil aircraft fly in all year long and the runway is built for civil aircraft. The PLAAF also has airfields in Hotan (Hetian) and Kashgar in western Xinjiang, where the PLAAF deployed two J-20s in August 2020. J-20 stealth fighters are tasked to be the network backbone for ground strike force, since Chinese fighters cannot carry full weapons load around the Himalayas due to poor aero jet engines and their side having thinner air. Since 2013 China's AirForce main roles have been ISR for "maintaining battlefield transparency" (protection of its Army from IAF fighters carrying stand-off air-launched precision-guided munitions) and AWACS, but they have not been able to use H-6K nuke bomber, strategic air transport and air-lift to fly at such high-altitudes over the Himalayas, again due to their poor aero jet engines. They don't have the kind of combat aircraft or attack helicopters capable of delivering stand-off precision-guided munition.
A basic operational idea of Air-Land Battle requires an interconnected battle network (with a sensor grid to find and shoot targets deep inside enemy territory). The essence of Air power is effective targeting which depends on accurate, actionable, and real-time intelligence. Besides acquiring actionable real-time intelligence and facilitating targeting, you also need to provide the superior kinetic weapons means for the destruction of targets. AWACS data is real-time, while the satellite photos are hours or days old. Indian AirForce's weaknesses lie in having less airborne assets for maintaining persistent ground battlefield surveillance and poor targeting data-link network on Mirage-2000 and Su-30MKI fighter jets. For battlefield surveillance 180 km inside neighbours’ territories, a side-looking radar antenna is preferred as it would help make the battlespace on the ground more transparent with strategic alert capability. Two of the most important elements in combat ops are to get: real-time Intel and SatCom, to the correct HQ Command. AWACS data is real-time, while the satellite photos are hours or days old. India's battle units must be led by large-scale fire support (technology & tactics) that is available within minutes (air-force fighters targeting integrated with Army's field artillery supporting fire) and real-time surveillance so that strike mechanised infantry and armoured units are able to survive fighting the enemy who has modern complex air-defence.
What separates a C4ISR network, from a C4ISRT network is targeting (the 'T') —the ability to use sensor data from a variety of systems to accurately direct long-range fires. Forces that can operate inside the range of China's long-range precision fires are more relevant than forces which rapidly positions outside. Attack helicopters, when employed in numbers, produce the desired effect in blunting the land offensives by armoured and mechanised divisions. However, in high altitude, even AH64E can carry only 40% of weapons. In the hi-tech mechanisation high-altitude battlefield, the winning side will be the fighting arms that possess better network command & control, real-time ISR of the battlefield combined with longer-range Non-line of sight (NLOS) rocket-artillery strike capability and a very high degree of mobility in high-altitude. In development, for destroying enemy targets in high-altitude (that are shorter distanced but out of reach for MBRL) is the 200-km range Pranash (meaning, 'to strike') tactical NLOS missile that's like rocket-artillery. If you deny PLA the G-219, then they are confined to firing from Xinjiang. Indian Army's Air-Defence grid also needs more support for C2 and looking deep and shooting deep enemy targets. In development is QR-Sam Air-Defence system.
Modern warfare has increased mechanisation which itself has seen rapid developments over the last few decades. Israel learned that drones (and Army aero scout helicopters) as spotters before any advance, firepower of infantry and artillery combined arms, were the keys to the survival of armoured vehicles. Aero scout aircrews operated in a "head out of the hatch" manner with maximum peripheral vision – something UAS operators have not replicated with their "soda-straw" view of the battlefield. Linked to ground-control stations, Shadow, Gray Eagle and other similar UAS operators lack the ability to coordinate on the spot or achieve the feel for the situation as aero scout aircrews could. It's claimed that Ukraine consumed around 5,000 to 10,000 drones a month. In Afghanistan, the US learned the hard way that road-side mines were deadly. The optics remain the Achilles heel of all main battle tanks. Tanks are also getting too heavy, due to added protections, to move quickly to cut across enemy lines, due to all the addition protection for survivability. The heavier the cannon, the heavier its chassis, and the more powerful engine is needed. Engine's Horse-Power loses as much as 25% power due to lighter atmosphere in high-altitude, and air-cooled engines have a tendency to seize when crossing water. Only long-range artillery and aviation, which need time to deploy, will do any good against constantly moving tanks.
The thermal sights on Indian tanks are French, but assembled by India's BEL. India only license-makes invar ATGM and Indian tanks will be teeth-less, if it runs out of imported 125 mm APFSDS. India's OFB have not been able to make APFSDS. Russian armoured vehicles are among the best, but they have had trouble surviving against the threat of Turkish precision strike with long-range reconnaissance drone in Syria. Same with UAE-supplied Chinese precision strike with drones in Libya. However, China also relies entirely on satellite data-links, that could be countered by Electronic warfare (jamming), which means high failure will result in an overall failure. It hardly matters how precise your weapons are if you lack the ISR reach to find targets. China is trying hard to quickly catch up with the US and UK as it plans to develop 3 low-Earth orbit constellations. This means defensive and offensive jammers and radars systems are increasingly important elements. Counter-reconnaissance capabilities will be key on the battlefield to frustrate Chinese scouting. Deception will present false targets to the adversary through a combination of electronic spoofing and physical decoys.
The higher you go, the more you see. While Aerostats are not able to sustain deployments in high-altitude areas due to strong winds. High altitude UAVs equipped with side-looking SAR sensors provides more actionable intelligence rather than overhead satellites. The precision afforded by high-altitude UAV comes with top-end technology, can be expensive. However, Chinese drones are great for scanning huge swathes of area to look for potential targets of interest during 10 hours of flight time. They are part of ISR and gathering of reconnaissance. But once the conflict starts, these drones can become susceptible. You can’t win a war by sending arms drones into well-defended enemy air-space. Therefore, China makes the most of ISR drones when there is no war, no peace at its border. Presently, there is a blurring of lines between war and peace as hybrid conflicts take centre-stage. Chinese AirForce's key strength is in round the clock SIGINT for protection of its Army from IAF fighters carrying stand-off air-launched precision-guided munitions. Air-Land Battle requires an interconnected battle network with a sensor grid to "look deep and shoot deep." General-purpose and attack helicopter units and UAVs, provide combined armed units and engineers regiment with a highly-manoeuvrable and versatile platform for reconnaissance, command and control, and fire support.
Starting in 2011, the PLAAF began deploying KJ-500 AEW and BZK-05 UAVs (also fighters for protection) to various airfields, including Lhasa Gonggar and Shigatse Peace Airport, which is about 250 miles west of Lhasa, for a short-term rotational basis, usually from July to September, but some might be there all year. Both airfields are dual-use, so civil aircraft fly in all year long and the runway is built for civil aircraft. The PLAAF also has airfields in Hotan (Hetian) and Kashgar in western Xinjiang, where the PLAAF deployed two J-20s in August 2020. J-20 stealth fighters are tasked to be the network backbone for ground strike force, since Chinese fighters cannot carry full weapons load around the Himalayas due to poor aero jet engines and their side having thinner air. Since 2013 China's AirForce main roles have been ISR for "maintaining battlefield transparency" (protection of its Army from IAF fighters carrying stand-off air-launched precision-guided munitions) and AWACS, but they have not been able to use H-6K nuke bomber, strategic air transport and air-lift to fly at such high-altitudes over the Himalayas, again due to their poor aero jet engines. They don't have the kind of combat aircraft or attack helicopters capable of delivering stand-off precision-guided munition.
A basic operational idea of Air-Land Battle requires an interconnected battle network (with a sensor grid to find and shoot targets deep inside enemy territory). The essence of Air power is effective targeting which depends on accurate, actionable, and real-time intelligence. Besides acquiring actionable real-time intelligence and facilitating targeting, you also need to provide the superior kinetic weapons means for the destruction of targets. AWACS data is real-time, while the satellite photos are hours or days old. Indian AirForce's weaknesses lie in having less airborne assets for maintaining persistent ground battlefield surveillance and poor targeting data-link network on Mirage-2000 and Su-30MKI fighter jets. For battlefield surveillance 180 km inside neighbours’ territories, a side-looking radar antenna is preferred as it would help make the battlespace on the ground more transparent with strategic alert capability. Two of the most important elements in combat ops are to get: real-time Intel and SatCom, to the correct HQ Command. AWACS data is real-time, while the satellite photos are hours or days old. India's battle units must be led by large-scale fire support (technology & tactics) that is available within minutes (air-force fighters targeting integrated with Army's field artillery supporting fire) and real-time surveillance so that strike mechanised infantry and armoured units are able to survive fighting the enemy who has modern complex air-defence.
What separates a C4ISR network, from a C4ISRT network is targeting (the 'T') —the ability to use sensor data from a variety of systems to accurately direct long-range fires. Forces that can operate inside the range of China's long-range precision fires are more relevant than forces which rapidly positions outside. Attack helicopters, when employed in numbers, produce the desired effect in blunting the land offensives by armoured and mechanised divisions. However, in high altitude, even AH64E can carry only 40% of weapons. In the hi-tech mechanisation high-altitude battlefield, the winning side will be the fighting arms that possess better network command & control, real-time ISR of the battlefield combined with longer-range Non-line of sight (NLOS) rocket-artillery strike capability and a very high degree of mobility in high-altitude. In development, for destroying enemy targets in high-altitude (that are shorter distanced but out of reach for MBRL) is the 200-km range Pranash (meaning, 'to strike') tactical NLOS missile that's like rocket-artillery. If you deny PLA the G-219, then they are confined to firing from Xinjiang. Indian Army's Air-Defence grid also needs more support for C2 and looking deep and shooting deep enemy targets. In development is QR-Sam Air-Defence system.
Modern warfare has increased mechanisation which itself has seen rapid developments over the last few decades. Israel learned that drones (and Army aero scout helicopters) as spotters before any advance, firepower of infantry and artillery combined arms, were the keys to the survival of armoured vehicles. Aero scout aircrews operated in a "head out of the hatch" manner with maximum peripheral vision – something UAS operators have not replicated with their "soda-straw" view of the battlefield. Linked to ground-control stations, Shadow, Gray Eagle and other similar UAS operators lack the ability to coordinate on the spot or achieve the feel for the situation as aero scout aircrews could. It's claimed that Ukraine consumed around 5,000 to 10,000 drones a month. In Afghanistan, the US learned the hard way that road-side mines were deadly. The optics remain the Achilles heel of all main battle tanks. Tanks are also getting too heavy, due to added protections, to move quickly to cut across enemy lines, due to all the addition protection for survivability. The heavier the cannon, the heavier its chassis, and the more powerful engine is needed. Engine's Horse-Power loses as much as 25% power due to lighter atmosphere in high-altitude, and air-cooled engines have a tendency to seize when crossing water. Only long-range artillery and aviation, which need time to deploy, will do any good against constantly moving tanks.
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The US military evolved over time to meet new and disruptive challenges. The large WW2 battle network was the British home air defense network had a sustainment & regeneration, inter-connected radar grid and C3I grid; that allowed the British to continue fighting and restore combat losses. In contrast, the French War college doctrine became overly fixated with well-balanced static defense and lessons learned from WW-1. There were voices inside the French Army who advocated for a different approach. The system potentially allowed for the creation of incubators, yet no one was in a position to extract their ideas.
Charles de Gaulle, for instance, pushed for the adoption of a professional Army organized into mechanized formations. Marshal Philippe Pétain, on the other hand, wanted a large military composed largely of light infantry designed to fight in a defense-in-depth. Both De Gaulle’s and Pétain’s proposals were ignored, largely since they would have put key industrial locations of France, centered on the Franco-German border, directly into the conflict zone. The French Army was stuck maintaining a “business as usual” approach. If the French High Command introduced too radical a change to the Army’s doctrine, the reserve units responsible for fleshing out standing divisions might arrive with a range of different training levels.-warontherocks
India military's sensor-to-shooter links have to be of a very high order, including communications and procedures, which is not there yet. Victory often rests on not just in the ability to out-detecting the enemy and then out-communicate that information to your relevant forces (to engage the enemy) but also the ability to outpace the enemy's speed of decision in the fog of war. If you can supply lots of precision weapons rapidly, then the next difficult aspect is the act of signal detection and sharing the information on enemy targets (despite enemy jamming). The profession of arms is unforgiving, mistakes are paid for in blood and incompetence can lead to catastrophic defeat. When we fight, we must win. There is no alternative. The key is to understand where you will be critically behind and to take steps to correct that shortfall before they become fatal. India still lacks any robust joint doctrines and tactics. Indian military planners need to have a deeper knowledge on their battle doctrine and tactics on each domain (land, air, sea, space, EW, cyber, information, psychological & political). Smart systems allow for both outwitting enemy defences is more valued than having numerical advantage. Indian Army has to prepare for the fact that it needs to focus more on capable command & control.
A known limitation on Indian Army’s capabilities is shortages of imported spares. India needs to create a Joint Logistics Command. It is a regrettable fact that such last-minute panic purchases have now become standard crisis-response. India’s dependence on imported platform is also the root of the Indian armed forces equipment shortages. India has been one of the world’s top arms importers and alone accounted for about 10% of global arms sales volumes. However, Full ToT technologies will not be given to anyone in the world. Military sales has long been a US diplomatic mainstay, however, US will not give its cutting-edge tech to even its NATO allies, so forget about India. India still sees US as less reliable than Russia, Israel and France, despite US being the one who has world-class defence tech.
One of the problems is also the high cost of US tech. So basically, it is a wild goose chase. India should not forget that when India’s Ballistic Missile Defence Programme conceptual stage, Americans had blocked the sale of Arrow 2 ABM. US Policymakers should understand that the US needs to boost India's military as a counter to China, and that we can’t let India’s relationship with Russia get in the way by outmanoeuvring India. We must also remember President Boris Yeltsin, under American pressure, held back cryogenic engines for ISRO's space programme. Among the methods used by the US included sanctions on the Indian and Russian Space Agencies, besides invoking the MTCR pact.
India's technological dependency has been growing in every sphere of life, and India remains one of the largest net technology importers in all spheres of industry. Even if any end-product is manufactured in India, all the high-end industrial machinery required for mass-production has to be imported. This dependency especially is in the arenas of industrial automation tools, Big Data & Secure Telecommunications technologies, networks & systems for both commercial & military applications. Even if 90% of the missile is fabricated and machined locally, the high-precision machined components (like rubber washers, ball-bearings etc) must be imported, without which the critical hardware becomes inoperable. It is essential that the critical sub-systems and spares of weapons systems are manufactured locally, which is not possible with foreign OEM suppliers who will never give away their intellectual property (crypto-keys). Allies won WW2, also because, they were able to quickly built to resupply their forces.
A known limitation on Indian Army’s capabilities is shortages of imported spares. India needs to create a Joint Logistics Command. It is a regrettable fact that such last-minute panic purchases have now become standard crisis-response. India’s dependence on imported platform is also the root of the Indian armed forces equipment shortages. India has been one of the world’s top arms importers and alone accounted for about 10% of global arms sales volumes. However, Full ToT technologies will not be given to anyone in the world. Military sales has long been a US diplomatic mainstay, however, US will not give its cutting-edge tech to even its NATO allies, so forget about India. India still sees US as less reliable than Russia, Israel and France, despite US being the one who has world-class defence tech.
One of the problems is also the high cost of US tech. So basically, it is a wild goose chase. India should not forget that when India’s Ballistic Missile Defence Programme conceptual stage, Americans had blocked the sale of Arrow 2 ABM. US Policymakers should understand that the US needs to boost India's military as a counter to China, and that we can’t let India’s relationship with Russia get in the way by outmanoeuvring India. We must also remember President Boris Yeltsin, under American pressure, held back cryogenic engines for ISRO's space programme. Among the methods used by the US included sanctions on the Indian and Russian Space Agencies, besides invoking the MTCR pact.
India's technological dependency has been growing in every sphere of life, and India remains one of the largest net technology importers in all spheres of industry. Even if any end-product is manufactured in India, all the high-end industrial machinery required for mass-production has to be imported. This dependency especially is in the arenas of industrial automation tools, Big Data & Secure Telecommunications technologies, networks & systems for both commercial & military applications. Even if 90% of the missile is fabricated and machined locally, the high-precision machined components (like rubber washers, ball-bearings etc) must be imported, without which the critical hardware becomes inoperable. It is essential that the critical sub-systems and spares of weapons systems are manufactured locally, which is not possible with foreign OEM suppliers who will never give away their intellectual property (crypto-keys). Allies won WW2, also because, they were able to quickly built to resupply their forces.
Building organizational structures is vital for doctrinal innovation. The US entered WW-II with the Army’s horse-bound 26th Cavalry Regiment engaging Japanese tanks during the Philippines campaign. By the end of the war, the Army had evolved into a competent and robust mechanized force. When the US entered the war, planners concluded that the U.S. would need over 200 infantry divisions and about 280 air combat groups to ultimately defeat the Axis powers. However, U.S. leadership knew that if they built so many infantry divisions, the manpower they would need to work the arsenal of democracy wouldn’t be there. They therefore made a conscious decision to hold the number of infantry divisions to no more than 90 while keeping the 280 air combat groups. The thinking was that a “heavy fisted air arm” would help make up for the lack of infantry parity with the Axis powers. The “90-division gamble” turned out to be a winner. As a result, throughout the Cold War, the U.S. never tried to match the Soviet Union tank for tank, plane for plane, or soldier for soldier. It instead sought joint maneuver to “offset” the potential adversary's advantages in attrition (tactical operational acts to cause the cumulative destruction of the enemy’s material strength). Two paradigms in military theory are attrition and maneuver, preventing effective cooperation between segments of the enemy force. Manoeuvre positions forces to inflict attrition on the enemy, while attrition disrupts the enemy to enable manoeuvre.
An offset strategy is some means of asymmetrically compensating for a disadvantage, particularly in a military competition. Atomic weapons could confidently take on and defeat a larger armed force. The use of two nuclear weapons in the closing stages of WW2 announced to the world that the US was a nuclear power (in fact, the only nuclear power for a while). In the 1950s, Eisenhower knew that having a “peacetime” standing army of that "90-division" was neither politically nor fiscally sustainable. Eisenhower’s New Look policy (or first offset doctrine or 1OS) relied on the US strategic nuclear triad arsenal for security. During the 1970s, the situation stagnated when the Soviets achieved nuclear parity with the U.S. and then, quickly surpassed the US arsenal numerically and qualitatively. Soviet armored units in Europe significantly outnumbered those of NATO, and the Soviets could no longer be deterred from an invasion of Central Europe. The US and its NATO allies spent decades developing technologies and operational concepts, like Follow-on-Force-Attack (FOFA) within integrated battle, that leveraged Soviet weaknesses in mobilizing forces and projecting power across Europe. Army planners realized that they would only succeed if, once a breach was achieved, they could disrupt the enemy’s rear areas.
Fast-forward twenty years. The operational concept that emerged in the 1970s and the 1980s, was the second offset (Air-Land battle) doctrine, also called the "holding strategy" by Robert O. Work. This really caught the Soviets’ attention, and the Soviets concluded the game results were accurate. They realized a conventional attack was not likely to succeed because NATO would be able to defeat their forces before they reached their planned penetration point. Soviet military theorists called a “military-technical revolution.” The second offset battle network had all the same characteristics of the British home air defense network in WW2, but it focused on the Air-Land battle. The digital microprocessor age had arrived, and the application of this technology to weapons proved to be decisive in the US maintaining a global edge.
It hardly matters how precise new weapons are if the Army lacks the ISR reach to find targets. It was a high-tech period when the U.S. invested heavily to increase battlefield awareness (outfitting long-range sensor-shooter network like stealth & surveillance aircrafts with over the horizon technologies) and long-range strike capability (precision guided munitions, but it could be used only at line-of-sight ranges) deep behind enemy lines against Warsaw Pact first, second and third echelon forces (while reducing friendly-fire). The concept sought to disrupt the ability of the adversary to mobilize forces that would exploit breakthroughs along NATO’s defensive perimeter. There were lots of realistic force-on-force trainings. The key strategic mainstay of US strategy is to deter aggression, and if this fails, then to deny the adversarial objectives by ultimately defeating the enemy, however with China, America is interested in managing risks. Since the 90's, after the Gulf War, China developed its own offset strategy, for some means of asymmetrically through its PLA Rocket Force's missiles to attack U.S. kill-chain battle networks & sensors, compensating for PLA's disadvantage, particularly in a direct military competition.
Now China is also focusing on attrition warfare (tactical operational design that causes the cumulative destruction of the enemy’s material strength), not using troops, but using AI-based, all-domain 全域作战, mobile military technologies, to disaggregate the adversary's ISR capabilities and affect its adversary's ability to make decisions & take critical actions in the early stages of conflict. Strategic cognitive overmatch (military-civil grey-zone multi-domain war) and tactical anti-satellite (space) warfare. In a short war, China has integrated their ground-based & space-based network grid for various target navigation and secure communications. Indian Army's firepower and maneuver are certainly important, but equally important is the ability to preserve information for one's own weapon systems while simultaneously starving battlespace information to one's adversary critical operational systems. PLA believes cyber deterrence and reconnaissance should make up a single integrated effort, to achieving information (AI) superiority. In Chinese military, this is as important as space and nuclear deterrence.
"There is also a concurrent need to further the understanding of air power among practitioners of land and maritime power so that the three can complement — rather than compete — with each other for strategic space. Critics of Indian military doctrine argue that each service principally develops its own concepts without coordination or relation to the other two. Therefore, the army articulates a doctrine that puts the air force in a subordinate role, providing CAS to ground troops and aspires to create a large aviation arm over the next few decades, while the air force’s own doctrine and acquisition pattern emphasises strategic strike and air-to-air combat capability... There is also a concerted attempt being made at appropriate levels to reconcile these turf issues and create a self-sustaining loop comprising the various theoretical and historical interfaces, doctrinal and conceptual organisations and departments that formulate strategy. The day this loop becomes inter-dependent, air power in India would fully mature as a means to achieving state policy and be seen as a vital factor in joint operations."Arjun Subramaniam.
Fast-forward twenty years. The operational concept that emerged in the 1970s and the 1980s, was the second offset (Air-Land battle) doctrine, also called the "holding strategy" by Robert O. Work. This really caught the Soviets’ attention, and the Soviets concluded the game results were accurate. They realized a conventional attack was not likely to succeed because NATO would be able to defeat their forces before they reached their planned penetration point. Soviet military theorists called a “military-technical revolution.” The second offset battle network had all the same characteristics of the British home air defense network in WW2, but it focused on the Air-Land battle. The digital microprocessor age had arrived, and the application of this technology to weapons proved to be decisive in the US maintaining a global edge.
It hardly matters how precise new weapons are if the Army lacks the ISR reach to find targets. It was a high-tech period when the U.S. invested heavily to increase battlefield awareness (outfitting long-range sensor-shooter network like stealth & surveillance aircrafts with over the horizon technologies) and long-range strike capability (precision guided munitions, but it could be used only at line-of-sight ranges) deep behind enemy lines against Warsaw Pact first, second and third echelon forces (while reducing friendly-fire). The concept sought to disrupt the ability of the adversary to mobilize forces that would exploit breakthroughs along NATO’s defensive perimeter. There were lots of realistic force-on-force trainings. The key strategic mainstay of US strategy is to deter aggression, and if this fails, then to deny the adversarial objectives by ultimately defeating the enemy, however with China, America is interested in managing risks. Since the 90's, after the Gulf War, China developed its own offset strategy, for some means of asymmetrically through its PLA Rocket Force's missiles to attack U.S. kill-chain battle networks & sensors, compensating for PLA's disadvantage, particularly in a direct military competition.
Now China is also focusing on attrition warfare (tactical operational design that causes the cumulative destruction of the enemy’s material strength), not using troops, but using AI-based, all-domain 全域作战, mobile military technologies, to disaggregate the adversary's ISR capabilities and affect its adversary's ability to make decisions & take critical actions in the early stages of conflict. Strategic cognitive overmatch (military-civil grey-zone multi-domain war) and tactical anti-satellite (space) warfare. In a short war, China has integrated their ground-based & space-based network grid for various target navigation and secure communications. Indian Army's firepower and maneuver are certainly important, but equally important is the ability to preserve information for one's own weapon systems while simultaneously starving battlespace information to one's adversary critical operational systems. PLA believes cyber deterrence and reconnaissance should make up a single integrated effort, to achieving information (AI) superiority. In Chinese military, this is as important as space and nuclear deterrence.
"There is also a concurrent need to further the understanding of air power among practitioners of land and maritime power so that the three can complement — rather than compete — with each other for strategic space. Critics of Indian military doctrine argue that each service principally develops its own concepts without coordination or relation to the other two. Therefore, the army articulates a doctrine that puts the air force in a subordinate role, providing CAS to ground troops and aspires to create a large aviation arm over the next few decades, while the air force’s own doctrine and acquisition pattern emphasises strategic strike and air-to-air combat capability... There is also a concerted attempt being made at appropriate levels to reconcile these turf issues and create a self-sustaining loop comprising the various theoretical and historical interfaces, doctrinal and conceptual organisations and departments that formulate strategy. The day this loop becomes inter-dependent, air power in India would fully mature as a means to achieving state policy and be seen as a vital factor in joint operations."Arjun Subramaniam.
Captain Liddell Hart once said that a direct frontal assault strategy when the enemy is expecting it, was bound to fail at great cost in lives, as happened in the WW1. He instead recommended the "indirect" approach and reliance on manoeuvring armoured with high-speed and surprise. The methods of the indirect approach are better suited to democracy. If India make a move towards Aksai Chin, China will probably lose its grip over Xinjiang. China wanted to bring India to the table based on Chinese terms. The local Chinese forces had established several new posts and resorted to aggressive patrolling in Indian areas, which lie west of even the 1956 Chinese map claim line. When Chinese troops advanced right up to the Indian post, surrounded it, but they did not open fire and eventually withdrew. On July 19, 1962, Indian troops fired at the Chinese patrol. The Chinese patrol took no action against the provocation. The message that the Chinese intended was a warning that they could eliminate any Indian post at any time, but Nehru misread it and was convinced that China would not fight.
Nehru told the Indian Army Chief General Thapar that he had ‘reliable information that the Chinese would not offer resistance if there was a show of force to make them vacate the check-posts’. Delhi said that "it fails to understand why the Government of China do not restrain their forces from going beyond even their 1956 Chinese map claim line, which is capable of easy and quick verification." Beijing, who had changed the line, added: "It is groundless to insist that there are discrepancies in the delineation of the boundary in the Western sector in these two maps and to blame China." Indian Defence Minister Krishna Menon led the Indian Intelligence Bureau Director to believe that the Chinese would never attack or, if they attack, it would be a minor clash. Major General DK Palit, wrote in his book, War in the High Himalayas: ‘There was a propensity to ignore military reality and adopt an emotional attitude that pandered to patriotic urges while shrugging away inter related problems with optimistic assumptions.’
"The biggest challenge of battle at the high altitude is to provide sustainable logistics and armament support. In the 1962 China-India border conflict, China failed to protect its fruits of victory due to poor logistics support. Although local Tibetan residents provided soldiers with temporary support, it was not sustainable," a Chinese military expert said. The Qinghai-Tibet Plateau has an adverse climate and complex topography. Over a long period of time, it is very difficult to provide soldiers with logistics and armament support. A single western theatre PLA command handles the border with India, integrating the earlier Chengdu and Lanzhou military regions.
China's claims to Indian territories are based on Tibet's historically irredentist claims on these territories. China highlights Tibet as the core issue with India by laying claim to Indian territories on the basis of purported Tibetan ecclesial or tutelary links, rather than any ethnic Chinese connection. Even though Bhutan’s Buddhist religion is very similar to that of Tibet, Thimpu has maintained a very strict distinct identity. It has not confused its identity with that of Tibet. Bhutan had recognised long ago that threats to its territory do not come from China’s claims but from Tibet’s claims, so Bhutan has maintained the distinction. The same was the case with the Sikkim monarchy till 1975. In Tibet, there is the yellow sect of Buddhism. These yellow sect’s Lamas have historically been an instrument of expansion for Beijing. In India’s Bihar, Bengal, and Odisha, there is the red sect of Buddhism, distinct from that of Tibet.
Ladakh was part of the Tibetan empire, which broke up after the assassination of King Langdarma in 742 CE. The 1684 Temisgang Treaty defined the Ladakh-Tibet border, and also entitled the ruler of Ladakh to govern Menser Enclave, located at the foot of Mount Kailash. Until 1834, Ladakh was an independent Himalayan kingdom, much the same way as Bhutan and Sikkim. The "Conqueror of Ladakh" Zorawar Singh Kahluria, was a military genius in mountain warfare, under the Dogra ruler Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu, who included of Ladakh and Baltistan. The land and financial records of Govt of India, clearly show that taxes were paid by villages around the Holy Parikrama of Kailash Mansarovar, including Taklakot. To regain the lost territories, Kalon Surkhan and Depon Pishy on behalf of Dalai Lama attacked Ladakh in 1842, but the siege was quickly thwarted by fresh troops of Diwan Hari Chand and Wazir Ratnu on behalf of Gulab Singh. The Chinese-Tibetian army were defeated and NOT the Sikhs during the Sino-Sikh war. In 1842, Qing & Sikh empire signed the Treaty of Chushul that fortified the existing territories and agreed to no transgressions in other country’s frontiers.
Post the First Anglo-Sikh War, under Article 4 of the Treaty of Lahore (1846), the Lahore Durbar ceded all territories between Rivers Beas and Indus to the British. Article 4 further stipulated that the territories of Gulab Singh shall not be changed without British concurrence. And Article 12, in turn, rewarded Gulab Singh with ‘Independent Sovereignty” of these territories to be turned over to him by a separate treaty. These were formalised through Article 1 of the Treaty of Amritsar (1846). Gulab Singh's son, Raja Ranbir Singh, reconquer Gilgit and its adjoining areas in 1860. The frontier region of Ladakh was put under the charge of a Governor (Thanedar). A number of efficient and capable Governors like Magna, Mehta Basti Ram and Mehta Mangal. After the Qing rule collapsed in Turkestan in 1863, the Governor Mehta Mangal, sent his troops to Shahidullah, a strategic point between the Karakoram range and Kunlun mountains, and constructed a manned post. Sir Francis Younghusband, a British army officer and explorer, feared a Russian invasion through this pass. Ladakh was annexed by the British. William H. Johnson's survey expeditionary work of the area were highly prized among the British surveyors, (endorsed by Sir John Ardagh) and Johnson was re-employed in 1869 on an even higher salary. After retiring from the Survey of India, Johnson was appointed as the Governor of Ladakh, in which position he served until his death.
Roosevelt (FDR) tried to persuade Winston Churchill to accept the forces of history and grant India its freedom, but his advice fell on deaf ears. The failure of the US to influence Churchill left the Indians leaders somewhat bitter. Nehru became disillusioned with the US, the country that claimed to uphold the very aspirations of freedom, liberty and equality that India was trying to attain. The last viceroy, Lord Louis Mountbatten, was sent to India to hand back power, was an unwitting pawn, manipulated by Winston Churchill as part of a plan “War Cabinet – Post-Hostilies Planning” to breaking-off India in order to keep Britain’s interests, for example, to keep influence over the key Pakistan warm water port which is strategically placed by the Suez Canal and the oil supplies in the Persian Gulf. Winston Churchill was worried that if he handed India back as promised, they were handing the whole of Asia to the soviet communists.
Ladakh was part of the Tibetan empire, which broke up after the assassination of King Langdarma in 742 CE. The 1684 Temisgang Treaty defined the Ladakh-Tibet border, and also entitled the ruler of Ladakh to govern Menser Enclave, located at the foot of Mount Kailash. Until 1834, Ladakh was an independent Himalayan kingdom, much the same way as Bhutan and Sikkim. The "Conqueror of Ladakh" Zorawar Singh Kahluria, was a military genius in mountain warfare, under the Dogra ruler Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu, who included of Ladakh and Baltistan. The land and financial records of Govt of India, clearly show that taxes were paid by villages around the Holy Parikrama of Kailash Mansarovar, including Taklakot. To regain the lost territories, Kalon Surkhan and Depon Pishy on behalf of Dalai Lama attacked Ladakh in 1842, but the siege was quickly thwarted by fresh troops of Diwan Hari Chand and Wazir Ratnu on behalf of Gulab Singh. The Chinese-Tibetian army were defeated and NOT the Sikhs during the Sino-Sikh war. In 1842, Qing & Sikh empire signed the Treaty of Chushul that fortified the existing territories and agreed to no transgressions in other country’s frontiers.
Post the First Anglo-Sikh War, under Article 4 of the Treaty of Lahore (1846), the Lahore Durbar ceded all territories between Rivers Beas and Indus to the British. Article 4 further stipulated that the territories of Gulab Singh shall not be changed without British concurrence. And Article 12, in turn, rewarded Gulab Singh with ‘Independent Sovereignty” of these territories to be turned over to him by a separate treaty. These were formalised through Article 1 of the Treaty of Amritsar (1846). Gulab Singh's son, Raja Ranbir Singh, reconquer Gilgit and its adjoining areas in 1860. The frontier region of Ladakh was put under the charge of a Governor (Thanedar). A number of efficient and capable Governors like Magna, Mehta Basti Ram and Mehta Mangal. After the Qing rule collapsed in Turkestan in 1863, the Governor Mehta Mangal, sent his troops to Shahidullah, a strategic point between the Karakoram range and Kunlun mountains, and constructed a manned post. Sir Francis Younghusband, a British army officer and explorer, feared a Russian invasion through this pass. Ladakh was annexed by the British. William H. Johnson's survey expeditionary work of the area were highly prized among the British surveyors, (endorsed by Sir John Ardagh) and Johnson was re-employed in 1869 on an even higher salary. After retiring from the Survey of India, Johnson was appointed as the Governor of Ladakh, in which position he served until his death.
Roosevelt (FDR) tried to persuade Winston Churchill to accept the forces of history and grant India its freedom, but his advice fell on deaf ears. The failure of the US to influence Churchill left the Indians leaders somewhat bitter. Nehru became disillusioned with the US, the country that claimed to uphold the very aspirations of freedom, liberty and equality that India was trying to attain. The last viceroy, Lord Louis Mountbatten, was sent to India to hand back power, was an unwitting pawn, manipulated by Winston Churchill as part of a plan “War Cabinet – Post-Hostilies Planning” to breaking-off India in order to keep Britain’s interests, for example, to keep influence over the key Pakistan warm water port which is strategically placed by the Suez Canal and the oil supplies in the Persian Gulf. Winston Churchill was worried that if he handed India back as promised, they were handing the whole of Asia to the soviet communists.
Why couldn't China with its rich literary and philosophical tradition have given rise to Ch’an or Zen or Thien or Son Buddhism? Bodhidharma's teachings evoked hostility in China is evident from the fact that after his death, his disciple felt it necessary to hide for a period. The great monk-historian Dao Xuan wrote of Bodhidharma that “everywhere he traveled people were enlightened.” Bodhidharma did not like emperors perhaps which is why he didn't appear in any official imperial records that were created while he lived. However, there are local records and stone monuments. A famous story of Bodhidharma is his meeting and rejecting “Emperor Wu” of the Liang Dynasty.
He is said to have gone to Luoyang, an active center of Buddhist scholarship. There he made himself hated, just for asserting that the Buddhist scriptures were only a tool for achieving enlightenment and need not be studied indefinitely for their own sake. Most Buddhism in China, at that time, was based on sutras and traditions. He then traveled to Mount Song for a period, and from there moved on finally to the Shaolin Temple in Henan Province. The temple, built in 495, was already a focal point for Indian Buddhist monks who came there to work at translating the Indian sutras into Chinese. He was not welcomed there either, so he took up “wall-gazing” meditation in a cave facing a high cliff opposite the Shaolin monastery. He meditated there in silence for nine years as a demonstration of the true reality of Buddhism. He pointed out the essential point — “pointing out” rather than telling. He’d encourage his student to dive in and puzzle it out for themselves, shattering their usual way of thinking.
A Chinese monk named Shen Guang was accepted as Bodhidharma's disciple. According to what is apparently a mostly oral tradition, Bodhidharma initiated training programs at the Shaolin temple which related to martial arts. Bodhidharma taught his brand of dhyana (meditation) to monks at the temple. Bodhidharma’s disciples Huike and Sengfu continued his rebellious ways, both actively avoiding emperors. Bodhidharma could be difficult, annoying, and confusing — but at the same time, he is considered one of the most intelligent and profound of teachers. Direct master to student transmission remains very important. The legendary Bodhidharma remains today a prime symbol of the will-power, determination and self-discipline that are essential to success in the martial arts. He helped shape Buddhism not only in China but also Japan, Vietnam, Korea and ultimately, around the world.
Chinese communists government like to pretend that they single-handedly defeated the Imperial Japanese military on their own. The conflict is officially known in the country as the "Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War". The reality is Imperial Japan was defeated by the US forces fighting in the pacific and with allied forces pushing in and supporting them from colonial Indian military. China's Communists were largely an underground force during World War II, with the brunt of the campaign against the Japanese fought by soldiers of the country's then Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-Shek.
The Chinese government attack the communists right after Japan surrendered in August 1945. The Nationalist government of China underestimated the communists, who then proceeded to defeat all the Nationalist armies after about three years of fighting. The nationalists took a big gamble, sending their best troops into Manchuria in late 1945 to try to knock out the communists. This ignored the well-known fact that a huge Russian army had just defeated Japanese forces in Manchuria, and the Russians were giving the Chinese communists huge quantities of military supplies. Had the nationalists been more prudent they would not have lost South China and the war, by 1948.
The Chinese government attack the communists right after Japan surrendered in August 1945. The Nationalist government of China underestimated the communists, who then proceeded to defeat all the Nationalist armies after about three years of fighting. The nationalists took a big gamble, sending their best troops into Manchuria in late 1945 to try to knock out the communists. This ignored the well-known fact that a huge Russian army had just defeated Japanese forces in Manchuria, and the Russians were giving the Chinese communists huge quantities of military supplies. Had the nationalists been more prudent they would not have lost South China and the war, by 1948.
Communist China's "ancient" or "lost" or "stolen" territory scam can't mask or excuse its calculated imperialism. China claims most of the South China Sea despite protests from Southeast Asian nations, including Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia. In the late 18th century, European empires sought colonies. Colonies gave the imperial powers natural resources, markets for economic dominance, and often strategic military bases.
China's very presence in Tibet is illegitimate. See this fact, Nobody in so-called "Little Tibet" Ladakh and "Southern Tibet" Arunachal Pradesh, ever wants to be governed by Chinese Communist Party. Tibet has the world's largest reservoir of fresh water in the Himalayas. By April 1959 China, for the first time, displayed maps showing Aksai Chin as being part of China. Pakistan became concerned that Chinese maps showed areas of land under Pakistani control in China. Jawaharlal Nehru became aggressive without having the military capability. The 1962 war with China led to its gaining control of a 3,000 sq km of land mass in Leh and Ladakh in J&K; at that point, it became a stakeholder in the Kashmir issue. We know how Pakistan, in 1963, had to cede 5,180 sq. km of its occupied part of the Baltistan / Ladakh region to China in 1963, in exchange for 750 sq. miles of territory comprising the mineral rich Oprang Valley and the Darband-Darwaza from China. Yet, the Pakistani leadership was made to say that the country had ceded no territory to China, and instead had to express gratitude for Premier Zhou Enlai’s generosity in ceding 750 sq. miles of territory to Pakistan. Protecting Ladakh's Aksai Chin (now, under Chinese-control) is practically important for Chinese control of Tibet and Xinjiang.
https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/02/1133212
In 1951-52, China illegally started construction and in September 1957, China announced the completion of NH-219 (G219) across the Aksai Chin plateau – area which is claimed by India as its territory and by China as part of Western Tibet. India accepted the closure of the trade with Uttarakuru (now Xinjiang) as a fait accompli, and also agreed to close its consulate at Kashgar by the end of 1953. The Indian Northern Army's commanding officer has said that, contrary to popular public perception, Pandit Nehru actually had all the best intentions in his mind, but it was the Tibetan leaders' ineptitude (Tibet sought Indian territories "such as Sayul and Walong and in direction of Pemakoe, Lonag, Lapa, Mon, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling, Ladakh and others on this side of river Ganges and Lowo, Ladakh etc. up to boundary of Yarkhim") and mistakes that reduced India's options on Tibet which that forced India to compromise with China throughout the 1950s (My Years with Nehru, The Chinese Betrayal by B.N. Mullick).
In 1959 that a CRPF patrol comprising 70 constables attempted to cross over the Lanak La Pass to establish a border post in Aksai Chin. On October 20th, 1959, 3 CRPF personnel were captured and detained by the PLA. The next day, after a short confrontation, 9 CRPF soldiers were killed and 7 taken prisoners. In Ladakh, China has claimed about 33,500 sq km of Indian territory and by the end of the 1962 war, the China had taken control of 37,244 sq km. Other lands ceded to China include a cluster of villages around Mount Kailash (also called Meru) and ManaSarovar lake or Swan rimbonche, that were under the protection of the Maharaja of Kashmir for Hind. It's the source of some of the Indus River, from which India gets its name. India then cozied up to Russia amid the Sino-Soviet split and Sino-Indian border tensions at the turn of the 1960s. India can never be seen again to lose its territory integrity to China.
In 1963, under the Sino-Pakistan Agreement, Pakistan had to "withdrew" from Ladakh (earlier part of J&K) 2,050 sq. miles of its occupied part of the Baltistan region to China, in exchange for "gaining" only 750 sq. miles of territory consisting of Oprang Valley & Darband (Darwaza) from China. It was signed by foreign ministers Chen Yi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Thus, Pakistan gave away Ladakh (earlier part of J&K) territories 5,180 sq km Shaksgam Valley (through which the crucial Sinkiang highway exists) to China in a 1963 to bring Chinese border next to Pakistan (but far way from Dorah Pass) and into the Kashmir conflict, against India. In 1970, Pakistan changed the name of the Shia-majority Gilgit-Baltistan region to “Northern Areas”, but kept it detached from Azad Kashmir. China is now claiming that the Trans-Karakoram (or Cis-Kuen Lun) Tract and the Shaksgam Valley (including the Raskam or Yarkand river valley) are now an integral part of Xinjiang. Chumur in Ladakh represents a deep vulnerability for China, as it is the only area across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to which the China does not have direct access. Like most other places in Ladakh, Demchok, Dongti, Daulat Beg Oldi, Galwan valley, and Chumar is marked by rugged mountains at an altitude of around 16,000 to 18,000 feet, with low temperatures and harsh icy winds.
Mao China's Great Leap Forward was a disaster and there was a terrible drought and famine in 1960-61. In the 1960s, the Chinese began to insist that the Soviet Union should evacuate the region that lay on the border of Uttarakuru (now Xinjiang). In 1969, a group of PLA troops ambushed Soviet border guards on ZhenBao Dao (or Damansky) island. To this day, each side blames the other for the start of the conflict. Until then, the occasional incursions by Chinese peasants and fishermen had been blocked or repelled without use of deadly force by Soviet border guards.
In 1962, the Galwan river valley was the site of a military stand-off between India and China. This Gorkha Rifles post of the Indian army was the first target of the Chinese, and the valley continued to act as an important route for attacking Indian forces. The Chinese surrounded the Indian post and employed a battalion to attack it. Galwan region was never a dispute in their own maps and their own historical accounts. Part of Galwan was always on the Indian side. The Chinese claim on the Galwan valley has come as a surprise for India, as this area was not claimed by Beijing in any of the major previous bilateral discussions since the 1950s. This is a claim which was not part of the 1962 demand, nor was it part of any Chinese maps before that.
The military disaster led Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to overcome his nonaligned instincts and make an open plea to US President John F. Kennedy, the stakes were "not merely the survival of India, but the survival of free and independent Governments in the whole of this subcontinent or in Asia." Kennedy responded by pulling together a coalition with Britain and its Commonwealth partners, Australia and Canada, with a joint package of military assistance of US$120 million (around US$1.1 billion in present day value). From early November 1962, the US Air Force began airlifting around 160 tons of military supplies per day from Thailand and Europe, which was then shuttled from Calcutta to the front line by US C-130s. Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies offered support to Nehru during the conflict and from early 1963, Australia sent rifles, ammunition, military clothing, blankets and other aid as part of a total assistance package of some A£3.3 million (approximately A$100 million in present value). A much larger additional package of US$500 million (US$4.6 billion in present value) was being negotiated when Kennedy was assassinated the following year. In 1963, the US, British, Australian and Canadian air forces all sent aircraft and some 750 personnel to India as part of Exercise Shiksha.
However, the perception that China was largely the innocent victim of India's hostile policies was put forth by journalist Neville Maxwell in his book India's China War, which found readers in many opinion makers, including Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon. Finally, a scholarly consensus has emerged that the 1969 Sino-Soviet border crisis was a premeditated act of aggression orchestrated by the Chinese side. In 1969, China had a 7-month undeclared border war with Soviet Union in 1977 for rival claims on the island ZhenBao-Dao (or Damansky) when China demanded additional territories as a right, with the reasoning that previous agreements had been "Unequal" treaties. China lost more than 248 PLA troops, but reported its loss to be only 29. While 32 Soviet guards were killed, China claimed it to be 58.
By 1964 the two sides did reach a preliminary agreement on the eastern section of the border, including ZhenBao Dao (or Damansky) island, which would be handed over to China, but the agreement fell apart when Japan leaked information to the Soviet Union that China had also planned to get vast Soviet territories in Siberia and the Far East as far as Kamchatka. After the Sinto-Soviet war, as relations soured, China seeked out the US to be its ally against the Soviets. During the 1970s, Henry Kissinger viewed India as a Soviet proxy to be countered by leaning toward China's ally, Pakistan and, if necessary, by providing military support.
The US believed that the highway to winning the Cold War passed through communist leaders in China. In 1972, the US changed its two-decade-old stand and voted to admit China into the UN and invited it to take the seat of permanent member with a veto at the UN Security Council. China was greatly benefitted when US granted China the "Most Favoured Trade Clause". In 1991 and 2003, that dispute was finally resolved. China was granted control over Tarabarov / Yinlong island, ZhenBao Dao (or Damansky) island, and approximately 50% of Bolshoy-Ussuriysky / Heixiazi island, near Khabarovsk.
China's very presence in Tibet is illegitimate. See this fact, Nobody in so-called "Little Tibet" Ladakh and "Southern Tibet" Arunachal Pradesh, ever wants to be governed by Chinese Communist Party. Tibet has the world's largest reservoir of fresh water in the Himalayas. By April 1959 China, for the first time, displayed maps showing Aksai Chin as being part of China. Pakistan became concerned that Chinese maps showed areas of land under Pakistani control in China. Jawaharlal Nehru became aggressive without having the military capability. The 1962 war with China led to its gaining control of a 3,000 sq km of land mass in Leh and Ladakh in J&K; at that point, it became a stakeholder in the Kashmir issue. We know how Pakistan, in 1963, had to cede 5,180 sq. km of its occupied part of the Baltistan / Ladakh region to China in 1963, in exchange for 750 sq. miles of territory comprising the mineral rich Oprang Valley and the Darband-Darwaza from China. Yet, the Pakistani leadership was made to say that the country had ceded no territory to China, and instead had to express gratitude for Premier Zhou Enlai’s generosity in ceding 750 sq. miles of territory to Pakistan. Protecting Ladakh's Aksai Chin (now, under Chinese-control) is practically important for Chinese control of Tibet and Xinjiang.
https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/02/1133212
In 1951-52, China illegally started construction and in September 1957, China announced the completion of NH-219 (G219) across the Aksai Chin plateau – area which is claimed by India as its territory and by China as part of Western Tibet. India accepted the closure of the trade with Uttarakuru (now Xinjiang) as a fait accompli, and also agreed to close its consulate at Kashgar by the end of 1953. The Indian Northern Army's commanding officer has said that, contrary to popular public perception, Pandit Nehru actually had all the best intentions in his mind, but it was the Tibetan leaders' ineptitude (Tibet sought Indian territories "such as Sayul and Walong and in direction of Pemakoe, Lonag, Lapa, Mon, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling, Ladakh and others on this side of river Ganges and Lowo, Ladakh etc. up to boundary of Yarkhim") and mistakes that reduced India's options on Tibet which that forced India to compromise with China throughout the 1950s (My Years with Nehru, The Chinese Betrayal by B.N. Mullick).
In 1959 that a CRPF patrol comprising 70 constables attempted to cross over the Lanak La Pass to establish a border post in Aksai Chin. On October 20th, 1959, 3 CRPF personnel were captured and detained by the PLA. The next day, after a short confrontation, 9 CRPF soldiers were killed and 7 taken prisoners. In Ladakh, China has claimed about 33,500 sq km of Indian territory and by the end of the 1962 war, the China had taken control of 37,244 sq km. Other lands ceded to China include a cluster of villages around Mount Kailash (also called Meru) and ManaSarovar lake or Swan rimbonche, that were under the protection of the Maharaja of Kashmir for Hind. It's the source of some of the Indus River, from which India gets its name. India then cozied up to Russia amid the Sino-Soviet split and Sino-Indian border tensions at the turn of the 1960s. India can never be seen again to lose its territory integrity to China.
In 1963, under the Sino-Pakistan Agreement, Pakistan had to "withdrew" from Ladakh (earlier part of J&K) 2,050 sq. miles of its occupied part of the Baltistan region to China, in exchange for "gaining" only 750 sq. miles of territory consisting of Oprang Valley & Darband (Darwaza) from China. It was signed by foreign ministers Chen Yi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Thus, Pakistan gave away Ladakh (earlier part of J&K) territories 5,180 sq km Shaksgam Valley (through which the crucial Sinkiang highway exists) to China in a 1963 to bring Chinese border next to Pakistan (but far way from Dorah Pass) and into the Kashmir conflict, against India. In 1970, Pakistan changed the name of the Shia-majority Gilgit-Baltistan region to “Northern Areas”, but kept it detached from Azad Kashmir. China is now claiming that the Trans-Karakoram (or Cis-Kuen Lun) Tract and the Shaksgam Valley (including the Raskam or Yarkand river valley) are now an integral part of Xinjiang. Chumur in Ladakh represents a deep vulnerability for China, as it is the only area across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to which the China does not have direct access. Like most other places in Ladakh, Demchok, Dongti, Daulat Beg Oldi, Galwan valley, and Chumar is marked by rugged mountains at an altitude of around 16,000 to 18,000 feet, with low temperatures and harsh icy winds.
Mao China's Great Leap Forward was a disaster and there was a terrible drought and famine in 1960-61. In the 1960s, the Chinese began to insist that the Soviet Union should evacuate the region that lay on the border of Uttarakuru (now Xinjiang). In 1969, a group of PLA troops ambushed Soviet border guards on ZhenBao Dao (or Damansky) island. To this day, each side blames the other for the start of the conflict. Until then, the occasional incursions by Chinese peasants and fishermen had been blocked or repelled without use of deadly force by Soviet border guards.
In 1962, the Galwan river valley was the site of a military stand-off between India and China. This Gorkha Rifles post of the Indian army was the first target of the Chinese, and the valley continued to act as an important route for attacking Indian forces. The Chinese surrounded the Indian post and employed a battalion to attack it. Galwan region was never a dispute in their own maps and their own historical accounts. Part of Galwan was always on the Indian side. The Chinese claim on the Galwan valley has come as a surprise for India, as this area was not claimed by Beijing in any of the major previous bilateral discussions since the 1950s. This is a claim which was not part of the 1962 demand, nor was it part of any Chinese maps before that.
The military disaster led Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to overcome his nonaligned instincts and make an open plea to US President John F. Kennedy, the stakes were "not merely the survival of India, but the survival of free and independent Governments in the whole of this subcontinent or in Asia." Kennedy responded by pulling together a coalition with Britain and its Commonwealth partners, Australia and Canada, with a joint package of military assistance of US$120 million (around US$1.1 billion in present day value). From early November 1962, the US Air Force began airlifting around 160 tons of military supplies per day from Thailand and Europe, which was then shuttled from Calcutta to the front line by US C-130s. Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies offered support to Nehru during the conflict and from early 1963, Australia sent rifles, ammunition, military clothing, blankets and other aid as part of a total assistance package of some A£3.3 million (approximately A$100 million in present value). A much larger additional package of US$500 million (US$4.6 billion in present value) was being negotiated when Kennedy was assassinated the following year. In 1963, the US, British, Australian and Canadian air forces all sent aircraft and some 750 personnel to India as part of Exercise Shiksha.
However, the perception that China was largely the innocent victim of India's hostile policies was put forth by journalist Neville Maxwell in his book India's China War, which found readers in many opinion makers, including Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon. Finally, a scholarly consensus has emerged that the 1969 Sino-Soviet border crisis was a premeditated act of aggression orchestrated by the Chinese side. In 1969, China had a 7-month undeclared border war with Soviet Union in 1977 for rival claims on the island ZhenBao-Dao (or Damansky) when China demanded additional territories as a right, with the reasoning that previous agreements had been "Unequal" treaties. China lost more than 248 PLA troops, but reported its loss to be only 29. While 32 Soviet guards were killed, China claimed it to be 58.
By 1964 the two sides did reach a preliminary agreement on the eastern section of the border, including ZhenBao Dao (or Damansky) island, which would be handed over to China, but the agreement fell apart when Japan leaked information to the Soviet Union that China had also planned to get vast Soviet territories in Siberia and the Far East as far as Kamchatka. After the Sinto-Soviet war, as relations soured, China seeked out the US to be its ally against the Soviets. During the 1970s, Henry Kissinger viewed India as a Soviet proxy to be countered by leaning toward China's ally, Pakistan and, if necessary, by providing military support.
The US believed that the highway to winning the Cold War passed through communist leaders in China. In 1972, the US changed its two-decade-old stand and voted to admit China into the UN and invited it to take the seat of permanent member with a veto at the UN Security Council. China was greatly benefitted when US granted China the "Most Favoured Trade Clause". In 1991 and 2003, that dispute was finally resolved. China was granted control over Tarabarov / Yinlong island, ZhenBao Dao (or Damansky) island, and approximately 50% of Bolshoy-Ussuriysky / Heixiazi island, near Khabarovsk.
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http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/chinese_geopolitics_and_significance_tibet
http://www.globalresearch.ca/eurasian-economic-boom-and-geopolitics-china-s-land-bridge-to-europe-the-china-turkey-high-speed-railway/30575?print=1
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/ND28Dj04.html
http://www.dsalert.org/gilgit-baltistan-the-chinese-shadow/413-the-unfolding-great-game-in-gilgit-baltistan-india-needs-to-safeguard-its-security-interests
http://www.canada.com/story_print.html?id=ddb8cf79-713f-4b88-81fb-da8cd0b598fc&sponsor=
http://www.observerindia.com/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/analysis/attachments/influence_1253251335478.pdf
http://thediplomat.com/2009/10/sri-lanka-the-new-great-game/
http://www.globalresearch.ca/us-promotes-islamism-and-political-destabilization-in-xinjiang-chinas-oil-and-gas-rich-province/5329016?print=1
http://www.firstpost.com/world/indias-dilemma-in-ladakh-how-do-you-deal-with-china-726517.html
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10553628/Are-China-Japan-and-South-Korea-fanning-the-flames-of-war.html
http://apdforum.com/en_GB/article/rmiap/articles/online/features/2013/01/29/china-blue-water
http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/china/articles/20140408.aspx
http://www.globalresearch.ca/eurasian-economic-boom-and-geopolitics-china-s-land-bridge-to-europe-the-china-turkey-high-speed-railway/30575?print=1
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/ND28Dj04.html
http://www.dsalert.org/gilgit-baltistan-the-chinese-shadow/413-the-unfolding-great-game-in-gilgit-baltistan-india-needs-to-safeguard-its-security-interests
http://www.canada.com/story_print.html?id=ddb8cf79-713f-4b88-81fb-da8cd0b598fc&sponsor=
http://www.observerindia.com/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/analysis/attachments/influence_1253251335478.pdf
http://thediplomat.com/2009/10/sri-lanka-the-new-great-game/
http://www.globalresearch.ca/us-promotes-islamism-and-political-destabilization-in-xinjiang-chinas-oil-and-gas-rich-province/5329016?print=1
http://www.firstpost.com/world/indias-dilemma-in-ladakh-how-do-you-deal-with-china-726517.html
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10553628/Are-China-Japan-and-South-Korea-fanning-the-flames-of-war.html
http://apdforum.com/en_GB/article/rmiap/articles/online/features/2013/01/29/china-blue-water
http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/china/articles/20140408.aspx
https://www.dw.com/en/water-wars-are-india-and-pakistan-heading-for-climate-change-induced-conflict/a-47203933 Chinese Water Resources Minister Wang Shucheng, a hydraulic engineer, explained: “For example, we must keep an eye on possible floods when the Yellow River has 58 billion cubic metres of water. If another 50 billion cubic metres, not to mention 200 billion, is poured in, I am sure all the dams and protection embankments will be destroyed immediately.” In 2016, Vietnam had to plead with China to release water from the Yunnan dam into the Mekong River. While China complied allowing the water to flow through Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam it showed the leverage China had over the Southeast Asian nations. India's 5 rivers flow through Jammu & Kashmir from the Himalayas. These rivers are Jhelum, Chenab, Sutlej, Ravi and Indus. Chenab is the largest tributary of the Indus, and where India has most of its hydropower projects. For China's CPEC (new Silk Road) to be successful, it wants Pakistan to get ownership over India's rivers in Kashmir that flows from Ngari into Pakistan via Ladakh. Both the Jhelum and the Chenab run through Kashmir and then into Pakistan. There are around 1230 water bodies in Jammu & Kashmir. Major lakes include Manasbal Lake, Dal Lake, Wular Lake, Nageen Lake, Pangong, Tso Moriri, Tso Kar, Spanggur Tso. China wants to own all the 5 rivers that start from Kashmir. India has never ever broken the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 does not matter at all. https://www.firstpost.com/living/climate-change-has-deepened-the-fault-lines-between-india-china-but-it-could-also-bring-us-closer-3840381.html The Kingdom of Ladakh was conquered by the Raja of Kashmir in 1834-1840, since when there has been some sort of understanding about trade and general relations between the two countries. Maharaja Hari Singh’s Instrument of Accession referred to him as “Shriman Inder Mahinder Rajrajeswar Maharajadhiraj Shri Hari Singhji, Jammu & Kashmir Naresh Tatha Tibbet adi Deshadhipati”. That is, he asserted that he is not just the ruler of Jammu & Kashmir but also of the areas of eastern Ladakh including Aksai Chin as well as the territory he controlled inside Tibet. Indian Army fought to ‘the last men, last round’ at Rezang La (Chushul) battle on November 18, 1962, and caused heavy damage to the Chinese army. The tale of courage and bravery of Major Shaitan Singh who not only motivated his men but also sacrificed his life fighting and saving the post. This battle is listed in the 8 stories of collective bravery published by UNESCO. Exactly after 5 years after the 1962 war, the Indian army hit back at the PLA's attempt to disturb the status quo in Sikkim, with a ferocious artillery bombardment at Nathu La on September 11 and Cho La on October 1, where over 300 PLA soldiers were reportedly killed. The two sides have made along the 4,057-km-long Line of Actual Control (LAC) has essentially been posturing, each side manoeuvring to prevent the other from altering the status quo on the ground. On 11 September 1967, the PLA opened fire on unarmed Indian soldiers who were laying a barbed wire along the boundary at Nathu la. During the 1967 Nathu La and Cho La clashes, a much larger PLA tried to storm through Sikkim, but the Indian Army thwarted the aggression. 88 Indian soldiers made the supreme sacrifice, while 340 soldiers from PLA were KIA. The closest India and China came to another war was in June 1986 when Indian soldiers received a rude awakening when they returned to find out that Chinese soldiers had already built semi-permanent structures in the territory and these were later fortified by the construction of a helipad. Under Operation Falcon, General Krishnaswamy Sundarji heli-lifted a mountain brigade to face off against the Chinese incursion. When Sumdorong Chu happened, China was aware that Operation Falcon was in its sixth year, and that India’s defence posture was not weak. Sumdorong Chu is in the Thagla Ridge area of Kameng district in Arunachal Pradesh from where the 1962 war started. After the Chinese unilateral withdrawal in 1962 they had warned India not to enter certain areas evacuated by them. The routine of the small Indian Intelligence Bureau detachment at Sumdorong Chu that left the post for overnight collection of salaries and rations was monitored by the Chinese. One day in June 1986, when the Indians got back to the post after collecting supplies from a point near Nymjang Chu, the main river in North Kameng, they found it taken over by a PLA detachment which used helicopter support. Gen. Sundarji ordered airlifting of artillery ammunition estimated at hundreds of million rupees to be stocked in the forward areas. The artillery units deployed near Towang commanded the complete zone over which Chinese re-enforcements would come in case of a crisis. By the spring of 1987, a PLA field army, 63rd Field Army from Chengdu Military Region (now called Group Army) was facing two Indian mountain divisions deployed in a holding role to secure Towang. A clear message had gone to China: India had the political will and the military muscle to defend itself. In 1988, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China, initiating the process of normalization of bilateral relations. The Nineties witnessed massive defence budget cuts, which resulted in the degrading of existing defences. This and a desire for warm relations with China resulted in two things: Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao ordered the abandonment of Operation Falcon, and he signed the 1993 Treaty with China which benefited the latter immensely. The Chinese troops did not withdraw until 1993 when Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao visited Beijing. India’s subservient attitude towards China despite its blatant proliferation of nuclear and ballistic missiles to Pakistan did not go unnoticed in the region. Soon the ASEAN countries adopted a deferential posture towards China where it was necessary to take Beijing’s viewpoint into account before taking decisions. Japan panicked and entered into an enhanced strategic cooperation with the US. https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/modis-world-changing-the-terms-of-indias-global-engagement | China’s South North Water Diversion Projects are diverting water that runs from the Yarlung Tsangpo River in Tibet to Nothern India, by constructing thousands of kilometers of canals and pipelines that would finally feed into the Yellow River more than 3,000 kilometers away. China’s unwillingness to sign any binding agreement with downstream countries over trans-boundary rivers is evidence of Beijing’s insistence on absolute sovereignty over water, to the significant detriment of downstream countries. |
Some retired generals who have served in the Ladakh theatre have told me that the military talks have reached a dead end, and it will take high level diplomacy to untangle the knots to revert to the April 2020 status quo ante in Ladakh.
I am afraid it is wrong to think in this manner. The way your question has been framed, it appears as if the onus of achieving a diplomatic breakthrough is on us. This is a fallacy. It is the Chinese side which have violated agreements between our two countries by moving large numbers of troops to the borders in Eastern Ladakh. The blame for the current situation is largely on them. So they should untie this knot!
If the Chinese leadership wants to convey a change in their attitude on the border, they can send such a message through their foreign minister, who has just been to New Delhi. He was not carrying any such message. So we can conclude that the Chinese are not changing their position about Eastern Ladakh.
India has to stay strong and keep up both our military as well as diplomatic posture. We have to remain strong over the long term, and then we shall see how the Chinese respond.
I am afraid it is wrong to think in this manner. The way your question has been framed, it appears as if the onus of achieving a diplomatic breakthrough is on us. This is a fallacy. It is the Chinese side which have violated agreements between our two countries by moving large numbers of troops to the borders in Eastern Ladakh. The blame for the current situation is largely on them. So they should untie this knot!
If the Chinese leadership wants to convey a change in their attitude on the border, they can send such a message through their foreign minister, who has just been to New Delhi. He was not carrying any such message. So we can conclude that the Chinese are not changing their position about Eastern Ladakh.
India has to stay strong and keep up both our military as well as diplomatic posture. We have to remain strong over the long term, and then we shall see how the Chinese respond.
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